LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Ganzon v court of appeals

200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds
of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him
hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and
the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this
is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was
given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President
over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials
of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that
the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power
of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

Garcia v COMELEC
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election
for
the
gubernatorial
position
of
Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to
send
notices
of
the
meeting
to
65
members
of
the
assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political
minority
to
equal
protection
of
the
law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any
mode,
let
alone
a
single
mode,
of
initiating
recall
elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of
recall
as
its
discernment
dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the
difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members
of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory
recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of
the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public
place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no
valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
-------------OR--------------

GARCIA
Sept. 30, 1994

V.

COMELEC

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the
required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or
referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the
event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17
which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and
the
exceptions
therefrom,
whereby
the
people
can
directly
propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1.
2.

Initiative
Initiative

on
the
Constitution
on statutes petition

petition
to
amend
the
Constitution
proposing to enact a national legislation

3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

GR no 196271

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
196271, October 18, 2011

DECISION
BRION,
I.

J.:

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order
to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint
OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections
assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the
new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent
to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in
the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with
the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary
by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot
make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be
sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on
very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years
that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a
call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153
and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can
make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under
the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law
that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however,
does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and
simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

GR no 183591
NORTH COTABATO v. GRP

FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought

about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled
to
be
signed
in
Kuala
Lumpur,
Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources
within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act
for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is
constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are
unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution
thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to
official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article
II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations.
No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and
approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be

held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents
authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to
any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.