Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943 VORONEZH FRONT

Oboyan
(Vatutin)
near Prokhorovka, 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast of 6th Guards Army 5th Guards Army
Kursk, in the Soviet Union, during the Second World Arm
y Prokhorovka
69 s
nk th net
War. Taking place on the Eastern Front, the fighting was a Ar Do
tT m
1s y
5th Guards
part of the wider Battle of Kursk, and occurred when the Rakitnoe
Zaudovka
Tank Army

5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attacked Arm
y
th

y
the II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Wehrmacht in one 40 48 Panzer Cor

s Arm
ps
rps
y Co 2 SS
of the largest tank battles in military history.[lower-alpha 10] 52 A
rm

uard
Tomarovka Panzer
Corps

7th G
4th PANZER ARMY Belgorod
On 5 July 1943, the German high command launched

SOU
(Hoth)

FRON
3 Panzer
Operation Citadel with the aim of enveloping and de- ARMY GROUP SOUTH Corps

TH
Army Corps

T
(von Manstein)

57
stroying the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The Soviet GROUP Rauss

WES
th
42 Army

Ar
KEMPF Corps
high command, Stavka, had been forewarned of the Ger-

my

T
man intentions, and employed a defence in depth strategy,
preparing a series of defensive lines along the routes of The German advance to Prokhorovka
the planned German attack. The German offensive was
conducted by three armies. In the southern side, the 4th
Panzer Army, with Army Detachment Kempf on its east- sume a defensive posture instead. This would allow the
ern flank, attacked the Soviet defences of the Voronezh Germans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared po-
Front. The Soviets also massed several armies as the sitions, after which the Soviet forces would be able to
Steppe Front, which included the 5th Guards Tank Army, reposture and go on the offensive.[9][10] A similar strat-
deep behind their defences, which they intended to use egy discussion occurred on the German side, with Field
to launch their own counteroffensives once the German Marshal Erich von Manstein, arguing for a mobile de-
strength had dissipated. fence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviets to
A week into the German offensive, the Soviets launched advance, while the Germans launched a series of sharp
powerful counterattacks against the attackers. In the counterattacks against their flanks to inflict heavy attri-
south at Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army at- tion. For political reasons Hitler insisted that the German
tacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army, forces go on the offensive, choosing the Kursk salient for
resulting in a large clash of armour just outside the set- the attack.[11]
tlement on 12 July 1943. The 5th Guards Tank Army The German offensive plan, called Unternehmen Zi-
was decimated in the attack, but succeeded in prevent- tadelle (“Operation Citadel”), envisioned an assault at
ing the Germans from capturing Prokhorovka and break- the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and
ing through the third defensive belt to achieve operational
south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the
freedom. Subsequently, the German offensive was can- Soviet forces in the salient.[12][13] The two spearheads
celled and their forces withdrawn. The Red Army went were to meet near Kursk. From the south, the XLVIII
on a general offensive and seized the strategic initiative Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer
on the Eastern Front, which it was to hold for the rest ofCorps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th Panzer
the war. Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth,
would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army
Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoth’s right flank
1 Background from counterattack by the Soviet strategic reserves known
to be located just east of the salient. The 4th Panzer
See also: Battle of Kursk Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army
As the spring rasputitsa season came to an end in 1943, Group South, commanded by Manstein; and their air sup-
both the German and Soviet commands considered their port was provided by Colonel General Otto Deßloch's
[14][15][16]
plans for future operations. Stalin and some senior So- Luftflotte 4.
viet officers wanted to seize the initiative and attack the Multiple delays by the Germans allowed the Soviets a
German forces inside the Soviet Union, but they were great deal of time to prepare their defences. Employ-
convinced by a number of key commanders, including ing defence in depth, they constructed a series of de-
the Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, to as- fensive lines to wear down the attacking panzer forma-

1
2 1 BACKGROUND

tions. Six belts made up of extensive minefields, anti- By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced
tank ditches, and anti-tank gun emplacements were cre- about 29 kilometres (18 mi) and broken through the first
ated, although the last three belts were mostly unoccupied and second defensive belts.[30][31][32][33] However, slow
and less fortified than the first three.[17][18] The Soviet progress by the XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to
forces in the salient were organised into two fronts. The shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west
Voronezh Front, commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin, to help the panzer corps regain its momentum towards
was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. Oboyan. On 10 July the full effort of the II SS-Panzer
The Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Ivan Corps was shifted back to its own forward progress, away
Konev, included Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov's 5th from Oboyan due north, to the northeast toward the town
Guards Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's of Prokhorovka.[34] Hoth had discussed this move with
5th Guards Tank Army, and formed the strategic reserve Manstein in early May, and it had been part of the plan
force to be held behind the front until it was needed for since the outset of the offensive,[35][36][37] although the
the counteroffensive.[19][20] plan originally envisioned the III Panzer Corps and ele-
ments of XLVIII Panzer Corps joining in the attack to-
wards Prokhorovka, but this could not be realized.[37]
1.1 German advance leading up to
Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July in-
Prokhorovka dicated that defensive works were being constructed by
German infantry all along the flanks of 4th Panzer Army
Main article: Operation Citadel
and that German armoured formations could not be spot-
The Germans launched their attack on the morning of 5
ted on the flanks despite armoured counterattacks that
should have provoked their appearance.[38] The Voronezh
Front headquarters concluded that the Germans were
reaching their limit, and hence it decided on a major
counteroffensive as the next course of action.[38]

A column of Panzer III tanks at Kursk

July 1943 and were met with heavy resistance.[21] The

density of Soviet anti-tank guns, minefields, anti-tank
ditches and large numbers of Soviet tanks were all much
A Tiger I of a Waffen-SS unit fires at a target during Operation
greater than had been anticipated, and made a break-
Citadel.
through far more difficult to achieve.[22] By the end of
6 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced through the first
defensive belt and reached the second.[23] But its advance While the German attack was in progress, the 5th
was greatly behind schedule, as according to the Citadel Guards Tank and the 5th Guards Armies of the Steppe
plan it should have penetrated the first two belts and been Front had been moving up from their reserve posi-
on its way to the third by the end of the first day.[24] tion since the evening of 6 July, travelling at night to
The corps benefited from close air support provided by avoid detection.[39] The 5th Guards Tank Army cov-
the Luftflotte 4’s VIII Fliegerkorps,[25] commanded by ered the 390 kilometres (240 mi) over three nights,
General Hans Seidemann,[26] whose aircraft helped de- and arrived at the Prokhorovka area on the night of 9
stroy Soviet strong points and artillery positions. To the July,[40] and the 5th Guards Army’s 33rd Guards Rifle
southeast, III Panzer Corps had great difficulty crossing Corps arrived on the night of 10 July.[41] Throughout 11
the Northern Donets River on 5 July.[27] They eventually July, the 5th Guards Tank Army organized itself around
formed a bridgehead across by the morning of 6 July,[27] Prokhorovka in preparation for the forthcoming massive
but stubborn Soviet resistance meant they were unable counteroffensive.[42]
to protect the east flank of the II SS-Panzer Corps.[21] On morning of 11 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps contin-
On 8 July, the Soviets launched powerful counterattacks ued its attack toward Prokhorovka. In the ensuing at-
against the II SS-Panzer Corps with several tank corps. tacks, its 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte
These failed to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps as hoped, SS Adolf Hitler had the most success, penetrating the So-
but succeeded in slowing its progress.[28][29] viet defences manned by the 2nd Tank Corps, and re-
2.2 Soviet plans for 12 July 3

inforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301st

Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd Guards
Rifle Corps.[43][44] They cleared Soviet resistance at the
“October” state farm (Russian: Совхоз Октябрьский),
crossed a 15-foot (4.6 m)-deep antitank ditch at the base
of Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a brief but
bloody battle.[45][46][47] North of Leibstandarte, the 3rd
SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf failed to expand
their bridgehead across the Psel River nor capture Hill
226.6, which were defended by the 31st Tank Corps,
the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps’ 95th Guards Rifle Divi-
sion,[48][49][47] and the 10th Tank Corps’ 11th Motorized
Rifle Brigade.[50] To the south, the 2nd Guards Tank
Corps and the 48th Rifle Corps’ 183rd Rifle Division re-
pelled the attack of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division
Das Reich.[47] By day’s end on 11 July Leibstandarte had
advanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt and
was only 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from Prokhorovka,[46][51]
but its flanks were exposed, as there was a 5-kilometre
(3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf,[52] and Das Reich
lagged behind by 4 kilometres (2.5 mi).[47] Leibstandarte
disrupted the 5th Guards Tank Army’s preparations for
its forthcoming counterattack, by capturing its planned
artillery positions and assembly areas, forcing Rotmistrov
to hastily revise his plans and select new positions.[53][54]

2 Planning Paul Hausser, commanding officer of the II SS Panzer Corps

2.1 German plans for 12 July for a massive armoured attack the following day.[58][59]
Throughout the night, German frontline troops could hear
Late on the evening of 11 July, General Paul Hausser, the the ominous sounds of Soviet tank engines to the east as
commander of the II SS-Panzer Corps, issued orders for the 18th and 29th Tank Corps moved into their assembly
[60][61]
a classic manoeuvre battle for the following day’s advance areas.
on Prokhorovka. It was known that the Soviets had dug in
many anti-tank guns on the west slopes of Prokhorovka,
making a direct attack by Leibstandarte very difficult.
2.2 Soviet plans for 12 July
[55]
The plan was for Totenkopf to capture Hill 226.6, and
advance northeast along the Psel river to the Kartashёvka-
Prokhorovka road, and then strike southeast into the
flank and rear of Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[56][55]
Leibstandarte was ordered to nudge forward and secure
Storozhevoe just outside Prokhorovka,[55] then it and Das
Reich were to wait until Totenkopf 's attack had dis-
rupted the Soviet positions, after which Leibstandarte
was to attack the main Soviet defences on the west slope
of Prokhorovka. To Leibstandarte 's right, Das Reich
was to advance eastward to the high ground south of
Prokhorovka, then turn south away from Prokhorovka
to roll up the Soviet defences and force a gap.[56] The
VIII Fliegerkorps was to make their main effort in sup-
Pavel Rotmistrov, left, commander of 5th Guards Tank Army
port of the advance of the II SS-Panzer Corps, with the
XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west assigned limited air The 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army of
resources.[57] the Steppe Front had been brought up from reserve
Unbeknownst to Hausser, on the night of 11 July Rot- and reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 July
mistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an respectively.[62] On 11 July Vatutin ordered that the fol-
assembly area just south of Prokhorovka in preparation lowing day the armies of the Voronezh Front were to go
4 3 OPPOSING FORCES

over onto the offensive along the entire front of the south-
ern salient.[63] This counterattack was planned to be in
concert with the Soviet Operation Kutuzov in the north-
ern side of the Kursk Salient.[64] Vatutin ordered Rot-
mistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovka
with his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing the
Germans to withdraw southwards.[65] Rotmistrov ordered
his tanks to move forward at speed to engage the German
armour in order to nullify the advantages the Tiger tanks
had in the range and firepower of their 88 mm guns. He
believed the more manoeuvrable T-34 would be able to
quickly close and obtain effective flanking shots against
the German heavy tanks.[56][66] In fact, Soviet intelligence German forces in the southern Kursk salient during Operation
had greatly overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands and Citadel
Tigers possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps.[lower-alpha 11]
In actuality there were no Ferdinands with the 4th Panzer
Army, as they were all deployed in the northern side of SS-Panzer Corps: Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and
the Kursk salient with the 9th Army.[67] Totenkopf.[72] On the evening of 11 July, the service-
able armour strength of the II SS-Panzer Corps was
Late on the night of 12 July, the III Panzer Corps 294 tanks and assault guns, which included 15 Tigers.
crossed the Northern Donets at Rzhawes (also known as The armoured strength of Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and
Rzhavets). This jeopardised Rotmistrov’s entire plan by Totenkopf were 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault guns
threatening the flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68][60] respectively.[67] Ten of the Tigers were to the north of the
Early on 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send re- Psel river with Totenkopf, four were with Leibstandarte,
inforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armies and Das Reich had just one.[73][66]
facing the III Panzer Corps.[68][36][60] He organised a task
force under the command of his deputy, General Kuzma Of the three divisions, Leibstandarte had advanced the
Grigorevich Trufanov, which consisted of the 26th Tank most deeply towards Prokhorovka and was situated in
Brigade from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and the centre of the German position. A railway line ran
12th Guards Mechanized Brigades from the 5th Guards through the Leibstandarte positions, heading northeast to
Mechanized Corps, and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment Prokhorovka. The railbed was about 30 feet high and
from the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68] Other units from divided the area of the Leibstandarte division north and
the reserve also were attached to the group on its way south. The bulk of the division was positioned to the
south.[68] In doing so Rotmistrov had committed over half north of the rail line, including the division’s panzer reg-
of his reserves to an essential ad-hoc advance before the iment, its 2nd Panzergrenadier regiment, and the divi-
Battle of Prokhorovka began.[60] sion’s reconnaissance, artillery and command units. To
the south of the rail line was Leibstandarte 's 1st Panz-
Soviet air support in the southern side of the salient ergrenadier regiment, along with the division’s Panzer-
was provided by the 2nd Air Army and the 17th Air jaeger battalion.[74] To the southeast of Leibstandarte
Army,[69] commanded by Lieutenant General Stepan stood Das Reich, which protected the southern flank.[75]
Krasovsky and Lieutenant General Vladimir Sudets,
respectively.[70][71] However, the bulk of the air sup- To the northwest of Leibstandarte was Totenkopf. The
port was committed in support of Soviet units attacking division’s panzer regiment had largely crossed over the
XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west of Prokhorovka and the river Psel in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarte
III Panzer Corps to the southeast, and only limited num- placed its lightly armed reconnaissance battalion in the
bers of aircraft were available to support 5th Guards Tank 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf, to-
Army’s attack.[69] gether with the division’s four remaining Tigers, which
were commanded by SS-Second Lieutenant Michael
Wittmann, to provide some flank protection.[76][77]

3 Opposing forces
3.2 Soviet
See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle
The main Soviet armoured formation involved in the bat-
tle was the 5th Guards Tank Army, which controlled
five corps by 12 July: the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 5th Guards
3.1 German Mechanized, 18th and 29th Tank Corps.[78][79][80] All to-
gether they fielded 793 tanks and 37 to 57 self-propelled
The German forces involved in the Battle of Prokhorovka guns for a total of approximately 840 armoured fighting
were from the three Waffen-SS divisions of the II vehicles.[81][82][83] About two-thirds of these tanks were
 5

T-34s, while the remainder were T-70 light tanks,[84] Soviet infantry out of Storozhevoe,[100][101][102] while the
with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well.[85][86] bulk of Leibstandarte waited to commence their main
Not all of the 5th Guards Tank Army was present in task for the day.[103] The Soviets began a preparatory ar-
the Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of the tillery barrage at around 08:00,[104][101][105] and as the
formation had been sent south to check the advance last shells fell at 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed the code
of the III Panzer Corps.[68] The Soviet armour of the words “Stal! Stal! Stal!" (“Steel, Steel, Steel!") – the
5th Guards Tank Army – including the newly attached order to commence the attack.[106][105] With that the So-
2nd Guards[lower-alpha 3] and 2nd[lower-alpha 2] Tank Corps, viet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army began their
as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps[lower-alpha 4] advance.[66][107][102]
held in reserve – facing the II SS Panzer Corps on 12 July
was about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns.[87][88] In ad-
dition, five artillery regiments, one artillery brigade, and
one anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to the 5th
Guards Tank Army for the assault.[89]
The main attack of the the 5th Guards Tank Army was
conducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18th
Tank Corps that had been brought up from the Soviet
strategic reserve.[90][91] These two Soviet tank formations
together provided the greatest number of tanks in the
attack,[92] with the 18th Tank Corps fielding 190 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps field-
ing 212 tanks and self-propelled guns.[91][93] Infantry sup-
port to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided by German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack
the 9th Guards Airborne Division.[91] A portion of the
18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern flank of Down off the west slopes before Prokhorovka charged
Totenkopf 's Regiment “Eicke”.[91] On the southeastern the massed Soviet armour of five tank brigades of the
wing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployed 18th and 29th Tank Corps, ineffectually firing as they
the remaining forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps that came at Leibstandarte 's positions.[108] As the Soviet tanks
were not sent south, which numbered about 80 tanks.[92] rolled down the slopes, they carried the men of the 9th
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnants Guards Airborne Division on their hulls.[107] In total,
of the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich.[36][94] about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th Guards
Their infantry support was provided by the 183rd Rifle Tank Army attacked the positions of the II SS Panzer
Division.[95] The northwestern flank of the 5th Guards Corps,[107] doing so in two massive waves, with 430 tanks
Tank Army, which faced Totenkpf, was defended by the in the first echelon and 70 more in the second.[109][89]
33rd Guards Rifle Corps’ 42nd and 95th Guards Rifle
Divisions,[96][97] supported by the remnants of the 31st Exhausted from the previous week’s fighting, the troops
Tank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Ri- of Leibstandarte were just starting their day at the out-
fle Corps’ 52nd Guards Rifle Division.[98][97] The forces set of the attack and were largely taken by surprise.[110]
of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not sent As the Soviet armour appeared, several German outposts
south were held as reserve north of Prokhorovka,[89][92] began firing purple warning flares signaling a tank attack.
and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelled Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop of the 1st SS-
guns.[93] Panzer Regiment’s 2nd Battalion stated later that he knew
at once a major attack was underway.[66] He ordered his
Despite having suffered significant losses over the previ- company of seven Panzer IVs to follow him over a bridge
ous week’s fighting, on 12 July the 2nd Air Army still across the tank ditch. Crossing the bridge they fanned out
had some 472 aircraft operational, while the 17th Air on the lower slope of Hill 252.2. Above them, on the crest
Army had 300 remaining operational aircraft; however, of the hill, Joachim Peiper's 2nd SS-Panzergrenadiers
only a few of these were made available to support the and their armoured half-tracks were being overrun. As
5th Guards Tank Army.[69] Ribbentrop’s tanks spread out he looked up the hillside
and was suddenly confronted by the wave of Soviet tanks:
“In front of me appeared fifteen, then twenty, then thirty,
4 Battle then forty tanks. Finally there were too many of them to
count. The T-34s were rolling toward us at speed, and
At 05:45 on 12 July, Leibstandarte 's headquarters started carrying mounted infantry.”[111]
receiving reports of the sound of a great number of tank As the Soviet armour charged down the west slope of Hill
engines as the Soviet tanks prepared for their advance.[99] 252.2 a hotly contested tank battle ensued. A Panzer IV
At around 06:50 , elements of Leibstandarte 's 1st SS- to Ribbentrop’s right was set ablaze.[111] Soon the com-
Panzergrenadier Regiment nudged forward and drove the pany was swamped by the Soviet tanks coming down the
6 5 FOLLOWING THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT

hill. The Soviet tanks were firing on the move. Rot- entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly the
mistrov’s tactic to close at speed disrupted the control fighter aviation, was totally insufficient.”[115]
and co-ordination of the Soviet tank formations and also By the end of the day, Leibstandarte still held Hill 252.2
greatly reduced their accuracy.[36] and had lost no significant ground,[116] but was exhausted
The advance of Soviet armour was held up at the base by the struggle turning back the five brigades of the two
of the Hill 252.2 when they reached the anti-tank ditch. tank corps.[36][117] To its left, Totenkopf had succeeded
Some vehicles crashed into the 15-foot ditch while others in capturing Hill 226.6 and its panzer group had ad-
moved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavy vanced along the north bank of the Psel to reach the
firing occurred between the Soviet armour and the two Karteschevka-Prokhorovka road, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)
other companies of the 1st SS-Panzer Battalion on the op- northwest of Prokhorovka.[118] Of the three SS-Panzer
posite side of the ditch, while the Soviet tanks searched divisions, it had been on the offensive the most and its
for a route across.[112] Meanwhile, with the passage of panzer regiment had suffered the heaviest losses. Though
the first waves of Soviet tanks Peiper’s surviving panzer- its hold on the forward ground was tenuous, it was in po-
grenadiers emerged from trench lines to engage the So- sition to outflank the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[119]
viet paratroopers and attack the Soviet tanks with mag- Das Reich had been forced onto the defensive by the
netic anti-tank grenades. Twenty of the battalion’s half- 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps,[120][95]
tracks were lost in the fighting, some of which were de- along with the Soviet infantry of the 183rd Rifle Divi-
stroyed when they attempted to ram the much heavier So- sion, which precluded its own planned attack.[95]
viet tanks in an effort to stop them.[113] On the Soviet side, 5th Guards Tank Army and all tank
units under Rotmistrov involved in the battle suffered
heavy losses.[121] The Soviet attack had been repelled
and Rotmistrov was forced to shift his tank army over to
defence.[122] Despite this, German intelligence reported
to the German command that the forces opposing the
II SS-Panzer Corps still had over 300 tanks available.
The Germans knew that the Soviet forces opposing them
were still considerable and a clear decision had yet to be
reached.

5 Following the main engagement

A weary officer lights the cigarette of his NCO in the southern
salient.
On the night of 12 July, Vatutin ordered the Soviet
forces facing the II SS-Panzer Corps to take a defen-
The 2nd and 17th Air Armies flew 893 sorties compared
to the VIII Fliegerkorps’s 654 sorties over the southern sive stance.[123] Orders issued by the Germans for 13
part of the salient. Of note, most of the Soviet sor- July instructed Totenkopf to consolidate its gains of the
ties flown that day were flown against the XLVIII Panzer previous day and then attack into the flank and rear of
Corps to the west and the III Panzer Corps to the south. the Soviet forces around Prokhorovka.[124] Leibstandarte
Low clouds in the morning and thunderstorms in the af- was to strengthen its front line and co-ordinate its attack
ternoon inhibited air operations in Prokhorovka by both on Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf 's attack
sides.[114] Over the Prokhorovka battlefield the Luftwaffe from the northwest.[124] Das Reich was to consolidate and
gained control of the air. Formations of Stukas, includ- strengthen its front line and prepare for an offensive op-
ing a small number of experimental 3.7-centimetre (1.5 eration to link up with the III Panzer Corps.[125]
in) BK 37 cannon-equipped G-2 variants, commanded On the morning of 13 July, the 5th Guards Mechanized
by Staffelkapitan Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Fw 190 fighter- Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps launched at-
bombers and Hs 129 ground-attack aircraft equipped tacks against Totenkopf 's left flank.[126] By afternoon
with 3-centimetre (1.2 in) anti-tank cannon attacked the these Soviet attacks had been beaten off, but they did
Soviet formations.[109] The 31st Tank Brigade reported: prevent Totenkopf from attacking to the south toward
“We suffered heavy losses in tanks through enemy ar- Prokhorovka.[126] Around noon, Leibstandarte was or-
tillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached the Kom- dered to attack northward toward the Psel River to con-
somolets State Farm, but due to continuous air attacks, solidate its front line with Totenkopf 's position.[126] This
they were unable to advance any further and shifted to attack confronted the defensive positions held by the 33rd
the defence.”[102] The tank brigade also reported: “our Guards Rifle Corps, which had been supplemented by
own air cover was fully absent until 13:00.”[115] The 5th the remaining armour of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps.
Guards Tank Army reported: “the enemy’s aircraft lit- Leibstandarte 's attack was unsuccessful.[126] That after-
erally hung above our combat formations throughout the noon, Totenkopf was ordered to abandon their positions
 7

northwest of Prokhorovka and return to a more defend- 1st Panzer Army to the south.[140] The assault began at
able positions along the north bank of the Psel River.[127] 0400 on 14 July.[138][141][142] Following a brief artillery
Soviet attempts to sever the salient were unsuccessful, and barrage, the Der Fuhrer Panzergrenadier Regiment of
the unit completed its withdrawal by nightfall.[127] Das Reich struck out for the high ground south-west of
Pravorot, evicting the remnants of the 2nd Guards Tank
Corps from the village of Belenikhino following violent
5.1 Aftermath house-to-house and hand-to-hand fighting. The panzer
regiment of the division fought off a series of counterat-
On 13 July Adolf Hitler summoned Manstein and Field tacks, destroying a number of T-34s in the process, and
Marshal Günther von Kluge to his headquarters, the forced the Soviets to withdraw to the east. A new line was
Wolfsschanze in East Prussia.[128][129] The Allied invasion taken, and Zhukov ordered elements of the 10th Guards
of Sicily on the night of 9–10 July combined with the So- Mechanized Brigade out of reserve to reinforce the po-
viet counteroffensive of Operation Kutuzov against the sition. To the south, the 7th Panzer Division made con-
flank and rear of Model’s 9th Army on 12 July and the tact with Das Reich, but Trufanov, commanding the So-
violent attacks by strong Soviet forces at Prokhorovka the viet forces in the gap, was aware of the threat and con-
same day had caused him to stop the offensive and shift ducted a fighting withdrawal. Though the Soviets had
forces to the west.[129][130] He ordered his generals to ter- to abandon a substantial number of anti-tank guns, the
minate Operation Citadel.[130][131][132][133] link-up failed to entrap many Soviet forces.[143] Opera-
Kluge welcomed the decision, as he was already in the tion Roland failed to produce a decisive result,[144] and
process of withdrawing units of the 9th Army from the Totenkopf began withdrawing from its positions north of
Kursk salient to deal with Soviet attacks on his flank.[132] the Psel, following orders issued late on 15 July, as the II
Manstein was greatly disappointed. He argued that his SS-Panzer Corps assumed a defensive stance.[145][146]
forces were now on the verge of achieving a major break- On 17 July the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts
through. As he saw it, with his III Panzer Corps about launched a major offensive across the Mius and Donets
to link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka, Rivers against the southern wing of Army Group South,
and with the XXIV Panzer Corps available as his oper- pressing upon the 6th and 1st Panzer Armies.[147][148] In
ational reserve, they would be halting the offensive just the early afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland was
at the moment when victory was in hand. With an eye terminated with an order for the II SS-Panzer Corps to
toward the west, Hitler was unwilling to continue the begin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back to
offensive.[130][134][135] Manstein persisted, proposing that Belgorod.[149][145] The 4th Panzer Army and Army De-
his forces should at least destroy the Soviet reserves in the tachment Kempf anticipated the order and began execut-
southern Kursk salient before Citadel was finally termi- ing it as early as the evening of 16 July.[150][151] Leib-
nated, so the Soviet fighting capacity in the sector would standarte 's tanks were distributed between Das Reich
be depleted for the rest of the summer.[134][135] Hitler and Totenkopf and the division was hastily redeployed to
agreed to continue offensive operations in the southern Italy,[152][153] while Das Reich and Totenkopf were dis-
salient until Manstein’s goal was achieved.[134][135] patched south to meet the new Soviet offensives.[154][155]

5.2 Operation Roland

6 Casualties and losses
Manstein hastily put together the plans for Operation
Roland, realizing that he only had a few days to conduct Losses are difficult to establish for either combatant.
the operation before he lost the SS-Panzer Corps.[136] Tank losses attributed to the Germans vary,[156] in part
The plan called for Das Reich to attack east and south due to the Wehrmacht’s methodology for counting and re-
and link up with III Panzer Corps, which would attack porting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not
to the northwest. Leibstandarte and Totenkopf were to be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as
anchor the left and northern flanks of Das Reich. Once losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered
the link was achieved and the Soviet forces encircled, the and repaired were simply listed as such.[157][158] Like-
Soviet defence would be crippled and Prokhorovka would wise, reliable figures for tank and personnel casualties for
likely fall shortly thereafter.[136] The goal of the operation the Soviets in the battle of Prokhorovka are difficult to
was to destroy the Soviet armoured reserve massed in the establish.[159]
southern sector of the Kursk salient, and thereby check
Soviet offensives for the rest of the summer.[135][137]
The orders for Operation Roland were issued in the 6.1 German
closing hours of 13 July 1943.[138][139] However, fol-
lowing Hitler’s meeting with Manstein, Hitler counter- The II SS Panzer Corps reported 842 men killed,
manded the XXIV Panzer Corps’ deployment to the wounded, or missing for 12 July.[160] Since the Germans
Kursk salient, sending them on 14 July to support the controlled the Prokhorovka battlefield until 17 July, they
8 7 OUTCOME

were able to recover most of their disabled armoured for all of its five corps, as well smaller units directly sub-
vehicles.[157] German historian Karl Frieser has attributed ordinated to the army headquarters.[170] The document
between three and five permanent tank losses to the II SS reported the following irrecoverable losses: 222 T-34s,
Panzer Corps.[161][162] 89 T-70s, 12 Churchill tanks, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and
Archival data of the II SS Panzer Corps shows that the 240 support vehicles.[170] The document reported dam-
corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the aged vehicles still under repair as 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s,
evening of 11 July[67] and 251 on the evening of 13 7 Churchill tanks, 3 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and no figures
July.[163][67] Allowing for the possibility that some re- for support vehicles.[170] The document reported person-
nel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded in
paired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these
numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns action, and 1,157 missing in action.[170] This adds up to a
total of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelled
became inoperable during the battle of Prokharovka,
which includes all 10 Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and guns,[159] with another 212 tanks and self-propelled guns
under repair, and 7,607 casualties.
one belonging to Leibstandarte. However, all of the inop-
erable Tiger tanks were repairable, and none were write-
offs.[163] An estimated total of between 60 and 80 of
II SS-Panzer Corps’ armoured vehicles were damaged 7 Outcome
or destroyed in combat on 12 July.[164][165] By the end
of 16 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable
tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at
the beginning of the battle on 12 July.[166] On 12 July,
Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the VIII Fliegerkorps and its at-
tached squadron of Stukas reported eleven aircraft dam-
aged, of which six were total write-offs, all by Soviet
flak.[115]

6.2 Soviet

Destroyed Soviet T-34 in the southern salient

Exact Soviet losses for 12 July are not known, but have
been estimated by military historians. Personnel losses
at Prokhorovka were estimated by the historian Chris-
ter Bergström to have been as high as 5,500 men.[115]
For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz and Prokhorovka battlefield memorial
Jonathan House estimate that the 5th Guards Tank Army
lost at least 400 tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[167] George
Debate exists over the significance and outcome of
Nipe puts the losses in armour as between 600 and 650 the battle. The Germans destroyed many Soviet tanks
tanks.[168] 5th Guards Tank Army losses were estimated and temporarily degraded the striking power of the
by the Soviet historians Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris 5th Guards Tank Army, but they were unable to take
Soloviev to have been about 300 tanks and self-propelled
Prokhorovka or break through into open ground.[36] For
guns.[115][169] the Soviets, the massive armoured attack of 12 July failed
A document prepared on 17 July 1943 by the 5th Guards to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps or throw it onto the
Tank Army Headquarters summarised the combat losses defensive, but succeeded in exhausting the Germans and
incurred by the formation from 12 to 16 July inclusive eventually contributed to checking their advance.[171][172]
8.2 Citations 9

Thus, neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II 324) Only its 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade was in the bat-
SS-Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives for the tlefield of Prokhorovka on 12 July.(Glantz & House 2004,
day.[172][173] While the battle is generally considered a p. 166,195,417) It is not uncommon for this formation to
tactical success for the Germans due to the high numbers be portrayed as part of the 5th Guards Army during the
of Soviet tanks destroyed,[174][175] ultimately there was no Battle of Prokhorovka, but that is a metachronistic error.
German breakthrough at Prokhorovka, and with the end [7] The 6th Guards Army bore the brunt of the German offen-
of Operation Citadel the strategic initiative permanently sive from the very opening hours of it; therefore, its sub-
swung over to the Red Army.[176] ordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka were
already heavily depleted.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167)

[8] These are only for the II SS Panzer Corps.

8 References
[9] These are for the whole 5th Guards Tank Army.

8.1 Notes [10] See also: Battle of Brody (1941), Battle of Raseiniai,
Operation Goodwood, Battle for Golan Heights (1973),
[1] The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the con- and others.
trol of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11
[11] A Soviet General Staff report estimated that the II SS-
July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327) All of its subordinate
Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps had 100 Tigers and
corps as of 12 July are listed below;(Zetterling & Frank-
Ferdinands on 12 July.(Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 222)
son 2000, p. 48) the divisions, regiments and battalions
directly subordinate to the Army’s Headquarters are not
listed below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327)
8.2 Citations
[2] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the
[1] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... a local, tactical
5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the con-
German victory.”.
trol of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July,
and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July.(Glantz [2] Clark 2012, p. 408, Excerpt reads: “Even though II
& House 2004, p. 318) SS-Panzer Corps could claim to have won a tactical vic-
tory in the monumental armoured clash at Prokhorovka ...
[3] The 2nd Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th Hausser’s men did not do enough to change the course of
Guards Tank Army, but was transferred from the con- the operation.”.
trol of the Southwestern Front to the 5th Guards Tank
Army on 11 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 321) Due to [3] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: “The Waffen-SS
earlier combat, by 12 July the 2nd Tank Corps had few won a tactical victory on July 12.”.
tanks left, many of which were locked in combat else-
where outside the battlefield of Prokhorovka and out of [4] Nipe 2012, p. 86, Excerpt reads: “The small expansion of
contact with their parent headquarters. Therefore it was the Psel bridgehead by Totenkopf and the advances of Das
reinforced with the 10th Antitank Brigade and relegated Reich around the southern edges of Prochorovka were tac-
to a supportive role in Prokhorovka.(Zetterling & Frank- tical victories at best and not decisive by any definition.”.
son 2000, p. 106; Glantz & House 2004, p. 179,181)
[5] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: “Operationally,
[4] Two of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps’ four brigades however, the palm rests with the Red Army.”.
– the 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized, and the [6] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 561, “The counterattack
24th Guards Tank Brigades – were sent south to block did not achieve its basic goal. The enemy [II SS-
the III Panzer Corps, leaving its 10th Guards Mechanized Panzer Corps] was not routed, but the further advance of
and 24th Guards Tank Brigades near Prokhorovka on 12 the II SS-Panzer Corps beyond Prokhorovka was finally
July.(Clark 2012, p. 379; Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. halted.”.
101; Glantz & House 2004, p. 321)
[7] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... the clash was,
[5] The 5th Guards Army was transferred from the control of when set against the much wider strategic backdrop of the
the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July.(Glantz offensive, no more than a local, tactical German victory.
& House 2004, p. 323) Only one of its two corps It was of no consequence or significance in helping to re-
were present on the battlefield of Prokhorovka – the 33rd alise any of the wider offensive objectives of Operation
Guards Rifle Corps.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167) The Zitadelle, which was in any case by this date already a
other corps – the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps – was de- failure.”.
ployed further west, near Oboyan.(Clark 2012, p. 230)
The divisions, regiments and other smaller units directly [8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108, “If we take a look
subordinate to the Army’s Headquarters are not listed at how the front lines changed during these five days one
below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 323) could interpret it as some sort of success for the Germans
... However, if we compare the outcome with the German
[6] The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of orders for the battle, which stated that Prokhorovka was
5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July and the target, it is clear that the Germans fell short of their
to the 1st Tank Army on 8 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. goals. The Red Army had hoped to push the II SS-Panzer
10 8 REFERENCES

Corps back and crush it. This failed completely, but at [43] Clark 2012, pp. 350–353.
least the 5th Guards Tank Army prevented the Germans
from taking Prokhorovka.”. [44] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.

[9] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 28–29]. [45] Glantz & House 2004, p. 172.

[10] Clark 2012, p. 189. [46] Clark 2012, pp. 352–353.

[11] Healy 2008, p. 43. [47] Nipe 2012, p. 315.

[12] Clark 2012, p. 187. [48] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 95.

[13] Glantz 1986, p. 23–25. [49] Clark 2012, p. 352.

[14] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196–197. [50] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166.

[15] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 51–53. [51] Dunn 1997, p. 153.

[16] Glantz 2013, p. 184. [52] Glantz & House 2004, p. 173.

[17] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 63–65. [53] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 176.

[18] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 41, 49. [54] Clark 2012, p. 356.

[19] Glantz 2013, p. 195. [55] Glantz & House 2004, p. 178.

[20] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 3–4. [56] Nipe 2010, p. 310.

[21] Clark 2012, p. 407. [57] Bergström 2007, p. 79.

[22] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 269–272. [58] Nipe 2010, p. 276.

[23] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 112. [59] Bergström 2007, p. 77.

[24] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 89–90. [60] Nipe 2010, p. 315.

[25] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 101. [61] Healy 2008, p. 330.

[26] VIII. Fliegerkorps. [62] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 323, 326.

[27] Clark 2012, pp. 256–260. [63] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 178, 198.

[28] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 134–135. [64] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 227.

[29] Clark 2012, pp. 297–299. [65] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 179.

[30] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 18–20 [66] Clark 2012, p. 364.
miles. [67] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103.
[31] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 18–20 [68] Glantz & House 2004, p. 202.
miles.
[69] Bergström 2007, pp. 78–81.
[32] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 km
at the end of 7 July. [70] 17th Air Army.

[33] Bauman 1998, pp. 8-5 to 8-6, this places it at 23 km. [71] Glantz & House 2004, p. 317,321.

[34] Glantz & House 2004, p. 146–147. [72] Dunn 1997, p. 154.

[35] Newton 2002, p. 6. [73] Nipe 2010, p. 309.

[36] Brand 2003. [74] Nipe 2012, p. 326.

[37] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 29–33. [75] Healy 2008, p. 320.

[38] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 258–260. [76] Healy 2008, p. 333.

[39] Glantz & House 2004, p. 138–139. [77] Clark 2012, p. 368.

[40] Healy 2008, p. 296. [78] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48, 101.

[41] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166–167. [79] Glantz & House 2004, p. 151.

[42] Clark 2012, pp. 350. [80] Nipe 2012, p. 39.

 8.2 Citations 11

[81] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 105–106, 793 tanks [117] Nipe 2010, p. 335.
and 57 self-propelled guns.
[118] Showalter 2013, p. 216.
[82] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 151, 328, 793 tanks and 37
self-propelled guns. [119] Clark 2012, pp. 388–389.

[83] Nipe 2012, p. 39, 850 tanks. [120] Clark 2012, pp. 381, 389.

[84] Healy 2008, pp. 171–172. [121] Nipe 2012, pp. 48, 52.

[85] Healy 2008, pp. 171–172, 35 Churchill tanks. [122] Clark 2012, pp. 390–391.

[86] Glantz & House 2004, p. 328, 31 Churchill tanks. [123] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208.

[87] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106-107. [124] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209–210.

[125] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209, 216.

[88] Clark 2012, p. 362.
[126] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 212–215.
[89] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 181.
[127] Clark 2012, p. 394.
[90] Licari 2004.
[128] Molony et al. 2004, pp. 55–65.
[91] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180.
[129] Clark 2012, p. 397.
[92] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 106–107.
[130] Nipe 2012, p. 71.
[93] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 107.
[131] Barbier 2002, p. 153.
[94] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180–181.
[132] Clark 2012, pp. 395–397.
[95] Glantz & House 2004, p. 192.
[133] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208, Kutuzov and allied land-
[96] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 96.
ings had an effect on the German High Command.
[97] Glantz & House 2004, p. 184. [134] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 217–218.
[98] Clark 2012, p. 378. [135] Clark 2012, pp. 397–398.
[99] Clark 2012, p. 363. [136] Healy 2010, p. 358.
[100] Glantz & House 2004, p. 182. [137] Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.
[101] Barbier 2002, p. 139. [138] Glantz & House 2004, p. 219.
[102] Bergström 2007, p. 80. [139] Barbier 2002, p. 163.
[103] Brand 2003, p. 8. [140] Healy 2010, p. 356.
[104] Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time. [141] Clark 2012, pp. 398.
[105] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 349. [142] Healy 2010, p. 359, States 15 July in error.
[106] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188, in Moscow time. [143] Healy 2010, p. 359.
[107] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188. [144] Clark 2012, pp. 401–402.
[108] Nipe 2010, p. 317. [145] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 98.
[109] Bergström 2007, p. 79–80. [146] Nipe 2012, p. 70.
[110] Nipe 2010, p. 316–317. [147] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 204, 223.
[111] Nipe 2010, p. 320. [148] Newton 2002, p. 24.
[112] Nipe 2010, p. 321. [149] Glantz & House 2004, p. 223.

[113] Nipe 2010, p. 322. [150] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 514–515.

[114] Bergström 2007, pp. 79–81. [151] Barbier 2002, p. 164.

[115] Bergström 2007, p. 81. [152] Nipe 2012, p. 72.

[116] Showalter 2013, p. 212. [153] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 139, 218.
 12 8 REFERENCES

[154] Glantz & House 2004, p. 245. • Brand, Dieter (2003). “Vor 60 Jahren: Pro-
chorowka (Teil II)". Österreichische Militärische
[155] Nipe 2012, p. 87.
Zeitschrift (in German) (Bundesministerium für
[156] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531–532, outlines various Landesverteidigung und Sport) (6).
figures proposed by various historians over the last three
decades. • Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle:
Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing
[157] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531–532. Group. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5.
[158] Bauman 1998, pp. 5-14.
• Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitler’s Gamble, 1943.
[159] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108. Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-275-
95733-9.
[160] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 105, 110, 247.

[161] Frieser 2007, p. 130, gives 3 losses.

• Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schönherr,
Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungváry, Kristián; Weg-
[162] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 513, 598, attributes five ner, Bernd (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und der
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– Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
[163] Healy 2010, pp. 346.
(in German). München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt
[164] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 212. München. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.
[165] Nipe 2012, pp. 60–61. • Glantz, David M. (September 1986). “Soviet De-
[166] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103, 105. fensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943” (PDF). US
Army Command and General Staff College (Ft.
[167] Glantz & House 1995, p. 167. Belvoir). Soviet Army Studies Office Combined
Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report
[168] Nipe 2012, pp. 85–86.
No. 11). OCLC 320412485.
[169] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 102.
• Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathon (1995). When
[170] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 536–538. Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 978-
[171] Overy 1997, p. 208.
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[172] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 108–109.
• Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1999). The
[173] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 553. Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press of
[174] Clark 2012, p. 408. Kansas. ISBN 978-0-70060-978-9.

[175] Nipe 2012, p. 86. • Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004)
[1999]. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University
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• Glantz, David (2013). Soviet Military Intelligence

8.3 Bibliography in War. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis (Routledge).
ISBN 978-1-136-28934-7.
• Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Great-
est Tank Battle, 1943. London; New York: Zenith • Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The
Imprint. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4. Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff
• Bauman, Walter (1998). Kursk Operation Simula- Study. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass).
tion and Validation Exercise – Phase II (KOSAVE ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. — This report, commis-
II) (PDF). Maryland: US Army Concepts Analy- sioned by the Soviet General Staff in 1944, was de-
sis Agency. — A study of the southern sector of signed to educate the Red Army on how to con-
the Battle of Kursk conducted by the US Army duct war operations. It was classified secret until
Concepts Analysis Agency and directed by Wal- its declassification in 1964, and was subsequently
ter J. Bauman, using data collected from military translated to English and edited by Orenstein and
archives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy In- Glantz. Its original title was Collection of materi-
stitute (TDI). als for the study of war experience, no. 11 (Russian:
Сборник материалов по изучению опыта Вели-
• Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk — The Air Bat- кой Отечественной войны № 11, Sbornik materi-
tle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN alov po izucheniiu opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny
978-1-903223-88-8. № 11)
 13

• Healy, Mark (2008). Zitadelle: The German Of- 9 Further reading

fensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0. • Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia
in the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 978-
• Healy, Mark (2010) [2008]. Zitadelle: The German 0-330-48808-2.
Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5716-1. • Evans, Richard (2010). The Third Reich at War.
New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-
• Molony, C.J.C.; Flynn, F.C.; Davies, H.L. & 311671-4.
Gleave, T.P. (2004) [1973]. Butler, Sir James, ed.
The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V: The • Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational
Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland,
3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. History of OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-
the Second World War, United Kingdom Military 4077-8.
Series. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-
84574-069-6. • Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don to
the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December
• Licari, Michael J. (2004). “The Battle of Kursk: 1942 – August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis
Myths and Reality”. Cedar Falls: University of (Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3.
Northern Iowa. Archived from the original on 11
September 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2014. • Guderian, Heinz (1996) [1937]. Achtung-Panzer:
The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tac-
• Newton, Steven (2002). Kursk: The German View: tics and Operational Potential. London: Arms and
Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the Ger- Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-282-3.
man Commanders. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.
ISBN 0-306-81150-2. • Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. New York:
Da Capo. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
• Nipe, George (2010). Blood, Steel, and Myth: The
II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka. • Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the
Southbury; Newbury: RZM; Casemate (distribu- East. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
tor). ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6.
• Kasdorf, Bruno (2000). The Battle of Kursk –
• Nipe, George (2012). Decision in the Ukraine: Ger- An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles
man Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Sum- (PDF). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War Col-
mer 1943. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. lege. OCLC 44584575.
ISBN 978-0-8117-1162-3.
• von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76032-054-
• Overy, Richard (1997). Russia’s War: A History of
9.
the Soviet Effort. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN
0-14-027169-4.
• von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles.
Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1-
• Showalter, Dennis E. (2013). Armor and Blood:
56852-578-8.
The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War
II. New York: Random House. • Moorhouse, Roger (2011). Berlin at War: Life and
Death in Hitler’s Capital, 1939–45. London: Vin-
• Zamulin, Valeriy; Britton, Stuart (2011). Demol- tage. ISBN 978-0-09-955189-8.
ishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka,
Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative. Soli- • Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies
hull: Helion & Company. ISBN 1-906033-89-7. of Adolf Hitler. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN
978-0-7864-2054-4.
• Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk
1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the So- • Smith, J.R. (1966). Aircraft in Profile No.69 – The
viet (Russian) Study of War. London: Taylor & Henschel Hs 129. UK: Profile Publications. OCLC
Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8. 42473519.

• “VIII. Fliegerkorps”. Retrieved 11 July 2015. • Willmott, Hedley Paul (1990). The Great Crusade:
A New Complete History of the Second World War.
• “17th Air Army”. Retrieved 11 July 2015. New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-934715-7.
14 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

• Замулин, Валерий (2006). Прохоровка – неиз-

вестное сражение великой войны [Prokhorovka
- the unknown battle of the Great War] (in Rus-
sian). Москва: Xранитель. ISBN 5-17-039548-
5. – Comprehensive description of Soviet and Ger-
many troop movement based on Soviet and German
archives

10 External links
• “Prokhorovka battle (July 1943)" [Прохоровское
сражение (июль 1943)] (in Russian). 1998. Re-
trieved 17 July 2015.

• “Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943”.

Retrieved 17 July 2015.

• Nipe, George. ""Kursk Reconsidered: Germany’s

Lost Victory"". Retrieved 17 July 2015.

• “Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis". Re-

trieved 17 July 2015.

• Wilson, Alan. “Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943

(maps)". Retrieved 19 June 2013.
 15

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text
• Battle of Prokhorovka Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Prokhorovka?oldid=672067946 Contributors: Pigsonthewing,
Altenmann, Wwoods, Itpastorn, Ezhiki, RivGuySC, Comatose51, Phe, Piotrus, Mzajac, Irpen, Ulflarsen, KNewman, Alsadius, Skorpionas,
Art LaPella, LtNOWIS, Trainik, Hohum, Shoefly, Ghirlandajo, Larry Dunn, Pierre Aronax, Woohookitty, Camw, Tabletop, Graeme-
Leggett, Ketiltrout, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Toby Douglass, Leo44, Ansbachdragoner, RussBot, Bleakcomb, Xihr, Alex Bakharev, Hawkeye7,
Grafikm fr, Merrybrit, Fastboy, Nick-D, Groyolo, SmackBot, DMorpheus, Flamarande, Squiddy, Chris the speller, Elagatis, EncMstr, Frap,
OrphanBot, MarshallBagramyan, Ctifumdope, Andreas1968, The PIPE, Ilvar, Noblige, Andrei Stroe, Ohconfucius, John, Minna Sora no
Shita, Illythr, Volker89, Mr Stephen, Andrwsc, Hellkt~enwiki, Clarityfiend, Marysunshine, FairuseBot, Karloman2, GeraldH, ThreeBlind-
Mice, TheCheeseManCan, Philippe, Sensemaker, Dr. Blofeld, Goldenrowley, Darklilac, Tigga, RebelRobot, WolfmanSF, Dodo19~enwiki,
Askari Mark, Buckshot06, Bernd vdB~enwiki, MetsBot, Dapi89, Rabidcentipede, CommonsDelinker, Geonarva, Andygx, Bad Night,
Johnadam789, Mrg3105, Tatrgel, MisterBee1966, Bogdan~enwiki, RabbitKing, W. B. Wilson, Andrein, Koalorka, WereSpielChequers,
Brozozo, Dormcat3, Faradayplank, Carpasian, Afernand74, Jaan, MBK004, Mild Bill Hiccup, Socrates2008, Arjayay, Sturmvogel 66,
Sholokhov, Deineka, Addbot, Caden, Groundsquirrel13, Tobi, Fryed-peach, Oleggem~enwiki, Legobot II, Shore3, AnomieBOT, Senor
Freebie, Tavrian, Christiangamer7, LilHelpa, Amore Mio, Anotherclown, Zumalabe, Crestar1, A Quest For Knowledge, AustralianRupert,
TungstenCarbide, Alexandre loichon, HROThomas, Thehelpfulbot, StoneProphet, FrescoBot, Darkstar8799, Kwiki, DrilBot, Decem-
ber21st2012Freak, White Shadows, DocYako, FlameHorse, Diannaa, John of Reading, Grottenolm42, Blablaaa, TuHan-Bot, Demi-
urge1000, Igor Piryazev, Terraflorin, FeatherPluma, Gunbirddriver, ClueBot NG, Observerq, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mohamed CJ, Frze,
DerKrieger, Hamish59, Choy4311, ChrisGualtieri, Khazar2, Irondome, Zatron100, 0wner170, EyeTruth, Ruby Murray, Melonkelon, Sto-
ryEpic, Arthur goes shopping, Somchai Sun, DannyKalb, Monkbot, GeneralizationsAreBad and Anonymous: 103

11.2 Images
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-15A,_Russland,_Panzer_im_Einsatz.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/2/2f/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-15A%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_im_Einsatz.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contrib-
utors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation
project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the
digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Wolff/Altvater
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Soldat_mit_Zigarette.jpg Source: https:
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%
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Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic
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Archive. Original artist: Koch
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Kradschützen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%2C_Kradsch%C3%
BCtzen.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive
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Koch
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0562A-06,_Russland,_Kolonne_mit_Panzer_III.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/e/e9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0562A-06%2C_Russland%2C_Kolonne_mit_Panzer_III.jpg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
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• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12,_Russland,_Panzer_IV_und_Schützenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg Source: https:
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_IV_und_
Sch%C3%BCtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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Archive. Original artist: Dieck
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A,_Russland,_zerstörter_russischer_Panzer.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/c/c7/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A%2C_Russland%2C_zerst%C3%B6rter_russischer_Panzer.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches
Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals
(negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg Source: https:
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5e/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A%2C_Schlacht_um_Kursk%2C_
Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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Archive. Original artist: Grönert
• File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1973-122-16,_Paul_Hausser.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/
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Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals
as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
16 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

• File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original

artist: ?
• File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(1935–1945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
• File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_
Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
• File:General_Rotmistrov_,commander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/
General_Rotmistrov_%2Ccommander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: scan da 'Soviet tanks in combat
1941-1945' di S.J.Zaloga et al., Concord 1997 Original artist: fotoreporter sovietico sconosciuto
• File:Kursk_south.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Kursk_south.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Con-
tributors: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Kursk_south.svg Original artist: Andrei nacu
• File:ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg License:
CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: ru:User:Voyagerim
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Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use official Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
Simon.
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11.3 Content license

• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0