Battle of Smolensk (1943)

The second Battle of Smolensk (7 August–2 October 1 Strategic context

1943) was a Soviet strategic offensive operation con-
ducted by the Red Army as part of the Summer-Autumn See also: Panther-Wotan line
Campaign of 1943. Staged almost simultaneously with
the Lower Dnieper Offensive (13 August–22 Septem-
ber), the offensive lasted two months and was led by By the end of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Germany
General Andrei Yeremenko, commanding the Kalinin had lost all hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastern
Front, and Vasily Sokolovsky, commanding the Western Front. Losses were considerable and the whole army was
Front. Its goal was to clear the German presence from the less effective than before, as many of its experienced sol-
Smolensk and Bryansk regions. Smolensk had been un- diers had fallen during the previous two years of fighting.
der German occupation since the first Battle of Smolensk This left the German army capable of only reacting to
in 1941. Soviet moves.

Despite an impressive German defense, the Red Army On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue the
was able to stage several breakthroughs, liberating several liberation of occupied territories from German control,
major cities, including Smolensk and Roslavl. As a result a course of action that had its first major success at
of this operation, the Red Army was able to start plan- the end of 1942 with Operation Uranus, which led to
ning for the liberation of Belarus. However, the overall the liberation of Stalingrad. The Battle of the Dnieper
advance was quite modest and slow in the face of heavy was to achieve the liberation of Ukraine and push the
German resistance, and the operation was therefore ac- southern part of the front towards the west. In order to
complished in three stages: 7–20 August, 21 August–6 weaken the German defenses even further, however, the
September, and 7 September–2 October. Smolensk operation was staged simultaneously, in a move
that would also draw German reserves north, thereby
Although playing a major military role in its own right, weakening the German defense on the southern part of
the Smolensk Operation was also important for its effect the front. Both operations were a part of the same strate-
on the Battle of the Dnieper. It has been estimated that as gic offensive plan, aiming to recover as much Soviet ter-
many as 55 German divisions were committed to counter ritory from German control as possible.
the Smolensk Operation — divisions which would have
been critical to prevent Soviet troops from crossing the Thirty years later, Marshal Vasilevsky (Chief of the Gen-
Dnieper in the south. In the course of the operation, eral Staff in 1943) wrote in his memoirs:
the Red Army also definitively drove back German forces
from the Smolensk land bridge, historically the most im- This plan, enormous both in regard of
portant approach for a western attack on Moscow. its daring and of forces committed to it,
The Strategic Operations included smaller operations: was executed through several operations: the
Smolensk operation, ...the Donbass [Opera-
tion], the left-bank Ukraine operation...[5]
Spas-Demensk Offensive Operation (7–20
August 1943)
1.1 Geography
Dukhovshchina-Demidov Offensive Operation
(1 Stage) (13–18 August 1943) The territory on which the offensive was to be staged
Yelnia-Dorogobuzh Offensive Operation (28 was a slightly hilly plain covered with ravines and pos-
August-6 September 1943) sessing significant areas of swamps and forests that re-
stricted military movement. Its most important hills
Dukhovshchina-Demidov Offensive Operation reached heights over 270 m (890 ft), allowing for im-
(2 Stage) (14 September-2 October 1943) proved artillery defense. In 1943, the area was for the
most part covered with pine and mixed forests and thick
Smolensk-Roslavl Offensive Operation (15 bushes.[6]
September-2 October 1943)
Numerous rivers also passed through the area, the most
Bryansk Offensive Operation (17 August-3 important of them being the Donets Basin, Western Dv-
October 1943) ina, Dnieper, Desna, Volost' and Ugra rivers. None of

1
2 2 OPPOSING FORCES

A detail of the Smolensk offensive, showing the concave shape of

the Soviet front line.

Map of the Smolensk operation and related offensives.

2.1 Soviet offensive sector

As of July 1943, the shape of the Soviet front line on this

part of the Eastern Front was described by a concave with
these rivers were especially wide at 10–120 m (33–394
a re-entrant centered around Oryol, offering them the op-
ft) respectively, nor deep at 40 to 250 cm (1.3 to 8.2 ft)
portunity to attack Wehrmacht defensive lines which be-
respectively; but the surrounding wide, swamp-like ar-
came exposed to flank attacks from the north.
eas proved difficult to cross, especially for mechanized
troops. Moreover, like many south-flowing rivers in Eu- Therefore, the offensive promised to be quite difficult for
rope, the Dnieper’s western bank, which was held by Soviet troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts who were
German troops, was higher and steeper than the eastern. predominantly tasked with the operation.
There were very few available bridges or ferries.[7] The Kalinin Front had assigned for the operation the 10th
Guards Аrmy, 5th Army, 10th Army, 21st Army, 33rd
Army, 49th Army, 68th Аrmy, 1st Air Army, 2nd Guards
Tank Corps, 5th Mechanised Corps, 6th Guards Cavalry
1.2 Transport infrastructure Corps.

For the Soviet troops, the offensive was further compli- The Western Front would have for the operation the 4th
cated by a lack of transport in the area in which the offen- Shock Army, 39th Army, 43rd Army, 3rd Air Army, 31st
sive was to be staged. The road network was not well de- Army.
veloped and paved roads were rare. After rainfall, which
was quite common during the Russian summer, most of
them were turned into mud (a phenomenon known as 2.2 German defenses
rasputitsa), greatly slowing down any advance of mech-
anized troops, and raising logistical issues as well. The As a result of the shape of the front, a significant number
only major railroad axis available for Soviet troops was of divisions of Army Group Center were kept on this part
the Rzhev-Vyazma-Kirov line. of the front because of a (quite legitimate) fear of a major
offensive in this sector.
The Wehrmacht controlled a much wider network of
roads and railroads, centered on Smolensk and Roslavl. For instance, at the end of July 1943, a German staff
These two cities were important logistical centers, allow- briefing stated:
ing quick supply and reinforcements for German troops.
By far the most important railroads for German troops On the front... held by the Army Group
were the Smolensk-Bryansk axis and the Nevel-Orsha- Center many signs show a continuous prepa-
Mogilev axis, linking German western troops with troops ration to a yet limited offensive (Roslavl,
concentrated around Oryol.[7] As part of the Soviet plan- Smolensk, Vitebsk) and of a maneuver of im-
ning the German railroad communications were attacked mobilization of the Army Group Center...[8]
by the partisans during the conduct of Operation Concert,
one of the largest railroad sabotage operations of World
War II. The front had been more or less stable for four to five
months (and up to 18 months in several places) before
the battle, and possessed geographical features favorable
for a strong defensive setup. Thus, German forces had
time to build extensive defensive positions, numbering as
2 Opposing forces much as five or six defensive lines in some places, for a
total depth extending from 100–130 km (62–81 mi).[9]
3.2 Spas-Demensk offensive 3

The first (tactical or outer) defensive zone included the

first (main) and the second defense lines, for a total depth
of 12–15 km (7.5–9.3 mi), and located, whenever pos-
sible, on elevated ground. The main defense line, 5 km
(3.1 mi) deep, possessed three sets of trenches and firing
points, linked by an extensive communication network.
The density of firing points reached six or seven per kilo-
meter (0.6 mi) of front line. In some places, where heavy
tank attacks were feared, the third set of trenches was in
fact a solid antitank moat with a steep western side in-
tegrating artillery and machine guns emplacements. The
forward edge of the battle area was protected by three
lines of barbed wire and a solid wall of minefields.[8]
The second defense zone, located about 10 km (6.2 mi)
behind the outer defense zone and covering the most im-
portant directions, was composed of a set of firing points
connected with trenches. It was protected with barbed
wire, and also with minefields in some places where heavy General layout of Smolensk region during the battle.
tank offensives were anticipated. Between the outer and
the second defense zones, a set of small firing points and
one”.[10] On the first day, the Soviet troops advanced only
garrisons was also created in order to slow down a Soviet
4 km (2.5 mi),[11] with all available troops (including ar-
advance should the Red Army break through the outer
tillery, communications men, and engineers) committed
defense zone. Behind the second zone, heavy guns were
to battle.[12]
positioned.
Despite violent Soviet attacks, it quickly became obvious
Finally, deep behind the front line, three or four more
that the three armies would not be able to get through the
defense lines were located, whenever possible, on the
German lines. Soviet commanders decided therefore to
western shore of a river. For instance, important de-
commit the 68th Army, kept in reserve, to battle. On the
fense lines were set up on the western side of the Dnieper
German side, three additional divisions (2nd Panzer Divi-
and Desna. Additionally, the main urban centers located
sion, 36th Infantry Division, and 56th Infantry Division)
on the defense line (such as Yelnya, Dukhovshchina and
were sent to the front from the Oryol sector to try to stop
Spas-Demensk), were reinforced and fortified, preparing
the Soviet advance.
them for a potentially long fight. Roads were mined and
covered with antitank devices and firing points were in- The attack resumed the following day with another at-
stalled in the most important and tallest buildings. tempt at a simultaneous breakthrough taking place fur-
ther north, towards Yartzevo. Both attacks were stopped
in their tracks by heavy German resistance. In the follow-
3 First stage (7 August – 20 Au- ing five days, Soviet troops slowly made their way through
German defenses, repelling heavy counterattacks and sus-
gust) taining heavy losses. By feeding reserve troops to battle,
the Red Army managed to advance to a depth varying
3.1 Main breakthrough from 15–25 km (9.3–15.5 mi) by 11 August.[13]
Subsequent attacks by the armored and cavalry forces of
After a day of probing, the goal of which was to deter- the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps had no further effect and
mine whether German troops would choose to withdraw resulted in heavy casualties because of strong German de-
or not from the first set of trenches, the offensive started fenses, leading to a stalemate.
on 7 August 1943 at 06:30 (with a preliminary bombard-
ment starting at 04:40 am) with a breakthrough towards
Roslavl. Three armies (apparently under the control of 3.2 Spas-Demensk offensive
Soviet Western Front) were committed to this offensive:
the 5th Army (Soviet Union), the 10th Guards Army, and During the Spas-Demensk offensive operation (Спас-
the 33rd Army. Деменская наступательная операция) in the region of
The attack quickly encountered heavy opposition and Spas-Demensk, things went better for the 10th Army.
stalled. German troops attempted numerous counterat- The Wehrmacht had fewer troops and only limited re-
tacks from their well-prepared defense positions, sup- serves in this area, enabling the 10th Army to break
ported by tanks, assault guns, and the fire of heavy guns through German lines and advance 10 km (6.2 mi) in two
and mortars. As Konstantin Rokossovsky recalls, “we lit- days.
erally had to tear ourselves through German lines, one by The 5th Mechanized Corps,[14] relocated from Kirov and
4 4 SECOND STAGE (21 AUGUST – 6 SEPTEMBER)

2. Wehrmacht defense lines were exceptionally well

prepared (firing points reinforced by trenches,
barbed wire, minefields etc.)
3. Several Red Army rifle divisions were insufficiently
prepared to perform an assault of a multi-lined de-
fense setup. This was especially true for reserve di-
visions, whose training was not always properly su-
pervised.
4. There were not enough tanks committed to battle,
forcing Red Army commanders to rely on artillery,
mortars, and infantry to break through Wehrmacht
A destroyed German bunker, showing shell impacts in its steel lines. Moreover, numerous counterattacks and an
plating.
abundance of minefields slowed down the infantry’s
progress.
committed to battle in order to exploit the breakthrough, 5. The interaction between regiments and divisions was
failed in its mission, mainly because a poorly organized far from perfect. There were unexpected pauses
anti-aircraft defense enabled Luftwaffe dive bombers to during the attack and a strong will of some regiments
attack its light Valentine tanks with some impunity. The to “hide” from the attack and expose another regi-
corps sustained heavy losses and had to pull away from ment.
combat. Soviet troops eventually advanced a further 25
km (16 mi) as of 13 August, liberating Spas-Demensk.[15] 6. Many Red Army commanders were too impressed
by Wehrmacht counterattacks and failed to act prop-
erly, even if their own troops outnumbered those of
3.3 Dukhovshchina offensive the Wehrmacht.
7. The infantry were not using their own weapons (such
As ordered by the Stavka (the Soviet Armed Forces
as their own heavy guns and portable mortars) well
Command), the Dukhovshchina-Demidov offensive op-
enough. They relied too much on artillery.
eration (Духовщинско-Демидовская наступательная
операция) near Dukhovshchina started almost a week 8. The fact that the offensive was postponed from 3–7
later, on 13 August. As on other parts of the front, the August gave German troops more time to increase
39th Army and the 43rd Army encountered serious op- their readiness.
position. During the first day alone, Wehrmacht troops
attempted 24 regimental-sized counterattacks, supported
With all these factors considered, Voronov demanded
by tanks, assault guns, and aviation.[16]
that the 4th Tank Army and the 8th Artillery Corps be
Soviet troops managed to advance only 6–7 km (3.7–4.3 transferred from the Bryansk Front and instead commit-
mi) over the next five days and, although they inflicted ted to support the attack near Smolensk.[20]
heavy casualties on Wehrmacht troops, their own losses
The stalemate was far from what had been desired by the
were also heavy.[17]
Stavka, but it had at least one merit: it tied down as much
as 40% of all Wehrmacht divisions on the Eastern Front
near Smolensk, making the task for troops fighting in the
3.4 Causes of the stalemate south and near Kursk much easier.[21] The Stavka planned
to resume the offensive on 21 August, but decided to post-
By mid-August, Soviet operations all along the Smolensk pone it slightly to give Soviet units time to resupply and
front stabilized. The resulting stalemate, while not a de- reinforce.[22]
feat per se, was stinging for Soviet commanders, who
provided several explanations for their failure to press
forward. Deputy Chief of General Staff General A. I.
Antonov reported “We have to deal both with forests and 4 Second stage (21 August – 6
swamps and with increasing resistance of enemy troops September)
reinforced by divisions arriving from Bryansk region”[18]
while Marshal Nikolai Voronov, formerly a Stavka mem- By mid-August, the situation on the Eastern Front had
ber, analysed the stalemate in his memoirs, publishing changed as the Red Army started a general offensive,
what he saw as the eight primary causes:[19] beginning with the Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Op-
eration (Белгородско-Харьковская наступательная
1. The Wehrmacht OKH command knew about the op- операция)(Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev)
eration and was prepared for it. (операция "Румянцев" - 3–23 August) and the Orlov
4.2 Bryansk maneuver 5

offensive operation (Орловская наступательная Dniepr.

операция) (Operation Polkovodets Kutuzov) (операция
"Кутузов" - 12 July - 18 August) known in German
history as the Battle of Kursk, and continuing with the 4.2 Bryansk maneuver
Wehrmacht’s defensive Battle of the Dnieper line in
North Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht command Near Bryansk, things went equally well for the Soviet
was still reinforcing its troops around Smolensk and armies, despite heavy German resistance. However, an
Roslavl, withdrawing several divisions from the Oryol identified weakness changed all the previous plans. A
region. As a result, the two Soviet counteroffensives surprisingly easy capture of several hills commanding the
that followed the Kursk defensive operation (Курская Dubrovka region north of Bryansk, with numerous Ger-
оборонительная операция 5–23 July) proceeded man soldiers captured in total absence of battle readi-
relatively easily for the Red Army around Oryol, creating ness, came to the attention of General Markian Popov,
a large salient south of Smolensk and Bryansk. commander of the Bryansk Front from June to October
1943.[26] This meant that the Soviet offensive was prob-
In this situation, the former attack axis, directed south- ably not expected along that particular axis.
west towards Roslavl and Bryansk, became useless. The
Stavka decided instead to shift the attack axis west to Therefore, the boundary between the First Belorussian
Yelnya and Smolensk.[23] Front and the Western Front was shifted south, and
two “new” armies executed a single-pincer movement to
Dubrovka and around Bryansk, forcing German forces to
withdraw.[27]
4.1 Yelnya offensive
By 6 September, the offensive slowed down almost to a
The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh offensive operation halt on the entire front, with Soviet troops advancing only
(Ельнинско-Дорогобужская наступательная 2 km (1.2 mi) each day. On the right flank, heavy fight-
операция) was considered the “key” to Smolensk ing broke out in the woods near Yartzevo. On the center,
and Wehrmacht troops created a massive fortified advancing Soviet troops hit the Dnieper defense line. On
defense position around the city. Swampy areas on the the left flank, Soviet rifle divisions were slowed as they
Desna and Ugra rivers were mined and heavy guns set up entered forests southwest of Yelnya. Moreover, Soviet di-
on hills overlooking the city. visions were tired and depleted, at less than 60% nominal
strength. On 7 September, the offensive was stopped, and
The Soviet armies, aware of the Wehrmacht preparations, the second stage of the Smolensk operation was over.[28]
were reinforced with tanks and artillery during the week
from 20–27 August.
The offensive finally commenced on 28 August by the 5 Third stage (7 September – 2 Oc-
10th Guards Army, 21st Army and the 33rd Army), sup-
ported by three Tank, a Mechanized corps and the 1st Air tober)
Army. These four armies were covering a front of only 36
km (22 mi), creating a very high concentration of troops. In the week from 7–14 September, Soviet troops were
The troops, however, had fuel and supplies for two weeks once again reinforced and were preparing for another of-
at most.[24] fensive. The next objectives set by the Stavka were the
Soviet troops moved forward after an intense 90-minute major cities of Smolensk, Vitebsk and Orsha. The op-
eration resumed on 14 September with the Smolensk-
shelling. The artillery bombardment as well as ground at-
tack aircraft significantly damaged Wehrmacht lines, al- Roslavl offensive operation (Смоленско-Рославльская
наступательная операция), involving the left flank of
lowing the Red Army to execute a breakthrough on a 25
km (16 mi) sector front and advance 6–8 km (3.7–5.0 mi) the Kalinin Front and the Western Front. After a prelim-
by the end of the day. The following day, 29 August, Red inary artillery bombardment, Soviet troops attempted to
Army rifle divisions advanced further, creating a salient break through the Wehrmacht lines.
30 km (19 mi) wide and 12–15 km (7.5–9.3 mi) deep.[25] On the Kalinin Front’s attack sector, the Red Army cre-
In order to exploit the breakthrough, the 2nd Guards ated a salient 30 km (19 mi) wide and 3–13 km (1.9–
Tank Corps was thrown into the battle. In one day, 8.1 mi) deep by the end of the day. After four days of
its troops advanced 30 km (19 mi) and reached the battle, Soviet rifle divisions captured Dukhovshchina, an-
outskirts of Yelnya. Leaving Wehrmacht troops no time other “key” to Smolensk.[29]
to regroup their forces, Red Army troops attacked the On the Western Front's attack sector, where the offensive
city and started to form an encirclement. On 30 August, started one day later, the breakthrough was also promis-
Wehrmacht forces were forced to abandon Yelnya, sus- ing, with a developing salient 20 km (12 mi) large and
taining heavy casualties. This commenced a full-scale re- 10 km (6.2 mi) deep. The same day, Yartsevo, an im-
treat by Wehrmacht troops from the area. By 3 Septem- portant railroad hub near Smolensk, was liberated by So-
ber, Soviet forces had reached the eastern shore of the viet troops. On the Western Front’s left flank, Soviet ri-
6 7 NOTES

fle divisions reached the Desna and conducted an assault last. An essay written after the war by several Wehrmacht
river crossing, creating several bridgeheads on its western officers stated that:
shore.
As the result, the Wehrmacht defense line protecting Although the vigorous actions of their com-
Smolensk was overrun, exposing the troops defending mand and troops allowed the Germans to cre-
the city to envelopment. General Kurt von Tippel- ate a continuous front, there was no doubt that
skirch, Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army during the poor condition of the troops, the complete
the Smolensk operation and later commander of the 4th lack of reserves, and the unavoidable length-
Army, wrote that: ening of individual units’ lines concealed the
danger that the next major Soviet attack would
“The forces of the Soviet Western Front struck the left cause this patchwork front—constructed with
wing of Army Group Center from the Dorogobuzh- such difficulty—to collapse.[33]
Yelnya line with the aim of achieving a breakthrough
in the direction of Smolensk. It became clear that the Third, as outlined above, the Smolensk Operation was
salient—projecting far to the east—in which the 9th an important “helper” for the Lower Dnieper Offensive,
Army was positioned could no longer be held.”[30] locking between 40 and 55 divisions near Smolensk and
By 19 September, Soviet troops had created a 250 kilo- preventing their relocation to the southern front.
meters (150 mi) long and 40 kilometers (25 mi) wide gap Finally, a once-united German front was now separated
in Wehrmacht lines. The following day, Stavka ordered by the huge and impassable Pripet marshes, cutting Army
the Western Front troops to reach Smolensk before 27 Group South off from its northern counterparts, thus
September, then to proceed towards Orsha and Mogilev. greatly reducing the Wehrmacht’s abilities to shift troops
The Kalinin Front was ordered to capture Vitebsk before and supplies from one sector of the front to the other.[34]
10 October.
For the first time, Soviet troops entered territories which
On 25 September, after an assault-crossing of the north- had been occupied for a long time by German sol-
ern Dnieper and street fighting that lasted all night, So- diers, and discovered war crimes committed by the
viet troops completed the liberation of Smolensk. The SS, Einsatzgruppen. In the areas liberated during the
same day another important city Roslavl was recaptured. Smolensk operation (occupied for almost two years), al-
By 30 September, the Soviet offensive force were tired most all industry and agriculture was gone. In Smolensk
and depleted, and became bogged down outside Vitebsk, oblast itself, almost 80% of urban and 50% of rural living
Orsha, and Mogilev, which were still held by Wehrmacht space had been destroyed, along with numerous factories
troops, and on the 2 October the Smolensk operation was and plants.[6]
concluded. A limited follow-on was made to successfully
capture Nevel after two days of street fighting. After the Smolensk offensive, the central part of the
Soviet-German front stabilized again for many months
Overall, Soviet troops advanced 100–180 km (62–112 until late June 1944, while the major fighting shifted
mi) during almost 20 days of this third part of the to the south for the Dnieper line and the territory of
offensive.[31] Ukraine. Only during January 1944 would the front move
The Battle of Lenino (in the Byelorussian SSR) occurred again in the north, when German forces were driven back
in the same general area on 12–13 October 1943. from Leningrad, completely lifting the siege which had
lasted for 900 days. Finally, Operation Bagration in sum-
mer 1944 allowed the Red Army to clear almost all the re-
maining territory of the USSR of Wehrmacht troops, end-
6 Aftermath ing German occupation and shifting the war into Poland
and Germany.
The Smolensk operation was a decisive Soviet victory and
a stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. Although quite mod-
est compared to later offensive operations (not more than 7 Notes
200–250 km (120–160 mi) were gained in depth),[32] the
Soviet advance during this operation was important from [1] A.A. Grechko and al., History of Second World War,
several points of view. Moscow, 1973–1979, tome 7, p.241
First, German troops were definitively driven back from [2] Glantz (1995), p. 297
the Moscow approaches. This strategic threat, which had
[3] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec43.html
been the Stavka’s biggest source of worry since 1941, was
finally removed. [4] V.A. Zolotarev and al., Great Patriotic War 1941–1945,
Moskva, 1998, p 473.
Second, German defense rings, on which German troops
planned to rely, were almost completely overrun. Quite [5] Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, The matter of my whole life,
a few remained, but it was obvious that they would not Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p. 327.
 7

[6] V.P. Istomin, Smolensk offensive operation, 1943, 8 References

Moscow, Mil. Lib., 1975, page 15

[7] V.P. Istomin, p. 16 • Author? World war 1939–1945 (collection of es-

says), Moscow, Ed. Foreign Lit., 1957.
[8] V.P. Istomin, p. 12
• Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathan (1995), When
[9] Marshal N.N. Voronov, On military duty, Moscow, Lib. Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler,
Milit. Ed., 1963, pp. 382 Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
ISBN 0-7006-0899-0
[10] K. Rokossovsky, Soldier’s duty, Moscow, Politizdat, 1988,
p. 218. • Grechko, A.A. and al., History of Great Patriotic
[11] V.P. Istomin, pp. 81–82 War, 1941–1945, Moscow, 1963.

[12] V.P. Istomin, p.84 • Grechko, A.A. and al., History of Second World
War, Moscow, 1973–1979, tome 7.
[13] V.P. Istomin, p. 84–88
• Istomin, V.P. (collective work, part written by
[14] See Tank Corps (Soviet); John Erickson, writing in the V.P.Istomin) Operations of Soviet Armed Forces
early 1980s, refers to the 5th Tank Corps being badly during the Great Patriotic War 1941—1945, tome
mauled both from the air and the ground. John Erickson 2, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1958.
(historian), Road to Berlin, 1982, p.130
• Istomin, V.P. Smolensk offensive operation, 1943,
[15] V.P. Istomin, p. 92–94 Moscow, Mil. Lib., 1975.
[16] V.P. Istomin, p. 94–95
• Rokossovsky, K. Soldier’s duty, Moscow, Politizdat,
[17] A.A. Grechko and al., History of Great Patriotic War, 1988.
1941–1945, Moscow, 1963, t. 3, p. 361.
• Shefov, Nikolai. Russian fights, Lib. Military His-
[18] G.K. Zhukov, Memoirs, Moscow, Ed. APN, 1971, p. 485 tory, Moscow, 2002.

[19] Voronov, pp. 387—388 • Tippelskirch, Kurt. History of Second World War,
Moscow, 1957.
[20] V.P. Istomin, p. 101
• Vasilevsky, A.M. The matter of my whole life,
[21] Operations of Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Pa- Moscow, Politizdat, 1973.
triotic War 1941—1945 (collective work, part written by
V.P.Istomin), tome 2, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1958. • Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military history jour-
nal), 1969, #10, pp. 31,32
[22] Marshal A.I. Yeremenko, Years of retribution, Moscow,
Science, 1969, pp. 51—55. • Voronov, N.N. On military duty, Moscow, Lib.
[23] V.P. Istomin, p. 104 Milit. Ed., 1963.

[24] V.P. Istomin, p. 105 • Yeremenko, A.I. Years of retribution, Moscow, Sci-
ence, 1969.
[25] V.P.Istomin, p.110.
• Zhukov, G.K. Memoirs, Moscow, Ed. APN, 1971,
[26] Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military history journal), p. 485
1969, #10, p. 31
• Zolotarev, V.A. and al., Great Patriotic War 1941–
[27] Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, p. 32 1945 (collection of essays), Moscow, 1998.
[28] V.P. Istomin, pp. 122–123
Coordinates: 54°47′N 32°03′E / 54.783°N 32.050°E
[29] V.P. Istomin, p. 131

[30] Kurt Tippelskirch, History of Second World War,

Moscow, 1957, pp. 320–321

[31] V.P. Istomin, pp. 134–136

[32] V.P. Istomin, p. 5

[33] World war 1939–1945 (collection of essays), Moscow, Ed.

Foreign Lit., 1957, pp. 216–217.

[34] V.P. Istomin, p. 163

8 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1 Text
• Battle of Smolensk (1943) Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Smolensk_(1943)?oldid=667069889 Contributors: Comte0,
Leandrod, Docu, Nikai, Bob O'Bob, Tpbradbury, Samsara, Topbanana, Raul654, PBS, Altenmann, BigT27, Wwoods, Everyking, Henry
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Icey, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Ligulem, Brighterorange, Tswold, RobertG, Kmorozov, Goudzovski, Roboto de Ajvol, Sus scrofa, Brandmeister
(old), Red Slash, Epolk, Kurt Leyman, Kirill Lokshin, Gaius Cornelius, Alex Bakharev, EWS23, Wiki alf, Welsh, Emilio floris, Grafikm fr,
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Yura2404, Daegu1983, Ruddah, Thadtricee, GeneralizationsAreBad, Thientu1 and Anonymous: 65

9.2 Images
• File:A_destroyed_german_bunker.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/A_destroyed_german_bunker.
jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://militera.lib.ru/research/isaev_av1/ Original artist: Unknown
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• File:General_map_of_smolensk_region.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/General_map_
of_smolensk_region.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: en:Image:General_map_of_smolensk_region.png Original artist:
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9.3 Content license

• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0