TANEDO vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tanedo executed a notarized deed of absolute
sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tanedo, and the latters wife, Teresita
Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter one hectare
of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona,
Tarlac and covered by Title T-l3829, the said property being his future inheritance
from his parents. Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an Affidavit
of Conformity dated February 28, 1980 to re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and
validate the sale I made in 1962. On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another
notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his undivided ONE
TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191. In February 1981, Ricardo
learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein,
through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. On June 7, 1982, private
respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and
the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451.
Petitioners in 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the
deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the
property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an Absolute Deed of Sale
dated December 29, 1980 conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under
the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the
land in litigation (Lot 191).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a Deed of Revocation of
a Deed of Sale dated March 12, 1981, wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of
petitioners for the reason that it was simulated or fictitious - without any
consideration whatsoever.
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement
which virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale
and the Deed of Sale in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro testified that
he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to
execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five pesos (P5.00) to
buy a drink.
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that
petitioners failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that
the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 was valid and that its registration in good
faith vested title in said respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the
Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid?
HELD:
1. Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into
upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.

Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of
any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. Hence, the affidavit
of conformity dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the
1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, suffers from
the same infirmity.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the
deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaros
undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was
subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December
29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two documents
were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of his (Matias) estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro
actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting,
were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
2. Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in
cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted

law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the
registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents
was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former
because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have
not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one
who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F.

SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F.
SANTOS vs SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129
March 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and
surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other petitioners
Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.

FACTS: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of
her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate in 1978. On the first
occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," in 1979. Respondents

Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed
by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On
the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as
evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," in 1981.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected
thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the
present. Respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita,
during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the
necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not
yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting
fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs,
the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 81729 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig City.
In 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal
demand letter8 to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners
still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject
property had been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied
that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because
the same was duly published as required by law.
The trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals which
was granted. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Decision but it was denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and
enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses
Lumbaos action for reconveyance with damages.
b) Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the
"Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and
consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses
Lumbao.
HELD:
a) Both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence
that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be

upheld. In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where ones
signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the
jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the
deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners
denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud
and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned
presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts
stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated
as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was
not yet divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire
estate is the only description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the
subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly
determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale
between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and
jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided,
co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided shares
and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-owner, however, has
no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal
portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed
purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The
sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May
1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold
by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be
deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased
mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the
petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was
already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
b) the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the
NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever
rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted
to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights
and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have
inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased
mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid
and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death
of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a
property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal

representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by

the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. SEGUNDA ALMEIDA
G.R. No. 162784
June 22, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to
Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in
San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. (By
virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA)
Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of
private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased
her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
In 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining
relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be
the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The said document was
signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side
of both pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total.
Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5above her name in the second page and
at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of
the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then CFI Laguna which declared the deed
null and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots
submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother.
Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the
application.
NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby
she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor
of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966
with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in
question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA
Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President.
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said
transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of
sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their
favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda MercadoAlmeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the
resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a
Complaint for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the RTC.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of
the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration
of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint
was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was
already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of
the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case involving "title and possession to real property within its
jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
In 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA
and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of
Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of
Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was
ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued. The Regional Trial Court
ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a
disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said
document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions
for reconsideration which were both denied for lack of merit. They both appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied
admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a
"carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine
(79) days late. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. The CA ruled that
the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It
upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment
of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE
SUBJECT LOTS
Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 198026 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now,
Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and
Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those
falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to
rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28,
2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide
the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as
per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989).28 We find no reason to disturb this
ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial
review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and
executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case
which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
Petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious
grounds when it considered the application for the purchase of lots. It is the position
of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was a will, it could not bind the NHA.31That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is
an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the
original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same
before it."32
The Court is not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document
commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words
"sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the
interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her
estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code
which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the
original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA
gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering
that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and
obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over
the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had
over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an
interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so
as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will
or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the
property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the
seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified
nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita
Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to
pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of
law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the
interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by
virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another

contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the
decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on
sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of
the decedent as the next "person"39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay
the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.
Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of SelfAdjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void40 should have alerted
the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent
who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded.
The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE WILL: We need not delve into the validity of the will.
The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary
disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which
shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41
EUTIQUIA AVERA vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian
of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia
G.R. No. 15566
September 14, 1921
STREET, J.:
FACTS: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of
the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan
Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and
Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will
introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified with details not
necessary to be here specified that the will was executed with all necessary
external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of
disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the
person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting
witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the
proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a
single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner
that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of
sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He
accordingly admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an appeal was taken in
behalf of the persons contesting the will.
ISSUES:
a) whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon
the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for
the absence of the other two.

b) whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the
signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on
the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
HELD:
a) Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay
be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses,
nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after
an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when
a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if
alive and within reach of the process of the court.
(Why all three of the attesting witnesses were not produced? The petition for the probate of this will
had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919,
no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the
attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the
court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was
contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial
in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses .)

Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not
produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in
the case above referred to. It appears, however, that this point was not raised by
the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for
determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new
trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be
raised for the first time in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first
assignment of error must be declared not be well taken. In the present case, if the
appellant had raised this question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a
motion for a new trial, that court would have had the power, and it would have been
is duty, considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial
in order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of
thus calling the error to the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is
first raised by the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late.
b) It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page;
and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with.
The provision to the effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be
written on the left margin of each page rather than on the right margin seems
to be this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every
part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the
left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page,
and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these
signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the mode of signing
adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from
possible alteration. In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any
possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the
letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the
instrument.

In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA

NAYVE vs. LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR
G.R. No. L-21755
December 29, 1924
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS: This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal
instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by
Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased.
The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to
the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy
was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law.
From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court
allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition.
The will in question is composed of four sheets with written matter on only
side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages
containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by
the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the
third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the
margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the
margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the
attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not
appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the
signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.
ISSUES:
(a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on
each and every sheet on the left margin;
(b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters;
(c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or
pages actually used of the will; and
(d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in
the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all
the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.
HELD:
a) In this respect the holding of this court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and
Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), is applicable, wherein the will in question was
signed by the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right, margin.
The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessary
signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated
and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of
the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate.
Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page
used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that
said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not detract
from the validity of the will.lawphi1.net
b) Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the sheets of
the document are not paged with letters, suffice it to cite the case of Unson
vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that paging with Arabic

numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of
the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.
c) As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages of the will, it must be noted that the last paragraph of the
will here in question and the attestation clause, coming next to it, are of the
following tenor:
In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig,
Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, composed of four sheets, including the next:
ANTONIO MOJAL
(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and
testament in the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator
Don Antonio Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of each other and of
the testator.)
PEDRO
CARO
SILVERIO MORCO
ZOILO MASINAS

As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. It
is true that in the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was held
that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the
will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the
attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is
necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it
complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is
composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of
the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
d) With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator does not
appear to have signed on all the sheets of the will in the presence of the
three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed on all the sheets
in the presence of the testator and of each other, it must be noted that in the
attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will "in
the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence
of each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the
attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was
clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is
whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the
will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is
stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause
now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the
sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document,
although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the
instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid,
does not exist.
Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses
signed each and every page of the will is proven by the mere examination of the
signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does not
invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.
JOSE RIVERA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J.
RIVERA

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named
Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only
surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration over Venancio's estate. This petition was opposed by Adelaido J.
Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic
wills.
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. This
petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir
of Venancio's intestate estate.
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera
was later appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto
found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio
Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in
question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including
Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his
father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. Its decision is now the subject of this petition, which
urges the reversal of the respondent court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EXECUTED BY VENANCIO RIVERA
IS VALID
HELD: YES. Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them
valid because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator
himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no
necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the
authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were
questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that
Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the
holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings,
Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed
that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court
should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not
the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being
a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition
thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony
of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been
written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO

LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA
LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR
G.R. Nos. 83843-44
April 5, 1990
PARAS, J.:
FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Iba, Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his
heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for
the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio
Labrador.Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition
on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law,
alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death,
testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a
matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat.
Sagrado thereupon filed, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which
Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio
Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, being premised on
the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
The trial court rendered a joint decision allowing the probate of the
holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. Respondents
appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which modified said joint
decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for
being undated. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is dated,
as provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: YES. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810.It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the
second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond,
and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one
who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in
the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in
the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the
testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about
"the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond,"
and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of
an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice
of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply
with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with
the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of
the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral
act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will.
The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's
instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware
of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the
testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, (Judge), ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D.
SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES
D. SEANGIO
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio (Sp. Proc. No. 98
90870) and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed
the petition contending among others that Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio,
for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the
event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the
will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo.
They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over
SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.
Private
respondents moved
for
the
dismissal
of
the
probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all

other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent and the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition
for probate proceedings on the ground that there clearly shows that there is
preterition. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC.
ISSUES:
a)

b)

Whether or not the document purporting to be the holographic will of

Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code.
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.

HELD:
a) NO. The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to
his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
b) YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized
as the supreme law in succession.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the

execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis
ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was
executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
(With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the
Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute
an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute
her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that
the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.)