ec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probable in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
2.
Effect Of Death On Civil Actions
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and
during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which
thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution
or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted
for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any
civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
ACTIONS?
1. If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed, without prejudice
to any civil action that the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased
2. If the accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, both
the criminal and civil liability arising from the crime shall be extinguished
> However, the independent civil actions may be filed against the estate of the accused
after proper substitution, and the heirs of the accused may also be substituted for the
deceased
E.
Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property.
JUNE 24, 2015 / LEGALMIND
(The following is cited from Spouses Bonifacio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May
2, 2006)
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession
of
real
property:
(a) accion interdictal;
(b) accion publiciana;
and
(c)accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date
of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to
be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for
in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief
in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
to
set
in
and
summarily
throw
him
out
of
the
land. Such
conclusion
is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether
it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that
they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the
issue on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind,
that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of
action fails.The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and
before
them,
their
mother. xxx Clearly,
defendants
entry
into
the
land
was
effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as
possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited
in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Devel
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted
for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the
recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court. [
B.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by
the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time
to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In
the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers,
to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized
government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal,
unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds
of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should
the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such
failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the
defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the
defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by
virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation
of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the
defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her
petition stated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of appeal which was given due course
without the respondents filing a motion for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the
court a quo."11 On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the RTC their motion for execution
pending appeal on February 19, 2004.
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals12 is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendantappellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not
stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the
supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but
the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede
s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.
Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution
pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution of the
judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the
immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply with all of the
three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of
appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without
the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because it
declared the judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over
her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to
conduct further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the
nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed against her has rendered moot and
academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned.
C.
RULE 18A. STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
Upon timely filing of an appeal or a motion to set aside the judgment, execution of the judgment
shall be stayed until the appeal or motion has been decided.
18A Stay of Execution of Judgment
[1] General commentary
Rule 18A is straightforward in stating that a properly filed appeal or motion to set aside a
judgment, stays execution of the judgment until the appeal or motion to set aside has been
resolved. As written, Rule 18A is self executing. That is, the rule does not expressly require a
party file a motion seeking to stay execution of a judgment. Under the rule a stay is automatic
upon a party properly filing an appeal or motion to set aside a judgment.
18A.1 Enforcement of Judgments
[1] General commentary
The rules of civil procedure for magistrate courts do not set out matters pertaining to
enforcement of judgments rendered in magistrate courts. The mechanisms for enforcing
magistrate court judgments is provided for by statute. It is provided under W.Va. Code 50-6-1(a)
that the statutes applicable to enforcing a judgment rendered in circuit court,
apply to the
enforcement of judgments rendered in magistrate court. The statute states further that process
for enforcing a judgment shall issue from magistrate court, but
that any process issued in
violation of the judgment enforcement statutes shall be void. The statute also provides that.
