JOSE C.
ZULUETA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICANOR NICOLAS in his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, defendant-appellee.
A.R. Teodoro for appellant.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Antonio C. Masaquel for appellee.
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal taken by plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing his complaint for damages on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant provincial fiscal
of Rizal to recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000. The complaint in
substance alleges on May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal conducted an investigation of a
complaint for libel filed by herein plaintiff against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff
members of the Philippine Free Press; that after said investigation the fiscal "rendered an
opinion" that there was no prima facie case; that the alleged libelous statements were made
in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the best interest of the public; and that in
consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff from the crime
of libel.
The only question for determination is whether plaintiff's complaint states a cause of
action.
The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which provides that "any
person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter." But as we said in Bangalayvs. Ursal,* 50 Off. Gaz. 4231, this
article "contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or
employee to perform his official duty." Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after
the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not
a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the
legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is no evidence to justify such action. But it
is equally his duty not to prosecute when after the investigation he has become
convinved that the evidence available is not enough to establish a prima facie case.
The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to
whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of corresponding the information and
having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to
dictation from the offended party (People vs. Liggayu , et al., 97 Phil., 865, 51 Off Gaz.,
5654; People vs. Natoza, 100 Phil., 533, 53 Off Gaz., 8099). Having legal cause to refrain
from filing an information against the person whom the herein plaintiff wants him to
charge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or neglected
without just cause to perform his official duty. On the contrary, it would appear that he
performed it.
A contrary rule would be fraught with danger. Says the learned trial Judge on this point:
Es altamente peligroso sentar un precedente judicial haciendo responsable por
danos al Fiscal Provincial de Rizal, aqui demandado, por rehusar este de presentar
querella si racionalmente y de buena fe, dicho Fiscal es o era de opinion en el
ejercicio de su sana discrecion de que no existian motivos para presentar una
querella; de sentar este peligroso procedimiento o precedente judicial contra los
fiscales seria poner a estos en una situacion que en el cumplimento de su obligacion
y en el ejercicio de su sana discrecion estuviesen siempre amenazados de una
demanda civil si su opinion fuese contraria a la del denunciante, como una espada
de Damocles pendiente en todo tiempo sobre sus cabezas. Si el denunciente en
aquel asunto criminal de libelo, demandante en la presente causa, no estuvire
conforme con la opinion o conclusion a que ha llegado el Fiscal Provincial de Rizal,
demandado en esta causa, opinion o conclusion hecha con entrera buena fe y en en
el ejercicio sano de sus facultades discrecionales, todavia queda al demandante
otros recursos que nuestras leyes proveen para proteccion o ejercicio de sus
derechos.
It may not be amiss to state here that , as a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a quasijudicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for
resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official
duty. (42 Am. Jur. sec. 21 p. 256). As was said in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon (33 Phil.,
508, 513)
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of
governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for
the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and
maliciously, and with the express purpos of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintif-Appellee, vs. DALMACIO
CATIPON, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
This appeal is taken from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
in its Civil Case No. 15711 sentencing Dalmacio Catipon to pay the Philippine
National Bank the principal sum of P3,050.83 with interest thereon from
September 1, 1951 until full payment plus costs.
The facts are set forth in the judgment appealed from to be as follows:
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The parties stipulate, among other things, that Defendant affixed his
signature on the Trust Receipt, Exhibit A because of his strong desire to
get the onions purchased by him from J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc., and which
were duly paid for to said J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc., and not
toPlaintif Bank, as evidenced by receipts marked Exhibits 1, 2 and 3;
that his signature was affixed at the Divisoria Market when a son of J. V.
Ramirez came to him and explained that the only way to get onions which he
bought was to sign the said Trust Receipt Exhibit A;
that the signature of
Dalmacio Catipon (Defendant) was affixed long after the trust receipt
Exhibit A was signed by J. V. Ramirez;
that J. V. Ramirez, who is the
President and General Manager of J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc., is the indentor and
importer and that Dalmacio Catipon is only a customer of J. V. Ramirez &
Co., Inc.;
that Plaintif filed a claim against J. V. Ramirez in the Insolvency
Proceedings of J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc. (Civil Case No. 3191 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila) long before the present complaint was filed;
and
that Plaintif did not realize any cent out of its claim filed in the insolvency
proceedings as J. V. Ramirez & Co. has no sufficient assets to meet all claims
of the creditors including that of the Plaintif. (Rec. App. pp. 92-93.)
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It is also of record that at the instance of the bank, Catipon was charged with
estafa (Criminal Case No. 8190) for having misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the merchandise covered by the trust receipt;
but
after due trial was acquitted from the charge. Shortly thereafter, the bank
commenced the present action to recover the value of the goods.
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Dalmacio Catipon rests his present appeal on three points, the same ones
invoked by him in the court below. They are:
(1) That his acquittal in
the estafa case is a bar to the Banks instituting the present civil
action, because the Bank did not reserve in the criminal case its
right to separately enforce the civil liability of the Appellant;
(2)
That under the facts stipulated, theDefendant was not liable under
the trust receipt;
and (3) That if at all, he should be held liable
only for one-half of the value of the goods under trust, there being
no stipulation that he would be solidarily liable with his co-signer.
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We agree with the trial court that the Appellants case has no merit. The
decision acquittingAppellant Catipon of the charge of estafa does not
preclude or bar the filing of this action to enforce his liability as one of the
signers of the trust receipt Exhibit A, for several reasons:
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(a) Because the acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that the guilt of
the Defendant, Dalmacio Catipon has not been satisfactorily established, as
expressly recited by the decision of acquittal of Judge Alejandro Panlilio
Exhibit 4-b, p. 4) and this acquittal being equivalent to one on
reasonable doubt, does not preclude a suit to enforce the civil
liability for the same act or omission, under Article 29 of the new
Civil Code;
it does not finally determine nor expressly declare that the
fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist (Rule 107, section 1
[d]);
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(b) Because the declaration in the decision of acquittal to the effect that if
any responsibility was incurred by the accused that is civil in
nature and not criminal amounts to a reservation of the civil action in
favor of the offended party, for the court in its decision had no reason to
dwell on a civil liability that it intended to extinguish by the same decision;
and
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(c) Because if the Appellant executed the trust receipt (that the
present action seeks to enforce), he is liable ex contractu for its breach,
whether he did or he did not misappropriate, misapply or convert
the said merchandise as charged in the information filed in the criminal
case.
The second issue raised by Appellant is likewise unmeritorious. Whether or
not Catipon appended his signature to the trust receipts at the request of the
son of his cosigner J. V. Ramirez, and regardless of the arrangements between
them, the fact remains that by signing the trust receipt the Appellant caused
the Bank to believe he assumed the obligations thereunder together with his
co-signer;
and the Bank having acted on that assumption, induced by
the Appellant, Catipon, the latter cannot, in equity, be heard now to deny his
liability, under the well known principle of estoppel. There is no finding that
the Bank was not warned or had reason to believe that theAppellant, in
signing the trust receipt, nevertheless did not intend to be bound by its
terms, or that there were special arrangements between Ramirez and
the Appellant.
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As to the third defense, it appearing from the stipulation that the
merchandise (onions) covered by the trust receipt were delivered by Ramirez
to the Appellant herein, who disposed thereof, it is but right that he should be
the one to answer for their value. Appellants payments to Ramirez cannot
diminish the rights of the Bank, since the trust receipt expressly obligated
herein Appellantto pay the Bank and not to his co-signer.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to the Appellants
rights against his co-signer J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc. Costs
against Appellant. SO ORDERED.
