Prediction versus Diagnosis: Comments on a Ken Jowitt Retrospective
New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. by Ken Jowitt
Review by: Ellen Comisso
Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 186-192
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_REVIEW
ARTICLES
Prediction versus Diagnosis: Comments on a Ken
JowittRetrospective
Ellen Comisso
New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. By Ken Jowitt. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1992. 342 pp.
Ken Jowitt's writings have never failed to entertain and provoke. New
WorldDisorder,essentially a collection of articles Jowitt has published
separately over the past fifteen years, is no exception. Parts of the
volume are and remain brilliantly insightful,some of it is simply wrong,
much of it is controversial (although perhaps less so than the author
would have us believe), and yet other arguments are either so obvious
or so general as to be close to banal.
The conscious and overt message of New WorldDisorderis that "leninism matters," both when it was present as a "world-historical phenomenon" and now, when it is, to useJowitt's colorful term, "extinct."
Moreover, Jowitt argues, understanding leninism requires recognizing
its genuine uniqueness as a distinct configuration of political, economic and social institutions, not assimilable to other traditional or
modern forms of rule. As such, "the Leninist party and regime constitute a novel package of charismatic, traditional, and modern elements,
a recasting of the definition and relation of these elements in such a
way that the Party combines impersonal and affective elements and
appeals ... to [those] groups in a turbulent society who themselves are
a composite of heroic, status, and secular orientations." As a phenomenon unto itself,leninism can be understood independently of its particular national incarnations as a unique "response to the status organization of peasant society and dependency," involving a number of
key elements: "the substitution of charismatic for procedural impersonalism; the recasting of status and the development of class features
under charismatic organizational auspices; ... an emphasis on institutional, not just elite, transformation of the agrarian sector"; and finally, insulation of "the country itself from international ties that constrain,shape, and reinforce domestic institutional patterns "that depart
from those prescribed by the Party's "programmatic-ideological commitments."
As such, the logic of the leninist system may be distinctive but it is
certainly present, and Jowitt demonstrates persuasively how both the
regime's organizational character and its relationship to the larger society change predictably as its core tasks evolve from transformation
to consolidation to modernization/inclusion. Yet paradoxically, he
notes, even as "Leninist regimes simultaneously achieve basic, farSlavicReview53, no- 1 (Spring 1994)
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Review Article
187
reaching,and decisive change in certain areas," they "allow for the
maintenance of prevolutionarybehavioral and attitudinal political
postures in others,and unintentionallystrengthenmany traditional
posturesin what,for the regime are oftenpriorityareas." As a result,
manyof the practicesand attitudesthatwere a response to pre-leninist
authoritarianism-be they dissimulation, ritualized behavior and
abuses of power, or relyingon "pull" for everythingfrombasic commodities to jobs and housing-persist and are reinforcedunder the
nominally"progressive"leninist successor regime. The consequence
may well be the mechanization of agricultureor the formationof an
industrialproletariat,but the creation of a bona fide citizen body or
a breakthroughinto a genuinelyopen or modern political order is as
faraway as ever.
Equally important,"Leninist partiesrequire combat environments
to preserve their organizational integrity."Yet once leninist parties
make peace with the societies they have transformed,identifyinga
accord"compellingsocial combat task"becomes increasinglydifficult;
ingly, the "heroic" ethos and collective discipline binding the elite
together begin to fade and "corruption"-that is, the subordination of
the general organization's interest to the individual, particular interests of its highest ranking members-ensues. The political significance
of the corruption thatJowittdescribes in the Soviet Union and eastern
Europe of the 1980s thus lies less in its scale (itselfconsiderable enough)
than in its causes, and in the extremely limited means the structure of
the leninist system itself provided for eliminating it. That Jowitt himself did not anticipate the ultimate consequences of tryingto remedy
the "neotraditionalism" he so eloquently described by no means detracts from the prescience of his 1983 analysis as to its importance.
It is here, however, that we arrive at the underlying question raised
by the publication of New WorldDisorder. That is, the cogency, intelligence and analytical depth ofJowitt's analyses are clearly first-rate;yet
each time an essay strays into the realm of prediction-whether it is
about a return to "mobilization" in the 1970s, the "global danger" of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Gorbachev's "exceptionally strong"
commitment to eastern Europe in the late 1980s, or the likelihood that
"a strong, not absolute, 'Giolittian' presidency" would emerge under
Gorbachev in 1990-it is simply wrong. If we accept mainstream social
science's account of itself,according to which the test of a theory is its
ability to predict, Jowitt-along with just about every other student of
leninist systems-is a failure as a theorist. Thus, the real question New
WorldDisorder raises concerns what the nature of the social scientific
enterprise is: can one thoroughly understand a social phenomenon
and yet still be wrong about it? Positivism tells us this is impossible;
our experience, however, continually confirms Kafka's observation that
"The right perception of any matter and a misunderstanding of the
same matter do not wholly exclude each other."
From the latter perspective, the task of the social scientist is not
predictive but diagnostic; rather than supply policy makers with a crystal ball, the role of social science is to illuminate and define current
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Slavic Review
188
problems while indicating the factorsthat will affecttheir solution.
Equally important,insofaras any coherent analysis must concentrate
on some variables to the exclusion of others,it means thatthe coherence of an analysismaywell be inverselyrelated to its predictivepowers: the futureresultsfromthe interplayof those elements which we
ignore or underanalyze togetherwith those variables upon which we
choose to focus.The testof a good theory,then,is its abilityto clarify
and to suggestpossible scenarios; prediction is quite beyond our capacities. In this regard,Jowittis brilliantas a diagnostician;not only
is he able to identifyimportantissues,but he can tell us cogentlywhy
those issues are importantand on which factorstheir resolution depends. His discussions of political culture both during and afterleninism are small classics in thisregard; one may disagree withsome of
his characterizationsand withthe role thathe assignspolitical culture,
but one cannot ignorethe case he makes forthe importanceof cultural
continuities.In short,as an example of what I have described above
as a "coherentanalysis,"Jowitt'swork is an outstandingcontribution.
But preciselyfor this reason, its predictivevalue is questionable.
whenJowittcommitsthe hubris of movingfrom
Not surprisingly,
analysisto forecast,elaboratingnot simplythe factorsaffectingpolitical evolutionbut actuallytellingus what the futureis likelyto be, the
The final three chapters of New World
resultsare far less satisfactory.
Disorderare illustrativeof the problem. On one level, they tell us a
story-in wonderful,metaphoric language, no less-which is quite
unobjectionable, namely that the leninist "legacy" in eastern Europe
and the Soviet successor states together with the leninist "extinction"
as a global phenomenon are likely to be prime factors shaping docentury. Thus, he
mestic and international politics into the twenty-first
writes, "The Leninist extinction should be likened to a catastrophic
volcanic eruption, one that initially and immediately affects only the
surrounding political 'biota' (i.e., other Leninist regimes), but whose
effects most likely will have a global impact on the boundaries and
identities that for half a century have politically, economically, and
militarily defined and ordered the world."
In addition, the intellectual thrust of these articles is important
and insightful; that many of their observations seem unremarkable
today should not detract from how controversial they were when Jowitt
firstmade them in 1990. Even now, Jowitt's trenchant contrast between
the political culture surviving leninism in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the "civic culture" needed to sustain an open,
competitive order, and his emphasis on the salience of the "civic/ethnic" identity issue everywhere are critical contributions to an understanding of political dynamics both within and outside the (former)
leninist bloc. As such, Jowitt's analysis provides a healthy antidote to
the euphoria of "transition to democracy" declarations, to the view
that simply rearranging political and economic institutions will miraculously produce democratic societies and competitive market economies, and to the assumption that the "east" can become like the "west"
while the west will remain unchanged in the process.
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189
On the otherhand, to assume thatthe "leninistlegacy" and primal
issues of culturalidentitiesare likelyto be the only or even the most
importantfactorsshaping the futuremeans ignoringa whole host of
othervariablesand counter-trends
thatcan be equally significant.
Thus,
whenJowittturnsto extrapolatehis analysisinto a vision of the future,
one all too frequentlyfinds passages which oscillate between the obvious .. . any substantialanalysisof democracy'sand marketcapitalism's chances in Eastern Europe must ... [come] to analytical grips
withthe cultural,political and economic 'inheritance'of fortyyearsof
Leninist rule.") and the hysterical(growing"movementsof rage" in
the Third World, religious crusades in the Middle East, "liberal authoritarianism"as the best possible outcome in eastern Europe, the
dissolution of Canada, intensifyingeconomic rivalrybetween the
United States,westernEurope andJapan, the possible failureof everythingfromVaclav Klaus's economic programto democracyin India).
And even if one hesitatesto dismissthe possibilitythatthe apocalypse
could well occur in an existentialist'sworld,one also needs to entertain
the possibilitythatit is not nearlyso imminentas an analysisfocusing
on issues of identityand culturemightsuggest.
In fact,even the mostradical packages of "shock therapy"measures
designed by westerneconomists were not adopted withouttakingaccount of the "cultural,political, and economic 'inheritance' of forty
yearsof Leninist rule," asJowittimplies.Quite the contrary:theywere
adopted-rightly or wrongly-preciselybecause of that"inheritance"
by leaders convinced that less dramatic measures would provide an
insufficient
basis for economic restructuring.
That such measures did
not instantaneouslycreate a "nation of entrepreneurs"is hardlysurprisingand one need not look to the "cultural legacies" of leninism
to understand why-even in the "civic cultures" of western Europe
and the United States, well over 90 percent of the economically active
population lives from wages and salaries, not from entrepreneurial
activities. What is perhaps more surprising (especially in light of Jowitt's warnings) is that the hardships such measures entailed for large
sectors of the populations affected has not lead to their reversal-but
the explanation here seems to rest more on the absence of viable alternatives, general problems of collective action and the fact that,
among the "legacies of leninism" easy to ignore, exist a small but rather
significant and strategic constituency-concentrated among younger
members of the population-genuinely supportive of market-oriented
reforms and a more open political process.
Likewise, it is certainly correct that the design of appropriate political institutions is no more a guarantee of political stability or competitive politics-much less "democracy"-than "shock therapy" is of
economic recovery and competitive markets. At the same time, however, badly designed political institutions are a guarantee-of political
stalemate and instability, even when "culture" is held constant: the
struggle between president and parliament in Russia was a product of
the institutional legacy of perestroika, not the "political culture" of
leninism per se. Accordingly, in eastern Europe, "priests, demagogues
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190
Slavic Review
and colonels" have not dominated the post-1989political landscape as
Jowittpredicted; and neither have "democrats and capitalists"-the
only alternativehe gives.Rather,the prime actors have been political
parties-often quite fragmented,internallydivided and lacking clear
social bases of support-largely because institutionalrules make electoral victoriesthe only means of access to power. While the commitment of the various parties to liberal political norms varies significantlyboth withinand between statesin the region,the cases in which
those norms have been transgressedhardly amount to anythingapproaching a new authoritarianism,partlybecause whateverauthoritarian instinctsrulingelites mayhave, the rules of the game theywere
elected under militateagainst indulgingsuch whims.
In short,the potentialoptions available in easternEurope and the
formerSoviet Union are far more numerous than those which can be
envisioned simplyby projecting"legacies" of the past into the future.
In fact,"muddlingthrough"via incrementalchanges in conflictingand oftenunanticipated-directions in differentspheres of social life
without either a resounding "success" or a clear cut "collapse" may
turn out to be a more popular strategy than anyone cares to admit.
The result may thus be political and economic systems broad enough
to accommodate priests, demagogues, colonels and capitalists and democrats, with no single element strong enough to exclude the others.
Finally, Jowitt's pessimistic prediction of "a period of global, regional, and national turmoil over boundaries and identities" thanks to
the "leninist extinction" is also subject to some question. Certainly, it
is true that we are no longer in a bipolar world; in this sense, Jowitt is
correct but tautological by noting that identifying oneself or one's
country as "anticommunist" has become an anachronism. At the same
time, predicting "turmoil over boundaries and identities" is quite reasonable, but to say such turmoil begins with the collapse of socialism
is to ignore international realities for (at least) the past two centuries:
"boundaries and identities" have always been contested, regardless of
the presence or absence of leninism.
In fact, the "leninist extinction" may be as much a consequence as
a cause of broader changes in the international political and economic
order. That is, the rapid reduction in the technical and political barriers to international trade in factors of production (namely, assets
and labor) that occurred in the 1980s set in motion a fundamental
change in the international opportunity structure confronting developed and developing countries alike. Combined with the debt crisis,
one consequence was a dramatic change in the economics of public
enterprise. In effect,state-owned enterprises changed from privileged
recipients of investment on capital markets dominated by national
governments to financially strapped entities whose owner was overwhelmed by debt and unable to borrow on favorable terms. Understandably, debtor states began to sell their assets; an additional consideration was that the assets themselves catered primarily to domestic
markets and hence were difficult to restructure into internationally
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191
competitive lines of production that could produce the surpluses
needed to pay debts. From the perspective of state enterprises,too,
once investmentwas available solelyfromprivatesources,diversifying
ownership became the only means of economic survival.Hence, the
decline of the political barriersto the expansion of global marketsin
equitycame to parallel the drop in the technicalbarriersto such trade
broughtby changes in computerand telecommunicationstechnology.
The factorsthatled to what is euphemisticallytermed"reform"of
the public sectorin westernand developing countrieswere factorsthat
proved fatal to state socialism, where the public sector was virtually
What Jowittdescribed in the sociopolthe entire economy toutcourt.
iticalspherewas equally,ifnot more,importantin theeconomic realm:
socialism's modernization commitments,formulated in a world in
which economic developmentoccurred largelyby the mobilizationof
domestic resources,could no longer be achieved withinthe confines
of a closed politico-economicorder once trade based on comparative
advantage became a viable alternative.
Equally important,reduced economic and physicalbarriersto trade
alter the economics of statebuilding as well. In an internationaleconomywithhighprotectivebarriers,large stateswithlarge domesticmarkets are at an advantage in realizing economies of scale. But where
enterprisesof small states can export relativelyfreelyto buyers in
adjoining areas and importthe inputstheylack at home withfewprice
disadvantages,size is no longer a necessarycondition of either international competitivenessor of economic growth.Indeed, when geographic extensivenessentails areas withverydifferentlevels of development and economic exigencies withina single state,it can even be
a disadvantage.Thus, Czechs may have needed the Slovak hinterland
in 1918 but in 1992 it was Vaclav Klaus, not the Slovak nationalists,
who forcedthe separation.
If I am rightand small is not only beautifulbut also rich,there is
an importanteconomic dimension to "turmoil over boundaries and
identities"that is easily overlooked if one focuses solely on cultural
and political parameters.In such a world,ethnicityand shared history
maybe as much a factorkeeping statestogetheras an elementleading
to theirdisintegration.
At the same time, one should not forgetthat reduced barriersto
internationaltrade are, afterall, a product of political decisions made
by states in their own interest.In this regard, "free trade" has traditionally been pushed by states with strong,highly developed economies. Such statesare also stateswithhigh standardsof livingand high
labor costs. In a world of high factormobility,however,theyare vulnerable to labor inflows(i.e., immigration)and capital outflows.In such
a situation, protectionismcould easily become the weapon of the
strong,in whichcase the desire to protecta "national tradition"would
simplybe a euphemism for protectingthe national pocketbook.
From this perspective,the key question is how open the international tradingsystemwill be, and noting thatincreased protectionism
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is a possibilityis by no means equivalent to sayingit is a probability,
as thereare also strongforcesin the westernworld militatingagainst
it. Again, this means we need to open our eyes to the possibilitythat
the futureis not composed of "either/or"alternatives,as eitherJowitt
or the "transitionto democracy" school would have us believe. For
example, it is difficultto imagine even the "Golden Triangle" of eastern Europe-Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary-entering EC
under its currentgovernance and economic arrangements.Yet preciselythe "turmoilover boundaries and identities"currentlyin progress now in westernEurope may well lead to modificationsin those
governance structuresthat would make east European inclusion far
easier. To furthermuddy the waters,it is also unclear if "joining Europe" even under these conditions will be the panacea it is currently
envisioned as; even now, France's unemploymentrate is nearly the
same as Hungary's and Spanish unemploymentis four times as high
as the Czech Republic's.
The moral of the story,then, is that we live in a world of mixed
blessings,in which our task is to understand how Hananiah can be
wrongwithoutJeremiah
being right(and vice versa).Accordingly,reading New WorldDisorderas an exercise in prediction is at best problematic; reading it, however,as an essay on "what mighthappen if..
is an intellectuallyinvigoratingexperience.
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