Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region
against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental
legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the

judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.

192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have
set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule
upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly
withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract
is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal
leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution
statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts
to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed
very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the
river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease
and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar,
however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial
Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that
appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ
of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of
Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper
remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable
injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for
reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a
petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner
asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the
Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication
Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner
Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the
NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it
concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie
evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the

other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case,
according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground
that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
HELD:
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful
authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It
follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for
Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside.
The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of
the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the
correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public
hearing before the Board.

Spouses Sangalang vs. IAC and Ayala Corporation, [G.R. No. 71169. August
30, 1989.]
Facts:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar
Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things,
Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using
intemperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
explanation.

The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration,
particularly, . . . The Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and
competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption
undeniably pervading the judiciary . . . disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for.
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in
acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open
assault upon the Court's honor and integrity.
Issue: Whether or not the counsels act constitutes malpractice in violation of the
Codes (CPR) provision on the use of scandalous offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
Held: In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to
the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of
the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better
that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments
of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations,
he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to
the stability of the administration of justice in general.
Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem . In that event, it is
the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession."
The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in
contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect
toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

JULIAN SANTULAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. L-28021
December 15, 1977
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by their
heirs were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of
public domain with an area of about 4 hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit
Cavite. The Petitioner Santulan surveyed the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an
application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an
area of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the application for revocable permit to

occupy the said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven
years later after acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand,
private respondent Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was
illegally entered the area covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and was refrain
from introducing improvements.
However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for a
revocable-permit and a lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the
said land. He also contends that he had been in the continues and exclusive
possession of the land since 1920 when it was still under water, and that he had
used it as a site of his fish corrals, and allegedly converted two (2) hectares into
fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and
another sluice gate made of wood. On the northern part of the land bordering the
bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to
protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. The private
respondent said that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private respondent
Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict.
Issue:
Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private respondent
could nullify the petitioners preferential right to lease the land by reason of his
riparian rights?
Ruling:
The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to reparian rights
which may he invoked by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the upland in
accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. It was found out
that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb
of the ordinary tides that is an extension of Santulans Lot No. 986 of the Kawit
cadastre, with an area of 17, 301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937
under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free
patent, and the said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits
accumulated by the alluvial action of the sea, and the petitioner was the first to
enter the land and to make dikes thereon.
Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad faith, and
latters allegation with respect to the possession and improvements could not nullify
the petitioners preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights.
Therefore, the rejection of the private respondents revocable permit and foreshore
lease is proper.
________________________________________________________________

Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or
banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands
adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns
land situated on the bank of a river.
Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers
but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the
sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the
land along the coast and the water near the coast or the shore zone between the
high and low watermarks.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS,

Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN
TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a
exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS:
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine

mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the

Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company
- sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but
Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the
Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment
of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such

omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of
the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently,
the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MANUEL

DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO DUMYUNG,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Republic of the Philippines filed separate civil actions for annulment of the free
patent and the corresponding certificates of title issued pursuant thereto to herein
private respondents on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and
information furnished by said respondents. The Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company intervened alleging that a portion of the titled lands in question was
within its ordinary timber license, and other portion, embraced in its mineral claims.
The proceedings on these cases were suspended until after the three criminal cases
for falsification of public documents filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for allegedly making untrue statements in their application for
free patents over the subject lands were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Thereafter, upon motion of private respondents and without having received any
evidence in the civil cases, the trial judge dismissed said cases, and ruled that
respondents' original certificates of title had become indefeasible, that they were
entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872 as members of the cultural minorities,

and their acquittal in the criminal cases for falsification was a bar to these civil
cases. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in ruling on the factual issues in
these civil cases without having received evidence thereon, and ruled that the
acquittal of private respondents from the criminal cases for falsification could not be
a bar to these civil cases, for, the only issue in the criminal cases was whether or
not there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had
committed the acts of falsification, and the factual issues of whether or not the
lands in question were timber and mineral, and whether or not private respondents
belonged to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be
issued free patents on said lands were not in issue in said criminal cases. Cases
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; MEMBERS OF CULTURAL MINORITIES ARE
ENTITLED TO ACQUIRE PUBLIC LAND, DISPOSABLE OR NOT, UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872. A member of the cultural minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated either by himself or through his predecessorsin-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1956,
shall be entitled to a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of land not
exceed 20 hectares; provided that at the time he filed his free patent application he
is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of
the Public Land Law. (Section 44, Republic Act 3872)
2. ID.; CERTIFICATION OF TITLE COVERING TIMBER OR MINERAL LAND IS
VOID. It is well settled that a certificates of title is void when it covers property of
public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on
non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall
be cancelled.
3. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL CASE IS NOT A BAR TO A
CIVIL CASE; CASE AT BAR. The acquittal of private respondents in the criminal
cases for falsification of public documents by allegedly making untrue statements in
their application for free patents is not a bar to civil actions to cancel their
certificates of title issued pursuant to the said free patents. For, the only issue in the
criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond doubt that
the private respondent had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the
informations, and the factual issues of whether or not the private respondents are
entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872, and whether or not the lands in
question are timber and mineral were not in issue in said criminal cases.
4. ID.; ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF TITLE; JUDGMENT; PREMATURE
DISMISSAL OF ACTION. In a suit for cancellation of title of land on the grounds
that the lands covered are mineral and timber lands, it is premature for the trial

court to rule that the certificates of title issued to defendants have become
indefeasible and that defendants are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872 as
members of the cultural minorities, and thereby dismiss the actions without first
receiving evidence on the factual issues, namely whether or not the lands in
question are timber and mineral lands and whether private respondents belong to
the cultural minorities and qualified to be issued free patents.
5. APPEAL; REMAND OF A CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT WHERE NO EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS FINDINGS. Where the trial court prematurely dismisses a suit for
cancellation of title of land without first receiving evidence on the factual issues
raised in the action, the order of dismissal, upon appeal, shall be set aside and
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
Facts :
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the
exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO
No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, coproduction, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which
were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the
effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.,
an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before
this Court.
Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?
Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as

amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of
location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law,
Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions
dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other
areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing
mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in
force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through
a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from
altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands
of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for
the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization
and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

TATEL V. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts:
Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatels
warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring
Tatels warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil
Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more
suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal
officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block
of houses either in thepoblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and
properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional,
contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null
and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO
Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its
police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies
of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation.
Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance(1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute(2) must not be unfair or oppressive(3) must not be
partial or discriminatory(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade(5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where

such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses
and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of
life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the
government.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not
been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government.
No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade
but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse
because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in
the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than
what has been conceived by the municipal government.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:
Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the
full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2)
requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building
permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the
required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the plant,
a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners
also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayors permit
but were not entertained.
Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked,
effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and
reasonable notice.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC,
alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow

Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until the case has
been adjudicated on the merits.
Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that
"Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to
the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a
time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari
for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology
Developer

HELD:
YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if
not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury
to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation
of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by
the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality
but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents
of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor
through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the
plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria,
but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6,
1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good
only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate
its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this
dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need
to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally
essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from
the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary reliefmay
recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN
PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary
Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove
timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with
an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
(Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the

logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to

presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural
Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter
addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation
and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the
cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his
letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by
petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was
allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award
or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter
dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April
2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR],
seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled
in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356
which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public
bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the
issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the
concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license
agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR
however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of
the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders
cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
HELD:
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable
period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences
of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or

should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of
declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those
who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three
years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the
validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that
petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity
to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay
constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in
favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public
policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of
discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to
be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who
should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its Chairman,
Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO, respondent.
FACTS:
On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several
foreclosed properties. Included in the properties offered to the public was a house
and lot situated at 3377 New Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted

his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was
subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of 35% of the amount
thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid
after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly,
petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of
P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9,800.00 proposal
bond.
Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25%
in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were issued to petitioner as
payment for his riceland consisting of twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela
acquired by the Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However,
the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then
offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment "and all future
installments." Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in cash the
balance of the required down payment.
A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November 19, 1981,
where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor GSIS "the balance of the
purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100
(P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine
currency, at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly,
beginning December 1, 1981."
The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner on
December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became due, petitioner
sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he
be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing
in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the said bonds. Petitioner invoked the
provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 251.
The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22, 1982,
denied petitioner's offer. The board resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank
bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System
18% at maturity.
In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of Trustees to
reconsider Resolution No. 91. Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position with the
contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling in the case of
Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System, etc., et al.. Likewise,
petitioner submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February

12, 1982, wherein it was stated, inter alia, that if the GSIS accepts the Land Bank
bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value. To accept
said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the credibility of the bonds as
instruments of indebtedness.
In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager, Acquired
Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was adopted on May 18, 1982 by
the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the request of petitioner. Hence, on August 5,
1982, the instant original action for mandamus was filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be
compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a
residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS.
HELD: Yes.
It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or
controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as
payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to
pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is
resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value.
Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a)
PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original
provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their face
value; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial
solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death, retirement,
insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million
members, the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and
workers."

PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.

Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. The protection of watersheds ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives.
This case sprouted from the Memorandum of Agreement signed by Secretaries of
DPWH and DENR together with the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC)
Governor. The same provides that DENR is allowing the utilization of its land in
Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC. It turned out, however, that
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo already wrote to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the
DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution
banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. The letter also

asked that addressee's side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and
temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the
San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters. It was also
found out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation Area. Thus, the report submitted by the forest officers of the Forest
Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural
Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, revealed that there was no
permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes. It
further states that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the
ecological balance and environmental factors in that community.
In February 1990, DENR granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC)
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage
dumpsite.
On July 31 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR
suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent Secretary of DPWH,
stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the site.
On November 1993, the DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that
the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be
dismantled. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the
government agencies, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635,Excluding from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as
Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of
action. On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio
phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation. On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early
Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite. As a result,
MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. On 19 July 1999,
then President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the
dumpsite on 31 December 2000. On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed
DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo
dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic.
Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence
erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for
Restraining Order on 19 January 2001. On 24 January 2001, SC issued the
Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, effective immediately and until further
orders. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as
The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by
President Estrada.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San
Mateo
Landfill as of December 2000; and
2. Whether or not the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by
Rep. Act No.
9003.
Held:
San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Proclamation No. 635 is illegal.
A mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. The court also
held that the records of this case indicate two self-evident facts. The San Mateo site
has adversely affected its environs, and sources of water should always be
protected. Adverse effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. MMA
was also informed that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by
dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation incompatible with Laguna Lake Development Authoritys (LLDA)
program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. Investigation Reports
regarding the respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located
approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large
flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground were also submitted.
Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already, contaminating the nearby creeks
that were sources of potable water for the residents. The contaminated water was
also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into
Laguna de Bay.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now. Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to
avert the garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to
adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which
adversely affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and
industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the
protection and conservation of watersheds. Respondents actions in the face of
such grave environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted
that instead of providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness,
worsened the problem.
The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the countrys
natural resources. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192
entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation and our other natural treasures. Although the DENR owns the Marikina
Reserve, it is but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to
the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes
particular reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority.

With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public
respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San
Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians
and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
The Local Government Code gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the
general welfare of their inhabitants. The circumstances under which Proclamation
No. 635 was passed also violates R.A. No 7160, or the Local Government Code.
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier,
on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the
state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27
requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government
authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can
be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior
approval of
the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.
Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000
was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic,
comprehensive
and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of
public health
and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the
utilization of
valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. It requires
the
adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the
collection
and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal
of solid
wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public
information, and the
funding of solid waste management projects.
The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management
Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure
for the phase out and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity
of the Act in case ofexisting open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an
aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently
developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40,

specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan
of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the
landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources
such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

Magallona vs Ermita
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was
meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence
the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No.
The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to
acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution

of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to

comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular
lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it
as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to
our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of
innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under
the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the
main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do
that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of
the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where
we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by
Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility
vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

 Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air
Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared
principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and
the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of
sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making
process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development
policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on
the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any
activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise
in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere
of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or
her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in
violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and
cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting
from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case
before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court
is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be
set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically

enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will
not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,

REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHIL. RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY & THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI),Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas region
of the Philippines and one of the countrys most popular tourist destinations, was
declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in 1973 under Presidential Proclamation
No. 1801. The island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and
Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan.
More than a decade ago, respondent Province built the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay.It also
built the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the
receiving end for tourists in Boracay. Respondent Province operates both ports to
provide structural facilities suited for locals, tourists and guests and to provide
safety and security measures.
Governor Marquez sent a letter to respondent PRA on March 12, 2009 expressing
the interest of respondent Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the
foreshores of Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, pursuant
to Resolution No. 13, s. 2008 issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan.
Sometime in April 2009, respondent Province entered into an agreement with the
Financial Advisor/Consultant that won in the bidding process held a month before, to
conduct the necessary feasibility study of the proposed project for the
Renovation/Rehabilitation of the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Building and Jetty Port,
Enhancement and Recovery of Old Caticlan Coastline, and Reclamation of a Portion
of Foreshore for Commercial Purposes (the Marina Project), in Malay, Aklan.
Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent

Province issued Resolution No. 2009110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file
an application to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay,
Aklan with respondent PRA.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its
strong opposition to the intended foreshore lease application, through Resolution
No. 044, approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that respondent Provinces
foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit, at
the expense of the local government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was
the rightful entity to develop, utilize and reap benefits from the natural resources
found within its jurisdiction.
In August 2009, a Preliminary Geohazard Assessmentfor the
enhancement/expansion of the existing Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal
through beach zone restoration and Protective Marina Developments in Caticlan,
Malay, Aklan was completed.
Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance Report and
Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his letter
dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). The letter reads in part:
With the project expected to start its construction implementation next month, the
province hereby assures your good office that it will give preferential attention to
and shall comply with whatever comments that you may have on this EPRMP.
Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on the
possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to
forty (40) hectares.
Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its Resolution
No. 4094and authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to enter
into a MOA with respondent Province for the implementation of the reclamation
project.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province ECC-R6-1003-0967100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of
2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA with respondent PRA.
In Resolution No. 046, Series of 2010, adopted on June 23, 2010, the Malay
Municipality reiterated its strong opposition to respondent Provinces project and
denied its request for afavorableendorsement of the Marina Project.

The Malay Municipality subsequently issued Resolution No. 016, Series of 2010,
adopted on August 3, 2010, to request respondent PRA not to grant reclamation
permit and notice to proceed to the Marina Project of the respondent Provincial
Government of Aklan located at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.
In a letter dated October 12, 2010, petitioner informed respondent PRA of its
opposition to the reclamation project.
Petitioner likewise transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010, registering its
opposition to the reclamation project to respondent Province, respondent PRA,
respondent DENR-EMB, the National Economic Development Authority Region VI,
the Malay Municipality, and other concerned entities.
Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipalitys denial of respondent
Provinces request for afavorableendorsement, as well as the strong opposition
manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as an NGO, respondent
Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection
Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court
issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.
After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province
immediately issued an order to the Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned
contractor to cease and desist from conducting any construction activities until
further orders from this Court.
ISSUES:

[1] Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot
and academic;
[2] Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing this case;
[3] Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by
laws and regulations based on the scope and classification of the project;
[4] Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under
the pertinent laws and regulations; and

[5] Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for
the project
HELD:
A close reading of the two LGUs respective resolutions would reveal that
they are not sufficient to render the petition moot and academic, as there
are explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by respondent
Province. In Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Caticlan it is stated that any vertical structures to be constructed shall be subject
for barangay endorsement. Clearly, what the barangay endorsed was the
reclamation only, and not the entire project that includes the construction of a
commercial building and wellness center, and other tourism-related
facilities.Petitioners objections, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the
reclamation per se, but also to the building to be constructed and the entire projects
perceived ill effects to the surrounding environment.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for
respondent Province to comply with on pain of revocation of its endorsement of the
project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on the environmental
impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us.
Therefore, the contents of the two resolutions submitted by respondent Province do
not support its conclusion that the subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs
had already addressed all the issues raised and rendered the instant petition moot
and academic.
We do not agree with respondents appreciation of the applicability of the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case. We are reminded
of our ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals, which summarized our earlier decisions
on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:
REMEDIAL LAW: exhaustion of administrative remedies
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule.
It is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2)
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, when there is no due process observed, or where the protestant

has no other recourse.

Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue
an ECC was rendered, it stands to be aggrieved by the decision, because it claims
that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would unavoidably adversely affect
the Boracay side, where petitioners members own establishments engaged in the
tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner contends that the declared objective of
the reclamation project is to exploit Boracays tourism trade because the project is
intended to enhance support services thereto; however, this objective would not be
achieved since the white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be
negatively affected by the project. Petitioners conclusion is that respondent
Province, aided and abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the
spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to perform
their duties under said laws.
REMEDIAL LAW: new rules of procedure for environmental cases; writ of
continuing mandamus
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a
relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil
action that may be availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO as an auxiliary
remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The Rationale of the said Rules
explains the writ in this wise:
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of
regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the
appropriate government agencies.
Thus, a government agencys inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future
of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek
to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely on such agencies to
take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly,
questions regarding the propriety of an agencys action or inaction will need to be
analyzed.
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus,
which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ
pertains: the performance of a legal duty.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated
under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well

as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.

Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.
Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised here
that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus it was justified in
coming to this Court.
3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs
submissions bear great weight in this case.However, the following are the issues
that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB RVI in issuing the ECC:
[1] Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere
expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new
project;
[2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located
project;
[3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government
agencies; and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation
project to the environment.
As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by
respondent Province above, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would be
devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be utilized for
the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To
be true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at
the very least predict the impact that the construction of the new buildings on the
reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These new
constructions and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies
that respondent Province previously submitted for the construction of the original
jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this alleged
expansion, instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.
Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay
are separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the
significant contributions of Boracays white-sand beach to the countrys tourism
trade, which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in
implementing projects within its vicinity.
POLITICAL LAW: public consultation

The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies
in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public
consultation and approval of local government units for the projects described
therein.
In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the
project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which
authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to
undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province
to go through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs
authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB
RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which is
tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements
found in the Local Government Code provisions.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultationwith the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is
illegal.
Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required
by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent Province.
Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had
already been issued was insufficient to comply with this requirement under the
Local Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior public
consultation should have considered the ecological or environmental concerns of
the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or
minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province
once tried to obtain the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay,
but this was denied by the latter.
Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:
5.3. ublic Hearing / Consultation Requirements
For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS
review is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other

undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required by EMB.

Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that
environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in
the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All public consultations
and public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. The
public hearing/consultation Process reportshall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and
shall constitute part of the records of the EIA process.
In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public
consultations, the same should be initiated early so that concerns of stakeholders
could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case, respondent Province
had already filed its ECC application before it met with the local government units of
Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay
of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Malay onFebruary 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging
and insistence of respondent Province. As we have established above, the
respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not render this petition
moot and academic.
It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the
promotion of tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill
the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this decision, we
mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very
apparent from both the petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and
memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth
resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces
cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the
proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of
utmost importance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing mandamus
specifically as follows:
1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental
Management Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and review the following
matters:

a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located

project;
b. its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere
expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new
project; and
c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated,
and comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be ordered by respondent
DENR-EMB RVI.
2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:
a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation
project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with
non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as
required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of the Local Government Code.
Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the
submission by respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by
respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns
raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in
modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of respondent
DENR-EMB RVI.
The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province
of Aklan, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine
Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance
with the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3)
months from the date of promulgation of this Decision.
In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or
their agents, representatives or persons acting in their place or stead,
shall immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of
the project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from
this Court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5)
days to this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this
Decision, copy furnished the petitioner.

SHELL vs. JALOS

This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum

contractor, whose pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal
areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen.
FACTS:
1. On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell)
and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the
exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.
2. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area
and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas
Project, which entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from
Shells production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. The
pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
3. On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares,
and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages against
Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from
the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was
adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shells natural gas
pipeline.
4. Jalos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of
the pipeline. As a result, their average net income per month fell from a high
of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They said that the pipeline greatly affected
biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to]
stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea. They now have to stay longer
and farther out at sea to catch fish, as the pipelines operation has driven the
fish population out of coastal waters.
5. Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. It
alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a
pollution case under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law. Under these statutes, the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution
cases and actions for related damages.
6. Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state
immunity without the States consent. Shell said that under Service Contract
38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves.

7. Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it
did not specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shells
part that could have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et al.
8. On March 24, 2004 the RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action
was actually pollution-related, although denominated as one for damages.
The complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB, the government
agency vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases.
9. Jalos, et al assailed the RTCs order through a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The latter court reversed such order and upheld the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the action. It said that Shell was not being sued
for committing pollution, but for constructing and operating a natural gas
pipeline that caused fish decline and considerable reduction in the
fishermens income. The claim for damages was thus based on a quasi-delict
over which the regular courts have jurisdiction.
10.The CA also rejected Shells assertion that the suit was actually against the
State. It observed that the government was not even impleaded as party
defendant.
11.The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong.
Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell
had the correlative obligation to respect. Failure to observe such obligation
resulted in a violation of the fishermens rights and thus gave rise to a cause
of action for damages.
12.Finally, the CA held that Jalos, et al substantially complied with the technical
requirements for filing the action. But since they failed to prove the
requisites of a class suit, only those who have verified the complaint should
be deemed party plaintiffs.
Shell moved for reconsideration of the CAs decision but the same was
denied. Hence, it filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
Issues
1.
Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary
jurisdiction of the PAB;
2.
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against
Shell; and
3.
Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the
doctrine of state immunity.
Rulings

1. Yes. While the complaint in this case sufficiently alleges a cause of action, the
same must be filed with the PAB, which is the government agency tasked to
adjudicate pollution-related cases.
Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the
National Pollution and Control Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by
P.D. 984. These empowered the PAB to determine the location, magnitude,
extent, severity, causes and effects of water pollution. Among its functions is to
serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution. In this regard, the PAB has the power
to conduct hearings, impose penalties for violation of P.D. 984, and issue writs of
execution to enforce its orders and decisions. The PABs final decisions may be
reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes. The complaint said that the natural gas pipelines construction and
operation greatly affected the marine environment, drove away the fish, and
resulted in reduced income for Jalos, et al. True, the complaint did not contain some
scientific explanation regarding how the construction and operation of the pipeline
disturbed the waters and drove away the fish from their usual habitat as the
fishermen claimed. But lack of particulars is not a ground for dismissing the
complaint.
A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. Its elements consist of: (1) a right
existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect
the plaintiffs right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such
right. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the
claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
Thus, the construction and operation of the pipeline may, in itself, be a
wrongful act that could be the basis of Jalos, et als cause of action. The rules do
not require that the complaint establish in detail the causal link between the
construction and operation of the pipeline, on the one hand, and the fish decline
and loss of income, on the other hand, it being sufficient that the complaint states
the ultimate facts on which it bases its claim for relief.
3. . Shell is not an agent of the State and may thus be sued before that body for
any damages caused by its operations. The parties may appeal the PABs decision
to the CA. But pending prior determination by the PAB, courts cannot take
cognizance of the complaint.
Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor
for the exploration and development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves.
While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the States full control and

supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the States agent within the
meaning of the law.
Shells main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to perform all
petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and finance as well as
other connected services to the Philippine government. Shells primary obligation
under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of
transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services,
technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. It is not immune
from suit and may be sued for claims even without the States consent. Notably,
the Philippine government itself recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to
the project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under
Service Contract 38.
Petition granted.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA.
PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec
Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA
contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for
the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus
with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document
signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment
clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless

to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be
invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual
undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession
areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in
favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has
the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the
project.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA.
PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of
the Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians
concerned. However, only one of the many provinces affected approved the
issuance of an IFMA. PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported
resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion.
PICOP filed a petition for MANDAMUS against DENR Sec Alvarez for refusing to sign
and execute the IFMA contract.
Issue:
Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of
Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion.
Held:
NO. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision.
Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by the
proposed IFMA. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not
because the local government has control over such project, but because the local

government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the
implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies to projects
that "may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species." The local government should thus represent the communities in such area,
the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic change
if the project is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the
resources in the area, and deserve to be adequately compensated when these
resources are exploited.
Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the
local government before the requirement of the national government seeking
approval from the local government can be applied.