State regulation

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
1.

Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2.

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
a.

All cases in which the constitutionality or

validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

b.

All cases involving the legality of any tax,

impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

c.

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any

lower court is in issue.

d.

All criminal cases in which the penalty

imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

e.

All cases in which only an error or question

of law is involved.

3.

Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other

stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.

4.

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a

miscarriage of justice.

5.

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

6.

Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in

accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Article 7 sec 14
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President
shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President, within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a
candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying

degree of strictness with which the examination papers were

graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per
cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to
75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious
of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note
to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to
the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced
the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per
cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views
of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on
the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on
June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR
BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTYFIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of seventy per cent in
any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen
hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive
approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid,
should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize
more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical
data are set forth:
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic
Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to

be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in
different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average
as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this
Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed
petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to
1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which
are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated,
this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their
grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching
effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have
been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of
the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply
argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which
the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs.
E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against
it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners,
Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and
Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The
legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The
question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new
member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author,
to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill,
its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon
after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946
to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition
604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094),
because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading
materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create
a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there
was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of
this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available
to the public during those years and private enterprises had
also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during
those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be
published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by

the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public

knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has
to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the
point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the
question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we
daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon
legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial
system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress
of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations of
those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the
validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those
against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW,
441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the
opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the
original bill and which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in
other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined
carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the
Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the
state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time
provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office
of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to
public office. Any male citizen of the age of twentyone years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all
the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the
power of appointing them had previously rested with
the judges, and this was the principal appointing
power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
the insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of
the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power
over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that
the admission spoken of must be by the court; that
to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of
granting necessarily implies the power of refusing,
and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to
entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without
affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision
seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring
the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with
the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the
object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department

under the charge of able professors, the students in

which department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt
justly, considered this examination, together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as fully
equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the
ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering
the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the
learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It
could have had no other object, and hence no
greater scope should be given to its provisions. We
cannot suppose that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention
that the authorities of the college should inquire as
to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation
of which the act admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma competent evidence as to
the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be
read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present
condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence
in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only
the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be
admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of
Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of
the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals.
and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the
highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial,
and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has
been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study
of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs.
Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe
the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act
of admission has always been regarded as a judicial

function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon

an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone
as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested
in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to
the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets
up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted?
(p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative
departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither
branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which
properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other
in the discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting upon
the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex
rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible
for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is
exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of
government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are
exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and
intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts
depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and
severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For
more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of
1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most
solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
that element and say with assurance that it is either
a part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent,
and coordinate branch of the government. They took
this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its
attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in
any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps
the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department
by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys
at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be
inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned
power to protect the public interest. When it does
legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required
of attorneys at law in order that public interests may
be protected, such qualifications do not constitute
only a minimum standard and limit the class from

which the court must make its selection. Such

legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court
cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed
necessary by the course of the proper administration
of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed
by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the
power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment
when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except
New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so
far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive
their formal license to practice law by their admission
as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34
L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice
having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the
part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always
has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside.
(p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of
that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and
to interpretation of the laws that there be members
of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and
sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by
Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an
"officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the end of justice.
His cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in
the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in
this country and England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded
to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered
upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred
authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to
be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in
its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the
unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those
not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has
been well settled, by the rules and practice of
common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for
what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition
to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a
law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed.
366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the
attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the

court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence

of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of
the admission of such officers in the highest court of
the states to which they, respectively, belong for,
three years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry
the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise
of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous
cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New
York in the matter of the application of Cooper for
admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in
the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without
exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of
a judicial function, and this opinion need not be
burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of
one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen,
102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a
judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California,
281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R.
1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between
the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that
shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial
power, and the distinction is a vital one and not
subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall
be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the
action of the courts by requiring of them construction
of the law according to its own views, it is very plain
it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court,
and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be
so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case
with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this
Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no

valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution

provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art.
VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to
reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has
not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility
over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate
group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does
not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that the legislature may and
should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the
Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of
a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that
it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are
not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to
the bar, without taking the prescribed examination,
on the ground that he holds the office of provincial
fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28,
1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act
Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws
and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and

regular standing as members of the bar of the

Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall
have held, under the authority of the United States,
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of
the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the
Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney
of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province,
may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various
branches of legal learning upon which he was
examined, thus falling four points short of the
required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent
in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required
qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to
the bar, we should grant him license to practice law
in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator
apparently sought to attain in enacting the abovecited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view
of the context generally and especially of the fact
that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides
for the admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give
effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and
to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power
exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and
in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the
above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or
limiting the power conferred upon the commission is
to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were
appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the
admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such appointments had been
made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason
to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any
other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment
as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively
appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency
on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in
itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the

necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We

conclude therefore that this application for license to
practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since that
time he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably
gave evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified
under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee
of the court upon his application therefor, without
prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to
present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 4849.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix
the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon,
has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a
class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students
who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had
studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and
would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for
three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this
law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to
the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law
in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved
March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who
shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in
regard to admission to the bar in force at the time
such applicant commend the study of law, either in a
law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one
branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899,
this court shall grant a license of admittance to the
bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued
by any law school regularly organized under the laws
of this state, whose regular course of law studies is
two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years,
and showing that the student began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with
the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office, or part of
such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid
law school," and whose course of study began prior
to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a
satisfactory examination by the examining board in
the branches now required by the rules of this court.
If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of
the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial
rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation
for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment,
it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature
had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice,

and could prescribe the character of evidence which

should be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, persons
or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The
right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for
that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court,
and confers upon him the right to appear for
litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as
from jury services and arrest on civil process while
attending court. The law conferring such privileges
must be general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be
some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis
for different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S.
150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the
skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E.
881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor,
65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness
for the profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes First,
those presenting diplomas issued by any law school
of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second,
those who studied law for the period of two years in
a law office, or part of the time in a law school and
part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present
rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision
there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of
time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for
the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness
of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date
of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study
of law November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who began on
the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need
spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years,
although they would complete two years before the
time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without
examination before December 31, 1899, and without
any prescribed course of study, while as to the other
the prescribed course must be pursued, and the
diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot
rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons.
(pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W.
441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate
Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be
granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon
which courts must admit and license those applying
as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised
in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or

profession he may choose, subject only to such

restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like
age, sex, and condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes
termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the
right to continue their prosecution is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of government that
all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the possession on
the part of the application of his proper qualifications
before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of
those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this
general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C.
643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to
confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to practice law
and that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the
public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c.
424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had
served in the military or naval forces of the United
States during the World War and received a
honorable discharge therefrom and who (were
disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as
"World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability
is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time
of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated
the quality clauses of the constitution of that
state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable
is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the
authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person
included in it and those excluded and, furthermore,
must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the
rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based
on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does
not apply and must rest on some reason on which it
can be defended. In other words, there must be such
a difference between the situation and circumstances
of all the members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory
legislation as presents a just and natural cause for
the difference made in their liabilities and burdens
and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to
operate on that class only, and not generally on all.
(12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general
average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to
1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those
will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955,
will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the
rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent,
which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any

motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned

authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the
years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said
years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued
that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional.
What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to
1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent
or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as
prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed
to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to
or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain
the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law
clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by
those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one
per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to
the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing
directly what the Tribunal should have done during those
years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words,
the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop
or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within
the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the
judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this
system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally
receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws
and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in
this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this
country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages.
In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21
(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article
1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first,
because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress
to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms
that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void,
and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to
wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates
who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it
admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law,
as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It
decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the
Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution

of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without
having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court
and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission
to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue
in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which
are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission
to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The
pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title
of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of
article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said
part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and
availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the
contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after
hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their
decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of
article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of
article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the
date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per
cent the passing general average in the bar examination of
august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed
75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction
in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule
127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The
proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below
50 per cent in any subject. In determining the
average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent;
Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per
cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5
per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics

and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation,

5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have
obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such
rating shall be taken into account in determining
their general average in any subsequent
examinations: Provided, however, That if the
candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per
cent in his third examination, he shall lose the
benefit of having already passed some subjects and
shall be required to the examination in all the
subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.
Any applicant who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50
per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No.
12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to
the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at
bar examinations should be compelled to repeat
even those subjects which they have previously
passed. This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due
credit for any subject which he has previously passed
with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May
3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed
by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making
any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127.
One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any
subject, although failing to pass the examination, he
need not be examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar
Examination on the installment plan, one or two or
three subjects at a time. The trouble with this
proposed system is that although it makes it easier
and more convenient for the candidate because he
may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the
time that he has passed the last required subjects,
which may be several years away from the time that
he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall
have forgotten the principles and theories contained
in those subjects and remembers only those of the
one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and
passed. This is highly possible because there is
nothing in the law which requires a candidate to
continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a
candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in
no more that three installments; but there is no
limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This
would defeat the object and the requirements of the
law and the Court in admitting persons to the
practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to
be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice
the legal profession and adequately render the legal
service required by prospective clients. But this
would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight
years ago, another three subjects one year later, and
the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to
obtain a passing general average with no grade in
any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and
prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of
admission to the practice of law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section
16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of
70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50
per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In
other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less

than 70 per cent in any examination since the year

1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by
the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will
be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next
preceding amendment that we are not exactly in
favor of reducing the passing general average from
75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the
future. As to the validity of making such reduction
retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The present amendment would have the effect
of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have obtained an average of 70
per cent or more but less than the general passing
average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase
of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the
Court remarked during the discussion, when a court
renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or
order on the basis of and in accordance with a
certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may
not affect the final decision, order, or resolution
already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is
the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar
candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and
qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was
not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be
its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and
in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and
even rejected by the Court to be its officer because
he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted
and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We
repeat, that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the
following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the
bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not
achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely
a special class who have failed in the bar
examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to
which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed
the corresponding oath of office. This provision
constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does
specifically one group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948,
1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside
final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be
noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those
who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have failed to obtain the passing
average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a

bad precedent in that the Government would be

morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those
who have failed in the examinations for admission to
other professions such as medicine, engineering,
architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the
Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House
as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution.
Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as
follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar
examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however,
That 75 per cent passing general average shall be
restored in all succeeding examinations;
and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next
whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination
after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the
President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme
Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court
has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947
to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all
parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual
increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination,
71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent;
for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955
bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade
of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation. It
is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading materials
will be under normal conditions, if not improved from
those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of
having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision
as well as the administration of the study of law
which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill
of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated
among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a class
legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per
cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who
this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as
having passed the bar examination on the strength

of the established precedent of our Supreme Court

and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were
unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent
cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without
giving due consideration to the rights already
accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the
examination when the precedent was not yet altered,
or in effect, was still enforced and without being
inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as
a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of
a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally
belong to the class, all who possess a common
disability, attribute, or classification, and there must
be a "natural" and substantial differentiation
between those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then
have the dissevered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465
(1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with
its tides brings new conditions which must be cared
for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions
affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting
statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly
and always. It permits them when there are special
evils with which the general laws are incompetent to
cope. The special public purpose will sustain the
special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is
one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the
case of plain abuse will there be revision by the
court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute
which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is
earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress
as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting
Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information
that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the
members of the Court are taking the same views
they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by
Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first
indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951,
to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should
be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it
became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution)
numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election
year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost
in the polls.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always
been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers
are members of the Court and only this Court should be
allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This
power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate
rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to
promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the

Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion

to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing
grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But
the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the
judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in
1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning
is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's
judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore
objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the
privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier
or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional,
because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power
of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is
discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar
candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75
per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to,
with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946,
the original list of successful candidates included only those
who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with
general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released
containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more;
but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the
original list of successful candidates those having a general
average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar
candidates had been released, and on motion for
reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69
per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948.
With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in
addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all
those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the
year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing
average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this
amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment
of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent
to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73
per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said
motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where
law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of
bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others,
for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per
cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly
in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the later bill
the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the
inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar
subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the
holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among
the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to
become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by
merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing
so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first
vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per
cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also
provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75
per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946,
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations
previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to
obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court
mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to
the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the
allegation that they have obtained the general averages
prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953,
this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions,
and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or
submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for
said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it
affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a
new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently
judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed
by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The existing
laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court
has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal,
alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary
to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress
to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in
so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval,
is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions
of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law
the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of
bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in
justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain
periods after which they become executory and unalterable.
Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject
to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period
within which the motion were filed, and this has been the
practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be
deemed as a judicial function only because said matters
happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules
of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word,
because bar examinations and the admission to the practice
of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing
litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining
boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not
prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or
vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract
or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process
and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a
mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious
inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different
passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946,
are being discriminated against, because we no longer have
any record of those who might have failed before the war,
apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been
the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there
are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those

benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter

of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by
the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress
held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon
the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is
sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides,
interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of
litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of
decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of
creating appearances of separation and equality among the
three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the
Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say,
the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed
by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those
who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose
general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to
practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages
were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of
Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution.
Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they
filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section
14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations
held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the
general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force.
In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court
and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly
pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it
is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had
already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947
bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations.
Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the
propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently
refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited
under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume
that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to
the general public was not considered by the Congress. As
already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all
the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the
question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept
Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people
through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the
Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not
do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right
men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional
and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the
Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to
Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%

1.

2.
3.

4.

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade

lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall
be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal
defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to
1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for
allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the
fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very
close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary
prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of
law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts
to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could
not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission
to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall
within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.
In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA
22, January

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its
Report with the earnest recommendation on the basis of
the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views
and counsel received from its [the Commissions] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the)
Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in
Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?

HELD:

YES. On all issues.

RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of
the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13
of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF

THE PHILIPPINES.
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case
No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and
counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing,
giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August
16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter
granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed
significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had
grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277
entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17,
1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This
law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand
pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of
this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be
included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary
factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and

necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the

views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to
Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that
body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis
as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission
on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it
is decreed by an entity with power to do so:
the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar
as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule
of Law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in
general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its
members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of
its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar
to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal
research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other
things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in
maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the
abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection
of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law,

and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of
disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country
so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational
materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards
of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law
libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the
people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of
the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may
integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under
Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new
power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere
legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of
the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar
integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the
dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent
discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages
44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar
integration measures has been put in issue,
the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this
reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise
and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation; and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice, as an
officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege
clothed with public interest, it is far and just
that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be
discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring
expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that
all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient
means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an

integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the
Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay
dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled
financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities
serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar
to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.
The legal profession has long been regarded
as a proper subject of legislative regulation
and control. Moreover, the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar
includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid
by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is
an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has
inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose.
It would not be possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program without means to
defray the concomitant expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power
to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment
of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to
voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views
be opposed to positions taken by the Unified
Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's
due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or
adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition
the right to practice law upon membership
in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to
understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the
member's dues to fulfill the very purposes
for which it was established.
The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax

would be suspect. The objection would carry

us to lengths that have never been dreamed
of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties
were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of
any other end condemned by his conscience
as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above
the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new
regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have
not had and through which, by proper work,
they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective
manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay
dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power
by the Court, because it will apply equally to
all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a
new regulation in exchange for new
benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court
should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and
the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following
benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the
Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective
discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to
its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than
these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the
event of integration, Government authority will dominate the
Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be
the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible;
the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will
intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions
where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses
or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored
public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional
consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the
public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission
on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration
of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over
the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses,
14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration,
while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or
1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty
(80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions
of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration,
while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80
per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are noncommittal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming
nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve

the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge

its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it
by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with
the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
b. requirements for admission to the practice of law
c. what constitute the practice of law
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of
the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's
alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law
practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of
law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments
committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods
appointment.

HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the
work done involves the determination of the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs.
Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission
show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was
liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of
Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use
their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The
court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the
Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers
engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days,
for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in
management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who
passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group
from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till
1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be
considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as
lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the
nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is
mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is
essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested
subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence,
there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power
since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA.