Cruz v.

Sec - DENR
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in
the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

Republic v. Agonoy
Facts:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two
parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
containing an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On January 18, 1967, he
was issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the Director of Lands.
On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija registered Free Patent No. 314450 and
issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by Francisca Perez, caused the annotation
on the said OCT of an adverse claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of the property.
On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Lands, conducted a formal investigation and
ocular inspection of the premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently issued
Lots were alienated and divided several times under different owners.
Issue:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR. HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE
PATENT NO. 314450 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS. 1341 AND 1342,
CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE, NUEVA ECIJA.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OVER THE PORTION
OF LOT NO. 1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. 196579 IN THE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN GOOD FAITH AND
FOR VALUE.
Held:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit(Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005,
451 SCRA 735, 746).
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioners own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer
part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens
titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino vs. Court of Appeals[20] and the cases[21] therein cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a previous
illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source)
cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration.
The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the
ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector
Jose Mendigoria about the abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even turn out to be the truth. What petitioner
perceives as fraud may be nothing more than the differences of professional opinions between Land

Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas. But regardless of who between
the two is correct, the hard reality is that the properties in question are no longer floating objects on a
spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as they are now very much ashore and firmly standing
on the high solid ground of the Torrens system of land registration.

Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners
and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more
than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable
lands of the public domain? Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land
belonging to public domain may be appropriated as private property?

HELD:
For public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an
express and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable
and disposable agricultural lands of public domain. Occupation in the concept of an
owner cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered to as a title.
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like.

LIGON v. CA
The Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), by virtue of an absolute deed, sold to Iglesia
ni Kristo (INK) 2 parcels of land in Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, QC. It was stipulated therein
that IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters in the property within 45 days from the
execution of the contract. IDP failed to do this, hence, INK sued for specific performance with
damages. IDP, on the other hand, alleged that it was INK which violated the contract by
delaying the payment of the purchase price and sought to have the contract of sale
rescinded.
Thereafter, INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was
actually no genuine issue as to any material fact; the TC granted. A year after, INK filed a
motion in the same case seeking to compel Leticia Ligon (petitioner), who was in possession
of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, to surrender said
certificates to the RD of QC for the registration of the absolute deed of sale in its name.
Ligon allegedly refused and/or failed to deliver the certificates despite repeated requests.
To this, Ligon opposed saying that (a) IDP was not served copy of the motion, (b) ownership
of INK over the property was still in issue, (c) and that the trial court had no jurisdiction as
the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not made a party
in the main case. The TC granted INKs motion and ordered petitioner to surrender the
certificates of title in open court for the registration of the absolute deed of sale in the
latters name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new
certificates (to be issued to INK). Upon Ligons motion, the TC redirected her to deliver the
documents to the RD of QC.
ISSUE: W/N INK has a superior right to the possession of the owners copies of the
certificated of title.
HELD:
YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented together with such
instrument, except in some cases or upon the order of the court for cause shown.
In case the person in possession refuses or fails to surrender the same to the RD so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107 of P.D. No.
1529 states:
Where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of
the holder to surrender the owners duplicate, the party in interest may file a petition in
court to compel surrender of the same to the RD.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the
duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or
memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not

amenable to the process of the court, of if for any reason the outstanding owners duplicate
cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance
of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the distinction between the RTCs general and the
limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a cadastral court has been eliminated. Aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not only on applications for original registration
but also over petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Even while Sec. 107 of
PD 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to
surrender the certificates of title to the RD, this does not preclude a party to a pending case
to include as incident therein the relief stated under said section, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the
principal action.
The principal action is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy against
multiplicity of suits. The order directing the surrender of the certificates to the RD in order
that the deed be registered in favor of INK cannot in any way prejudice her rights and
interests as mortagee, since any lien annotated on the previous certificates which subsists
shall be incorporated or carried over to the new certificates of title.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO V. COURT OF APPEALS

> This is a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in the provinces Nueva
ecija, Bulacan, and in cities including Quezon city.
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against
third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000
hectares or 214,047 quiniones, on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894.
The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro
Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of
Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City
Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and
Tayabas Bay in the sout
> This case involves 2 cases, which prior to being decided by the SC were
consolidated. The first case was a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In the complaint, it was alleged
that the defendants (Ocampo - Dela Cruz) were able to secure from the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City titles to a portions of the claimed estate. In the end, the lower
courts ruled in favor of Ocampo - Dela Cruz, declaring
that the Torrens titles of the defendants cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish
title, Titulo Propriedad no. 4316.
> The 2nd case is a petition for letters of adiministration over the intestate estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. This involves a prayer to be declared as
administrator. This case eventually ended in the same manner as the first case - the

Titulo de Prorpriedad was declared void and of no legal force, therefore the lands
covered by the Titulo are not within the estate of the deceased.

> Issue: W/N the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands
covered or claimed under such title are not included in the estate of the deceased...

> The Titulo is null and void. It has been defeated by the title of the defendants
under the Torrens system.
> It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892 which tool effect on Feb 16 1976 the syte
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be registered
under the Land Registration Act within 6mos from date of effectivity of the said
decree.
> Proof of compliance (Certificate of Title) with the said decree should have been
presented during trial.

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tirol

Facts:
Sps Tirol and Sps Ngo bought 2000sqm of land from Sps. Jenkins in 1993. Land was
originally owned by Sps. Cosef in 1934 and sold to Cuizon-Patalinghug in 1974.
When Sps Tirol requested for a height clearance from DOTC they were referred to
MCIAA. MCIAA said they owned the land since 1959 and that Sps. Tirol were trustees
for the original owners.
RTC initially ruled for MCIAA but then after a MFR they reversed the decision. Hence,
the Court agrees with the plaintiffs when they contended that even at the time
when OCT No. RO-2754 was issued [,] there was no document allegedly proving its
(MCIAA) ownership being annotated on the certificate of title. At the time when
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16735, 18216 and 27044 were issued to the
plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, there were no annotations of the
alleged claim of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have all the good reasons to rely
on the validity of the titles
Land registration; Torrens system. Under the established principles of land
registration, a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond it to determine the legal status of the property, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. Applying this standard to the facts of
this case, we rule that respondents exercised the required diligence in ascertaining
the legal condition of the title to the subject property as to be considered innocent

purchasers for value and in good faith. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
vs. Sps. Edito and Merian Tirol and Sps. Alejandro and Mirando Ngo, G.R. No.
171535, June 5, 2009.
Land registration; Torrens system. Well-settled is the rule that registration of
instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to effect and bind the land.
Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land
Registration Act) governed the recording of transactions involving registered land,
i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended,
provided for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate
without prejudice to a third party with a better right. Accordingly, if a parcel of land
covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and
not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered registered and the
registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to register its Deed of
Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344 is of no moment, as the property subject of the
sale is indisputably registered land. Section 50 of Act No. 496 in fact categorically
states that it is the act of registration that shall operate to convey and affect the
land; absent any such registration, the instrument executed by the parties remains
only as a contract between them and as evidence of authority to the clerk or
register of deeds to make registration. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
vs. Sps. Edito and Merian Tirol and Sps. Alejandro and Mirando Ngo, G.R. No.
171535, June 5, 2009.

Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA

June 21, 2004
FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go covered by a tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a
Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved.The said
free patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997,
Spouses Abrigo.

Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the

On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera
registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo
before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages Villafania.

The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the
instant (RTC) case that neither of them can physically take possession of the
property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.
The RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by
the parties. In the said Decision, Villafania was given one year from the date of the
Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would
mean that the previous sale in favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain
valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without
need of any demand. Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the
[vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo
as well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private
respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one
and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had
already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the
subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.The CA also dismissed the appeal of
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and
for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens
title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.

HELD: DE VERA
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision affirmed.The present case involves
what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the
disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn,
derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was executed by Villafania with
Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of
the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they
registered their respective sales under Act 3344 For her part, respondent registered
the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had
presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper
registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case
was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale
under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court
upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final
conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not
applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time
the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as
the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was
done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344
to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968,
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June
22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full
payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of
Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and
her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and
signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.

Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and
Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the
lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive
property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further
alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at
the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the
conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully
paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2
years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v Heirs of Maria Valdez G.R. No. 171531 January 30, 2009
The descendants of Pablo Pascua filed a complaint (in their complaint respondents alleged
that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one
of whom was the deceased Cipriano) seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area
of 23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales with Original Certificate of Title

(OCT) No. 404 in the name of Pablo. In the alternative, the heirs of Valdez prayed that
damages be awarded in their favor.
OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents complaint. It contained
several annotations in the memorandum of encumbrances which showed that the property
had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto
Morales.
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed a petition
before the RTC of Olongapo City for the issuance of a new owners duplicate of OCT No. 404.
However, the RTC denied the petition and held that petitioner was already the owner of the
land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the
back of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed from the issuance of TCT No.
T-10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the complaint states no cause of action as
it is an innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on the clean title of the spouses
Rodolfo.
The RTC granted petitioners motion to dismiss.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue: The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTCs granting of
the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of Appeals reversal of the
RTCs ruling.
Held: The petition is meritorious.
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint,
and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the
spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioners predecessors-in-interest, or any circumstance from
which it could reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any actual knowledge of facts that
would impel it to make further inquiry into the title of the spouses Rodolfo.
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales
executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not binding
on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree (SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title).
Lastly, respondents claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101 of
P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss,
damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a
breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive. Even assuming arguendo that they
are entitled to claim against the Assurance Fund, the respondents claim has already
prescribed since any action for compensation against the Assurance Fund must be brought
within a period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred,
which in this case was in 1967.