Art. 886.

Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of

because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory
heirs. (806)
Three principal systems of distribution of hereditary property:
1. Absolute freedom of disposition
2. Total reservation
3. Partial reservation
T: Considering the customs and traditions of the Filipinos for the sake of family solidarity, the
present code preserved the system of legitimes. However, changes have been made as follows:
1. with respect to the amounts of that coumpulsory heirs receive;
2. illegitimate children have been made compulsory heirs though with a smaller legitime;
3. legitime of surviving spouse has been changed from a mere usufruct to a full ownership.
4. eliminates the mejora which resulted in the increase of both the legitime and the free portion
Thus, Justice JBL Reyes has this to say:
The increase of the legitime to as against the 1/3 in the old code, and the suppression of the
mejora, operate to limit the freedom of choice of the testator to a greater extent than under the old
code, for the testator, under that law, could at least select the individual descendants who should
receive the third betterment.
Jurisprudence, however, interpreted the ultimate purpose of the systems of legitime. It is a
limitation upon the freedom of the testator to dispose of his property. Its purpose is to protect
those heirs, for whom the testator is presumed to have an obligation to reserve certain portions of
his estate, from his unjust ire or weakness or thoughtlessness.
Ratio of the free portion:
1.
An owners jus disponendi
2.
man as a member of society can entertain not only familial affections, but also legitimate
affections to his fellowmen, thus, should not be absolutely be restrained from disposing property
according to dictates of generosity.
The legitime does not consist in determinate or specific property which the testator must reserve
for his compulsory heirs. It consists of a part of fraction of the entire mass of the hereditary estate.
The standard for determination is fixed by law, but quantity may vary according to number and
relation of the heirs to the testator.
B. Who are entitled?

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)
Compulsory heirs are those who succeed whether the testator likes it or not and they cannot be
deprived of their legitime except only by disinheritance.
An heir, of whatever class is absolutely free to accept or renounce the inheritance because the
law on legitime is a restriction not on the freedom of the heir to accept or repudiate, but on the
freedom of testator to dispose of his property.
Kinds of Compulsory heirs:
1.

Primary those who exclude other compulsory heirs ex. Legit children & ascendants

2.
secondary succeed only in the absence of the primary.
ascenadants

ex. Legit parents &

3.
Concurring succeed together with the primary and secondary cannot be excluded by
them. Ex. Widow/er & illegit children
Legitimate children and ascendants in the ordinary course of nature father or mother die
ahead of the child; the law confers preferential legitimary rights upon them. Thus the law intends
that property of the decedent pass not to strangers but to his natural successor.
Legitimated Children the NCC is silent as to this kind of children but the Family code under
Art. 272 grants the same rights to legitimated as that of the legitimate. Hence they are included as
a compulsory heir.
Adopted Children Art. 189 of the FC provides that for civil purposes, the adopted shall be
deemed a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire reciprocal rights and obligations
from a parent-child relationship. Hence, considered as legitimate child of the deceased adopting
parent both as CH and LH.
Illegitimate Parents they are compulsory heirs only in the absence of legitimate, or illegitimate
children of the decedent as provided under Art. 903.
Adopting parents they are not compulsory heirs of the adopted child because Art. 190 of the FC
only provides that they shall be legal heirs of the deceased adopted and is silent as to their
becoming compulsory heir. This indicates that the latter was not intended.
Ratio: Adoption is for the benefit of the adopted, and unless the law clearly intends to favor the
adopter, all doubts should be resolved against him. Because of the silence of the law on
legitimes, he cannot be entitiled to the legitime of the legitimate parents; and in the law of

testacy , he is not given, in general, the same rights as a legitimate parent but only such as are
specifically provided in Article 190 of the FC. Legitimes of CH are restrictions on the freedom of
the testator and must not be presumed but viewed strictly.
Illegitimate Children the FC abolished the distinctions in the old civil code thus merging them
to one group.
Social and humanitarian reasons justify this grant of rights. These children are brought to the
world without their fault and under circumstances beyond their control. To leave illegitimate
children w/o successional rights not only weighs them down with the moral handicap of their
status but also denies them the material assistance which they may need after their parents
death so as not to become social burdens.
They are not required to be recognized by putative parents but must only prove their filiation.
In the enforcement of this new right it is the death of the parent which determines the right of the
child to succeed and not the birth of the latter.
Surviving Spouse there should be a valid marriage between the deceased and the surviving
spouse. Thus, the following marriages has different effect on the capacity of the widow or
widower to succeed:
1.
null and void marriages such as incestuous or bigamous ones. Except in cases of
bigamous marriages where two wives contract in good faith with the same husband, both are
entitled to inherit equally from the deceased husband.
2.
Voidable marriages entitle the widow/er to legitime because there exists a valid marriage
until it is annulled. Thus, once annulled before death of a spouse they are incapacitated to inherit.
However, pending the case of annulment and one spouse dies the widow/er, nevertheless,
inherits the legitime because the marriage can no longer be annulled after death of one.
3.
Legal separation of the spouses before death entitles the widow/er the Legitime if he /she
is the innocent spouse. Unless reconciliation occurred before the death of the spouse, the
survivor will inherit regardless of his guilt. In such case that the decree is pending upon death of
one spouse then the decision should be awaited. The fact that the innocent spouse instituted the
legal separation manifest his desire to not to allow the guilty spouse to benefir fro his estate. The
accident of death should not defeat this purpose.
4.
Separation in fact by amicable settlement does not incapacitate the guilty spouse to
inherit though there may be valid grounds for legal separation there being no judicial decree, the
right of legitime is preserved.
Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
The article allows the legitimate and illegitimate descendants to represent the illegitimate child
who predecease his own parent. But the illegitimate children of of an illegitimate child can
represent the latter only in the rights set forth in the preceding articles namely 894, 895, 896,
899, and 901.
The criticism on this article is that the law gives better rights to the illegitimate children of an
illegitimate child and not to the illegitimate children of a legitimate child. This is absurd since the
position of the illegitimate children is no better than or equal to that of the legitimate child.

However, though unfair to the latter this is an express provision of law which we are confronted
with. Thus, dura lex sed lex
Rosales vs. Rosales
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter,
her mother-in-law.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate Fortunato T. Rosales (husband) 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son), 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February 4, 1975. These
Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as
the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution. First is a widow (surviving
spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which
excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two
(2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the
order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to
inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final
intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the
intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-inlaw of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a
share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because
of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had
an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it
may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not
succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
C. Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their legitimes.

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)
The enlargement of the legitime and the free portion to half each is primarily the result of removal
of the 1/3 mejora or betterment in the old code where the testator disposes a portion in favor of
his legitimate children for their betterment or reward. The NCC eliminated the mejora for the
following reasons:
1.
The natural inequalities among children is but imaginary and parent reward merely on
better qualities of one children
2.
half

such reward may be effected by the father or mother by disposing of part or all of the free

3.

the testator should have greater freedom to dispoe of his estate by will

the supposed free portion is not always disposable by the testator; it is expressly made subject to
the rights of illegitimate children and the surviving spouse. Only the remainder thereafter shall be
disposable, if there is any left.
Art. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or ascendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estates of their children and descendants.
The children or descendants may freely dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (809a)
Art. 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them
equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor.
If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal
degree of the paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between
both lines. If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the
ones nearest in degree of either line. (810)

Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal
separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause
for the same.
If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can
be freely disposed of by the testator. (834a)
T: As to legitimate children, the law makes no distinction whether of the previous marriage or the
marriage dissolved by death, hence, children in both cases are included
The surviving spouse concurring with legitimate children receives only equal to the legitime of
each of the legitimate children and ascendants.
What if there are no legitimate children only descendants? Does this mean that the spouse
shall receive equal to each descendants which may be even more than the number of
children of the deceased? NO. whatever the number of descendants is immaterial the divisor is
still the number of children they represent because the descendants only inherit by
representation. Even if all the children repudiate the legitime the divisor shall still be the number
of children. But if only some of the children repudiate, the basis of computation should be the
number of children who accept the inheritance
If the surviving spouse receives a devise or legacy, is he entitiled to the same in addition to his
legitime?
T: if the testator gives a devise or legacy to the surviving spouse, and there is enough of the
portion subject to his disposal which can cover such devise or legacy, then the surviving spouse
should get the devise or legacy in addition to his legitime. To merge the devise or legacy in the
legitime would leave a part of the free portion undisposed of; this is contrary to the policy of law
against intestate succession and against the express will of the testator. We believe, therefore,
that the devise or legacy should be first taken from the remaining disposable portion, and if there
is any excess of the devise or legacy over the disposable portion, that excess charged against or
merged in the legitime of the surviving spouse.
If however, the legitime of the surviving spouse is already protected by the disposition giving him
an amount or portion equivalent to that legitime, then he cannot ask for more unless, the testator
provides it as addition to his legitime.
Art. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants,
the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the estate. (836a)
Art. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate children to another
third. The remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (n)
Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.

The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural
child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.
The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the
free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such
illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse
must first be fully satisfied. (840a)
Article repealed by Article 176 of the Family Code which provides that the legitime of each
illegitimate children is one-half of that of legitimate child.
Ratio: the law rewards more the fruits of legal unions, thus, giving preference and greater portion
of the hereditary estate. However, for humanitarian reasons the illegitimate children should not be
disregarded because they are just as innocent and blameless as the legitimate children for being
born in this world beyond their control.
Limitations to the rights of Legitimate children:
1.

filiation must be proved

2.

their share comes only from the free portion

3.

surviving spouse is preferred over them, the legitme of the spouse is satisfied first

4. their share is susceptible of proportionate reduction if their total legitimes exceeds the free
portion
Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the
deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the
portion at the free disposal of the testator. (841a)
Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants,
and acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children
which must be taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.
(n)
Art. 898. If the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and
with illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal
fiction, the share of the surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the
preceding article. (n)
The Family Code has already abolished the distinction between natural and other illegitimate
children placing them under one category of illegitimate children.
Art. 899. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and
with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the
hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the
illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also
from the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth
of the estate. (n)

T: This seems to be an unjustified discrimination against the surviving spouse because he

receives a graeter or an equal amount when she survives with either the IC or the LP but with
both at the same time she only receives a measly 1/8 of the estate. Undoubtedly, the code seems
to have wanted to save portion of the estate for the free disposal of the deceased. This is not a
sufficient justification for discriminating against the surviving spouse and destroying the balance
between the legitimes, after vall, there are instances in w/c the free portion is merely theoretical.
Art. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half
of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the
other half. (837a)
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo
mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the
legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the
latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding
paragraph. (n)
Presupposes that the surviving spouse is the only compulsory heir.
T: We believe that this rule will apply only when the deceased is the spouse who was at the point
of death at the time of marriage; hence, it will not apply when the spouse who was at the point of
death at the time of marriage is the one who survives, and the other is the one who dies w/in
three months after the marriage.
Ratio for the rule is the presumption that the marriage is contracted exclusively for inheriting.
However, this suspicion is erased if the spouses had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years on account of companionship and affection for such length of time.
This distinction does not apply to intestacy
Art. 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory
heirs, such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased.
The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (842a)
Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves
neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is onehalf of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate
children are left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow
or widower survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is
one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also onefourth of the estate. (n)
It must be noted that in illegitimate filiation, the right to succeed in the ascending line terminates
with the parent of the deceased illegitimate child. There is, therefore, no reciprocity of
successional reights between the illegitimate grandparent and the illegitimate grandchild.
P.D. 603; Art. 39. Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire Philippine
citizenship by virtue of such adoption:

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
(3) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and
(4) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the
adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person,
the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural
child: Provided, further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted
from the adopter shall revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter
without legitimate issue unless the adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such
property: Provided, finally, That in the last case, should the adopted leave no
property other than that received from the adopter, and he is survived by
illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate issue collectively or the spouse
shall receive one-fourth of such property; if the adopted is survived by illegitimate
issue and a spouse, then the former collectively shall receive one-fourth and the
latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting to the adopter, observing in the
case of the illegitimate issue the proportion provided for in Article 895 of the Civil
Code.
The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall
inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take
the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.
D. Restrictions regarding the legitime

Art. 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in
cases expressly specified by law.
Art. 872. The testator cannot impose any charge, condition, or substitution whatsoever
upon the legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do so, the same shall be considered
as not imposed. (813a)
The legitime goes to the heir by operation of law and not by the will of the testator; hence it
cannot be subject to the freedom of the latter to impose encumbrances, conditions and
substitutions. Any encumbrance is simply disregarded and considered as not written. The CHs
right to the legitime is free, unencumbered, and pure.
Art. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future legitime between the
person owing it and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the same upon
the death of the former; but they must bring to collation whatever they may have received
by virtue of the renunciation or compromise. (816)
1.
The future legitime between is merely an expectancy, and the heir does not acquire any
right over the same until death of testator.
2.
The renunciation or compromise does not become valid by the mere failure of the
compulsory heirs to assert its invalidity because the matter of its legal effect cannot be left to the
will of the parties.
3.
all renunciations of future legitimes are void. However, a mere statement made by a son
of the properties ne has received from his father, still living, for the purpose of taking the same
into account in case of partition in the event the father dies, is not a renunciation or compromise
on future legitime.

4.
Since the legitime is a part of the inheritance, and a compromise is contract, it is obvious
that all compromises on future legitimes, by and between the heirs themselves to the exclusion of
the testator, must be held void if not under this article, under the general prohibition of Art. 1347.
5.
the nullity of the renunciation or compromise may be claimed, not only by the CH who
made it, by co-heirs prejudiced thereby.
6.
the giving of donations as advance of the legitime is not prohibited by this article nor 1347
but governed by rules on donation and the reduction thereof whenever inofficoius.
Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. (815)
By the word testator, irt is believed thiat this principle applies only when that which has been left
is in a will or testament. If there is no testatmentery disposition in his favor, the heir cannot ask for
completion of his legitime, because there is nothing to complete; instead, there should be case of
preterition or total omission, and in such case the forced heir in the direct line is entitled to ask,
not merely for the completion of his legitime, but for the annulment of the institution of heir.
But when it is not evedent that the testator has forgotten the compulsory heir and it appears as a
fact that the compulsory heir had already received something in the way of advance upon his
legitime, it cannot be presumed that the testator had forgotten the compulsory heir. There is no
real preterition, although nothing has been left by will to the CH. The purpose of Article 906
evidently is to give the compulsory heir only that ehich has been reserved for him by the law,
nothing less nothing more. If he was not forgotten then he is entitled only to that which the
testator cannot deprive him.
Even when the CH has not been mentioned in the will or has not been gien an advance on his
legitime, if the testamentary dispositions do not cover the entire estate but something is left
undisposed, and the CH is also a compulsory heir is also an intestate heir. The indisposed portion
would pass by the rule of intestacy to the CH; if it is not enough to cover his legitime, then he may
ask for the completion of such legitme. It is to be presumed that the testator intended to give him
the undisposed portion.
Art. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or
excessive. (817)
Only the CHs whose legitme has been impaired can avail of the right to ask for the reduction of
inofficious donations, devises, or legacies.
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things,
may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)
It is essential that the object must be in existence at the time of perfection of the contract, or that
it has the possibility or potentiality of coming into existence at some future time. By way of

exception, the law generally does not allow contracts on future inheritance. In order to be future
inheritance, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract to
fall within the prohibition of this article, the following requisites are necessary: 1. that the
succession is yet to be opened. 2. the object forms part of the inheritance. 3. the promissor has
an expectant right over the object which is purely hereditary in nature.
An agreement to partition an estate of a living person by those who inherit from him is void. A
contract renouncing the right to inherit from one who is still alive is void.
After the death of the person, however, the properties and rights left by him by way of inheritance
can be the subject matter of a contract among or by his heirs, even before a partition thereof has
been made, because the rights of the heirs are transmitted to them from the death of the
predecessor.
When the object of the contract is not a part of the inheritance, the prohibition does not apply,
even if delivery of such object is dependent upon the death of one of the contracting parties.
Thus, life insurance contracts, and stipulations providing for reversion of property donated in
marriage settlements in the event of the death of the donee, are valid. Likewise, if the right of the
party over the thing is not by virtue of succession, but as creditor, the contract does not fall within
the prohibition of this article. It has been held that in a contract of purchase by co-owners, it is
valid to stipulate that in the event of death of any of them, those who survive will acquire the
share of the predeceased.
E. Determination of computation
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will.
Steps to determine legitime:
1.
Determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testators
death; either by:
a.

judicial proceedings in the settlement of the estate assisted by tax appraisers

b.

true value of the property not merely assessed value for taxation purposes

2.
determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or
deducted from the value of the property
3.
the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the net hereditary
estate;
4.

addition to the net value of the estate of donations subject to collation

5.
determination of the amount of legitimes by getting from the total thus found the portion
that the law provides as the legitimes of each respective CH.
The remainder after deduction of the debts and charges is the net hereditary estate.
Collation, in the first concept is the imaginary or fictitious reconstitution of the estate of the
testator by mere mathematical process of adding all that is donated during the lifrtime of the
testator to CH or strangers.

The second concept entails that property donated by the testator during his lifetime must be
brought back actually and returened to the hereditary estate whenever it is found that such
donation exceeds the disposable portion of the estate. The purpose of which is to complete the
assets necessary for the payment of the shares of the compulsory heirs.
Collation is thus for the benefit of the CH, and not the creditors of the decedent. The presence of
the latter, however, must be determined at the time of the testators death, not at the time the
donation was made. The value of the property donated, however, is determined on the date the
donations were made.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a)
Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the
testator could have disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be
reduced according to the rules established by this Code. (819a)
Art. 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may have received during the lifetime of his
father or mother, shall be charged to his legitime.
Should they exceed the portion that can be freely disposed of, they shall be reduced in the
manner prescribed by this Code. (847a)
Any donation to the grandchild is not subject to collation because the same is not a CH but it may
be charged against the free portion as a donation to stranger.
When the donation to a compulsory heir exceeds his legitime, the excess is chargeable against
the free portion which is at the disposal of the the testator, just as any donation to stranger,
subject to the resk of reduction.
If the donation to a stranger exceeds the free portion, then it will have to be reduced as
inofficious. The purpose of the law is not to prevent the stranger from getting more from the
inheritance, but to ascertain that the CH do not get less than what pertains to them as legitime.
Art. 911. After the legitime has been determined in accordance with the three preceding
articles, the reduction shall be made as follows:
(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be covered, reducing
or annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies made in the will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata, without any
distinction whatever.
If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be paid in preference to
others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the latter have been applied in full to
the payment of the legitime.
(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose value may be
considered greater than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may

choose between complying with the testamentary provision and delivering to the
devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely
dispose. (820a)
Donation intervivos is preferred over disposition mortis causa. Ratio:
1.
Donation intervivos are by nature irrevocable to allow annulment on account of legacies
and devise in excess of free portion in effect allows the revocation to depend on the will of the
donor-testator.
2.
Donation is a bilateral act based on the sgreement of donor and donee while a will is
unilateral;
3.

Priority in time is priority in right.

The article provides a rule on preference to determine which devise or legacy is to be reduced
whenervr it execeeds the free portion or to the extent that it impairs the legitime.
Art. 950 also provides the following order of reduction of legacy or devise:
1.

remunatory legacy or devise;

2.

legacy or devise declared by testator to be preferred;

3.

legacies for support;

4.

legacies for education;

5.

specific determinate thing ehich form part of the estate;

6.

all others pro rata.

Where lies the distintion bet. 950 and 911?

Article 911 will apply as to the manner of reducing legacies:
a. when reduction is necessary to preserve legitime of CH from impairment wheter there are
donation inter vivos;
b. when although legitime has been preserve by the testator, by giving sufficient portion to
cover legitime of CH, thereare donations inter vivos concurring with legacies or devises
within the free portion.
Article 950 applies when the question of reduction is exclusively among the legatees themselves,
either because ther are no compulsory heirs, or because the legitme of CH has already been
provided for by the testator in his will and there are no donation inter vivos.
As to usufruct, use or habitation, or life annuity there shall be taken into account the probable life
of the beneficiary in accordance with the American Tropical Experience table at 8% per annum.
Donations are reduced first the most recent ones with regard the excess. Thus, priority in time
priority in right. If several donations made on the same date they are reduced pro rata

A property donated once alienated by donee cannot be set aside. It would be dangerous to the
stability of property and inimical to the freedom of alienation.
In the above instance, can the inofficious part of the donation be taken from other proerty of the
donee?
We believe that in such case the donee should be made to respond fro the value of the excess or
inofficoius part. It was the act of the donee which made it impossible to recover the inofficoius part
to the hereditary estate. He is conclusively presumed to knoe that that the donation stands the
risk of reduction.
What if the donee is insolvent and cannot return anything to the estate to complete the impaired
legitime; who shall bear the loss?
It is submitted that that the amount to be returned by the insolvent must be borne and paid by
those whose donation are within the free portion. As between the compulsory heir, whose rights
are derived from law, and the donees, whose rights spring from the will of the deceased, the
former should be protected from the impairment of their shares.
Art. 912. If the devise subject to reduction should consist of real property, which cannot be
conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of
its value; and in a contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter
shall reimburse each other in cash for what respectively belongs to them.
The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime. (821)
Art. 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to avail themselves of the right granted by
the preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not have such right may exercise it;
should the latter not make use of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the
instance of any one of the interested parties. (822)
T: Division under this article means a material division, which is inconvenient, because the the
property is not susceptible of such division, or because it will lose or diminish its value or utitlity
when so divided. Hence, although the law specifically refers only to devise, it should be
considered applicable to all objects whether movable or immovable, of the same nature, such as
vessels.
Query: if the reduction should be exactly of the value, does it mean that the hir gets to retain it
not being less than ? does not absorb
It is submitted that the thing should be retained by the devisee. The intention of the testaor in
making a devise of a determinate object is clearly so that the legatee may enjoy that particular
property. Out of respect for this intention, and since the will of the testator is the governing law in
the succession, the thing should be given to the devisee in case he is entitled to half its value and
the heirs the other half.

Summary of Legitimes of Compulsory Heirs

1. Legitimate Children with other CH

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

LC alone
1 LC w/ SS- ,
2 or more LC w/ SS , same as 1 LC receives
LC w/ IC , half of 1 LC
1LC, SS, IC , , half of 1 LC
LCs, SS, IC , same as 1 LC, half of 1 LC

2. Legitimate Parents & Ascendants w/ other CH

a.
b.
c.
d.

LPA alone 1/2

LPA w/ SS ,
LPA w/ IC ,
LPA, SS, IC , 1/8,

3. Illegitimate Children w/ other IC

a.
b.

IC alone
IC w/ SS 1/3, 1/3

4. Surviving Spouse alone

Except in articulo mortis marriage and spouse dies w/in 3 mos. Surviving spouse entitled
only to 1/3
5. Illegitimate Parents w/ other CH
a.
b.
c.

IP alone
IP w/ LC or IC excluded by the latter
IP w/ SS ,

COLLATION
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have
so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the
donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Art. 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired. (1037)
Art. 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive with their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit
from their grandparents in representation of their father or mother, they shall bring to
collation all that their parents, if alive, would have been obliged to bring, even though such
grandchildren have not inherited the property.
They shall also bring to collation all that they may have received from the decedent during
his lifetime, unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes must be
respected, if the legitime of the co-heirs is not prejudiced. (1038)

Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the inheritance of their
ascendants any property which may have been donated by the latter to their children.
(1039)
Art. 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be brought to collation; but if
they have been given by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to
bring to collation one-half of the thing donated. (1040)
Art. 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical attendance, even in extraordinary
illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to
collation. (1041)
Art. 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional,
vocational or other career shall not be brought to collation unless the parents so provide,
or unless they impair the legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum which the
child would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his parents shall be
deducted therefrom. (1042a)
Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of his children, election
expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be brought to collation. (1043a)
Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and
outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of
the sum which is disposable by will. (1044)
Art. 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition, but
only their value at the time of the donation, even though their just value may not then have
been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total loss or destruction, be it
accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and risk of the donee. (1045a)
Art. 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-half shall be brought to
the inheritance of the father, and the other half, to that of the mother. That given by one
alone shall be brought to collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a)
Art. 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be reduced by an amount equal to that
already received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as possible,
in property of the same nature, class and quality. (1047)
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable, if the property
donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent in cash or
securities, at the rate of quotation; and should there be neither cash or marketable
securities in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary shall be sold
at public auction.
If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs shall only have a right to select an
equivalent of other personal property of the inheritance at its just price. (1048)
Art. 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation shall not pertain to the
estate except from the day on which the succession is opened.

For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits and interest of the property of the
estate of the same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall be made the standard
of assessment. (1049)
Art. 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee the necessary expenses
which he has incurred for the preservation of the property donated to him, though they
may not have augmented its value.
The donee who collates in kind an immovable which has been given to him must be
reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which have increased the value of the
property, and which exist at the time the partition if effected.
As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of the donee, no reimbursement is
due him for them; he has, however, the right to remove them, if he can do so without
injuring the estate. (n)
Art. 1077. Should any question arise among the co-heirs upon the obligation to bring to
collation or as to the things which are subject to collation, the distribution of the estate
shall not be interrupted for this reason, provided adequate security is given. (1050)
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez. a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate grand-daughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate
child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositorsappellants.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except, two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her abovenamed heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the
last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the
appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing
her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs
amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate
children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided"
in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and
eight grandchildren.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the
testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be
reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling
one-half
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would he deemed as constituting the legitime of
the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts
of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling
that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is
impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this
process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the
executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall
be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if
upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article
791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will
for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the
law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by
the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors
(excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their-impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in
respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
m the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise
anew the following issues:
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature
of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their
legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain.
9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for
the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the
appellee.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela. Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated
the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old
Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only
amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the
then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must
first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case
of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect.
Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support
the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the
counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the
testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which

they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory
heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto
nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the
provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir
the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the
nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in
her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous
premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory
heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion,
that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs . . . and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have
to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion."
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix,
being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion
of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely
provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going
by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 of the Civil Code
covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix
with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may
retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of
course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article
1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the
legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed
subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case
remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the
legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in
the present ease. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the
testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The
amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues
are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime
under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate,
as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of
the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are
not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to
her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the
intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of
transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrixappellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner

appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence,
there cannot be said to be any question and none is presented as to fairness of the
valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The
plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the
testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes
and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must
be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the
estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties'
manifestation,
20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of
partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both
projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to
meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the
last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors
would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined
further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of
the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own
decision of pursuing the present appeal.
De Roma vs. CA
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. 2 There
is no dispute regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands
are subject to collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article
1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to
collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,
* which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.
Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court ** holding that the
deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.
Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the
fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. 4
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.
6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the
collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation
that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise

language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if
that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not
the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
Locsin vs. CA
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties 3 . The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted
legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being
childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to
their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives"
(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives.
4"
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time,
his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from
both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his
estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceedings was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her
husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6 Catalina declared
that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form
part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42
are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco,
and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio
Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she
disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the
witnesses to the transactions were her nieces Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria
Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her
house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9)
years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she
was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment,
Don Mariano's, as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made
the following sales and donations of properties which she had received from her husband's
estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977. Four years before her death, she had made a will on October
22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there
was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under
the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except
some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces
who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties
which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were in
officious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those
who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, 1985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and
against the Locsin defendants
The petition has merit and should be granted. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years
before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such
time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her
lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her
death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as
donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they
nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during
her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom
to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code
which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
"Art 750.
The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in, full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of
the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person
affected. (634a).
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she
died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been
imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and
nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don
Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already
begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don
Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano
Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43-hectare
land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she
sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

Among Doa Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property
which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent
when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the
fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously
disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente
Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020.
Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5,000 sq.m. of the same lot to Jualian
Locsin. 19
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano
died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties
should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the
spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air
that would also prejudice his own interest.
Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent
when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to
Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue
pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them.
Doa Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in
her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not
dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.
Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after
Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in
the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an
injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said
transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and
the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.
F. Freedom to dispose free portion
Art. 914. The testator may devise and bequeath the free portion as he may deem fit.
The article reiterates the principle embodied already in article 842. thus, superfluous and at
some point misleading. In many cases, the testator cannot really dispose of part or whole of the
free portion, because the legitimes of concurring compulsory heirs, like the surviving spouse and
illegitimate children when there are legitimate children or descendants, are taken from the free
portion. Hence, he can only dispose that which is the remainder of the free portion when this is
partly consumed by the legitimes of concurring compulsory heirs. The phrase, as he may deem
fit, is therefore erroneous. The testator does not absolute freedom over the free portion when
concurring CH are present and only to those qualified to succeed.