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ON ISRAELI GEOPOLITICS: THEORIES AND CASE STUDIES

Tiberiu Condulescu
European Institute for Jewish Studies, Stockholm
Abstract
Situated within the broad field of geopolitics and foreign policy with a special
focus on the case of Israel this article examines how geopolitical considerations
influence foreign policies. In this respect, existing research defines the relationship
between two dimensions of the political: geopolitics and foreign policy in the case
of a small-sized, medium-power state: Israel. Even though there are various other
factors contributing to foreign policy beyond geopolitics, my present aim is to
focus specifically on the relation between these two. The main concern addressed is
to what extent geopolitical considerations, termed as geopolitical consciousness,
influenced the foreign policy behavior of the state of Israel.

Introduction
Israel, as well as other states, became concerned with geopolitics to a great
extent, especially after the territorial changes that occurred in the aftermath
of World War II and the decolonization period worldwide. Confronted
with several major problems after its foundation in 1948, the state of Israel
had to resort to a genuine geopolitical stance within the Middle-East.
Among the determinants that framed Israels unique geopolitical situation
and geopolitical consciousness were: first, the fact that the fledgling state
was surrounded by a generally hostile Arab world, (Newman 1998, 4),
second that it occupied a strategic position in the Suez area (Friedman 2008,
7) and third that it was a Jewish state (Newman 1998, 4). Fourth, beyond
geographic considerations it had to adopt a specific stance in respect to
demographic issues as well (Bialer 1990, 68, 76), ultimately linked to one of
the most salient resource problems of the region which constitutes the fifth
determinant: fresh-water and its acquisition, supply and distribution
(Newman 1998, 14). These five dimensions were the major constituents of
the basis of Israeli geopolitics in the past and today as well, but with
variations in scope and importance. Yet, my research at present will draw
mainly on one of these: geographic considerations which I considered most
relevant for the present research. Thus geopolitical consciousness will be
limited for most of its part to this one dimensions of geopolitics interwoven
to some extent with the issue of water resources. I chose to give a lesser
importance to the demographic factor for a series of reasons: it is first of all
organically linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to which a lot of
research and work has been already allocated in terms of the refugee
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problem and population growth within the territories in and around Israel
providing small space for any new approaches on the issue. Second, given
the historical background of the establishment of the state, more
specifically the various waves of immigration, it is somewhat difficult to
analyze the exact influence geography had on the population, as classical
geopolitics would proceed. As such land was chosen for its unique role and
importance in the region.
Not only does Israel represent a unique case for understanding the
influence of geopolitics on foreign policy but it also entails a series of other
features that motivate its choice as the subject of the current work. First, a
relatively low number of works address the issue of Israeli geopolitics
explicitly and even if they do so, they either do that from a broader
geopolitical perspective or they address mainly the role of the demographic
factor both in respect to settlement activities and the refugee problem, or
the current crisis in the dynamics of the population. Fresh-water, as the
most vital resource in the area, especially in connection to the Jordan River,
became prominent because of the desire of each state to control as much of
it as possible.
Second, Philippe Moreau Defarges (2003, 125-126) created a theoretical
framework unexploited yet in further research, by observing three types of
foreign policy options available to Israel, based on the geopolitical
considerations at its disposal, within which to scrutinize the effects of
geopolitics on foreign policy. The first one is the isolationist approach
towards the surrounding world, based on the logics of the fortress. The
second one is the expansionist option based on the logics of the Promised
Land underlining the tension between Israels contemporary borders
versus its biblical ones. The last option questions the isolationist policy in
favor of reconciliation with the Arab world, an option more successfully
embraced towards the end of the century. These strategies were not
mutually exclusive as one might expect after such a straightforward
categorization, though there were periods when one or the other prevailed.
Even more so, the same geopolitical consciousness depending on the given
circumstances would have the capacity to fuel different processes in the 61
year long history of the state.
The third and last reason justifying the choice of the subject is the fact that
ever since its foundation the state of Israel has played a pivotal role in
Middle-Eastern politics with the capacity to draw the attention of all major

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actors on the international scene to the events that took place around and
within its borders, sometimes posing a threat even to world security.
Turning on the ambivalence of Israeli foreign policy, which is the research
subject of the present paper, I will scrutinize how strong the relationship
between geopolitics and foreign policy was and what it evolved into. From
the early days on Israel managed to conduct its foreign policy in a very
brilliant but often puzzling way drawing benefits from all major powers
interested in the Middle-East, changing its attitude towards the
surrounding Arab world in various instances. I will therefore analyze in
what ways these changes in attitudes were determined by the geopolitical
consciousness of the state, claiming that it played a very significant role in
the development of the relations with the surrounding world. Therefore the
contribution to the existing literature will be in providing an evaluation of
specifically Israeli geopolitics and an analysis of the effects of the landwater connection (mainly territory) on foreign policy for subsequent
research.
Apart from Moreau Defarges, I draw upon the writings of scholars such as
Frederic Encel, John Agnew, George Friedman, Avi Shlaim, Uri Bialer, Paul
Johnson, Alain Dieckhoff, Baruch Kimmerling, William Quandt, Stewart
Reiser, Bernard Reich and Michael Oren who have addressed various
aspects of Israeli politics, especially topics concerning: Zionism and its
policy consequences, the relevance of the major Israeli wars and their
geostrategic implications, modern Jewish history and Israeli foreign policy,
and different views on the development of Israeli geopolitics and the role
of water. I have also conducted interviews with professors Philippe
Moreau Defarges and Frederic Encel as well as with the head of the French
Institute for Geopolitics Professor Beatrice Giblin.
This article is structured into two sections, each tackling different aspects of
the topic at hand. The first section provides and overview of some of the
most important geopolitical notions considered here, as well as about
Zionism and foreign policy. The second section comprises two case studies:
the Six Day War and the Camp David Accords underlining the geopolitical
approach to the investigation of these. The method of analysis utilized is
process tracing, with the purpose of tracking how specific events and
turning points affected the behavior of the state and what role geopolitics
played in their development. My conclusions show that the geopolitical
consciousness of the state (especially in terms of land and water) was

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inherently part and determined both events analyzed, defining parts of
them as well as the whole process presented.
Geopolitics, Zionism, and Foreign Policy
Geopolitics is the discipline that developed in the last century in an
atmosphere of great power rivalry and colonial imperialism focusing on the
analysis of the relation between geography and political power within a
political entity. It was meant as a guideline to harnessing geographic
knowledge to further the aims of specific nation states having an
instrumental purpose as well, today referring mostly to how foreign policy
elites and mass publics construct geographic imaginations of the world to
inform world politics (Agnew 2002, 14-15) and how they utilize geography
for specific aims. Hence, geopolitics concentrates on how space determines
politics and how political entities use space to achieve their aims. It is
therefore particularly useful to analyze international relations which often
have a strongly spatial dimension, especially in the Middle East where
territories are contested for various reasons in a relatively small area.
This section aims is to clarify how geopolitics is applicable to Israel, why it
is a useful tool to analyze both the developments in the Middle East and
the making of Israeli foreign policy and to introduce ideas that can be
developed in future research. Subsequently my argument is that geopolitics
is one of the most appropriate tools to analyze the events in the region and
given the importance of geopolitical considerations it also has a clear
influence on Israeli policies, especially those that concern the surrounding
Arab world.
Geopolitics is an efficient tool to analyze the Middle East as it focuses on
the conflict for the acquisition and control of territory. From the early 50s
to the 70s several states caught up in the Arab-Israeli conflict aimed first
and foremost at gaining additional territorial growth in order to establish a
strategically and politically superior position in the region: Syria aspired to
a position of hegemony in the region, Egypt wanted to become the
unquestioned leader of the Arab League and implicitly the Arab world
while Jordan aspired to gain the territories of the Palestinians and maintain
control of the West Bank, opposing the establishment of a rival state that
could threaten its own existence. Israel as well wanted to secure its
territorial existence once it came into being after almost two millennia of
Jewish dispersion. Therefore the ensuing conflict essentially revolved and
revolves around the control of a small territory, which is specifically
relevant in the dispute for the Temple Mount, one of the places with the
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greatest symbolic values in the world, from which the second Intifadah
broke out. (Giblin, interview 2009) Geography also defined the target
locations of agricultural settlement that were established in Palestine and
later on Israel, which were always set up in places of strategic and
geographic value. (Giblin, interview 2009) Therefore, in our case it is
especially important to observe how politics used the configuration of
physical geography to create new political relations and situations. The last
important element of geopolitical analysis are the representations and
symbols used by the various factions involved in the conflict,
representations that fuel a wide range of feelings and actions. (Giblin,
interview 2009)
Zionism and Geopolitics
Geopolitics starts from a simple premise: the geographic location and
conditions play a significant role in the way people and states behave.
Therefore geopolitics scrutinizes the interaction between politics and space.
There are three dimensions of analysis in case of any state: internal
geopolitics, focusing on demographic structure and territorial integrity;
regional interaction, focusing on relations with the neighboring countries
and interaction with the great powers (Friedman 2008, 2), dimensions we
will examine in the present section. Although this paper does not aim to
present an overarching description of Zionism and its implications, I
summarized the ideas with greater impact on the geopolitical positioning
and foreign policy of the state.
Zionism fostered two geopolitical visions according to the revisionist
historian Avi Shlaim (2004, 657): the non-recognition of a Palestinian
national identity and the quest for an alliance with a great power. One
major Zionist imperative was from its outset the establishment of an
alliance with a great power that could protect Israel and support it. This
struggle for finding the proper ally remained constant and started even
before the statehood period with Turkey as envisaged power, followed by
Britain and France in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet ultimately it was the
American option that would prevail, due in not a least significant way, to
David Ben-Gurion who maneuvered himself through the early stages of
statehood in sometimes ambivalent ways but always loyal to his ultimate
goal, namely that of securing US support for Israel (Shlaim 2004, 659).
What particularly made Zionism relevant from a geopolitical perspective
was its aim to establish a political entity in Palestine for the Jewish people,
and this made it unique among all the ideologies (nationalism, liberalism,
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socialism) in the framework of which it appeared. Nationalism as such took
the link between territory and the nation as normal and given, yet Zionism
was not based on a living reality in this sense, but on historical memories,
ties and feelings. (Kimmerling 1983, 205) In their aim to give a politicalgeographic existence to the Jewish people in Palestine, some Zionists such
as Ahad Ha-Am recognized that the Jewish state would play a unique role
in the game of interests of the great powers being located at the crossroads
of three continents (Hertzberg 1981, 57), a role ultimately fulfilled.
Zionist politics was also responsible to a great extent for the aggressive
water policies implemented by Israel because of its major concern with
agricultural settlement and cultivation. Reclaiming the land and making
the desert bloom were high aspirations of Zionism that would have
implicitly made the Jewish society in Israel thrive and would have
provided some form of legitimacy to the state, since the Arab population
did not have either the means or the underlying ideological motivation to
do it. The four main reasons identified for the aggressive stance on water
(limiting distribution of water, cutting distribution from the Arab side,
water diversion, etc.) were seen to be: the need to support intensive
agricultural production, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, sharing and
contesting symbolic places with the Palestinians and the problematic status
together with the boundaries of Jerusalem. (Schnell 2001, 216) Would there
have been any remedies to these, whether to all or just some, it was
expected that Israels policies would have been less pragmatic.
Zionism was concerned with the redemption of Israel by settling the land
as well as creating strategic settlements along the border. Redemption was
understood both from the non-Jewish population and from desolation and
nature. (Kimmerling 1983, 201) Yet this interesting strategy implemented
along the boundaries, termed Frontier Settlement, whose origins may be
linked to German and Italian practices, (Penslar 1991, 7) defined as the
settlement of people in border and peripheral areas of the country for both
political-military reasons and ideological ones, was central to the Zionist
enterprise not only because of securing boundaries and enhancing the
socio-economic capacity of the areas but also because of creating stable
points from where to launch further settlements or expansionist activity.
(Morag 2007, 188) Especially characteristic during the Mandate period,
these settlements created the seedbeds of the military as well (Morag 2007,
154).

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The underlying idea for this strategy was that whereas borders symbolize
the limits of a countrys sovereign territory, a frontier is a politicalgeographic space lying within as well as beyond the integrated region of
the political unit into which expansion may take place. (Kreiner, Mansfeld,
Kliot 2006, 383) Frontier as taken from the American experience and
understood by the Israeli one as well thus came to mean the line dividing
the inhabited from the uninhabited, while having the connotation of a
movement always towards the horizon creating the illusion of infinite
expansion. (Kimmerling 1983, 3) And indeed in the period of the Mandate,
expansion was deemed as infinite.
Apart from this, it needs to be underlined that Zionism as such had some
concern for peace. This was one of the basic aims of the Zionist movement
and it was understood first and foremost in terms of recognition and
legitimacy of existence. (Kimmerling 1983, 3) Therefore as long as the
surrounding environment was hostile and no bargaining position could be
attained, peace in whatever terms was inconceivable.
The Importance of Jerusalem
Jerusalem cannot miss from any geopolitical analysis of the Middle East
given its uttermost importance for Jews, Muslims and Christians as well,
yet given the fact that several writings have been dedicated to the subject I
only focus on some of the most relevant facts. Jerusalem is a micro-cosmos
on its own and a continuous source of tension and rivalry. (Encel interview,
2009) If Israel as the Holy Land is the crossroads of three religions,
Jerusalem is their crucial point, giving home to the most sacred places of
Judaism and Christianity and the third most sacred place of Islam.
What makes the situation even more explosive is the concentration of holy
places in one small area, namely the Temple Mount within the Old City of
Jerusalem. Historically divided into four quarters: the Muslim, the
Armenian, the Christian and the Jewish one, the Old City has been one of
the most controversial territories, ever since its recapture by the IDF in
1967. Set up initially according to the UN Partition Plan of 1947 as
international territory, Jerusalem was soon divided by Jews and Muslims,
to be later incorporated into Israel following 1967. The first state leader
who created the powerful symbolic value of Jerusalem was Ben-Gurion,
according to whom the Negev and the Galilee where only the body of Eretz
Israel whereas Jerusalem was its spirit. (Encel interview, 2009) Therefore
there could be no Jewish state without Jerusalem. The failure to recapture

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the Old City and East Jerusalem in 1949 was thus seen as a tragedy in view
of the demographic and military efforts put into it.
Israeli Foreign Policy in Geopolitical Terms
Israel in its foreign policy goals and objectives fits into the general pattern
of Middle Eastern states seeking first and foremost security and well-being
for its people, (Reich 2004, 121) with survival and security being its main
concerns Defarges interview, 2009). The geopolitical discourse has therefore
evolved around these two elements of policy and along the five
determinants enumerated earlier.
What makes foreign policy singular in this case is the fact that Israel has an
atypical set of determinants through which it views the world and which
affects its approaches to foreign policy. (Reich 2004, 122) First, it is the fact
that Israel sees itself as a Jewish state, unique to the world with a particular
role in Jewish history and the life of the Diaspora, beyond the role other
nation states have for their representative nations. Second is the Zionist
ideology of the state with which even today many Israelis identify
themselves. Zionism aimed at creating a sovereign Jewish state that would
represent a safe haven for persecuted Jews from all around the world to
ensure their survival. Third is the security policy which identifies three
major concerns: enhancing the security of the state; establishing, sustaining
and expanding peaceful relations with the Arab states and last, opposing
any form of anti-Semitism wherever it may exist or arise and ensure Jewish
immigration to Israel. (Reich 2004, 125) Out of these, a specific set of foreign
policy options arose.
Three Foreign Policy Approaches
Derived from the reluctance of the Arab world to accept Israel as a state of
the Middle East, peace and security or security and peace came to be the
central themes of Israeli policy, (Reich 2004, 135) and in order to manage
these a set of three possible options came to the forefront. Taking the above
mentioned factors into consideration Israels three foreign policy options,
drawing on the observations of Philippe Moreau Defarges, were
isolationism, expansionism and/or reconciliation.
The Isolationist Approach or the Option of the Fortress
Israel has traditionally perceived itself as an isolated player on the world
stage. This is not only because of the persecution the Diaspora Jews have
experienced throughout the centuries but also because of the concept of the
reality of statehood that has evolved in the last 60 years during which Israel
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has been involved in 5-6 major conflicts perceived as defensive wars
against external aggression and which guaranteed the continuous existence
of the state in a hostile region. Regardless of the controversies surrounding
some of these wars, the image of a threatened state has been maintained all
throughout its existence, and under such circumstances the logic that
would prevail was that of the fortress.
Defining for the isolationist logics is the so called Massada complex based on
an ancient event. The Massada was a hilltop fortress in Palestine
overlooking the Dead Sea. During the Roman occupation in 70 A.D. the
people of the region chose to die heroically for their freedom in the face of
the Roman attempts to quench their rebellion, instead of surrendering. This
event revived by the Zionists created a powerful echo within the Jewish
people who had been persecuted up till the last century. Defending the
country from external invaders is therefore seen as the ultimate form of
heroism that specifically derives from the Massada complex (Encel 2006,
271) which is a powerfully constructed image to maintain the cohesion and
unquestionable importance of the army as well. Young Israeli soldiers were
taken to the Massada hilltop for their swearing in ceremony where they
declared in unison that: Massada will not fall again. This mentality led to
policy implications according to which the new formed state could only
rely on itself, through a strong military posture and should maintain
independence in foreign policy without external interventions (including
that of the United States) in its security decision making process. (Newman
1998, 11) Nonetheless, this did not exclude the creation of strong bonds
with foreign powers sympathizing with the Israeli cause. This logic has
been the foundation of Israeli politics since 1948, changing more
powerfully only after the 1990s.
The Expansionist Option or the Theory of the Promised Land
Deeply rooted in the conscience of the Jewish nation was the dream of
acquiring the Promised Land, the territory promised by God to Abraham.
This dream was to influence Israeli foreign policy mainly because of the
size of the territories allocated to the state in 1947 and the need for
establishing a powerful deterrence towards the Arab world surrounding it.
(Reiser 2001, 79) Once the fortress, mentioned earlier, had been established
the need for expanding the fortress arose, a phenomenon similar to that of
an empire. (Defarges interview, 2009) The finest example for territorial
expansion, and a key moment in Israels history in this respect was the Six
Day War. It was not the only occasion on which Israel occupied foreign
territories but it is the most significant defining Israeli policies from then
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on. Once some form of expansion occurred Israels discourse could change
for it not only gained territories with which to undertake possible future
bargains but it also created a certain type of deterrence towards the
surrounding world. Expansion in this sense was inextricably part of Israeli
policy.
The Reconciliatory Option
Israel did not advocate an offensive policy willingly from its beginnings on.
The looming menace of the surrounding Arab world and its hostility
towards the Jewish state kicked off the conflict, not that the events previous
to its establishment had not already degenerated into armed disputes
where both the Jews and Arabs had made a series of bad choices. The 1947
Partition Resolution provided Israel with a small territory that made it
almost impossible for her to enter any kind of peace negotiations with the
Arab world, being considered both an inferior and a small state.
Nonetheless the issue of territory became a vital question, even though
gaining territories could only be achieved by war especially when a
complete change in status quo was expected to occur.
The first step forward in respect to reconciliation happened after Israel
gained a definite geopolitical advantage in front of all its three major
neighbors by capturing territories important if not even vital to them. This
brought possible peace negotiations one step further in some sense, though
it created a series of problems as well. After Nassers death in 1970, Egypts
attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict gradually changed under the
influence of the United States who became increasingly involved in the
peace process. Thus, in 1979 the first peace-treaty with an Arab country
was signed, between Israel and Egypt following the Camp David Accords.
From then on further peace was not any more out of discussion but became
more a matter of time, since the newly established relations with Egypt did
not develop into what was expected by the Israeli side.
Ultimately things for Israel came down to the issue of isolating itself in the
region, dominating the region or establishing friendly relations with its
neighbors. (Defarges interview, 2009) Yet as mutually exclusive as these
seem, Israel found ways in which to combine the three approaches and
conduct a complex foreign policy while one view dominated the others to
some extent.

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The role of the United States in Defining Israeli Policies
In assessing the actual independence of Israeli policies, be they based on
geopolitics or other considerations, we need to clarify in the present section
the role played by the United States. Evidence shows and most scholars
agree on the point that the Cold War itself played more a secondary role in
the making of Israeli foreign policy while virtually almost none in shaping
its domestic politics. (Karsh 1997, 156) Even more, apparently neither of the
superpowers or the declining powers had a decisive say in their smaller
Allies grand strategies be it Israel or any other state. (Karsh 1997, 156)
In the 1960s the United States had not yet become a leading power in the
region and was still preoccupied with developing its relations with the
Arab world, which meant that had it not been for Trumans pro-Jewish
inclinations American support for the establishment of Israel would either
have not existed or not sufficed to make the Zionist endeavor reality.
(Johnson 1988, 525-526) It was actually the initial reluctance, of both Britain
and the US, to the establishment of the Jewish state that drove Israel into
the arms of the Soviets with whom cooperation lasted for a short while.
(Karsh 1997, 160)
Eisenhower saw no particular interest in Israel and relations with the US
started improving only in the 1960s, especially after the French had lost
their interest in Israel and the Soviets gained a foothold in the region.
American-Israeli relations entered a new phase based on two major
considerations: an ideological/sentimental one and a strategic one. (Lewis
1992, 2) US support did not become substantial until the Kennedy-Johnson
and the Nixon years, reaching its peak towards the end of the century
when Israel became the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the region.
The 70s and 80s were the years when the relation with the US flourished
whereas the early 90s brought about cooling down in US-Israeli
cooperation, which did not mean that the US would not support Israel
anymore, just that the administrations became more critical of the Jewish
state than before. What also needs to be given attention is the fact that the
exact nature and extent of US commitment to Israel remains somewhat
imprecise because there is no mutual treaty or formal alliance binding the
two countries together, requiring the US to intervene with arms under
volatile conditions. (Reich 2004, 134)
It is true that the backing of the US implied a somewhat more robust self
confidence but it by no means meant that the Jewish state did not have a
will of its own according to its capacities. This aspect is especially relevant
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when considering Israels nuclear program at Dimona in the 60s, about
which the US was rather critical, as a result of which Israel acquired the
nuclear bomb in the 70s; as well as a series of local conflicts in which the
opinion of the US was totally ignored. Israel is up till today seen as a very
much independent state regardless of her ties to the US. The special
relationship is one that needs to be sustained but Israel refused and refuses
to let outsiders influence its perceptions of threat or security which are
decisive in defining its foreign policy. (Reich 2004,, 134)
Given the discussions in this section it is a paradox that even though such a
wide panoply of geopolitical conceptions may be applied and apply to the
study of Israel, the official discourse of the state avoids the mention of
geopolitics and Israeli academia is reluctant to use the term geopolitics,
resorting rather to the use of international relations theories. (Encel
interview 2009) Yet as the current analysis proves, state policies, various
implemented actions, foreign policy, as well as the founding ideology
extensively rely on some form of geopolitical notions, determining a form
of global geopolitical consciousness that is always present in the making of
policies vis--vis the Arab world and the international community.
Geopolitical consciousness therefore needs to be understood as the panoply
of considerations in respect to space, resources, identity, water, strategic
positioning and regional status that are all present to a different extent in
defining Israels foreign policy.
The Six Day War and the Camp David Agreements
After having clarified all the relevant conceptual aspects, I now turn to the
cases chosen for analysis. First, I provide an overview of one the most
important wars fought by Israel and second I focus on the peace agreement
that represented a milestone after this war. The Six Day War provides some
of the most interesting geopolitical perspectives to be analyzed since
subsequently to it Israel tripled its territory and changed its position in the
region. The Camp David Accords were the first successful peace
negotiations with an Arab state, concluded with territorial rearrangements,
marking at the same time a clear departure towards peace as a viable
option.
The Six Day War
One of Israels major military operations and most important victories was
achieved in the summer of 1967 during the Six Day War that brought
geopolitical considerations to the top of the agenda by the conquests
realized. The Jewish state practically tripled its territory and gained
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geopolitical advantage over each of its neighbours. It is argued that water,
and especially occupying territories with significant water resources played
a significant role in the conflict as could be seen during earlier events in
1965 when clashes over water occurred between Syria and Israel. Overall
there were a number of reasons for the increased tensions that led to the
breakout of the conflict such as Israel being seen as a colonial-settler state in
a post-colonial Middle East that was eager to forget the colonial experience,
the Cold War bipolarity, political rivalries between some of the Arab states,
Palestinian, Egyptian and Israeli cross-border raids, poor intelligence and
the political insecurities of the Eshkol government. (Selby 2005, 338) Yet as
long as we keep in mind that it was the closure of the Straits of Tiran that
triggered the war and that the Golan was taken for mainly strategic
purposes, in which water was as important as the location itself, we may
see that water played indeed an important role in the breakout of the
conflict and in the way it unfolded.
The most significant confrontation preceding the Six Day War arose
because of water disputes in 1964 over the plans of Israel to divert water
from the Galilee to the Negev. Syria who had most vehemently opposed
such a move and was expressly against Israels National Water Carrier
program not only tried through the Arab Leagues support to implement a
project by which to divert the Hasbani and Banyas rivers before they
reached Israel but took up arms against the Jewish state as well. These
events showed that Syria was capable of tampering with the Jordan Rivers
origins by shutting off its supplies while Egypt could enact a blockade on
the Straits any time it wanted to. (Oren, 2002a, 17) This dual menace had
therefore underlined the essential role of water in a possible future
confrontation which would follow a year later.
In the Arab world the period after the Suez War brought about some
significant changes such as the rise of Egyptian charismatic leader Gamal
Abd-al Nasser and Pan-Arabism, elements which conveyed the Arab
interests a new geopolitical dimension: the creation of a monolithic Arab
state entity while Israeli boundaries and the refugee problem became more
of a second rank concern. (Reiser 2001, 75) From then on Israel represented
a political and physical barrier in achieving this goal. It is important to
understand the fact that neither Egypt, nor Jordan nor Israel really wanted
the war which broke out in June, which as evidence came to suggest was in
significant part a consequence of the false information provided by USSR
intelligence to both Egypt and Syria. (Beilin 1992, 41)

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Given these assumptions it is important to concentrate on why Israel
commenced such overwhelming military operations although evidence
suggests that it was completely unaware of its actual conquering potential
and was more bent on peace with some of its neighbours especially Jordan
rather than on war. (Beilin 1992, 41) After real mobilization started on all
sides due to the false information launched by the Soviet Foreign Ministry
it was almost impossible to stop the escalation and thus Israel launched a
pre-emptive strike that would have surprising consequences. Eshkol had
even tried to strike at Syria by an indirect route through the UN Security
Council, but the Soviets vetoed all actions against their protg. (Oren 2002,
30)
The spark that ignited the build up seems to have been most likely the
Soviet attempt to exploit the local states, in order to frustrate the US, rather
than the domestic and regional agendas of the participants. (Beilin 1992, 41)
The trigger of the attacks was a strategic move on behalf of Egypt to which
it had resorted earlier in the past as well by blocking the Straits of Tiran
and occupying the region of Eilat, an action that not only endangered
Israels trade routes with the East but put it in a geopolitically fragile
situation since the port city was crucial in developing the Negev. (Bregman
2002, 71) This move was considered a legitimate casus bellum (Reich 2004,
127) and since none of the great naval powers intervened to protect the
freedom of navigation Israel felt compelled to re-establish the status quo.
In this period the internal political situation of Israel was somewhat
unstable as well because of growing rivalries between Ben-Gurion (Primeminister) and Yigal Allon on the strategy of deterrence to be adopted and
later between Yitzhak Rabin (Chief of Staff) and Levi Eshkol (PM and
Defence Minister) on who could crack down most strongly on the Arabs. In
the end the debate reached a form of compromise in which Israel had
acquired an undeclared bomb and enhanced conventional power.
The Rabin Eshkol debate on the other hand ultimately resulted in
relinquishing the Defence Minister post to Moshe Dayan, then a member of
Ben-Gurions Rafi party, a move that let loose the break. Dayan had already
been an established name in the Israeli army and political circles after his
successes in the 1956 campaign, proving to be one of the most brilliant
strategists of the period.
It is at this point required to examine that, as the person in charge of
military operations, Moshe Dayan, brought about changes both to the
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strategy and the aims of the military operations. Initial plans envisaged
occupying Gaza and bargaining for the Straits as well as pushing as far as
the Canal, Dayan on the other hand had not wanted to occupy the Gaza
Strip under any circumstances, foreseeing the dangers of engulfing a large
Arab population into the territory of Israel. (Bregman 2002, 80) He had also
not wanted to occupy the Suez Canal, having issued orders for the army to
stop short of it but not take it. (Bregman 2002, 80) Orders were thus clear
regarding both Gaza and the Suez Canal. He was further reluctant to take
over the Golan Heights as well, considering that such a move would
perpetrate the conflict with Syria forever even though it would constitute a
strategic asset. Yet in the course of the war that lasted but six days it seems
that he was convinced into overriding all his previous considerations.
Apparently due to stringent requests in respect to Gaza and lack of specific
information about the positions of the troops in the Sinai Peninsula, Dayan
consented to going as far as the Canal and occupying the Gaza strip from
which settlements were shelled. (Bregman 2002, 85-86) The West Bank was
a totally different story given the national disappointment of the failure to
take it in 1949. A possible occupation of both East Jerusalem and the West
Bank, which were seen as organic parts of Israel would not only have
meant re-establishing to some extent the historical territory of Israel but
would also strengthen the sense of Jewish identity, (Bregman 2002, 92) yet
such events were not even deemed possible before the war. However in
what regards Dayan he would remain unpredictable and enigmatic.
To understand the important if not even crucial role of water in respect to
the Golan as such, historical evidence suggests that it was a group of
settlers and kibbutznik, from the Galilee region that pressured the
government and mainly Dayan into considering occupying the Golan
Heights. (Ben-Ami 2008, 151) The war had actually already been decided
by the eve of the 9th of June. This argument seems to be acceptable in light
of the fact that Dayan had not wanted to occupy neither the Gaza strip nor
the Suez Canal but ultimately was convinced to do it, just as it happened
with the Golan Heights. He had known that if once taken, Israel would
never be willing to relinquish the strategically vital plateau for it would
create a buffer zone along with the rest of the territories taken. Thus what
had been until then a fight with Syria for the demilitarized zones would
turn into a struggle for the Golan Heights. (Muslih 1993, 621)
Once the war was over, Israel had acquired control of most of the
freshwater sources in that region as well, being able to veto any kind of
increase of the water supply (Sharif 1996, 71) to the Arab parties until the
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peace settlement in 1994 with Jordan. The military operations had proven
that the land-water nexus could easily be established since Israel did not
have to venture far away from its UN designed borders in order to gain
control of headwaters and additional water resources. (Sharif 1996, 72)
The initial euphoria of the victory combined with the gradual realization of
what changes the new status quo would imply in terms of demography, a
possible peace for territory strategy, future settlement possibilities in the
occupied territories and the new image of Israel as a colonial country
prompted the government to reconsider the possibility of peace. Even
though the Israeli government secretly decided to make known its
readiness for peace agreements with both Syria and Egypt on June 19th
1967, the response it received after the convening of the Karthoum Summit
by the Arab world was both negative and worrisome: peace was not an
option. (Beilin 1992, 42) The agreements sought for by the Israelis would
have entailed an exchange of the Sinai and the Golan for peace treaties with
Egypt and Syria while planning to resettle the refugees of the Gaza strip as
part of a regional plan. (Oren 2002, 313) Dayan as well was in favour of this
idea, envisaging a whole series of possible peace solutions, while at the
same time supporting the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West
Bank. (Oren 2002, 316)
If peace was not foreseeable any time soon, the occupied territories still
gave Israel an enhanced strategic position making it more defensible and
providing it with early-warning time due to greater strategic depth. Even
so the conquest of these new lands stirred up the dispute about the degree
to which they were a real resource for territorial expansion, in the sense of
how control of the areas could be increased by settlement and ownership in
order for sovereignty to be enacted at some later stage. (Kimmerling 1983,
181) The only territories that would unequivocally become annexed were
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Compared to the War of Independence for example, the Six Day War had
altered the geopolitical calculations in the region in a far different way.
Whereas it had consolidated Israeli existence, making it clear that Israel
would not disappear any time soon, the sudden seizure of Arab land
completely altered the no peace, no war policy of the Arabs (Reiser 2001,
69) as well as the dream of Arab unity. As in 1948, a new Jewish state
appeared in the region in 1967 as well, but this time it had managed to
prove its military superiority by achieving an overwhelming victory over
the Arab armies. In this new situation Israel had acquired valuable land
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from the Arabs, which would change the perspectives of bargaining for
peace, perspectives that actually changed in less than a decade leading to
the peace agreements with Egypt in 1978. Relations with Jordan would
have probably evolved in a similar way had the Palestinian refugee
problem not acquired a national dimension and a different representative,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The Camp David Agreements
After the Six Day War Israel gained the definite status of regional power
able to withstand the aggression of any of its neighbours and got
surrounded by an aura of indestructibility while its geopolitical status had
changed in a most significant way, the state reaching the borders of the
often evoked Greater Israel, having within its confines the West Bank of the
Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and going even beyond,
through the capture of the Sinai Peninsula. Along with these changes in the
balance of power the next decade brought about a series of other surprises.
The first one was the 1973 Yom Kippur war that had caught the Israelis by
surprise and changed the blissful atmosphere of the post 1967 period. The
second was the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement from the end of the 1970s
which I will take a closer look at.
The event that triggered the re-evaluation of the regional status quo of the
70s was the 1973 Yom Kippur War that had shattered the myth of Israeli
indestructibility. This almost lost war had powerfully shaken the Israeli
public and the political elite as well and brought about another dimension
in the relations with the Arab world. If until that time isolationism and
expansionism were the most often considered options, the new state of
mind dominating Israeli society and the realization that only negotiations
could improve the conflict led to a gradual thaw in Egyptian Israeli
relations under American involvement (Karsh 1997, 180) paving the way
for a new policy of reconciliation, concluded in its first phases with a series
of disengagement agreements, followed by a peace agreement. The next
agreement would follow almost two decades later and these two events
would represent the culmination of Israels reconciliatory efforts, thus
creating the third path of foreign policy options: reconciliation with the
surrounding world.
After having restored the countrys pride, self-respect and honour
president Sadat of Egypt could move on to start a dialogue with the Israelis
whose attitude and leadership changed in a significant way making a land
for peace strategy as called for in the UN Security Council Resolution 242
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acceptable without much protest on behalf of the Israeli side. (Bregman
2002, 143) This sudden shift to bilateral talks after a recent war came as a
surprise to the Israeli side which had learned to treat the possibility of
peace with any other major Arab country as a mere illusion after the events
that occurred in the past. It is at this point important to keep in mind that it
was indeed the Egyptians who made the first steps towards peace while the
option of a reasonable geopolitical reconfiguration of the area made it an
acceptable idea to the Israeli side, which would commit itself to the peace
efforts once it became clear that it was possible.
The Yom Kippur war had serious political costs and destabilized the
position of the Israeli government of that time, which had acquired after
the 1973 elections a young and somewhat indecisive leadership. It was
under this constellation that the US threatened with its reassessment policy
which induced the Israeli side to consider negotiations with Egypt and
have Kissinger involved in his well-known shuttle diplomacy. The war also
led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 that would call for
an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of the provisions of
Resolution 242 from then on, present in each major negotiation process ever
since. (Dieckhoff and Tessler 2008, 302) Given the political developments in
Israel, Sadat was just waiting for the appropriate moment to make his next
move, which happened shortly after the elections which were won by
Begin. A secret meeting in Rabat between Dayan and the Egyptian deputy
prime-minister was convened in mid September 1977, an event from which
Sadats historical visit to Jerusalem was just a couple of steps away
preparing the ground for the peace agreement. (Dieckhoff and Tessler 2008,
302)
It was Secretary of State Kissingers shuttle diplomacy that created the
starting bridge between the Israeli and the Egyptian sides, yet its
importance must not be overestimated. Contrary to general perceptions it
was the local actors, especially president Sadat of Egypt and Israeli primeminister Begin that played the crucial role in getting the peace process
among the two countries started in the late 1970s. (Karsh, 1997, 181) Both
leaders were motivated by personal considerations as well wanting to
change their past reputations and reduce the ongoing tensions between the
two states. (Karsh, 1997, 182)
The main points of the Accords were: relinquishment of the entire Sinai
Peninsula, evacuation of settlements and airfields in the Sinai and

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establishment of a Palestinian administrative authority. (Quandtt 1978, 454455)
Things were not clear within the Israeli political spectrum about the future
of the Occupied Territories though. Agreements had been included
regarding the establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority in
Gaza and the West Bank for an interim period of about five years until a
final solution could be reached but the situation was not entirely clear even
under these circumstances. The future of the Golan was not addressed
anywhere in the Accords, indeed it was an issue to be settled among Israel
and Syria but it would soon turn out that it was very much linked to how
things worked out with Egypt. Whereas the Accords dealt only with
transitional arrangements regarding the Palestinians, they were fairly
precise and definite about the Egyptian-Israeli arrangements.
The peace agreement at Camp David with Egypt marked a new era in
Israeli history. It first meant geopolitical stability on the southern border:
expanding into Egyptian territory was ruled out and the final status of the
borders was negotiated as well. It secondly brought the Palestinian issue
into a new phase. At this point when Israels most dangerous and strongest
neighbour was put at peace, focus shifted to Syria and the Arab-Israeli
conflict changed into the Syrian-Israeli conflict, (Pipes 1991, 5) because of
Syrias aspirations of achieving strategic parity with the Jewish state
(aspiring to re-establish Greater Syria which encompassed most of Syria,
Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Occupied Territories and a small part of
Turkey) and becoming the unquestioned leader of the struggle for
Palestinian rights and interests. (Pipes 1991, 2)
The Accords were unquestionably a success, yet not in the way it was
expected, creating a mere cold peace between the two parties, leaving
further Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories possible. As soon as it
became clear that Egypt was eliminated from the conflict, the Arab
countries had lowered their aggressive stance in respect to the Jewish state
seeing military confrontation not as promising anymore, while talks
became an acceptable approach. (Pipes 1991, 4-5) The peace with Egypt
provided in some form or another the confidence for a more aggressive
behaviour towards the surrounding territories creating a sudden shift from
reconciliation to expansionism by striking at Iraqs nuclear reactors near
Baghdad, annexing the Golan, accelerating settlement in the West Bank and
invading Lebanon. (Pipes 1991, 7) Evidence came to show that Israel had
strongly pushed for the intensification of the settlement program in the
West Bank in the immediate years after Camp David, having managed to
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alter the demographic balance in some places to the extent that the
occupation could hardly be reversed. (Saunders 1988, 420) If the shift was
indeed sudden, the ideology behind it was not. Out of the two major
schools of thought that dominated Israeli politics, the one represented by
Begin prevailed. This meant that with Camp David achieved, Israel
received a free hand to focus on Greater Israel. (Shamir 1988, 193) Yet
Labour maintained the opinion that holding on to the Occupied Territories
would but destroy the Jewish identity of the state. The fundamental change
in the Israeli posture towards the Arabs that was expected to occur, thus
failed to materialize. (Shamir 1988, 191)
Conclusions
This article shows that Israeli foreign policy was determined to an
important extent by the states geopolitical consciousness and especially by
the considerations regarding territory. As the two cases come to prove
possession of territories was the most important factor in fueling the events
surrounding Israels modern history, whereas water played a significant
role only in determining parts of the conflicts or peace processes.
Regardless if the piece of land under discussion was seen as part of the
heart of Israel such as Judea and Samaria which constitute the West Bank,
whether it was seen as a strategically vital asset such as the Golan Heights
or the Gaza Strip, the latter which ultimately turned into a liability; or was
considered the symbolic capital, Jerusalem, land has been the uttermost
concern of the Israeli-Arab dispute.
The other dimension that came along with the problem of the land was that
of water resources meant to develop the land and sustain the growing
population. This is the reason why negotiations were always concerned to
some extent with the problem of water, and the Camp David Accords with
Egypt were no exception to this. Of course with Egypt it was more a
problem of waterways: free navigation and use of the Straits of Tiran, the
Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Territory had and has its most important say in how Israel is portrayed: a
minute and unique nation within the Middle-East. This is an important
geo-regional component of the security discourse (Newman 1998, 13)
which is a major reason for why so overwhelmingly much attention is
given to the state by world media. This minute territory and even smaller
parts within have showed in various instances their capability to spark
major events in the region, constantly proving that the state cannot act
without taking into consideration its geopolitical consciousness. Even
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more, its whole understanding of security is based on geography: land
being the ultimate concern for national security. Ultimately every state
makes the politics of its geography, (Defarges interview, 2009) and Israel is
an excellent example of this.
In what regards the importance of water behind Israeli military actions or
decisions, this aspect is somewhat more problematic than that of land.
(Defarges interview, 2009) As we could see from the analysis,
considerations regarding territory were much clearer than those regarding
water. Each of the sides had a concern for water in some form, therefore
each of them tried to maximize their goals in that respect. Yet it was Israel
who managed to secure itself areas important in terms of water but hardly
defined its aims exclusively in terms of that. Water was also one of those
dimensions that gained importance through time, an aspect that I had not
dealt with in the present article. Water would have been interesting to be
analyzed from a closer perspective as well, since its extraction and
production went through significant changes in the last decades having an
impact on its importance and relevance in policy determination.
Another constituent of geopolitical consciousness that has not been
thoroughly touched upon at present is the demographic structure of the
population, which not only adds a qualitative dimension to the notion
discussed but brings into the picture the issue of identity, cultural borders
and representations. In view of these the most intuitive research direction
proposed is expanding and deepening the notion introduced here with
various other geopolitical considerations in order to have an overall picture
of geopolitical consciousness. Not only that, but for the accuracy of the
research a number of other case studies besides the Six Day War and the
Camp David Accords are also required.
Geopolitics, with clear considerations embedded in Zionism, as we could
see was a clear determinant of isolationism, expansionism and
reconciliatory action yet the present research provided only the framework
and basics for a vaster analysis that can be carried further on along he lines
of what was underlined earlier while focusing on all aspects of what can be
defined as the geopolitical consciousness of the state and how this then
influences foreign policy. Given the fact that geopolitics is an exceptional
tool to analyze the events in the Middle East, I recommend therefore
looking even deeper into the mechanisms that set in motion Israeli foreign
policy for a better understanding of the events in the region, taking up a
track of research yet unexploited as the size of the literature on specifically
Israeli geopolitics comes to suggest.
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