Self and Identity, 2011, 10 (3), 295303

http://www.psypress.com/sai
ISSN: 1529-8868 print/1529-8876 online
DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2010.538550

Hypocrisy, dissonance and the self-regulation

processes that improve health
Je Stone and Elizabeth Focella
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA
This paper explores the use of hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance for motivating
changes in health. Hypocrisy occurs when people publicly advocate a health behavior
and are then made mindful that they have not performed the target health
behavior regularly in the past. The discrepancy poses a threat to their self-integrity,
which hypocrites reduce by bringing their own health attitudes and behavior into line with
the standards for good health. After examining the research that supports the use of
hypocrisy for changing health attitudes and behavior, we nish by discussing how
hypocrisy represents a powerful strategy for engaging the self-regulation processes that
improve health.
Keywords: Hypocrisy; Cognitive dissonance; Self-regulation; Health; Attitudes; Behavior
change.

We often hear people extol the virtues of a good diet, regular exercise, or of
quitting smoking, only to see them eat a bag of potato chips at lunch, spend their
spare time watching television, or enjoy a full pack of cigarettes during a night on
the town. Indeed, people often act hypocritically when it comes to their health by
advocating one thing and then doing another. However, research indicates that
an act of hypocrisy can also provide a means for motivating them to practice
what they preach about how to be more healthy. This is because making people
aware of the inconsistency between the standards for good health they advocate
to others, and their own failures to live up to the standards, can induce a threat
to self-integrity that they become motivated to reduce. With the right touch, an
act of hypocrisy can motivate people to restore their self-integrity by eating
more salads for lunch, getting more exercise, or initiating a smoking cessation
program.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the literature relevant to the self- and
social-identity regulation processes that underlie the eect of hypocrisy on changes
in health attitudes, beliefs and behavior. After describing the theoretical assumptions
that guide the use of dissonance and hypocrisy for improving health, we present the
evidence supporting immediate and longer term changes that follow a hypocritical
discrepancy. We nish by discussing how hypocrisy relates to contemporary theories
of self-regulation.

Correspondence should be addressed to: Je Stone, Department of Psychology Rm 436, University

of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. E-mail: jes@email.arizona.edu
2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

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Dissonance Interventions that Improve Health

The use of hypocrisy as an intervention for improving health is based on the drive to
maintain consistency that Festinger (1957) described in his seminal book on
cognitive dissonance theory. According to Festinger (1957), the perception of an
inconsistency between cognitions induces a negative state of tension that is similar to
hunger or thirst. The tension motivates people to reduce it by restoring consistency
among the relevant cognitions. Decades of research show that the pressure to restore
and maintain consistency between behavior and belief can lead to enduring and
meaningful changes in the way people think and act (Cooper, 2007).
The classic approach to using dissonance for changing health attitudes and
behavior is to have people perform an act that is discrepant from their preexisting
attitudes and beliefs. For example, Axsom and Cooper (1985) applied the eort
justication procedure by having community members in a ve-week weight-loss
program perform a series of highly eortful cognitive tasks that were unrelated to
the topic of weight loss (e.g., reciting text while listening to another persons voice).
The authors hypothesized that choosing to perform the unrelated eortful tasks
would create an inconsistency between the eort they put into the meaningless
cognitive tasks, and the wisdom of participating in what appeared to be a
nonsensical weight-loss program. The results showed that compared to a low-eort
control group, the high-eort group lost an average of 6.5 pounds immediately
following the intervention and sustained the weight loss for one full year after the
program ended. The researchers conclude that to reduce dissonance and justify their
eort, participants became more positive toward losing weight, which led them to
maintain exercise and healthy eating behaviors over time.
Other research uses a classic counter-attitudinal task to promote better health. In
one well-established approach, females at risk for eating disorders perform public
advocacy and role-playing exercises that are inconsistent with their attitudes toward
the thin-ideal body type. In a recent meta-analytic review of 16 clinical trials, Stice
and Shaw (2004) reported that, compared to other interventions and control
conditions, the dissonance-based intervention showed stronger reduction of eating
disorder risk factors and symptoms, lower risk for onset of the disorder, and lower
use of mental health resources in the weeks and months following the program.
Both of these approaches to using dissonance to motivate changes in health
require participants to justify experimentally engineered discrepant acts. In contrast,
the use of hypocrisy does not rely on creating an inconsistency that necessitates selfjustication; an act of hypocrisy simply calls attention to an inconsistency that is
already present in the minds of the target audience.
The Use of Personal Hypocrisy for Motivating Better Health
Hypocrisy begins when people rst make a public advocacy about the importance of
the target health behavior. For example, people can deliver a brief statement or write
an essay about the importance of a behavior that they believe will benet the health
of specic individuals or society in general. The advocacy is designed to be consistent
with their current attitudes and beliefs about the issue, and, as such, should not cause
discomfort. Dissonance emerges when people are then made aware that they often
fail to perform the target health behavior. Past lapses in the target health behavior
can be brought to mind by having advocates examine or generate a list of reasons for
not performing the behavior. Once mindful of the inconsistency between their

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positive attitudes and beliefs about the behavior, and their past lapses, people are
motivated by the discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance to make change.
We believe that hypocrisy motivates changes toward better health because people
perceive the discrepancy as a threat to the self-perceptions of honesty and sincerity
that denes their self-integrity (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). Honesty
and sincerity are important positive self-beliefs that people are motivated to
maintain (Aronson, 1999). When an act of hypocrisy makes people acutely aware
that they have behaved in a dishonest and insincere manner, they feel the discomfort
of dissonance and are motivated to reduce it. The most direct way to get back on
track toward their self-integrity goal is to act in a more honest and sincere manner in
the future. Taking their own good health advice permits hypocrites to reduce their
discomfort and restore their perceptions of being honest and sincere about a
healthier lifestyle.
Over two decades of research shows that an act of hypocrisy motivates people to
adopt healthier attitudes and behavior (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). For example, to
motivate college students to practice safer sex, Aronson, Fried, and Stone (1991) had
sexually active male and female college students recall past failures to use condoms
during sex before video recording them giving a brief speech about the importance of
using condoms to practice safer sex. The results showed that participants in the
hypocrisy condition reported greater intentions to use condoms in the future,
compared to control conditions (Aronson et al., 1991).
A follow-up by Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, and Fried (1994) examined
whether those in the hypocrisy condition were serious about their intentions to use
condoms. When participants were provided with an opportunity to purchase
condoms after the study was over, more participants in the hypocrisy condition
(83%) purchased condoms compared to those who only advocated the importance
of condom use (33%), were only made mindful of past failures (50%), or who were
only exposed to information about condoms (44%). Thus, hypocrisy motivated
participants to increase their intentions and to take the steps necessary to reduce
their risk for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs; see also
Thompson, Kyle, Swan, Thomas, & Vrungos, 2002).
Two recent studies have shown that hypocrisy can motivate healthier behavior
outside of the lab. For example, Bator and Bryan (2009) approached 127 members of
a college tness center and asked them to provide reasons for why they do not
exercise regularly before asking them to sign a large poster advocating the regular
use of the tness facility. The results showed that members in the hypocrisy
condition reported signicantly higher intentions to exercise regularly, and based on
the number of times they swiped their identication card at the entrance, they were
more likely to use the recreational facility during the next week, compared to control
conditions. Morrongiello and Mark (2008) applied hypocrisy to reduce childrens
risk for injury on playground equipment at school. Children aged 712 years
advocated for safe-play behaviors before being made mindful about past failures to
play safely on playgrounds. The children then created posters indicating which
playground behaviors they would demonstrate during recess. The results showed
that children in the hypocrisy condition endorsed signicantly fewer risk behaviors
compared to an information-only control condition.
Do these changes in health behavior after an act of hypocrisy reect a specic goal
to restore self-integrity, or do they reect a more general goal to arm global selfworth? If hypocrisy activates a general goal to enhance self-worth, then performing
an unrelated positive behavior, like helping another person, should resolve the

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dissonance, even if it does not restore perceptions of honesty and sincerity. In

contrast, if an act of hypocrisy arouses dissonance because the behavior threatens
self-integrity, then people should focus on changing the discrepant behavior to
restore their self-integrity. Thus, when they have a choice between performing the
behavior that directly reduces the hypocrisy, and performing a behavior that does
not reduce the hypocrisy but enhances their self-worth, most people should choose to
perform the behavior that directly reduces the hypocritical discrepancy.
Stone and colleagues (1997) tested these predictions by having participants act
hypocritically about safer sex. At the end of the study, some had the opportunity to
donate to support a homeless sheltera behavior that would arm their global selfworth, but would not directly reduce their hypocrisy about safer sex. In another
condition, participants were oered the opportunity to donate to the homeless, but
were also oered the opportunity to directly resolve the hypocritical discrepancy by
purchasing condoms. The results were clear: when self-armation (donation) was
the only option available, 83% of those in the hypocrisy condition used it. However,
when they could donate or restore their self-integrity by purchasing condoms, 78%
chose to purchase condoms compared to only 13% who donated. The results
indicate that when the only option for dissonance reduction is a behavior that
enhances global self-worth, people will use it to enhance their self-worth, even if
doing so does not resolve their hypocrisy. However, when they can directly restore
their honesty and sincerity, most people focus on performing the target behavior,
even when other options for dissonance reduction are available (see Fointiat, 2004,
for similar ndings).
Optimizing the Eect of Personal Hypocrisy on Changes in Health
There are several important parameters to the eectiveness of hypocrisy as an
intervention for motivating better health (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). For example,
the eect of hypocrisy on change is greatest when people construct and deliver a
persuasive message about the target health behavior. Simply reading about the
behavior (Aronson et al., 1991; Stone et al., 1994) or preparing an advocacy but not
delivering it (Stone et al., 1997) does not cause the same level of dissonance as does
advocating the behavior to an audience. It is presently unclear why the publicity of
the statement enhances the eect; it could be because having an audience increases
commitment to the course of action, enhances elaboration about the steps to change,
or adds other pressures like evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1970; see Stone &
Fernandez, 2008). Whatever the case, taking a public stand on the importance of the
target behavior signicantly increases the level of change.
In addition, consistent with the importance of tailoring new health information to
the personal concerns of the audience (Kreuter & Strecher, 1996), when made
mindful of past lapses in the target health behavior, the eect of hypocrisy is greatest
when people recall their own personal failures, rather than thinking about failures in
general (Stone et al., 1997). Hypocrisy is also more eective when people can easily
bring to mind past failures to perform the target behavior (Son Hing, Li, & Zanna,
2002).
An important limitation to using hypocrisy to change health is that people do not
like to be humiliated by their discrepant behavior (Rosenberg, 1970). Publicly
associating them with their past failures to perform the behavior will cause a threat
to their self-integrity, but rather than reducing the threat by adopting the target
behaviors, the publicity of their past failures may make future intentions and

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299

behavior more resistant to change (Festinger 1957). For example, in two studies,
Fried (1998) had participants advocate the importance of recycling before she varied
the degree to which participants were publicly identied with their past failures to
recycle. Participants in an unidentied condition completed a list of past failures
anonymously, while in an identied condition wrote their name and phone number
on their list and then signed it in front of the experimenter. The results showed that
hypocrites who felt anonymous about their recycling failures donated more time and
more money to the recycling program compared to hypocrites who were publicly
identied with their past failures to recycle. Moreover, hypocrites who were publicly
identied with their past failures reported signicantly more negative attitudes
towards recycling than hypocrites in the anonymous failure condition. The publicity
of the past transgressions apparently pushed some to justify their past failures by
becoming more negative toward the target behavior. These ndings suggest that
backing hypocrites into a corner forces them to take the path of least resistance and
change their attitudes to justify their lapses in the target behavior. Alternatively,
when allowed to discover their past lapses in private, hypocrites are not forced to
restore their self-integrity by saving face; instead, they can bring their behavior into
line with the standards for good health.
Finally, hypocrisy appears to be less eective for people who do not hold positive
or certain views of their self-integrity. For example, people with high self-esteem
have higher expectations than people with low self-esteem for behaving in an honest
and sincere manner (Aronson, 1999). Consequently, when those with high selfesteem act hypocritically about their health, they experience a greater threat to their
self-integrity, and are more likely to perform the health behavior in the future. In a
recent test of this prediction, Peterson, Haynes, and Olson (2008) had regular
smokers who were high or low in self-esteem publicly advocate against smoking
before being reminded of past failures to quit smoking. As predicted, hypocritical
smokers with high self-esteem exhibited greater intentions to quit smoking and to
adopt a healthier lifestyle, compared to smokers with low self-esteem.
To summarize, the research suggests that hypocrisy is most eective for
motivating changes in health attitudes and behavior when people who value honesty
and sincerity publicly advocate a specic health behavior and then easily and
privately recall past instances in which they personally failed to perform the target
behavior.

Vicarious Hypocrisy: Being Healthy to Protect a Valuable Social

Identity
Can witnessing another persons hypocrisy cause observers to change their own
health behavior? Research on vicarious cognitive dissonance (see Cooper, 2007)
shows that when observers witness an inconsistent behavior by another individual, if
the observers share an important social identity with the actor, they can experience
dissonance vicariously and be motivated to alter their attitudes. In the case of
hypocrisy, we (Stone, Fernandez, Cooper, Hogg, & Focella, 2010) propose that if
people observe a prototypical in-group member committing an act of hypocrisy
about a target health behavior, they will experience a threat to the integrity of the ingroup that will arouse dissonance. In order to reduce their dissonance in a way that
restores the integrity of the in-group, highly identied observers should be highly
motivated to follow the health advice in the in-group hypocrites advocacy.

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J. Stone & E. Focella

In one experiment, female and male college students who were highly identied with
their university campus evaluated a recorded message by another female student about
the importance of using sunscreen to reduce the risk for skin cancer. The speaker was
either an in-group (same university) or an out-group member (rival university), and she
revealed her hypocrisy when she admitted to previous failures to use sunscreen. The
results showed that, as predicted, female students who shared a strong social identity
with the female hypocrite became signicantly more favorable toward the regular use of
sunscreen than female students exposed to an out-group hypocrite, and compared to
male students who did not share the same level of similarity to the female speaker.
Female in-group observers also bolstered the credibility of the in-group hypocrite and
denied that she should feel bad about her hypocrisy.
Follow-up studies suggest that the bolstering eects among highly identied
females are due to vicarious dissonance and not persuasion. For example, in a
second study, after observing the in-group female hypocrite, females again became
more positive toward the regular use of sunscreen unless they self-armed the valued
in-group identity before exposure to the speaker. In a third study, females who
varied in their level of identication with their campus were exposed to an in-group
female hypocrite who either expressed high or low choice for past failures to use
sunscreen. Consistent with predictions, when provided an opportunity to order
sunscreen at the end of the session, 95% of the highly identied females ordered
sunscreen when the speaker said it was her choice not to use sunscreen, compared to
60% of highly identied females exposed to a female who said her failures to use
sunscreen were beyond her control, and compared to females who were not highly
identied with the speakers campus identity regardless of whether she expressed
high (50%) or low (55%) choice to use sunscreen.
The results of these studies suggest that exposure to the hypocritical behavior of
another person can motivate those who share an important social identity with the
speaker to bolster their support for the target health behavior. An in-group hypocrite
motivates in-group members to repair the damage to the groups integritythe
perception of the group as honest and sincere about issues that are important for
good health. More generally, vicarious hypocrisy represents a promising new vehicle
for using cognitive dissonance to change health attitudes and behavior through
channels, like broadcast mass media, that can be less costly and more ecient to
implement than personal hypocrisy. However, like many mass-media campaigns, the
most eective approach requires careful attention to the targeting of the audience, to
assure that they share an important social identity with the hypocritical advocate.

Coda: Using Hypocrisy to Initiate Self-regulation Processes

Contemporary principles of self-regulation grew from the early work on dissonance
theory, and, as a result, the two perspectives share many fundamental assumptions,
such as the process of discrepancy detection, the arousal and reduction of negative
aect, and the motivation to change cognitions to reduce discrepancies (Aronson,
1999; see Carver, 2004). The tenets of self-regulation theory, in turn, contribute to
recent advances in dissonance theory. For example, in the self-standards model of
dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), the nature of dissonance processes depends on
the types of self-attributes and standards that people use to interpret a discrepant
act. In the action-based model, Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2008) proposed
that dissonance interferes with eective action and activates an approach, actionoriented mindset that leads to discrepancy reduction. These new links between

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301

dissonance and self-regulation processes provide novel insights into how and why
discrepancies between behavior and belief lead to change. We believe that by
focusing people on discrepancies between current and desired end states, dissonancebased interventions like hypocrisy provide useful strategies for engaging the selfregulation processes that facilitate attitude and behavior change.
To illustrate, research suggests that forming approach goals is more eective than
avoidance goals for the initiation of a new health behavior (e.g., Rothman, Baldwin,
& Hertel, 2004). Whereas research has not directly compared the eectiveness of
being hypocritical about approach versus avoidance goals, the literature suggests
that hypocrisy may be an eective strategy for motivating people to achieve either
health-related goal. Specically, some studies show behavior change after hypocrisy
about failing to achieve approach goals (e.g., safer driving, Fointiat, 2004), other
studies show behavior change after hypocrisy about failing to achieve avoidance
goals (e.g., use condoms to prevent AIDS, Stone et al., 1994; use sunscreen to
prevent skin cancer, Fernandez & Stone, 2010), and still others show behavior
change after hypocrisy about failing to achieve both goals (e.g., recycle to saves trees
and also prevent waste, Fried, 1998). The evidence suggests that having people
advocate either approach or avoidance goals will motivate the early stages of change,
as long as they are then made mindful of past lapses in the target behavior.
We suspect the dierence between the hypocrisy and goal-framing literatures lies
in the accessibility of cognitions about failure. Whereas an approach- or avoidanceframed message or goal-formation task may prime a specic standard or end state, it
may not systematically also provide feedback about progress toward the goal.
Hypocrisy, in comparison, can make people acutely aware of the discrepancy
between their current health behavior and goals, and, as a result, the strategy
systematically engages the discrepancy detection and reduction processes that
motivate people to adjust their attitudes and behavior toward better health.
People are also more likely to initiate new health behavior when they create
implementation intentions, the ifthen plans that specify when, where and how to
perform the behaviors that lead to successful goal achievement (Gollwitzer &
Sheeran, 2006; see Sullivan & Rothman, 2008). Research suggests that once plans are
formulated, advocating implementation intentions increases goal strength and makes
people perceptually ready to perform the behaviors that are required to reach their
goals. However, several studies in the hypocrisy literature show that advocating the
steps to perform a health behavior, by itself, does not motivate the same level of
change, as when advocates are also made mindful of past lapses in executing the
behavior (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Thus, hypocrisy may provide an especially
eective strategy for harnessing and directing the power of implementation
intentions on the initiation of new health behaviors. Having people advocate stepby-step plans for performing a health behavior, and then making them mindful of
their failure to initiate their plan, perform specic components of the plan, or
instances when they deviated from the plan, should induce a dissonance that is
specically tailored for their current stage of change. As a result, they should be
motivated to bring their health attitudes and behavior into line with the specic steps
in the plan that they advocate to others.

Summary
Research over the last two decades has shown that when individuals do not practice
health behaviors that they preach to others, their hypocrisy induces a threat to their

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self-integrity that motivates them to practice what they preach. Motivating people to
be honest and sincere about important health issues can be a powerful way to initiate
the self-regulation processes that bring attitudes, beliefs and behavior into line with
their goals and standards for good health.

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