Calder
Facts of the case
Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were denied an
inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision
more than a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within
18 months of the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the
restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of
Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court.
Question
Was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution, which
prohibits ex post facto laws?
Conclusion
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law. The
Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights," arguing that restrictions
against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights. Justice Chase
noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily
ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws.
Cummings
Facts of the case
Following the Civil War, Congress and Missouri adopted provisions that required persons in
specified professional occupations to take an oath that they have never given aid to the rebellion
and secession. Missouri convicted a priest who refused to take the oath. A former Confederate
congressman asked the Supreme Court for permission to practice without taking the federal oath.
Question
Do the state and national oaths violate prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder of the Constitution?
Conclusion
Field, writing for a divided Court, held that both state and national oath laws were
unconstitutional. The oath laws transformed acts that had not been forbidden into crimes and
increased the punishment of acts that were known to be crimes. The oath laws were also bills of
attainder since they were legislative acts that inflicted punishment without the benefit of a trial
by a judge.
Lovett v. United States
Posted on September 12, 2014 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law
Case Briefs
328 U.S. 303 (1946)
Facts: Congress attached legislative rider 304 onto the Wartime Urgent Deficiency
Appropriation of 1943 that forbid the executive branch from paying three employees who
Congress had found guilty of subversive activity their salaries unless they were reappointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. President made a signing statement that said that he
believed that it was unconstitutional. What did it prohibit? Cant be paid for past and future
actions from funds; House would not pass any appropriation without this rider attached.
Holding: Majority did not reach the constitutional issue; the employees were entitled to recover
b/c the rider left the governments salary obligations to them wholly intact. Court found that the
prohibition amounted to a bill of attainder and there was no judicial tribunal that found them
guilty of any crime
Bill of attainder: A legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial
trial.
Rationale: No balancing was done here b/c the Constitution specifically prohibits bills of
attainder. So all the court had to find here was whether or not this piece of legislation was a bill
of attainder.
In addition, the appropriation was allocating provisions for the future.
Lovett and War Powers: Lovett supports proposition that Congress may not use its national
security powers to micro manage the conduct of war of foreign policy. Dicta asserts that
Congress cant direct the conduct of campaigns, and cant in the disguise of rules for the
governance of the army impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.
This kind of structural trespass is usually a question of degree to be resolved
by a functional balancing test under separation of powers analysis.
1. Congress can limit, but its a weighing function.
Lovett and Appropriations Limitations: Supreme Court has, on rare occasions, struck down
legislation for intruding impermissibly on Pres inherent constitutional authority/exercise of
national security powers. Congress cant through mere appropriation measures accomplish that
which by direct legislative action would be beyond its constitutional authority.
AUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime,
entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was
ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and
became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the
respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied
with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to
the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition
applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention
that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with
respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect,
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor
a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons
wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven
persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was
one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was a rubout and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.)
8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is plan
from the facts and was made to suit the petitioners case, thus, making it an ex-post
facto law that would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process. Hence,
the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto
law that may affect the petitioners right to due process?
HELD: No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 an ex post facto law
generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains,
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that
defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Republic Act
8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not
be considered an ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the
law in question has retroactive effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
Alcuaz vs PSBA GR 76353 02 May 1988
11 Wednesday Mar 2015
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law II
Leave a comment
Facts: Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA-QC who conducted demonstrations. The
said demonstrations were tumultuous. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of school year 1986-1987. The President of the Student Council filed a complaint with
the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council
Officers and student leaders. The student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees,
requesting for a written statement of the schools decision regarding their enrolment. Another
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students to the President, Board of Trustees, to enrol
his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming,
hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not students were denied of due process for failing to give notice and hearing
(procedural) and failing to decide without bias or prejudice (substantive)?
Decision: Petition dismissed. a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Thus after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The charge of denial of due
process is untenable, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the
minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case. Records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions No. 1
and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with
Isabelo v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal and DECS [1993]
6:45 AM academic freedom, digest, Isabelo v. PHCR, manuelito isabelo, PHCR No
comments
Facts:
A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of mandamus
addressed to DECS to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior graduating student of Perpetual Help College
of Rizal (PHCR)
Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal for BS Criminology. He was elected Public
Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council
He was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. He was asked by the VP for Academic
Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement a 20% tuition fee increase for the
school year 1991-1992.
Manuelito refused to sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow
officers.
Since, the administration assured that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the
petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105.
PHCR announced that it will increase tuition fees in all levels. The student council filed with the DECS a motion for
reconsideration. DECS held the advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending
the resolution of (the) matter."
The administration dropped Manuelito from PHCR's list of students because of the following reasons:
Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and
PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;
Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22)
He took special training during the semestral break, and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still refused to give him
that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR.
Manuelito wrote to DECS, which in turn sent their letter to PHCR ordering that students should be allowed to
continue their classes pending the resolution. PHCR did not comply with the directive.
Manuelito: Real reason PHCR has voided his enrollment is his active participation in opposing PHCR's application
for tuition fee increase with the DECS.
PHCR: invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. HE been allowed to enroll
"conditionally" pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed.
Issue: WON PHCR may drop Manuelito from the list of students. CASE REMANDED.
In Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology: admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary
upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student.
In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulon: the term "academic freedom" "the freedom to determine on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be
admitted to study."
However academic freedom is not an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to
exercise it responsibly.
In Non vs. Dames II: abandoned Alcuaz vs. PSBA, (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester
contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead the right of a
student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. We have also stressed that
the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an ordinary contract.
Expulsion is disproportionate to his deficiencies in his CMT course. The circumstances show that the PHCR has
strongly been influenced by his participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase.
However DECS should determine whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class or has a number of
school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent school counters.
UP vs. Ayson
G.R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989
Facts:
The UP Board of Regents issued an order abolishing the University of the Philippines College
Baguio High School (UPCBHS) on the ground that such school is not serving as a laboratory or
demonstration school, among others, invoking in their favor academic freedom. The UPCBHS
filed a petition for injunction with preliminary preventive mandatory injunction with a prayer for
the issuance a TRO in the CFI, invoking the right to quality education and free public secondary
education. The CFI granted this and issued an order restraining the Board from implementing
their decision to phase out the UPCBHS. Thus, this petition for certiorari. (In the meantime while
the case is pending, the SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the assailed order of
the CFI.)
Issue: WON, in the light of the circumstances of the case, a petition for certiorari/prohibition (to
restrain the Board from implementing the decision of phasing out UPCBHS), is proper.
Held: No.
It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedomthe
institutional kind.
It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.
Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of competence must be casually overturned
by the courts.
**Mandamus is not proper to compel a school to enroll a student for academic deficiencies
because this involves the exercise by the school of discretion under academic freedom.
University of San Carlos v. CA
granting of honors - Schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and
guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom.
Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to
determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on
this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is
grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
