NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

May 21, 2010

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________

Submitted January 12, 2010 - Decided May 21, 2010

Before Judges Carchman, Parrillo and Ashrafi.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ASHRAFI, J.A.D.

Defendant Riley Jefferson appeals from an order of the

trial court denying his motion to suppress evidence. We

reverse.
 Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to second-

degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within

1,000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and -5b(2). In

accordance with his plea agreement with the State, other charges

were dismissed and defendant was sentenced to five years'

imprisonment and money penalties as required by statute. At the

time the State filed its brief on this appeal, defendant had

been released on parole.

The charges against defendant arose from warrantless police

searches of his person and his residence. After indictment,

defendant moved to suppress cocaine and related evidence found

by those searches. The trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing in which three police officers and defendant testified.

Finding the officers' testimony more credible where it differed

from defendant's testimony, the court concluded that the police

had reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain defendant and

investigate his involvement in a reported shooting of a firearm,

and that they did not violate his constitutional rights by

entering his home without a warrant and subsequently arresting

him when he resisted them physically. On appeal, defendant

argues that the trial court erred because the searches were

illegal and violated his federal and State constitutional

rights.

2 A-1945-06T4
 I.

In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate

court must defer to the trial court's fact findings and "feel"

of the case and may not substitute its own conclusions regarding

the evidence, even in a "close" case. State v. Locurto, 157

N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146,

161-62 (1964)); State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009); State

v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). In particular, the

appellate court must defer to the credibility determinations of

the trial court between competing factual testimony. Locurto,

supra, 157 N.J. at 474; State v. Hodgson, 44 N.J. 151, 163

(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1021, 86 S. Ct. 1929, 16 L. Ed.

2d 1022 (1966).

In this case, the trial court's findings of fact are well-

supported by the evidential record, and we have no reason to

disagree with those findings. To place the relevant facts in

context, the court first noted that the City of Plainfield had

been suffering through a gang war in the summer of 2005,

resulting in an unusual number of shootings and deaths. On the

morning of August 20, 2005, a concerned citizen called the

police to report people arguing and selling drugs and a possible

gunshot in the 700 block of East Front Street. The citizen

described a red Grand Am, giving its license plate number. She

3 A-1945-06T4
also indicated that an African-American man was involved,

describing his skin tone and head covering. The police

responded to that location at approximately 9:44 a.m., but did

not see anything that supported the complaint.

The police checked the plate number provided and determined

it was registered to a red Grand Am owned by Tiffanie Morrison

with an address in Plainfield. Within minutes, Sergeant David

Passarelli, Sergeant Sharon Smith, and three other officers

arrived at that address and saw a red Grand Am with the

designated license number parked in the street. Sergeant

Passarelli placed his hand on the hood and confirmed by the

warmth that the car had recently been driven.

The address at which the car was registered was a multi-

family dwelling. A solid wood exterior door and a storm door

were in the front, opening into a common hallway, with

apartments on each of two floors and the basement. The door was

kept locked, and only the tenants and landlord had access to the

common hallway. A stairway led to the second-floor apartment in

which defendant Jefferson and his family lived.

According to defendant's testimony, he had recently arrived

home from visiting relatives in the 700 Block of East Front

Street. He saw the police from the front window of his

apartment and came downstairs. The police witnesses testified

4 A-1945-06T4
they saw defendant's head and shoulder at the front door peering

out. Sergeant Smith ordered defendant to show his hands as all

five officers approached the front door. Defendant told

Sergeant Smith he did not do anything and did not have a gun.

The officers shouted for him to show his hands. Eventually,

defendant showed the officers his hands around the door. The

officers were still unable to see his waist area.

Sergeant Smith continued toward the door, and as defendant

took a step back, the door began to open. Sergeant Smith wedged

herself into the opening. Defendant attempted to close the

door, and the two began to struggle with the door. Other

officers saw the door strike Sergeant Smith, and they pushed it

open and entered the hallway. After a brief but loud and

violent struggle, the police subdued and arrested defendant for

allegedly assaulting Sergeant Smith. They patted his clothing

and did not find a firearm or any other weapon. Defendant was

placed in a police car, and, after being advised of his Miranda

rights,1 he was questioned about the Grand Am and Tiffanie

Morrison. He identified her as his wife and told the police she

was in the second-floor apartment. Defendant was taken to

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).

5 A-1945-06T4
police headquarters, and when searched, two bags of crack

cocaine were found on his person.

After defendant was taken to headquarters, Sergeant

Passarelli entered the hallway of the residence and led the

officers up to the second-floor apartment. He listened at the

door and heard whispered voices. He banged on the door and

announced the police presence. Tiffanie Morrison opened the

door with a child clinging to her leg. She and the child

appeared to be afraid and upset. Sergeant Passarelli asked if

anyone else was in the apartment. Morrison denied anyone else

being present, but her eyes darted away from the police into the

apartment, causing Sergeant Passarelli to become concerned.

The police asked if they could enter, and Morrison gave

permission. The police conducted a protective sweep of the

apartment. They found no other person, but they saw narcotics

packaging materials and other possible evidence of narcotics.

Sergeant Passarelli asked Morrison for consent to search the

Grand Am, advising her that she had the right to refuse consent.

Morrison consented orally and in writing at 10:15 a.m., and the

police thoroughly searched the car, finding no incriminating

evidence.

Sergeant Passarelli then requested consent to search the

apartment. Morrison was hesitant and asked if she could seek

6 A-1945-06T4
the advice of a relative who was a police officer. Sergeant

Passarelli encouraged her to do so, and Morrison made several

calls attempting to contact her relative. In the meantime, the

police posted officers to secure the apartment and prohibited

Morrison or anyone else from entering.

Sergeant Passarelli returned to police headquarters to seek

a search warrant. He spoke to a Union County Assistant

Prosecutor, who advised him to continue to seek consent for the

search. Upon Sergeant Passarelli's return to defendant's

residence, Morrison gave her consent in writing at 12:39 p.m.

The search of the apartment uncovered quantities of crack

cocaine, narcotics paraphernalia, and a stolen bulletproof vest

belonging to a police agency.

On these facts, the trial court denied defendant's motion

to suppress the evidence recovered from his apartment and his

person.

II.

For purposes of our review, we accept the trial court's

findings of fact, but we need not defer to the trial court's

legal conclusions reached from the established facts. See State

v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990). "If the trial court acts

under a misconception of the applicable law," we need not defer

7 A-1945-06T4
to its ruling. Ibid. The trial court's application of the law

is subject to plenary review on appeal.

We agree with most of the conclusions the trial court

reached in assessing the facts recited. We hold, however, that

the police entered defendant's home when Sergeant Smith wedged

herself in the doorway, and that they needed either a warrant or

an exception from the warrant requirement of the federal and

State constitutions to do so.

The trial court began its decision by concluding that the

citizen informant provided a reliable tip, and that the tip

established a reasonable basis for the police to investigate the

vehicle identified and defendant, who fit the description

provided and, minutes later, was at the address where the police

found the vehicle. We agree with these conclusions.

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880,

20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968), and subsequent cases developing

the scope of an exception from the warrant requirement of the

Fourth Amendment for temporary detention and investigation of a

suspect, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210-11, 99 S.

Ct. 2248, 2255-56, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 834-35 (1979); United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S. Ct. 2574,

2580, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 616-17 (1975); State v. Dickey, 152 N.J.

468, 477 (1998), the police had a reasonable articulable

8 A-1945-06T4
suspicion of criminal activity to detain defendant temporarily

and investigate his potential involvement in the reported

shooting and sale of drugs. See United States v. Hensley, 469

U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 612

(1985); Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 247; State v. Nishina, 175

N.J. 502, 510-11 (2003).

We also agree with the trial court that the tip and

corroborating evidence were not sufficient to establish probable

cause to arrest defendant for any offense. Probable cause

requires "a 'well-grounded' suspicion that a crime has been or

is being committed." State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 214 (2002)

(quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001)). The

informant's tip and limited corroborating evidence the police

developed did not rise to the level of probable cause to believe

that defendant had committed either a firearms or a narcotics

offense. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct.

1921, 1924, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972) (informant's unverified

tip not sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest

defendant or search his car but "carried enough indicia of

reliability to justify" investigatory stop); State v. Arthur,

149 N.J. 1, 15 (1997) (police had reasonable suspicion of drug

transaction to make a motor vehicle stop and to investigate but

not probable cause to search for drugs).

9 A-1945-06T4
 We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Sergeant

Smith acted reasonably, meaning constitutionally, when she

wedged herself in the front doorway to prevent defendant from

closing it. The trial court found that the common hallway of

the multi-family house was not open to the public, and the

police were not privileged to enter that hallway. Contrary to

the trial court's implicit conclusion, reasonable suspicion to

detain and question defendant pursuant to Terry, if the police

had encountered him in a place where they had a right to be, did

not authorize the police to enter his home for that purpose in

the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.

The trial court said, "the police were facing a potentially

armed suspect who had not unequivocally indicated that he did

not wish to speak to them." But defendant's possible

willingness to speak to the police from inside his house did not

translate into permission for them to enter. Defendant gave no

indication that he had invited the police into the hallway, or

into any part of his home. We reject the State's argument that

Sergeant Smith could reasonably believe that she was permitted

to "move to the threshold to view [defendant's] entire body and

ascertain that defendant was not armed." In fact, she inserted

herself into the doorway while defendant was peering from behind

10 A-1945-06T4
it, thus expressing his choice to exclude the police from his

home.

The State has not cited any case recognizing an exception

from the warrant requirement when the police wish to enter a

home to effect a Terry-type investigative detention of a

suspect. The State's argument that the police have such

authority is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement

that police have a warrant, or establish an exception to the

warrant requirement, when they enter a home to make a formal

arrest. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638, 122 S. Ct.

2458, 2459, 153 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603 (2002); Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 588-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L. Ed. 2d

639, 651-53 (1980); State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585-86, cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 936, 110 S. Ct. 330, 107 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1989).

If the police need a warrant or a recognized exception to enter

a home to make an arrest, clearly they may not enter a home to

effect a warrantless Terry-type detention, which our Supreme

Court has determined to be constitutional because it is

"minimally intrusive." See Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 478; see

also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 and n.8

(9th Cir. 2004) ("We have repeatedly held that an intrusion into

someone's home may not be premised on Terry's reasonable

suspicion standard.").

11 A-1945-06T4
 In this case, the police had no warrant and made no showing

of an exception from the warrant requirement when Sergeant Smith

partially entered defendant's residence to stop him from closing

his front door. That conduct of the police infringed upon the

"firm line at the entrance to the house" when applying the

protections of the Fourth Amendment. Kirk, supra, 536 U.S. at

638, 122 S. Ct. at 2459, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 602 (quoting Payton,

supra, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1382, 63 L. Ed. 2d at

653).

In State v. Penalber, 386 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006),

we held that the police were not authorized to enter an open

apartment door without a warrant to arrest the person who made

an undercover sale of narcotics in that apartment forty-five

minutes earlier. We quoted a pertinent observation of the

United States Supreme Court: "In terms that apply equally to

seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth

Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.

Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably

be crossed without a warrant." Id. at 11 (quoting Payton,

supra, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1382, 63 L. Ed. 2d at

653).

In State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477, 479-81 (1989), our State

Supreme Court considered facts similar to this case where a

12 A-1945-06T4
police officer physically prevented the defendant from closing

his door. The police had received information from a reliable

informant that defendant was then selling drugs in his

apartment. Eight police officers went to the defendant's

residence, and after knocking on the door, one put his foot into

the doorway to prevent the defendant from closing it. From that

location, the officer saw drugs on a table inside the apartment.

Id. at 480-81. The Court stated:

the "plain view" of the items on the kitchen

[Id. at 486-87.]

Although the Court did not hold explicitly that the officer had

no right to prevent the defendant from closing his door, it

suppressed the evidence, reasoning that the police could not

show exigent circumstances and were required to obtain a warrant

before entering the apartment. Id. at 489.

In this case, the police entered defendant's home when

Sergeant Smith placed her body in the doorway. They needed

13 A-1945-06T4
either a warrant or an exception from the Fourth Amendment's

warrant requirement to do so.2

III.

The State has not argued, and the trial court did not

conclude, that exigent circumstances authorized the police

conduct in this case. The State refers, however, to the trial

court's remark that "the police were facing a potentially armed

suspect." For completeness, we will address whether exigent

circumstances justified the police entry into defendant's home.

The facts here did not involve "hot pursuit" of a suspect

into a dwelling, which may apply where the police have probable

cause to believe that the suspect has just committed a serious

crime or is in possession of evidence that may be destroyed.

See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L.

Ed. 2d 300 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct.

1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); State v. Davis, 204 N.J. Super.

181 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 378 (1986).

2
In State v. Mai, ___ N.J. ___ (2010), the Court held that the
police did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by
opening the door of a vehicle while ordering passengers out.
The Court concluded that the act of opening the vehicle door was
not a separate intrusion upon the defendant's rights against a
warrantless search and seizure where, in accordance with State
v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994), the police had reasonable
articulable suspicion to make a motor vehicle stop and to order
the passengers to alight. See Mai, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip
op. at 2-3, 13-14). The holding and reasoning of Mai do not
apply to the facts of this case and do not affect our decision.

14 A-1945-06T4
 In Santana, supra, the police first confronted the

defendant as she stood in the open doorway of her house. 427

U.S. at 40, 96 S. Ct. at 2408, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 304. As the

police displayed their badges and approached, the defendant

retreated into the vestibule. The police followed her in and

arrested and searched her. Id. at 40-41, 96 S. Ct. at 2408-09,

49 L. Ed. 2d at 304. The Court held the police entry was

constitutional, reasoning that they had sufficient probable

cause to arrest the defendant for selling illegal drugs, the

arrest had begun in a public place where the police had a right

to be, and they were in "hot pursuit" of evidence they had

learned was then in the defendant's possession, namely, marked

bills used for the undercover purchase of narcotics from her a

few minutes earlier. Id. at 42-43, 96 S. Ct. at 2409-10, 49 L.

Ed. 2d at 305-06. The Court held that "a suspect may not defeat

an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is

therefore proper under [United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,

96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)], by the expedient of

escaping to a private place." Santana, supra, 427 U.S. at 43, 96

S. Ct. at 2410, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 306.

In this case, the police did not have probable cause to

arrest defendant as they approached his front door, and they did

not first encounter him and "set in motion" a Terry-type

15 A-1945-06T4
detention in a public place. See State v. Nikola, 359 N.J.

Super. 573 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 30 (2003).

Furthermore, they did not have probable cause to believe that he

possessed evidence of criminal activity on his person and,

therefore, were not in "hot pursuit" of the recovery of such

evidence.

In Nikola, the police first made a lawful Terry stop and

detained the defendant in her driveway to investigate whether

she was driving while intoxicated. Id. at 584. They then

entered the defendant's garage without a warrant as she went to

her car to retrieve credentials. Id. at 577. We concluded the

police did not need a warrant for the limited further intrusion

into the garage. Id. at 586. Here, the police did not first

confront or detain defendant in a public area where they had a

right to be; their first encounter was in his own house.

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S. Ct. 2091,

2098, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 743 (1984), the Supreme Court said,

"Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the

home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent

circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness

that attaches to all warrantless home entries." The Court in

Welsh rejected a "hot pursuit" justification and found no

exigent circumstances to enter the defendant's home and arrest

16 A-1945-06T4
him for driving while intoxicated where the suspect had reached

his home on foot shortly after a motor vehicle accident. Id. at

753, 104 S. Ct. at 2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 745; see also Bolte,

supra, 115 N.J. at 597 (in the absence of probable cause to

believe that the defendant had committed a serious offense,

police could not show exigent circumstances for warrantless

entry of suspect's home).

The State argues the police had reason to suspect

defendant was armed because he denied having a gun before the

police said anything about a shooting. But defendant said he

did not have a gun in response to the police approaching his

home in force and ordering him to show his hands. That police

command would naturally indicate that the police suspected

defendant of being armed. A person subjected to such a police

advance and command may arouse suspicion if he does not

immediately announce he is unarmed. The police cannot claim

exigent circumstances by ordering a suspect to show his hands

and then using his response that he is unarmed as evidence that

he might in fact be armed. See State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457,

468-73 (1989) (surveying cases that address exigent

circumstances created by police conduct). Here, the police did

not show exigent circumstances dispensing with the requirement

that they have a warrant to enter defendant's home.

17 A-1945-06T4
 IV.

Despite the initial unlawful entry, we agree with the trial

court's conclusion that defendant did not have a right to resist

the police physically, even if they were violating his

constitutional rights. See State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 453-

54, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d

563 (2006); State v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 136, 145 (App.

Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2002); State v. Koonce,

89 N.J. Super. 169, 183-84 (App. Div. 1965).

Based on the evidence at the suppression hearing, the trial

court could conclude that the police had probable cause to

arrest and charge defendant with assaulting Sergeant Smith when

he slammed the door on her. But cf. State v. Stampone, 341 N.J.

Super. 247, 254-55 (App. Div. 2001) (defendant's slamming car

door and thus threatening injury to police officer's arm did not

establish sufficient evidence to convict him on charge of

disorderly conduct).

Upon arresting defendant, the police had a right to search

his person without a warrant as incident to his arrest. See

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034,

2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969); State v. Pena-Flores, 198

N.J. 6, 19 (2009); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 196-97 (1994).

Therefore, the two bags of cocaine found on his person were

18 A-1945-06T4
admissible as the product of a warrantless search incident to

arrest. See State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 18 (2007).

V.

After the arrest, defendant was placed in a police car and

transported to police headquarters. The police then entered the

residence a second time without a warrant. The trial court

reached no specific conclusion about the right of the police to

enter the common hallway a second time and to go upstairs and

knock at defendant's apartment door.

The State justifies the second warrantless entry under the

community caretaking function of the police. See Cady v.

Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-48, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2527-31, 37 L.

Ed. 2d 706, 713-18 (1973); State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73-75

(2009); State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 276 (2004); State v.

Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. 521, 526-27 (App. Div. 1999), certif.

denied, 164 N.J. 560 (2000). The State contends the police were

checking on the welfare of Tiffanie Morrison because defendant

told them that she was upstairs in the apartment but she had not

come out despite the commotion of defendant's arrest in the

hallway.

We find insufficient evidence in the record to support a

community caretaking exception with respect to the welfare of

defendant's family. Nothing in the tip the police had received,

19 A-1945-06T4
or information they developed in their brief investigation,

indicated that anyone in defendant's residence needed police

caretaking. Morrison's choice not to leave her apartment and

child in response to police commotion in the hallway did not

demonstrate that she needed the police to check into her well-

being inside her own house.

We conclude that the police violated defendant's Fourth

Amendment rights a second time after his arrest when they

entered the common hallway without a warrant or an exception

from the warrant requirement.

Nor were the police authorized to enter defendant's

apartment to conduct a sweep for the presence of other persons,

at which time they allegedly saw in plain view evidence of drug

dealing activity. See Lewis, supra, 116 N.J. at 486. The trial

court apparently concluded that the entry was valid because

Morrison consented. Although the police witnesses testified

that Morrison granted permission for them to enter, they did not

testify that she was advised of a right to refuse consent before

the initial entry into her apartment.

Under the protections recognized in our State constitution

against unreasonable search and seizure, N.J. Const., art. I,

¶ 7, Morrison's initial oral consent is not considered voluntary

without proof that she knew she had a right to refuse. See

20 A-1945-06T4
State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 307 (2006); State v. Johnson, 68

N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975); State v. Todd, 355 N.J. Super. 132,

138-39 (App. Div. 2002). The State bears the burden of proving

her consent was voluntary, State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 262

(1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed.

2d 803 (1989); State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super. 452, 466 (App.

Div. 2000), and it did not satisfy that burden with respect to

the first police entry into the apartment.

We also reject any suggestion that police observation at

the apartment door justified the initial entry and protective

sweep because of community caretaking or exigent circumstances.

On this record, the whispering the police heard inside the

apartment, and the nervousness and fear of Morrison and the

child at the door, did not indicate danger from anyone else in

the apartment but rather reaction to the police presence and

actions. The trial court did not conclude that the initial

entry into the apartment was lawful as part of the police's

community caretaking function or because of exigent

circumstances. We also reject such a conclusion.

The trial court expressly rejected the State's community

caretaking rationale for the later police entry and search of

defendant's apartment, almost three hours after defendant was

arrested. The court noted that the passage of substantial time

21 A-1945-06T4
refuted any community caretaking reason to enter the home at

that time. We agree with that conclusion.

VI.

The trial court concluded, however, that Morrison gave

voluntary consent for the police to search the apartment after

Sergeant Passarelli returned from police headquarters. In

reaching that conclusion, the trial court did not consider the

taint of the initial unlawful entries into the home. Also, it

did not adequately weigh the coercive effect of the lengthy

police intrusion into and seizure of the home.

When Morrison finally signed consent forms at 12:39 p.m.,

the police had already entered her apartment and conducted an

unlawful sweep and plain view search. They had removed her and

her child from her home. During the next two and a half hours,

police officers remained inside her apartment while she was

prohibited from re-entering. The police gave no indication of

when their seizure of the home would end and when Morrison and

her family might be permitted to return. Under these

circumstances, we disagree with the trial court's statement that

"in this case there's no evidence that Miss Morrison's will was

overborne."

We conclude that the search of the apartment some three

hours after defendant had been arrested was a violation of his

22 A-1945-06T4
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. It

was the fruit of the unconstitutional entries into the hallway

and the initial sweep of the apartment, see Lewis, supra, 116

N.J. at 486-87; State v. Lashley, 353 N.J. Super. 405, 409-11

(App. Div. 2002), and its "connection with the unlawful search"

did not become "'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,'"

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S. Ct. 2529,

2533, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472, 480 (1988) (quoting Nardone v. United

States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. Ed. 307,

312 (1939)).

VII.

In sum, we conclude the cocaine seized from defendant's

person was admissible in evidence as the product of a

warrantless search of defendant incident to arrest, but the

evidence seized from the apartment should have been suppressed.

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with our decision.

23 A-1945-06T4