STAGES IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME

Book 1- General Provisions

ARTICLE 6. STAGES IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME (RPC)
I. Introduction: Generation of a Crime
A. The first is the Mental Stage
General Rule: Mental acts such as thoughts, ideas, opinions and beliefs, are not
subject of penal legislations. One may express an idea which is contrary to law,
morals or is unconventional, but as long as he does not act on them or induce
others to act on them, such mental matters are outside the realm of penal law and
the person may not be subjected to criminal prosecution.

B. The Second: The External Stage which is where the accused performs acts which
are observable
1). The Preparatory acts: Acts which may or may not lead to the commission of a
concrete crime. Being equivocal they are not as rule punishable except when there
is an express provision of law punishing specific preparatory acts.
Example: (i) the general rule: buying of a gun, bolo or poison, even if the purpose is
to use these to kill a person; so also with conspiracies and proposals. (ii) the
exception: possession of picklocks and false keys is punished; as with conspiracies
to commit treason, rebellion, sedition and coup detat
2) The Acts of execution: the attempted, frustrated and consumated stages
II. Application of Article 6:
Only to intentional felonies by positive acts but not to: (i). Felonies by omission (ii)
Culpable felonies and (iii) Violations of special laws, unless the special law provides
for an attempted or frustrated stage. Examples of the exception are The Dangerous
Drugs Law which penalizes an attempt to violate some of its provisions, and The
Human Security Act of 2007
III. The attempted stage:
"the accused commences the commission of a felonious act directly by overt acts
but does not perform all the acts of execution due to some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance
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A).(1). The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a connection
to a particular, concrete offense, that which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to the its realization and
commission (2) The act must not be equivocal but indicates a clear intention to
commit a particular and specific felony. Thus the act of a notorious criminal in
following a woman can not be the attempted stage of any felony.
B). Overt or external act is some physical deed or activity, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to is complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense

C). Examples:

1. The accused pressed a chemically -soaked cloth on the mouth of the woman to
induce her to sleep, while he lay on top of her and pressed his body to her. The act
is not the overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. They
constitute unjust vexation. ( Note: it would be attempted rape if he tried to undress
the victim or touch her private parts) ( Balleros vs. People, Feb, 22, 2006)
2. One found inside a house but no article was found on him, is liable for trespass
and not for attempted theft or robbery even if he is a notorious robber
3. One found removing the glass window panes or making a hole in the wall is not
liable for attempted robbery but for attempted trespass
D) The accused has not yet passed the subjective phase or that phase
encompassed from the time an act is executed which begins the commission of the
crime until the time of the performance of the last act necessary to produce the
crime, but where the accused has still control over his actions and their results.
E).The accused was not able to continue performing the acts to produce the crime.
He was prevented by external forces and not because he himself chose not to
continue. Such as when his weap0n was snatched, or his intended victim managed
to escape, or he was overpowered or arrested.

F). If the accused voluntarily desisted i.e he himself decided not to continue with his
criminal purpose, then he is not liable.

1. Reason: This is an absolutory cause by way of reward to those who, having set
one foot on the verge of crimes, heed the call of their conscience and return to the
path of righteousness. .

2. The reason for the desistance is immaterial

3. Exceptions: when the accused is liable despite his desistance

a). when the act performed prior to the desistance already constituted the
attempted stage of the intended felony. For example: the accused, with intent to
kill, shot at the victim but missed after which he desisted, his acts already
constituted attempted homicide
b). When the acts performed already gave rise to the intended felony. The decision
not to continue is not a legal but factual desistance. As in the case of a thief who
returned what he stole.
c). When the acts performed constitute a separate offense. Pointing a gun at
another and threatening to kill, and then desisting gives rise to grave threats.
IV. The Frustrated Stage:
the accused has performed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the felony
but the crime is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused.

A. The accused has passed the subjective phase and is now in the objective phase,
or that portion in the commission of the crime where the accused has performed the
last act necessary to produce the intended crime and where he has no more control
over the results of his acts.

B. The non-production of the crime should not be due to the acts of the accused
himself, for if it were he would be liable not for the frustrated stage of the intended
crime, but possibly for another offense.
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Thus: where the accused shot the victim mortally wounding him, but he himself
saved the life of his victim, his liability is that for serious physical injuries as the
intent to kill is absent.

C. Attempted vs. Frustrated Homicide/murder. Where the accused, with intent to kill,
injured the victim but the latter did not die, when is the crime attempted or
frustrated?

1. First View: The subjective phase doctrine. If at that point where the accused
has still control over the results of his actions but is stopped by reason outside of his
own desistance and the subjective phase has not been passed, the offense is
attempted

2. Second View: The Mortal Wound or Life Threatening Injury Doctrine: If a mortal
wound or life threatening injury had been inflicted, the offense is frustrated, else it
is attempted ( Palaganas vs. PP., Sept. 12, 2006)

3. Third View: The belief of the accused should be considered in that if the accused
believed he has done all which is necessary to produce death, then it is frustrated.

V. Consummated.
When all the elements of the crime are present whether it be the intended crime or
a different crime
VI. Factors to Consider in determining the proper stage.

A. The manner of the commission of the crime and how it is defined by the RPC.
Some crimes have only the consumated stage (Formal crimes) such as threats,
coercion, alarms and scandal, slander, acts of lasciviousness. In rape the gravamen
is whether there is penetration or not, no matter how slight, hence rape is either
attempted or consummated.

B. The elements of the felony.

1. Theft: it is consummated once the article is in the material physical possession of

the accused, whether actual or constructive. His ability to dispose off the thing his
immaterial and does not constitute an element.

N.B. Decisions of the CA as to bulky items where the accused must have the
opportunity dispose off or appropriate the articles have already been reversed. The
doctrine now is that theft has no frustrated stage ( Valenzuela vs. PP. June 21, 2007)

2. Estafa: It is not the material possession but the existence of damage which
consumates the crime.
3. Robbery with Force Upon Things: The thing must be brought out of the building
to consumate the crime.

C. The Nature of the Felony Itself

1. Crimes which require the participation of two persons have no frustrated stage.
Examples: Adultery and concubinage; corruption of a public official.

2. There are crimes which are punished according to their results and not the
intention of the accused such as physical injuries.

3. As to Arson: it is consumated once a part of the building is burned. It has been

ruled that if the accused lit certain materials but no part of the building as burned,
the crime is in its frustrated stage and if there was no material which was as yet lit,
then arson is still in its attempted. Thus one who places sacks soaked in gasoline

near the post and lit it but no part of the building was burned, committed frustrated
arson.

(Personal Opinion: there can be no frustrated stage, but only attempted stage if the
fire was not yet applied to the building. But if fire was applied to the building or a
part thereof but no part of the building was burned, then it is attempted. The only
consideration is whether or not the accused succeeded in burning a part of the
building. If no part of the building was burned, it is still attempted arson no matter
how far gone were the acts of the accused).

July 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Criminal Law
and Procedure
Posted on August 16, 2010 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal Law
Tagged appeal, arrest, bp 22,dangerous
drugs, estafa, evidence, homicide, information, kidnapping, murder, Ombudsman, parricide, preli
minary investigation, probable cause, rape, search, testimony, theft, treachery, warrantless
arrest, warrantless search

Here are selected July 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:

CRIMINAL LAW
1.
Revised Penal Code
Aggravating circumstance; treachery. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial
court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There
is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no
opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be
more sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young
daughters while they were sound asleep and totally defenseless. People of the
Philippines vs. Calonge y Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010.
Aggravating circumstance; treachery. The Court held that treachery can still be
appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life
because what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the
victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. Although the victim knew
that the accused held a grudge against him, he never had any inkling that he would
actually be attacked that night. The way it was executed made it impossible for the
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victim to respond or defend himself. He just had no opportunity to repel the sudden
attack, rendering him completely helpless. Accused, moreover, used a firearm to
easily neutralize the victim, which was undeniably a swift and effective way to
achieve his purpose. Lastly, but significantly, the accused aimed for the face of the
victim ensuring that the bullet would penetrate it and damage his brain. These acts
are distinctly indicative of the treacherous means employed by the accused to
guarantee the consummation of his criminal plan. Thus, as treachery attended the
killing of Loreto Cruz, such circumstance qualified the killing as murder, punishable
under paragraph 1 of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. People of the
Philippines vs. Pedro Ortiz, Jr. y Lopez, G.R. No. 188704, July 7, 2010.
Attempted homicide; civil liability; temperate damages. The Supreme Court
modified the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the petitioners civil
liability for being erroneous and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. The Court of
Appeals ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount ofP3,858.50. In People v.
Andres, the Supreme Court held that if the actual damages, proven by receipts
during the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. The
award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New Civil Code which
states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with
certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages considering that the amount of actual damages is
only P3,858.50. Actual damages should no longer be awarded. Giovani Serrano y
Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Attempted homicide; civil liability; moral damages. The Supreme Court found that
the victim is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in accordance
with settled jurisprudence. Under Article 2219, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code,
the victim is entitled to moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023,
July 5, 2010.
Attempted homicide; penalty. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that the imposable penalty for an attempted crime shall be lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Thus, under
Article 249, the crime of homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. Applying
Article 61 (Rules of graduating penalties) and Article 71 (Graduated scales), two (2)
degrees lower of reclusion temporal is prision correccional which has a duration of
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken, in view of
the attending circumstances that could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken within the range of prision
correccional, depending on the modifying circumstances. In turn, the minimum term
of the indeterminate penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the penalty one
degree lower of prision correccional, that is arresto mayor with a duration of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of prision correccional or two (2) years and four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. The minimum term shall be taken
within the range of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court affirmed the penalty imposed
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by the Court of Appeal against the petitioner of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum term of the indeterminate penalty. Giovani
Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Direct Assault; elements. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148
of the Revised Penal Code. It is an offense against public order that may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second,
by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force,
or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
The instant case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault. Its elements are: 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs
force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance; 2. That
the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent; 3. That at the time of the
assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance
of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties; 4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and 5. That there is no public
uprising. Lydia Gelig vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010.
Estafa through falsification of public documents. Petitioners are private individuals
who presented the alleged will to the probate court and made it appear that Alegria
signed the alleged will disposing of her rights and interest in the real properties, as
well as all of her personal properties to petitioners when in fact petitioners knew
that Alegria never signed such alleged will as her signatures therein were forged.
Petitioners argued that they already had in their possession the personal properties
of Alegria which included the pieces of jewelry by virtue of an alleged general power
of attorney executed by Alegria in their favor. However, such agency between
Alegria and petitioners was terminated upon Alegrias death; thus, they had no
basis for taking possession and custody of Alegrias properties after her death.
However, by virtue of the falsified will which petitioners presented for probate, and
by which petitioners became co-administrators of the estate of the Figueras couple,
and had gained possession of the jewelry, they were not able to account for the
same when ordered to do so by the probate court. The crime committed was estafa
through falsification of public document. Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando
vs. People of the Philippine, G.R. No. 138696. July 7, 2010.
Frustrated and attempted homicide distinguished. Under Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In Palaganas v. People, the Supreme Court made the
following distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony as follows: (a) In
frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution; (b) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non8

accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the

perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the nonfulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Frustrated and attempted homicide distinguished. The crucial point to consider is
the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof
showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victims death without
timely medical intervention. In this case, from all accounts, although the stab
wound of the victim could have been fatal since the victim testified that he saw his
intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the wound;
hence, the Supreme Court did not consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause
death. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023,
July 5, 2010.
Homicide and serious physical injuries distinguished. The assailants intent to kill is
the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. Intent to kill
is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, the Supreme Court considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. The Supreme Court also considered the
motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the
victim as additional determinative factors. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Homicide and serious physical injuries distinguished. The records show that the
petitioner used a knife in his assault. The petitioner stabbed the victim in the
abdomen while the latter was held by Gener and Orieta. Immediately after the
stabbing, the petitioner, Gener and Orieta beat and stoned the victim until he fell
into a creek. It was only then that the petitioner, Gener and Orieta left. The
Supreme Court considered in this regard that the stabbing occurred at around 9:30
p.m. with only the petitioner, Gener, Orieta, and the victim as the only persons left
in the area. The Court of Appeals aptly observed that a reasonable inference can be
made that the victim was left for dead when he fell into the creek. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing, beating and
stoning the victim, intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed cannot be
merely serious physical injuries.Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Kidnapping; deprivation of liberty. The essence of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Siongco y
Dela Cruz, et al, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010
Kidnapping; elements. The following are the elements that must be established by
the prosecution to obtain a conviction for kidnapping: (a) the offender is a private
individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
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kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female, or a public officer. If the victim is a
minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration
of detention becomes immaterial. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Siongco y
Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010.
Kidnapping; penalty. The penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is
death. However, Republic Act No. 9346 has banned the imposition of death penalty
and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Siongco y Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No.
186472, July 5, 2010.
Murder; damages. The award of civil indemnity is proper in this case. It requires no
proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
responsibility therefor. Although jurisprudence fixed the civil indemnity
at P50,000.00 only, the Supreme Court upheld the award ofP300,000.00 as civil
indemnity since the parties had stipulated such amount in the event of a judgment
of conviction. The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is proper here. Moral
damages are awarded in view of the violent death of a victim. There is no need for
any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the victims heirs. Likewise,
the award of exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense
is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, as in
this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court awarded exemplary damages in the
amount ofP30,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. People of the Philippines vs. Albert
Teoso y Lopez alias Paking and Edgardo Cocotan alias Paot, G.R. No. 188975,
July 5, 2010.
Parricide; elements. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. People of the Philippines vs. Calonge y
Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010.
Parricide; penalty. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of two (2)
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death. People of the Philippines
vs. Calonge y Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010
Rape. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides among others that a crime
of rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threat or intimidation.People of the Philippines vs. Adriano Leonardo y
Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010
Rape; damages. In line with recent jurisprudence regarding damages in rape cases,
the civil indemnity in this case must be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
and the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. People of the Philippines
vs. Ermilito Alegre y Lamoste, G.R. No. 184812, July 6, 2010.
Rape; damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the awards of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity andP50,000.00 as moral damages given by the lower courts to AAA for
each count of rape. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Moral
damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim
10

suffered trauma of mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the

basis thereof. These are too obvious to still require their recital at the trial by the
victim since we even assume and acknowledge such agony as a gauge of her
credibility. People of the Philippines vs. Adriano Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No.
181036, July 6, 2010.
Rape; damages. The Supreme Court modified the amount of moral and exemplary
damages,P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, awarded by the Court of
Appeals to the rape victim. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court increased the grant of moral damages toP50,000.00 and the award of
exemplary damages to P30,000.00. People of the Philippines vs. Jessie Dacallos y
Modina, G.R. No. 189807, July 5, 2010.
Rape; damages. The Supreme Court modified the trial courts award of damages
finding the accused-appellant civilly liable in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the counts of consummated
rape and P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and moral damages atP25,000.00 for each
count of attempted rape. People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Republo, G.R. No.
172962, July 8, 2010.
Rape; elements. To secure a conviction for the crime of rape, the following elements
must be proved: (a) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; (b) that
said act was accomplished under any of the following circumstances [i] through
force, threat or intimidation; [ii] when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; [iii] by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; or [iv] when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. People of the Philippines vs. Basilio Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010.
Rape; evidence. The absence of bruises and contusions on the victims body does
not negate the commission of rape. It is not necessary that the victim should bear
marks of physical violence sustained by reason of the persistence of the sexual
attacker, nor is the exertion of irresistible force by the culprit an indispensable
element of the offense. Thus, for rape to be committed, it is not necessary that
there be marks of physical violence present on the victims body. People of the
Philippines vs. Rommel Belo y De Leon, G.R. No. 187075, July 5, 2010.
Rape; evidence. Corollarily, the fact that the accused did not possess any bread
knife when he was apprehended a few moments after the commission of the alleged
crime does not negate the existence of force and intimidation. The non-presentation
of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of
the accused. It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the
commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused. People of the
Philippines vs. Rommel Belo y De Leon, G.R. No. 187075, July 5, 2010.
Rape; evidence. The testimony of the rape victim that the accused was armed with
a deadly weapon when he committed the crime is sufficient to establish that fact for
so long as the victim is credible. It must be stressed that in rape, it is usually only
the victim who can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject the
testimony of the alleged victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the
conviction of the accused. In the present case, complainant positively described
how the accused, armed with a knife, threatened and raped his victim. Absent any
showing that certain facts of substance and significance have been plainly
overlooked or that the trial courts findings are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions
reached by the trial court must be respected and the judgment rendered should be

11

affirmed. People of the Philippines vs. Rommel Belo y De Leon, G.R. No. 187075,
July 5, 2010.
Rape; mental retardate. Accused assails his conviction alleging that appellate court
erred in admitting evidence and basing its decision on AAAs mental retardation, a
fact which should be but was not alleged in the informations. Under Art. 266-A(d),
sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is
incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without
requiring proof that the accused used force or intimidation in committing the act, for
as long as that the fact of carnal knowledge and mental retardation is alleged in the
information and proven during trial. However, in the case at bar, it should be noted
that appellant was charged with rape through force and intimidation. Thus, contrary
to appellants claims, an allegation in the information of the victims mental
retardation was not necessary. People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Paler, G.R. No.
186411, July 5, 2010.
Rape; minority. The assertion of the accused that the minority of AAA was not
established because the prosecution failed to present her birth certificate in
evidence deserves scant consideration. The informations specifically alleged that
AAA was a minor, i.e., barely 14 years old on July 14, 1999 and September 1999,
when she was raped by her own father. The accused himself, with the assistance of
counsel, categorically admitted during pre-trial that AAA was his daughter and that
she was only 14 years old on July 14, 1999 and in September 1999. These
stipulations are binding because they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. The stipulation
of facts signed by the parties, that is, the accused, his counsel and the prosecutor,
in a criminal case is recognized as a declaration constituting judicial admission and
is binding upon the parties. The stipulated facts stated in the pre-trial order amount
to an admission by the accused and a waiver of his right to present evidence to the
contrary. Although the right to present evidence is guaranteed by the Constitution,
such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. Thus, the rule that no proof need
be offered as to any facts admitted during a pre-trial hearing applies. People of the
Philippines vs. Ricardo Bodoso y Bolor, G.R. No. 188129, July 5, 2010.
Rape; minority. In this regard, the Supreme Court is also guided by the ground rules
laid down in the case of People v. Pruna, in appreciating the age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Thus: (1) The best evidence to
prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party; (2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age; (3) If the certificate
of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or
a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify
on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances: (i) If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; (ii)
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old; (iii) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old; (iv) In the
absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
12

testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused; (v) it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Bodoso y Bolor, G.R. No.
188129, July 5, 2010.
Rape; minority. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him. People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo
Bodoso y Bolor, G.R. No. 188129, July 5, 2010.
Rape; penalty. The Supreme Court modified the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals in this case since it failed to state that the reduction of the penalty of rape
from death to reclusion perpetua is without eligibility for parole as held in the case
of People v. Antonio Ortiz. Thus, finding the accused guilty of two (2) counts of rape
committed against his daughter, AAA, the Supreme Court sentenced the accused, in
each count, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Bodoso y Bolor, G.R. No. 188129, July 5,
2010.
Rape; penalty. Under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. People of the Philippines
vs. Basilio Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010.
Rape; use of deadly weapon. The use of a deadly weapon in this rape case was a
fact specifically averred in the information and proved during the trial. This qualifies
the rape the accused has committed. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon
should be reclusion perpetua to death. But in view of the enactment of Republic Act
9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility for parole as provided by Act 4103 should instead be
imposed. People of the Philippines vs. Ermilito Alegre y Lamoste, G.R. No. 184812,
July 6, 2010.
Statutory rape; elements. The acts were committed by accused in April of 1997,
before RA 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, took effect on October 22, 1997 and
amended the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the crime of rape. Thus,
Article 335(3) of the Revised Penal Code defining how statutory rape is committed is
the applicable law. It must be remembered that under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence, the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old. The only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the such woman is under twelve (12) years
of age. Since the very act of sexual intercourse was established, in fact admitted by
accused-appellant and the age of AAA was established before the RTC to be 11
years, the acts of accused-appellant fall squarely under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Garbida, G.R. No. 188569, July 13,
2010.
Theft; penalty. The Supreme Court discarded the testimony of the private
complainant that the value of the magwheels and the other items stolen was more
or less P27,000.00 for being a mere sweeping assessment uncorroborated by any
other evidence. It was pointed out that the two (2) magwheels which were found in
the possession of the accused were pegged at P17,000.00 without any conclusive or
definite proof relative to the value of these magwheels other than the testimony of
private complainant. Thus, the Court fixed the value of the magwheels
at P12,000.00 following the guidelines in Francisco v. People. Applying Article 309
(2) of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner and
13

his co-accused, were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months and one (1) day also of prision correccional, as maximum. Luis
Chito Buensoceso Lozano vs.. Poeple of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165582, July 9,
2010.
2.
Special Laws
Acts of lasciviousness on a child; penalty. For acts of lasciviousness performed on a
child under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the penalty prescribed
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding
that Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law, the appellant may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayormedium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range
of which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand,
the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from 14
years, 8 months and 1 day toreclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and
maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
to 17 years and 4 months; medium 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years; and
maximum reclusion perpetua. People of the Philippines vs. Adriano Leonardo y
Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22; elements. To reiterate the elements of a violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, violation thereof exists where: (1) a person makes or
draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value; (2) the person who
makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the
check upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment. Eumelia R. Mitra vs. People of the Philippines and Felicisimo S.
Tarcelo, G.R. No. 191404, July 5, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. What determines if there
was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established.
The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and
presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti. People of the Philippines vs. Sonny
Padua y Reyes, G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Anent the failure of the
prosecution to present the testimony of the informant, it is well-settled that the
testimony of an informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential for conviction and
may be dispensed with if the poseur-buyer testified on the same. Informants are
almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Further, not all people who came into contact with
the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No.
9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such requirement. As long
as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been
14

broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it
is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the
drugs should take the witness stand. People of the Philippines vs. Sonny Padua y
Reyes, G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu; elements. For the successful prosecution
of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence. All these requisites were met by the
prosecution in this case.People of the Philippines vs. Alioding Sultan, G.R. No.
187737, July 5, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. In a prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction
or sale took place; (2) that thecorpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. The presence of these
elements is sufficient to support the trial courts finding of appellants guilt. What is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the
contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate
the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. The
presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or substance of the crime
establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed. People of the
Philippines vs. Christopher De Mesa and Emmanuel Gonzales,G.R. No. 188570. July
6, 2010
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. The burden of the prosecution
in a crime for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to prove (1) the identities of the
buyer and the seller; (2) the sale of dangerous drugs; and (3) the existence of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. People of the Philippines vs. Noel
Catentay, G.R. No. 183101, July 6, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; requirements. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
states: Sec. 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. On the other hand, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9165 states: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
15

well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,

seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The
apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. People of the Philippines vs. Christopher De Mesa and Emmanuel
Gonzales,G.R. No. 188570. July 6, 2010
Sexual abuse; elements. The prosecution in this case has proved the essential
elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows: (1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act
is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. People
of the Philippines vs. Adriano Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Appeal; judgment of acquittal. Section 1 of Rule 122 allows any party to appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused against double
jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole case wide open for review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an
appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the rule barring an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal is, not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i)
when the prosecution is denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused demurrer to evidence.People of
the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S.
David and Rogelio L. Luis, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010.
Corpus delicti; handling. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was originally
envisioned by the legislature to serve as a protection for the accused from malicious
imputations of guilt by abusive police officers. The illegal drugs being the corpus
delicti, it is essential for the prosecution to prove and show to the court beyond
reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs presented to the trial court as evidence of
the crime are indeed the illegal drugs seized from the accused. Section 21,
paragraph No. 1, prescribes the method by which law enforcement
agents/personnel are to go about in handling thecorpus delicti at the time of seizure
in order to ensure full protection to the accused. It reads: SEC. 21.Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/ Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
16

controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia

and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. However, Section 21 was not meant to
thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents. Slight infractions or
nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the corpus
delicti should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant. In fact, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 adequately reflects the desire of the law
to excuse from the rigid tenor of Section 21 situations wherein slight infractions in
methodology are present but the integrity and identity of the specimen remains
intact. It reads in part: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In
this case, the failure of the apprehending officer to immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the prohibited drugs in the
presence of the accused as required by Section 21 can be considered as a slight
infraction that does not automatically render the seized items inadmissible. There is
a justifiable reason for such failure in this case as was explained by the police officer
during his cross-examination. People of the Philippines vs. Alioding Sultan, G.R. No.
187737, July 5, 2010.
Defense; alibi. As consistently enunciated by the Supreme Court, the established
doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to be at thelocus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Based on the findings of the trial court, accused-appellants failed
to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Weak as it is, alibi becomes
weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses
as in this case. People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Asis and Julius Pearanda, G.R.
No. 177573, July 7, 2010.
Evidence; alibi. The Supreme Court considered the defenses of denial and alibi put
up by the accused, but found them relatively weak and insufficient to overcome the
positive and categorical identification of the accused as perpetrators. The rule is
that the defense of denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters. People of the Philippines vs. Albert Teoso y Lopez alias
Paking and Edgardo Cocotan alias Paot,G.R. No. 188975, July 5, 2010.
Evidence; alibi. The evidence presented in this case by the defense consisted
mainly of bare denials and alibi. As the Supreme Court has oft pronounced, both
denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive
and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not sufficient that appellant prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also show
17

that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate
vicinity when the crime was perpetrated. Further, the defense of alibi may not
prosper if it is established mainly by the accused themselves and their relatives like
in this case and not by credible persons. People of the Philippines vs. Adriano
Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010.
Evidence; child testimony. Testimonies of child-victims are almost always given full
weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The
fact that EMA freely went with the accused to the house of the latter after she went
down from the guava tree should not be taken to mean that her account of the
events is incredible. It must be noted that EMA was merely (9) years of age when
the rape transpired. By her own admission, EMA did not even understand what
accused-appellant said when he instructed her to have sexual intercourse with him.
Considering the age of the complainant, the Court found it improbable for a girl of
her age to fabricate a charge so traumatic to herself and her family had she not
been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. Moreover, she was
steadfast in relating her ordeal and nightmarish experience at the hands of the
accused under rigid cross-examination. People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Quiros
y Sembrano, G.R. No. 188600, July 13, 2010
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an
accused only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. People of
the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Bayon y Ramos, G.R. No. 168627, July 2, 2010.
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. In this case, the court found that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence relied upon were insufficient to convict appellant of the
crime of qualified theft. In the first circumstance, appellant was not the only stay-in
helper of Atty. Limoso, as the latter testified that he had two housemaids. Although
Atty. Limoso testified that only appellant, as his masseur, had access to his room,
this is doubtful, considering the Filipino lifestyle, in which a household helper is
normally tasked to clean the room of his/her employer. Further, in the second
circumstance, the disappearance of appellants clothes from Atty. Limosos house
after the discovery of the loss of the aforementioned valuables cannot be construed
as flight by the appellant since appellant was talking with the guards in the
compound where Atty. Limosos residence was located when he was arrested by the
police. Notably, the prosecution failed to establish the element of unlawful taking by
appellant and this warranted an acquittal. People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo
Bayon y Ramos, G.R. No. 168627, July 2, 2010.
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. The oft-repeated rule has been that
circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one
circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven
and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
18

circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
guilty person. People of the Philippines vs. Calonge y Verana, G.R. No. 182793, July
5, 2010.
Evidence; conflicting testimonies. Accused insists that the testimonies of the
prosecutions eyewitnesses, Alfredo and Allan, were somewhat contradictory, and
should not be given credence. Alfredo said that Dela Cruz and Benoza, aided by
Baylon, immobilized Yrigan by holding and pulling away his hands from either side
so appellant Rollan and the other accused could freely attack him with a long bladed
weapon. Allan said, on the other hand, that appellant Rollan and Benabesi were the
ones who held Yrigans hands while the others attacked him with a bolo and a knife.
Rejecting the accuseds argument, the Court ruled that both testimonies show that
the assailants acted in conspiracy with each other as evidenced by their concerted
action in surrounding Yrigan and attacking him simultaneously, with some holding
and pulling at his hands so he could not use them to defend himself and return the
attack, and the others stabbing and slashing at him with weapons. Since the
accused had not presented evidence of ill-motive on the part of the witnesses to
testify falsely against him, their (witnesses) testimonies can be believed. People of
the Philippines vs. Gerardo Rollan y Rey, G.R. No. 175835, July 13, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of rape victim. Failure of a victim to immediately report the
rape does not necessarily weaken the case against the accused. The charge of rape
is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In this
case, AAA did not report what her father did to her because she was terribly afraid
that he would harm her. This is a normal reaction by minors to hide the truth
because they are easily intimidated by threats on their person and other members
of the family. Besides, the trauma to a young girls mind of the realization that her
own father, who is supposed to be her natural protector, has sexually violated her,
cannot be underestimated. When she was cross-examined, AAA replied that she
could not even tell her own siblings of her plight because they were all afraid of
their father. The only time she felt safe was after they had moved out of their
fathers house. Thus, the one year delay in the reporting of AAAs harrowing
experience in the hands of her father does not vitiate the integrity of her
testimony. People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Alarcon,G.R. No. 177219, July 9,
2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual
findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and binding upon the Supreme Court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge
can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of
unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings
unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. In this case, none of these circumstances are
present. People of the Philippines vs. Adriano Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No. 181036,
July 6, 2010.
19

Evidence; credibility of witness. Credible witness and credible testimony are the two
essential elements for the determination of the weight of a particular testimony.
This principle could not ring any truer where the prosecution relies mainly on the
testimony of the complainant, corroborated by the medico-legal findings of a
physician. Be that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone,
uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim provided that her testimony is clear,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. People of the Philippines
vs. Adriano Leonardo y Dantes, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the
trial court that it is unbelievable that AAA would file complaints for two counts of
rape and one count of attempted rape just to exact revenge for the time accusedappellant allegedly kicked her. The Supreme Court is convinced even less that BBB
(victims mother) would persuade her daughter to lie about such rape incidents
because of her quarrel with accused-appellant. The Supreme Court consistently held
that: Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed the charges brought against
them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged motives have never
swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who
remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a
minor as in this case. Further, we simply cannot believe that a lass of tender age
would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma, of a
public trial, unless she was in fact raped. People of the Philippines vs. Romeo
Republo, G.R. No. 172962, July 8, 2010
Evidence; credibility of witness. No young and decent Filipina would publicly admit
that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such was true, for it would be
instinctive for her to protect her honor. People of the Philippines vs. Romeo
Republo, G.R. No. 172962, July 8, 2010
Evidence; Credibility of witness. In the review of rape cases, the Supreme Court is
almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Equally settled is the
rule that assessment of credibility of witnesses is a function that is best discharged
by the trial judge whose conclusions thereon are accorded much weight and
respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless a material or substantial fact has
been overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account could alter
the outcome of the case. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
found the testimony of AAA credible, truthful and straightforward as against a mere
denial proffered by the accused. Moreover, the lower courts did not accept
accuseds theory that AAA harbored serious anger and resentment toward him
because he allegedly mauled her mother, causing the latter to become
insane. People of the Philippines vs. Jessie Dacallos y Modina, G.R. No. 189807, July
5, 2010.
Evidence; inconsistency in testimony. The Supreme Court has examined the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but found them too
inconsequential to adversely affect their overall integrity. Such minor
inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential
20

credibility as long as it is in its entirety coherent and intrinsically believable.

Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not
been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every
single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.People of the Philippines vs.
Albert Teoso y Lopez alias Paking and Edgardo Cocotan alias Paot, G.R. No.
188975, July 5, 2010.
Evidence; non-identification of the drugs. As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony aboutevery link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. People of the Philippines vs. Rose Nandi y Sali, G.R. No. 188905, July 13,
2010.
Evidence; non-identification of the drugs. A closer look at the records of the case
reveals that the prosecution failed to show that there was compliance with the
inventory requirements of R.A. No. 9165. When the poseur-buyer, PO1 Cecil Collado,
took the witness stand, he failed to describe with particulars how the
seized shabu was handled and marked after its confiscation. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the subject substance was
the very same object taken from the accused. These lapses warrants the acquittal
of the accused. People of the Philippines vs. Rose Nandi y Sali, G.R. No. 188905, July
13, 2010.
Evidence; positive identification. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals
conclusions on the petitioners positive identification are supported by ample
evidence. The Supreme Court considered in this regard the following pieces of
evidence of the prosecution: (1) the manner of attack which was done frontally and
at close range, thus allowing the victim to see his assailant; (2) the lighting
conditions at the scene of the stabbing, provided by two Meralco posts; the scene
was also illuminated by white, fluorescent type light coming from a steel
manufacturing shop; and (3) that the victim and the petitioner knew each other also
allowed the victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.Giovani Serrano
y Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010.
Evidence; positive identification. The victims credibility is further strengthened by
his lack of improper motive to falsely accuse the petitioner of the crime. Human
experience tells us that it is unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his
actual attacker; in the normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest
desire to bring the guilty person to justice, and no other. We consider, too, that the
victim consistently and positively, in and out of court, identified the petitioner as his
assailant. The victim testified that the petitioner was a neighbor who lived just a few
houses away from his house. Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court
found the victims identification of the petitioner as his assailant to be positive and
conclusive. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
175023, July 5, 2010.

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Evidence; self-serving. The phrase self-serving evidence is a concept which has a

well-defined judicial meaning. The common objection known as self-serving is not
correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for
objection is hearsay. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of
court advocating his own interest; they do not include a partys testimony as a
witness in court. Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse
party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a partys testimony in
court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination. People of the Philippines vs. Mary Lou Omictin y Singco, G.R. No.
188130, July 26, 2010
Evidence; testimony. By the distinctive nature of rape cases, conviction thereon
usually rests solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered
to the following guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Complementing the foregoing principles is the rule that
the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in prosecution
for rape; that in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the highest degree of
respect must be afforded to the findings of the trial court. People of the Philippines
vs. Basilio Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010.
Ombudsman; preliminary investigation. The Romualdezes point out that the Office
of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case since
its authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before that date. Accordingly,
since the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their
case as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the
investigation that it did. But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out, the
Ombudsman has, under its general investigatory powers, the authority to
investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed
before February 25, 1986. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the
Ombudsmans correlative power to initiate the proper action for the recovery of illgotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of illgotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986.
However, the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture
or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the
aforementioned date pursuant to the Ombudsmans general investigatory power
under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770. Alfredo T. Romualdez vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and the Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 161602, July 13, 2010.
Rules of Procedure, liberal application. Petitioners former counsel erroneously
appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner pleaded that Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which mandated
the dismissal of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of Appeals be relaxed and
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the Court of Appeals be directed to forward the records of the case to the
Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court in granting petitioners prayer held that since
the appeal involved a criminal case, and the possibility of a person being deprived
of liberty due to a procedural lapse a relaxation of the Rules was warranted for rules
of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such
that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to
frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. Cenita M. Cariaga vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010.
Search Warrant; buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is an event where a
warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. When
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, the buy-bust
operation is a judicially sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in illegal
drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime
comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is
caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. People of the Philippines
vs. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No. 189278, July 26, 2010.
Search Warrant; buy-bust operation. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation,
the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. The illegal drug seized is
not the fruit of the poisonous tree as the defense allege. The seizure made by the
buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec.
13 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate,
it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to
conduct it. People of the Philippines vs. Elizabeth Marcelino y Reyes, G.R. No.
189278, July 26, 2010.
Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause. Respondents questioned the alleged lack of
personal determination of probable cause by Judge Navidad in issuing the warrants
for their arrest. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the
warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The duty of the judge to determine probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the
Philippine Constitution. This constitutional provision does not mandatorily require
the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he
may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph
Jojo V. Gray, Francis B. Greay, and Court of Appeals-Cebu City, Eighteenth
Division,G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010.
Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause. What the law requires as personal
determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information. Contrary to respondents claim, the language of the
Order clearly showed that the judge made his own personal determination of the
existence of probable cause by examining not only the prosecutors report but also
his supporting evidence, consisting mainly of the sworn statements of the
prosecutions witnesses. People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Jojo V. Gray, Francis
B. Gray and Court of Appeals-Cebu City, Eighteenth Division, G.R. No. 180109, July
26, 2010.
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Warrantless Arrest; objections. Petitioners claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal
lacks merit. However, nowhere in the records can it be found in which petitioner
interposed objections to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has
been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived. Salvador Valdez Rebellion vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 175700. July 5, 2010.
Warrantless Arrest; objections. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a
negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused. Salvador Valdez Rebellion vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 175700. July 5, 2010.
Withdrawal of Information. It bears emphasizing that when the trial court grants a
motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Information in compliance with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of
compliance to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice, but in sound
and faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. The trial court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The prior determination of probable
cause by the trial court does not in any way bar a contrary finding upon
reassessment of the evidence presented before it. In this case, the Supreme Court
agreed with the reasons of the trial for granting the motion for the withdrawal of the
Information. Antonio B. Ramos (deceased), substituted by his surviving heirs,
namely Ma. Margarita A. Ramos, Antonio A. Ramos, Ma. Regina Ramos De Dios, Jose
Vicente A. Ramos, Ma. Pomona Ramos Ko Teh and Oscar Emerito A. Ramos vs.
People of the Philippines and Rogerio H. Escobal, G.R. No. 171565, July 13, 2010.

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