Effectivity of Laws

TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would
be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the
Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the
Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986)
when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need
not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited
readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the
Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.

*note: gi apil ra nako..hehehhee

PVB employees vs Judge Vera

FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of
Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on
March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it
into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its
subsequent publication was not necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature
and not have general application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was
rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws
take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to
provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided

IN AID OF LEGISLATION

Senate vs Ermita
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in

Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon

203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed
FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the
Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that
Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee

hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations
and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and
Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of
their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and
injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
Standard Charted Bank Phil v Senate
[G.R. No. 167173; December 27, 2007]
Petition for Prohibition
- With prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction
- Dated and filed Mar 11, 2005.
- Purpose: to enjoin respondents from
1. proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Phil Senate (PS) No. 166
2. compelling petitioners (officers of SCB-Phils) to attend and justify before any
hearing to be conducted by respondents particularly set on Mar 15, 2005. enforcing
any Hold Departure Order (HDO) and/or putting petitioner on Watch Lis

Also prays for:

3. annulment of SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM issued to
P.
SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM: A process to cause a witness to appear
and give testimony, under conditions therein mentioned.
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM: a command to produce documents
FACTS
1. Feb 1 2005. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (VC of R) delivered a privilege
speech = Arrogance of Wealth.
- Based on a letter from Atty. Mark Bacobo denouncing SCB Phils for selling
unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA
8799)
- According to letter, P is reported to have a sale of unregistered and high-risk
securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses
to the investing public
- Urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, aid in legislation, to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.
2. Sen. Francis Pangilinan motioned the speech to be referred to R. PS Resolution
was earler been introduced by Sen. Enrile.
3. R invited petitioners and other resource persons to attend hearing. On Feb 28,
2005 when the investigation was commenced, Senator Enrile moved that
subpoena be issued to those who did not attend and requested Dept of Justice to
issue an HDO against them or include them in the Watch List.
4. P were later served SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM and DUCES TECUM
to compel them to attend the next set hearing, thus they filed this petition.
5. The issues raised against SCB Phils regarding the selling of unregistered foreign
documents are already foreign securities.
Primary: Did the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee have jurisdiction over the case at
bar?
HELD
Petition for Prohibition -DENIED, lack of merit.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
*Note from Nachura: it was held that the legislative inquiry does not violate the
petitioners right to privacy.
RATIO
A. Bengzon Jr v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee does not apply in this case.
- -The similarity of Bengzon Jr and of this case is only until the presence of
cases already pending in various courts and admin bodies regarding the
matter to be investigated.
- -Bengzon Jr, was not in aid of legislation. The speech therein contained no
contemplated legislation
- On the other hand, this case is explicit on the nature of the inquiry, as stated
in last 3 WHEREAS clauses in P.S.

Resolution No 166.
a. exisiting laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be
inadequate
c. the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appear to be
inadequate.
d. there is a need for remedial legislation to address the issue.
- Conclusion of Enriles privilege speech: conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation.
B. landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno
- -the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
- -P cannot claim to have been singled out by R before there are other
resource persons invited to help them in the case.
- -purpose of the investigation: quest for remedies, to prevent recurrence
- independent of the judiciary, it can assest its authority and punish noncompliance.
C. Right of privacy ---not absolute right. (Sec 21, ART VI of Consti)
Sabio v Gordon, Right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest
NORECO II vs Sanguniang Panglungsod
155 SCRA 421 Political Law Inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an
investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of
public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental
II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged
to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to
appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order
the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is
lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither
the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in
inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the
LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and
the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal
provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power

partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions.
To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres
and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even
less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and
the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt
power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised
where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.