CHUAT HUAT VS.

CA
FACTS:
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel delRosario to condemn the
dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners.

The said official issued notices of

condemnation to petitioners based onInspection Reports showing that the buildings suffered from structural
deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in
dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276
of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to demolish as
the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor confirmed the condemnation
orders.
More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the notices of
condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound.
Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO
against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.
The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed
claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive
domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised
Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police
power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official;
(2) WON the City Mayor and City Engineer committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of such powers.
HELD:
(1) YES. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila
and the National Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous
buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation
and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided
in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
(2) NO. The orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building
Inspectors. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was
shown that all the buildings had architectural, structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. The
respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law. Petitioners
were given the opportunity to protest the condemnation but only did so long after the lapse of the period (7 days)
allowed them under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law."

Tatel vs Municipality of Virac

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of
Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner's warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a
public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of
1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios
without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives
and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and
void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to
avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government.
The lower court did not err in its decision.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

Facts:
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed
by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue
that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a
clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion,
protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to
be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue
of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the
people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this
rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city
and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated preemptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID
and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED

G.R. No. 175241

February 24, 2010

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY
L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA, Respondent.
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines 1 (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June
28, 2006 Decision 2 and the October 26, 2006 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Jose Lito Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than
the one applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the
City Mayor of Manila a letter application 4 for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit 5 dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein
Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 94949.6 The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June
22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to
resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985. 7
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for
being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan
whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners
allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, 8 docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for
violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a
Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition
became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second
assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his Comment of November 18,
2008 which merited petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009.
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does
not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the passing of the date of the
rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or

dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.9
In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms of an
intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the
application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels
the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the
criminal case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.
Under the Rules,10 the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in a criminal
action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance
of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,11 the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a
petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action, 12 the determination of
the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this Court
in an appeal from the civil action.
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that
the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court went on to hold
that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly which are not
absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest
rallies are allowed without permit.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,13 the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free
speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court
in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.14 (emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling
in Reyes v. Bagatsing.15 In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of
the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.16 (italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant
may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and
present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued
permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the
American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.17 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and
caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is
thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit in terms satisfactory to the applicant. 18
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED.
The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the rally permit issued on June
16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators.
The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section
458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the
ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on
motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is
another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only
on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act
upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same
fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and
whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Facts:
Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended
that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a
lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing.
RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City
Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain
Places
of
Amusement
within
Their
Respective
Territorial
Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power
to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to
prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The
exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition
Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissed the cases. Hence this petition forcertiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the
exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve
the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public
needs.
In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix
the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative
will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance,
would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.
Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L.
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City
Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila
and

MALATE

TOURIST

DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION

G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the
City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING

PENALTIES

FOR

VIOLATION

THEREOF,

AND

FOR

OTHER

PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive
exercise

of

police

power;

(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial

establishments,

except

those

specified

therein;

and

(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did,
ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure
(1)

prescribed
must

(2)

(5)

law,

not

must

also

not
be

general

to

and

following

substantive
or

unfair

be
prohibit

the

Constitution

be

not

must

conform
the

not

must

must

it

contravene

must

(3)
(4)

by

consistent

any

statute;

or

partial
but

requirements:

oppressive;

or
may
with

discriminatory;
regulate

public

policy;

trade;
and

(6)

must

not

be

unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting
as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A.

The

Ordinance

contravenes

the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general

laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites

for

the

valid

exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
a violation of the due process clause.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck

down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through
means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses
or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality

employed

is

unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval
within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will
be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property

in

manner

that

interferes

with

reasonable

expectations

for

use.

are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.
or to convert into allowed businesses

to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area

The second and third options

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications

whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be
tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers
in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause.
These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B.

The

Ordinance

violates

Equal

Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus,
the discrimination is invalid.

one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish

The standard where women are used

as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution

C.

The

Ordinance

is

repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general
welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation
and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance

per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly
argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree
allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage
depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is
not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the
City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

DECISION
CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades Strike but hear me first! It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since

they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now
come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised
there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered
enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did
not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an
entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal. 6We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in
fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then will
be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily, 8 to recall Justice Laurels trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that
the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President in his judgment, a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a
proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an iron rule laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.

The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise. 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due
process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than the embodiment of the sporting Idea
of fair play. 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark
of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear the other side before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in
leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the
vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to the law of the land, which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these
requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for
a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained
by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described
as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. We affirm at the outset
the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect
and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattlerustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was
required by the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class and that the prohibition
of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes was a reasonably necessary limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the
services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a
desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor mans tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure
is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial

and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In
the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioners peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos. (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a roving
commission, a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing, in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioners
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent
of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would
never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become
a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have

ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever
they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned
to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered rest