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LOCSIN V. HRET

FACTS: Petitioner Locsin and private respondent Lagdameo, along with three other
candidates, vied for the position to represent the First Legislative District of Makati in
the 2010 national elections. Lagdameo was proclaimed winner but Locsin instituted an
election protest before the HRET alleging that the results were tainted by election fraud,
anomalies, and irregularities. Petitioner continuously presented documentary evidence.
However, upon recount of the ballots, it was found that Lagdameos winning margin
increased. Hence, the final dismissal of the election protest.
Locsin alleged that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the
presence of 2,457 invalid, irregular, and rejectible ballots for Lagdameo and 663 bona
fide claimed ballots for petitioner. Specifically, only two of the 2,457 contested ballots
were rejected by the HRET, and only 192 of the 663 ballots claimed by petitioner were
admitted by the HRET. Petitioner argued that a re-examination of the private
respondent's ballots would show that markings were placed intentionally for
identification, and the ballots should have been rejected. Those which contained
shadings below the 50% threshold should have been rejected also.
RULING
I. Objected Ballots
The Omnibus Election Code provides explicitly that every ballot shall be presumed valid
unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. 49 Unless it should clearly
appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter to serve as identification marks,
commas, dots, lines, or hyphens between the first name and surname of a candidate, or
in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter "T", "J", and other similar ones, the first
letters or syllables of names which the voter does not continue, the use of two or more
kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental flourishes, strokes, or strains, shall not
invalidate the ballot.
On the premise that the alleged markings in the ballots, i.e, and other similar marks do
not qualify to identify the ballot, the HRET admitted as not marked the 381 ballots
objected by petitioner in favor of Lagdameo. On the other hand, the HRET admitted as
not marked 4,562 ballots objected by Lagdameo in favor of petitioner. Only one (1)
ballot for petitioner was rejected while only two (2) ballots for Lagdameo were rejected
for being marked.
Petitioner objected to most of the ballots on the ground that these were Spurious or
Substituted ballots. These are ballots that allegedly do not contain the signature of the
Chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) at the designated space or the
signature is allegedly different from the BEI Chairpersons signature appearing on other
election documents.

Ultra-violet (UV) lamps were used to confirm the presence of the UV code or seal placed
as security markings at the upper center of the automated ballots. This UV code or seal
was inserted to identify ballots that were cast and fed to the PCOS machines. The HRET
found these ballots authentic and admitted as valid the 1,808 ballots objected by
petitioner and favoring Lagdameo. On the other hand, the HRET admitted 1,905 ballots
objected by Lagdameo and favoring Locsin.
Ballots with an Over-Voting count occur when a voter shaded more than two or more
ovals pertaining to two or more candidates for representative. The HRET admitted 10
ballots in favor of Lagdameo owing to the untenability of the objections raised. On the
other hand, all 597 ballots in favor of petitioner Locsin were admitted.
Lastly, the HRET found without merit objections made on miscellaneous grounds and
admitted one (1) ballot for petitioner and four (4) ballots for Lagdameo.
II. Claimed Ballots
The HRET applied this rule on its appreciation of the claimed ballots. For Stray ballots,
the tribunal admitted two (2) ballots out of the 451 stray ballots claimed by petitioner
and in fact admitted only one (1) out of the 606 stray ballots claimed by Lagdameo. For
PCOS Machine-Rejected ballots, these may still be admissible for the claimant provided
that upon physical examination, the four requisites for the applicability of the intent rule
are present. The HRET admitted 190 claimed ballots in favor of petitioner and 191 in
favor of Lagdameo.
Clearly, Lagdameo received 42,484 votes. Locsin, on the other hand, received 42,149
votes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
promulgated on 17 September 2012 and HRET Resolution No. 12-209 dated 15 October
2012 are AFFIRMED.

JALOSJOS V. COMELEC
Assailed in this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No.
96132 dated January 15, 2013, ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation
of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate
for Zamboanga City.
Petitioner was convicted by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal

penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively,
which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). His petition for Inclusion in the Permanent
List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City. Likewise, COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No.
961314 on January 15, 2013, resolving to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate
of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13,
2013 National and Local Elections due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well
as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective
office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
HELD: Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all
should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation.
On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective
candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular
office
orto
be
elected
to
such
office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the
exercise
of
any
of
the
rights
mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised

in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes
that the conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In
particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective
office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said
provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law26imposes a
penalty, either as principal or accessory,27 which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetuaand reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision
such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioners
service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.33 In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been
expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as
such, petitioners disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more
significantly, considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections,
the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains
disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, Respondents.

FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of
Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number
of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC
held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as
the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi
was then installed as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount
the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus,
it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray
the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued
another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued
that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had
been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had
not been preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to
the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had
been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during
the revision.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a
clear violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering
that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were

done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans
any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on appeal.
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.
POLITICAL LAW notice to parties
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on
Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the
opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so
lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the
First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving
the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due
process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court held
that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used
for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short,
when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the
ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the
equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture
images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still
consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that
the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
SILVERIO TAGOLINO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL & LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ,
G.R. No.202202, March 19, 2013
Actor Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking
the congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Leyte. He

indicated his residence as 910Carlota Hills, Ormoc City. The same was
questioned before the COMELEC by Buenaventura Juntilla, one of the candidates for
the said position claiming that Richard is a resident of Colgate St., East Greenhills, San
Juan City, MM. The COMELEC disqualified Richard based on Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code for lack of residence. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Torres-Gomez
(Lucy) filed her Certificate of Candidacy as SUBSTITUTE of Richard. Despite the
vigorous objection of Juntilla, the COMELEC allowed the substitution and Lucy was
elected as Representative of the 4th District of Leyte in the May 10, 2010
elections. A case was filed before the HRET questioning the election of Lucy on the
ground that the substitution is not valid but the HRET sustained the validity of the
said substitution
Issue: Was there a valid substitution? Was Lucy Torres Gomez validly elected as
representative of the 4th District of Leyte?
Held: A valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid candidate
substitution. Since Richards COC was not valid for material representation as to his
residence, then there was no valid substitution. In short, since Richard is not considered
a candidate or there was no candidate to speak of, there would be no candidate to be
substituted. Unlike disqualification under Section 68 where he can be substituted
because the candidate therein has all the qualifications but disqualified because of
prohibited acts like election offences or because he is a permanent resident of a foreign
country, a candidate disqualified under Section 78 could not be validly substituted.

ABUNDO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA,Respondents.
FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the
position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election
and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year
and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC,

which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office
to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official
the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared
winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term
has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres).
Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot
be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office
and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election
protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period
during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or
break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was
Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Federico vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 199612 : January 22, 2013
Renato M. Federico, Petitioner, v. Commission on Elections, COMELEC
Executive Director and Osmundo M. Maligaya, Respondents.
FACTS:
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were
candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the 2010
Elections.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate

for the province of Batangas, died. Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased
husband.
On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of the
Election Officer his COC and CONA as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as
substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Federico before the Comelec. Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to
run as substitute candidate for Edna since the period to file the COC for substitute
candidates had already lapsed after December 14, 2009.
The COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial
candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty
candidate.
But the official ballots had already been printed. On the day of elections, the name
SANCHEZ, Edna P. was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and
garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligayas 22,577 votes.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Edna as the winning mayoralty
candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Edna Sanchez. This
petition was later withdrawn.
The MBOC credited the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico and
proclaimed the latter as the winning candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul
Proclamation of Federico as mayor.
Meanwhile, Maligayas petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico
was denied by the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec First Division denied
Maligayas petition to annul the proclamation of Federico for having been filed out of
time.
Maligaya elevated the matter to the Comelec En Banc. The Comelec En Banc issued the
assailed Resolution granting Maligayas partial motion for reconsideration. The Comelec
En Banc was of the view that the annulment of Federicos proclamation was in order
because of his invalid substitution of Edna, as his substitute COC was filed beyond the
deadline and due to the illegality of the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the
second COCVP without authority from the Comelec and without notice to the parties.
Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Pending resolution of the case, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva) of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying essentially that as
Federico failed to qualify, he should be adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under

the Local Government Code.

ISSUES: Whether or not Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her
candidacy for the mayoralty position?
Granting that Federico was disqualified, whether or not he should be succeeded by
Intervenor Silva under the LGC or be replaced by Maligaya?
HELD: The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of discretion.
POLITICAL LAW: substitution of candidates
FIRST ISSUE: Federicos substitution of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty
candidate was not valid.
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution
No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides, the substitute for a candidate
who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office
affected not later than December 14, 2009.
In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have filed a
COC by December 14, 2009.
When Batangas Gov. Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her
candidacy as mayor and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the
province on April 29, 2010. The party actually had the option to substitute another
candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate
for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor.
Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed,
no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then
Governor Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not
justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
SECOND ISSUE: There being no valid substitution, the candidate with the
highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified candidate in the
mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas - Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he
received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva that he be
considered the legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify, has no legal
basis. There is simply no vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on succession
under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be invoked.
DENIED.