Legaspi v.

CSC
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
Cortes, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Issue:
whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right to information
Held:
Yes. Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted
by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be
imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to
information may be exercised by the public.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the
power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which
the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information
sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second

pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more
importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation
by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly,
its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It
does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular
public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee.
Issue:
whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit
Held:
Yes. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. When the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
Issue:
whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern
Held:
The above question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the
desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any

discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were
appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to
lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent
has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioners right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about ones civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioners request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through
any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

Valmonte Vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right
to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging
to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards
the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.
It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that governmentowned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right
to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)

brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is
scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources
within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act
for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is
constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are

unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution

thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56450 July 25, 1983
RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA, in his capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff
of Iloilo,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding Judge, Branch I of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT and ESTEBAN C. TAJANLANGIT, respondents.
Salvador A. Cabaluna, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Hannibal de los Reyes for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May the respondent court order that a mortgage on real property be substituted by a surety bond
and direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated on the Torrens Title since the
surety bond already secures the obligation earlier secured by the cancelled mortgage?
The petitioner comes to us stating that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of its jurisdiction in so ruling.
On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a
real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage executed on March 19, 1979 (Annex "A", Petition) between Randolph Tajanlangit and
Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other
hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00
in favor of Ganzon, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
That whereas, the MORTGAGORS are justly indebted to the MORTGAGEE in the
amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as
evidenced by their promissory note for said sum, in the words and figures as follows:
P40,000.00 Iloilo City
March 19, 1979

For value received, we promise to pay RODOLFO T. GANZON, or order, at his

residence in Molo, Iloilo City, the sum of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00 on or before 25
May 1979; and P20,000.00 on or before 25 August 1979. This note shall not draw
interest. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 15)
The mortgage covered a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1- F of the subdivision plan
Psd-274802, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T50324.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo served
personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on the private respondents. Lira also caused the
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Iloilo of a Notice of Extra
Judicial Sale of Mortgaged Property, setting the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property at
10:00 a.m. on September 28, 1979, at his office at the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City.
On September 27, 1979, a day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a
civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
petitioners with the respondent court. The action, docketed as CFI Case No. 13053, sought to
declare the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith
null and void. The private respondents asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioners from proceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the
urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial
sheriff from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979.
On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. For purposes of the
instant petition, the pertinent allegations in the amended complaint are the following: (1) On August
25, 1978, defendant, now petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of
land in favor of plaintiff, now respondent Esteban Tajanlangit. The parcel of land, subject of the sale
is described as Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo located at Molo, Iloilo City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579 with an area of 24,442 square meters, more or less; (2) The
deed of real estate mortgage which is the subject of the extra-judicial proceedings initiated by
defendant Rodolfo Ganzon executed by plaintiffs Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in
his favor was for the purpose of securing the payment of P40,000.00 which formed part of the
purchase price of Lot No. 1900; (3) Incorporated in the aforesaid deed of absolute sale was a
proviso to the effect that vendor-defendant Rodolfo Ganzon guaranteed to have the occupants of the
lot to vacate the premises within 120 days after the execution thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above- mentioned
parcel of land and that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at the
execution of this deed shall vacate the premises within a period of one hundred
twenty (120) days computed from the date of the execution of this document.

(4) The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot
up to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is illegal
since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate mortgage
does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged property.
On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint. They admitted the
veracity of the deed of absolute sale covering said Lot No. 1900 but denied that the real estate
mortgage covering Lot No. 1901 subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was executed
by Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon to secure the payment
of the balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. They maintained that the real estate mortgage
was an entirely different transaction between the Tajanlangits and Ganzon from the sale of Lot No.
1900 embodied in the absolute deed of sale of realty. They further maintained that the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings would be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For
Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to
which the petitioners interposed an Opposition.
In an order dated November 20, 1980, the respondent court granted the respondents' motion. The
order states:
This is a Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to
Accept Bond or Cash in Lieu Thereof.
It appears that defendant sold to Esteban Tajanlangit, Jr. Lot No. 1900 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579. The
document of sale provides that the vendee who is the defendant herein, promised to
exclude from the premises the occupants. To secure the unpaid balance of
P40,000.00, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage on their Lot No. 1901-4-61-B1-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-274802. Because defendant failed to clear the
occupants of Lot No. 1900, as provided for in the contract of sale, plaintiffs withheld
payment of the P40,000.00. To clear the title of Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-1 plaintiffs are
willing to submit a bond in the sum of P80,000.00 which is double the consideration
of the mortgage.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, considering that plaintiffs are willing and able
to pay the P40,000.00 and considering further that defendant has not yet cleared the
premises he sold to plaintiffs of tenants, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered
to cancel the mortgage lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324, upon
showing by the plaintiffs that they have put up the surety bond in the sum of
P80,000.00. " (Annex "F", Rollo, p. 58)
On January 28, 1981, the respondents after receipt of the aforesaid order, put up a surety bond in
the amount of P80,000.00 with the Summa Insurance Corporation as surety (Annex " G ") for the
approval of the respondent court,

On February 14, 1981, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of The Order
Dated November 20, 1980, And Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond.
The respondent court in its order dated February 24, 1981, denied the aforesaid motion. The order
states:
Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond well
taken and considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not question the
validity of the surety bond itself but is anchored upon grounds that had already been
passed upon by this Court in the order dated November 20, 1980, the surety bond in
the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa Insurance Corporation is hereby
approved.
The defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon, through Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, Jr., is hereby
ordered to surrender to the plaintiffs, through Atty. Hannibal de los Reyes the owner's
copy of TCT No. 50324, so that the mortgage annotated therein in favor of defendant
Rodolfo T. Ganzon could be duly cancelled. (Annex "I", Rollo, p. 65).
Hence, the instant petition.
On March 18, 198 1, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch I at Iloilo City.
On July 8, 1981, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
As stated earlier, the issue raised before us is whether or not the trial court may order the
cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a
promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to
secure the payment of the promissory note.
In issuing its November 20, 1980 order, the trial court before trial on the merits of the case assumed
that the real estate mortgage subject of the extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings was indeed a
security for the payment of a P40,000.00 promissory note which answered for the balance of the
purchase price of the sale between Ganzon as vendor and Esteban Tajanlangit was vendee of Lot
No. 1900. With this assumption, the trial court concluded that Rodolfo Ganzon violated his warranty
that he would clear the parcel of land of its occupants within 120 days after the execution of the deed
of absolute sale of realty. On this premise and upon motion of the private respondents, the court
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Title covering the mortgaged parcel of land and to substitute therein a surety bond approved by the
trial court.
It must be noted that petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon vehemently denied the allegation that the P
40,000.00, consideration of the promissory note which resulted in the execution of the real estate
mortgage to secure its payment was a balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. As earlier

stated, Ganzon maintained in his Answer that the real estate mortgage arose from a different
transaction. At the pre-trial, what the parties admitted were the existence and due execution of the
documents, including the absolute deed of sale of realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In
connection with the documents, the issues per the pre-trial order were "... whether or not the
documents express the true intention of the parties, and whether or not they complied with the
provisions of the document. (Rollo, p. 78) Hence, at that stage of the case, the trial court's order
dated November 20, 1980 had no factual basis.
Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were justified by
evidence in the records the same would still not be proper.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same
consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract."
(Banco de Oro v. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation v. Lichauco, 46 Phil.
460). On the effects of a mortgage we ruled inPhilippine National Bank v. Mallorca (21 SCRA 694):
xxx xxx xxx
... By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain
of 1889.) a 'mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted.' Sale or transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A
purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to
which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor 'in
order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit
therefrom.' (Bischoff vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690, 700) For, a recorded real estate is a
right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. (Altavas, The Law of
Mortgages in the Philippine Islands, 1924 ed., p. 2) Because the personality of the
owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership;
the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first one; and this, independent
of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. (Id., at p. 6) So
it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent
purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with
or without the consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows
the property. (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1961 ed., p. 225;
emphasis supplied. See also V. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1962 ed., p.
477)
Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as
ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable
from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage
with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This
conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage
contract.

Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under
the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the
P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even
before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation
from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated November 20, 1980 and
February 24, 1981 of the trial court are SET ASIDE. Our March 18, 1981 Temporary Restraining
Order is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Facts:

On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land

situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the
balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and
P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per
annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has
been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two
installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so
Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and
the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a
prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed
his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA
342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot beenforced until after
the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was
made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause

grounds.

Held:

Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations

decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its
essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State
may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protectivepower notwithstanding interference with contracts. The
question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the
Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA
342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true
as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason
considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as
regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary
obligations.