STATE OF MICHIGAN BEFORE THE MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION Complaint Agains HON. LISA 0. GORCYCA FORMAL COMPLAINT NO. 98 6th Cirenit Court 1200N. Telegraph Pontiac, MI 48341 DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER OF DISCIPLINE, ‘At a session of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission held on November 14, 2016, in the Hon. Pablo Cortes, Vice-Chairperson Naney J. Diehl, Fsq., Secretary Hon, Monte J. Burmeister Hon, Lawrence 8, Talon David T. Fischer Melissa B. Spickler Pursuant to its authority under Article 6, §30 of the Michigan Constitution as amended, ‘and MCR 9.203, the Judicial Tenure Commission of the State of Michigan (“Commission” below) files this recommendation for discipline against Hon. Lisa O. Gorcyea (“Respondent”), ‘who at all material times was a judge ofthe 6" Circuit Court (“the Cour”) in the Cty of Pontiac, State of Michigan On or about July 1, 2016, the Commission received the findings of fuct and conclusions (of law from the Master appointed by the state Supreme Court to hear evidence in this matter. We have reviewed the relevant portions of the hearing transcript and exhibits, as well as the ‘Master's Report, and have considered the written and oral arguments of counsel. We agree with the Master’s conclusion thatthe Examiner established by a preponderance of the evidence thatthe Respondent committed an act of judicial misconduct in open court on June 24, 2018. Howover, we further conclude that while her responses may have been inaccurate and somewhat misleading, Respondent did not make intentionally false statements in her answer to the formal complaint or during er testimony at the public hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Commission recommends that the Supreme Court impose on Respondent a public censure and thirty-day suspension without pay from office. 1, Procedural Background (On September 1, 2015, the Commission issued a 28-day letter to Respondent, seeking answers to questions about her conduct during proceedings in her courtroom occurring on June 24, 2015. Respondent replied by letter dated October 23, 2015, and the Commission issued a Formal Complaint on December 14, 2015 alleging that Respondent's conduct at a hearing in ‘open court on June 24° constituted judicial misconduct, and that she had made false statements inher answer to the 28-day lette. Respondent fled her answer on January 21, 2016. (On January 22, 2016, the Michigan Supreme Court appointed Hon. Daniel P. Ryan to serve as Master, to conduct a public hearing inquiting into the allegations contained in the Fonmal Complaint. The Master held public hearings on May 27, May 31, and June 1, 2016, In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued on July 1, 2016, the Master concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had committed acts of judicial misconduct as ‘outlined in MCR 9.205 and Canons 1-3 of the Code of Judicial conduct, and made a materially false statement in her response to the Commission's 28-day letter.' The Commission heard ‘objections tothe Masters Report at a public heating held on October 10, 2016. Tl, Standard of Proof In all judicial disciplinary matters the Fxaminer bears the burden of proving the allegations contained in the Complaint by a preponderance ofthe evidence. In re Ferrara, 458 ‘Mich 350, 360; $82 NW2d 817 (1998). MCR 9.211(A). Although not required to accept the “Master's findings of fact, the Commission may defer to the Master's superior ability to observe and assess the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Jn re Lloyd, 424 Mich $14, 535; 384 "The Master dd not find persuasive the Examiners legaton tht Respondent made 2 second fase statement In her answer to Gestion 25 posed by the amie, when she disputed the algaton tht she decided to hod the hire inthe dorce case ging rise to tis Complant In contemot of eur when they reused to speak or have lunch with ther father. The Master determined that tis allegation was a mater of semaats rather than {asehaod, andthe Commision eoncusNW2d 9 (1986), We do, however, review the Master's factual findings and legal conclusions de novo. Inre Chrzanowski, 463 Mich 468, 480-481; 636 NW2d 738 (2001), IML. Findings of Fact Factual Background (On December 17, 2009, a divores action was filed in Oakland County Circuit Court secking dissolution of the marriage between two Israeli citizens residing in the United States whose children enjoyed dual American and Israeli citizenship. The case —~ captioned Maya Eibschitz-Tsimhoni v Omer Tsimoni, 6% Circuit Docket No, 09-T88749-DM — was assigned to Respondent, resulting in a judgement of divorce entered on Avgust 8, 2011, As part of the judgment, the court awarded the partes joint custody of their three minor children, with physical ‘custody given to the mother and parenting time awarded to the father. The ensuing years saw a Tong, complex, and acrimonious legal battle between the two parents, complicated by the international status of the parties? The case has involved more than forty hearings andl more than a hundred pleadings, many involving show-cause aetions filed against the mother by the father, or the Guardian Ad Litem appointed on behalf of the children. Those hearings and pleadings, along with the many reports, findings, and recommendations filed by the Guardian Ad Litem with respect to the children, provide some historical context to Respondent's actions on June 24, 2015. “The divorce action resulted in dozens of separate orders, including about thst relating to ‘the three minor children. Most of these sought to facilitate meaningful parenting time between the children and their father. It appears that many of those orders may have been ignored or thwarted by actions of the mother, and by the children themselves. ‘Throughout the underlying litigation, the dominant issue has been the children’s failure to participate in parenting time with ‘their father, and the father’s claim that the mother has boen orchestrating their alienation by ‘ostracizing him in their eyes. Since its inception, the mother has been represented by sixteen attorneys, the father by four. The children have been clinically examined and evaluated by ‘multiple therapists, some of which participated in supervising visitation with the futher. Friend of the Court Family Counselor Tracey Rae Sticb has been involved with the ase from the beginning; Attorney William Lansat was appointed Guardian Ad Litem for the three children on "Among the comping foctor was theft that he father moved tole! mare than 2 ear before the dhorce ection commenced. Ten months later, hoping fr reconcilation, the mother and clden moved there 25 wel, However, the mother returned in Decenber, 2009 to extablish eldeny in Oakland County and fed the aeton for vor,‘August 25, 2010; and the eurent parenting time supervisor, Art Gallagher, has been involved ‘withthe ease since 2013, From 2010 until the events in question, Respondent spent five years sifting through various motions and complaints that the mother and children were filing to comply with the court's orders respecting, parenting time for the father. Her orders reflected efforts to craft solutions to the resentments the children expressed towards their father. And she has indicated that her actions on June 24, 2015 were not undertaken lighily, but “emanated from years of frusration” stemming trom the mother’s continuing efforts to disobey court orders made in an effort “to unify the children with Defendant Father while maintaining a relationship with Plaintiff Mother” {In August, 2014, the Guardian Ad Litem suggested the unusual step of having the father's parenting time take place in Judge Gorcyca's jury room. The parties and Respondent agreed to this remedy to help make sute that the children participated in parenting time with their father. (On August 20, 2014 Respondent signed a consent order to that effect, directing that parenting time would take place on the following two days, August 2*and August 22%. (On August 21, 2014, the mother and children appeared at Court, The children, sitting in chairs in the public hallway outside Judge Goreyea's courtroom, refused to enter the jury room whore their fither and the parenting supervisor were waiting, and refused to participate in any parenting time with their father. Linking their arms together, they refused to look ator speak to anyone, or even to get up and enter the jury room. Notified ofthese developments, Respondent personally observed the children’s actions through a window in the courtroom door. She summoned deputies from the Oakland County Sherifl’s Office to her courtroom and asked for help fiom Assistant Oakland County Prosecutor Lisa Harts, whom Respondent believed was ‘good at working with children, Harris, the Deputies, and the Guardian Ad Litem encouraged the children to visit this father ia the jury room, explaining at some length the significance of the court's orders and way they had to be followed, but the children refused to respond to any of them. Among the consequences explained 10 the children was that a continuing refusal to ‘comply could end in their placement in the Oakland County Children’s Village, and their ‘mother's placement in the County Jail Seeing that nobody secmed able to persuade the children to visit with their father, Respondent stepped into the hallway and told them that they had to follow the Court's orders. She explained that they and their mother could be found in contempt of court if they kept refusing to have contact with thir father ~~ the contempt remedy having been suggested to her poser to 28-day eter. (Examines Exit 68, p23.)bby Assistant Prosecutor Harris After Responclent’s admonitions, the children complied, albeit reluctantly, and entered the jury room accompanied by Art Gallagher, Tracey Stieb, and William. “Lansat to begin patenting time with their father. Lansat and Stieb later reported to Respondent thatthe session had resulted in little progress, The children completed the visitation scheduled forthe following day without further incident, although a report from the Guardian Ad Litem ddated November 3, 2014 advised Respondent that the parenting session had not gone well. Over the course of the next several months, the parties participated in a number of court hearings and stipulated orders, including several motions to show cause filed by the father, alleging violations of parenting time. One such motion, fled in March of 2015, culminated in the mother's agreement that she was in contempt of court. As a result, the mother was held in a holding room atthe Courthouse for a few hours before being released and allowed to work at an animal shelter for two days in early April, 2015 as part of her contempt sanctions. The record also shows that on March 23, 2015, Respondent conducted a hearing into a request by the mother to suspend the fuhor's visitation due to allegations that the father had assaulted one of his sons ‘0n March 23, 2015, and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation Proceedings of June 23 and June 24, 2015 On June 23, 2016, the parties appeared before the Court for a review hearing to assess the ‘mother’s compliance with the Court's orders regarding parenting time. The father’s attomey, ‘and the parenting-time supervisor, told Respondent that although the children would appear as ordered for scheduled visits with their father, their participation in the visit was minima Respondent informed the mother that she would face additional jail time if this did not improve ‘and, wit the parties’ agreement, ordered thatthe father would exercise his parenting time with sine-year old daughter NT and ten-year old son RT in the courts jury room the following day, June 244. The order also stated thatthe father’s parenting time with his other son, thirteen-year “Respondent tested a the Sicipinary hearing that was Assistant Prosecutor Hares who ist suggest holeing the cidren in contempt forthe failure to comply wih the cour’ orders during the vstation ius ‘on August 21% and recommended appointing atomeys for he chidren ad holding the hearing on the spot; GAL ‘anst recommenced agains sending the chien to Chitren's Vilage, and advised ahingit “one more shot” The Jue decided atthe tine agains ol the eile a contempt, but appeared atthe ime to understand that t ‘wae the prosestor who would be bringing criminal contompt charges. (Tanszipt of 6/1/16, pp 317-318. Fespondent cites this a8 an example of usa resraint under the ting cecurstances of tis case but, asthe Master noted, also suggest that Respondent understood the difrence between civ and criminal contempt, and was aware that contempt proceedings in August woud have Been criminal in nature. See, REONT OF MASTER, peo‘old LT, was to occur on July 14, 2016,* Having boen advised that the father was about to leave ‘on a two-week business trip, Respondent denied the mother's request to schedule visitation around 2 dermatologist's appointment scheduled for the following day, ruling that she was “not ‘ving up one minute of dad’s parenting time” because the mother would have “the rest of the summer fo reschedule those appointments."* (On June 24, 2016, the mother brought her younger children, NT and RT, to court for their supervised visitation, as Respondent had ordered. Accompanying them was the oldest child, LT, ‘whom the mother had brought with them to the courthouse. At about 9:00 a.m., RT commenced his parenting time with his father in Judge Goreyea’s jury room. During the course ofthe routine siotion cal forthe day, Respondents secretary informed her that parenting time for RT was not going well, because the child was not cooperating. Seeking guidance, Respondent summoned ‘Tracey Stieb the Friend of the Court Family Counselor, and they entered the jury room together to determine the nature ofthe problem, Entering the jury room, Respondent saw RT seated in a chat, his legs placed over second chair and his head tucked between his legs. Also in the room were the child's father, the parenting time coordinator Art Gallagher, and Guardian Ad Litem William Lansat. Respondent testified thatthe child was being theatrical ~ breathing heavily, and sighing and panting, with a roll of toilet paper next to his shoe. The mother and the other children were notin the room at the time. Respondent told RT to sit up and cease his behavior, and asked him what was wrong, ‘The child responded that he did not want to have parenting time with his father; when asked ‘why, he replied that it was because his fither had assaulted him, to which Respondent replied ‘that she had already hed a hearing on the matter and found no evidence to suppor the allegation.” Asked if there was any other reason besides the alleged assault Why he did not want to visit with his father, RT replied — through what Respondent took to be “theatrical sobs” - that “He did’ say happy birthday to me.” Upon hearing this, te father replied: “Honey, I did say happy birthday to you,” and Respondent remarked that it as @ good thing that he wanted more attention from his father, and ‘that his father really wanted to be part ofthe boy's life. Tracey Stieb then talked to RT about Grominers GI. To protect the prhacy ofthe minor chlor, ths report retersto them bythe ts, rather than by name "Trane of une 23,2035, 99. hs was the hearing hat took place on Morch 23, 2015, shortly before the mother was sent tal for interfering with the father’s station, Respondent ltr testified thatthe chien themselves had never been brought into ourton the recor unt the contampt proceedings of ne 24, 2015. (ranserit of 5/33/16 pp 3-32,‘making a fresh start with his father, to which he replied that did not want to do so because his dad had been mean; the boy refused to converse oF interact any further with his father, oF with the Judge. Respondent informed RT tha there were serious consequences toa continuing refusal to obey the Court's orders, reminding him that it was not up to him — or his siblings -~ to decide whether to participate in parenting time with their father. She also reminded him of her admonition the previous August regarding potential consequences, including @ potential placement at Children's Village After leaving the jury room, mindful of a statement RT made in the jury room that he always listened to his mother, Respondent wrote out a scripted statement for the mother to read ‘aloud to her children in the jury oom, in the presence of their father. The statement included assurances from the mother to the effect thatthe father loved them, would not harm them or hr, that both parents wanted the futher to be part of thei lives, and that she wanted them all to spend time with him and have a good relationship with him, ‘After consulting with her attorney, the mother agreed to read the prepared statement, ‘Though not there for parenting time that day, LT entered the jury room with her at about 1:30 fam., and she read the statement to all three children, adding @ few words in Hebrew. Respondent then left the jury room so that the family could talk amongst themselves, with help from Family Counselor Stieb and Guardian Ad Liter Lansat. ‘After the mother read her statement and lef the thre children remained inthe jury room with their father and Tracey Stieb. A short time later Stieb informed Respondent that the three children were still refusing to communicate with their father or participate in the parenting time scheduled for that day. Respondent informed the parties, their atomeys, and the Guardian Ad that she was appointing attorneys forall three children and that, i necessary, she would be proceeding with an immediate contempt hearing after the children had the chance to consult counsel, Anticipating that she might be sentencing the children for contempt, she called for an extra sheriffs deputy, and appointed counsel for each of the children: Attorney Jeffrey Schatz, P-32076 for LT; Attorney Michael Dean, P-32631 for RT; and Attomey Karen Cook, P-26141 for NT. The attomeys had a halfhour or soto meet and confer with the three children. Contempt Hearing of LT Shortly after noon on June 24, 2016, Respondent commenced a contempt hearing against thirteen-year old LT, who had accompanied his mother to court that day while she took his younger brother and sister for their scheduled visitation with their father. Though expressing ‘confusion about the proceedings, L1’ apologized to the court; he di however, tell the eourt chat hae didnot wish to apologize or speak to his father, because he had seen his father hit his motherand believed him to be violent® In response, Respondent informed LT that she was holding him indirect contempt,” because she had ordered him to have a healthy relationship with his father, that she had witnessed his mother informing him that she (the mother) wanted him to talk this father, that he was a “defiant, contemptuous young man,” and that he would be spending the rest ‘of the summer in Children's Village. Upon L1's reply that he bad done nothing wrong, Respondent told him that he had defied a direct court order; when LT" responded that he thought there were rules against hitting people, the following exchange ensued: ‘THE COURT: ...[YJou're supposed to have a high 1Q, which I'm doubting right row because of the way you act, you're very defiant, you have no manners, T ordered you to have a relationship...with your dad. T ordered you to talk to your father. Your mom told you to talk to your father. There is no reason why you do rot have a relationship with your father. ‘Your father has never been charged with anything, your fither’s never been convicted of anything. Your father doesn’t have @ personal protection order against him. Your father is well liked and loved by the community, his co- ‘workers, his family, his colleagues, You, young man, have got it wrong. think your father is a great man who has gone through hoops for you to have a relationship with you. You are in contempt and you are going to live in Children's Village. Remind me how old you are? u Fitoen. (sil? THE COURT: You may stay in there until you graduate from high school [COUNSEL FOR MOTHER} ...{ust for the record, 'd like to make clear that ‘my clien...did comply with the court's directives, ‘The court asked mother to speak withthe children about...the necessity of the relationship with their father and I believe she did so to the cout’ satisfaction... was the second ld that dy to report ther winesing or suring frm an act of wolnce by the father. ‘Te only cely of Respondent sppatent on the record before us was her testimony that she had informed RT carlin the doy that she had conducted 2 heering inthis leztion, and found It unsupprte bythe evidence. Shed, however, testy that the contempt hearings on June 24” were the fst time the cen had appeared Deore herin cour. See supra, nate ther reparteavalable to the Cour from various mental heath professional suggested thot the chiles refusal topartpate in parenting ine with the father was duet feor and mistrust. See, Examiners Ahi 69, p 2. * whe the transcript recor the aniwer ae “tee,” L's dat of bth was Jy 6, 2003, making him thirteen ears ald on the date ofthe hearing. The audio perton ofthe vdeo rear is somewhat ndstin, and i probably more acerately wanszribedas"****teen”THE COURT: Mother, I appreciate that you did say tht... It was probably way too late. Your children — you need to do a research program on Charlie Manson and the cult that he has. Your behavior in the hall with me months ago, your behavior in this courtroom, your behavior back there, is unlike any I've ever seen in any 46,000 eases, You, young man, are the worst one. So you have bought ‘yourself living in Children's Village, going to the bathroom in public, and maybe Summer school, but you and mom...well, I'll [put] it in here, you're not atlowed 1 visit him, it's only your father and...anyone your dad chooses fo bring in, And your attomey. This is over your dad's objections... Obviously, it’s over your mother's ‘objections. Your dad —1 wanted to do this because of your horrific behavior a long time ago and your dad begged me not to... So it was only because of your dad — I would have switched eustody and they would have appealed because 1 find it's against ~- it's hurting ~- you are so mentally messed up right now and it's not because of your father. And one day you are going to realize what's going ‘om inthis case and you're going to apologize to your dad. We'll seta review hearing I guess what, September 1"? Unless you, for ‘whatever reason, alk to your dad and your dad comes to me and says..."Judge Goreyea...my son has seen the light and he’s changed and...can you let him out? ‘And he’s — Wants to have a relationship with me.” And then Pl do it. ‘And if it doesn’t happen — actually, you know what, we're just going to set 8 review hearing when you're 18, Dad, if you ever think that he has changed and therapy has helped him and he's no longer like Charlie Manson's cult," then you let us know and we can doit!" [At the eonelusion of the hearing, Sherif's deputies handcuffed LT, preparing to remove him from the courtroom, as Respondent continued berating him for his behavior. Respondent also denied the mother’s request to have a moment to say goodbye to her son, before deputies took him away. ® atl point, Respondent was making the crear gesture with er fies that forms the bas for Count ofthe Formal Compa "transcrip of lune 28, 205, show Cause Hearn pp 610.Contempt Hearing of RT and NT ‘After LT was removed ftom the courtroom, Respondent commenced contempt proceedings agains! ten-year old RT, and his sister, nine-year old NT. Reading from a written note prepared with the help of counsel, RT apologized to Respondent and to his father, told his father that he enjoys soceer and hoped to be on a soccer ‘eam, and promised to communicate with him at future parenting sessions ‘After hearing from RT, Respondent addressed his younger sister, NT. ‘The nine-year old irl had been present in court during 1.T's contempt hearing, handcuffing, and removal from the ‘court. She was visibly shaking and erying throughout the proceedings. Her atomey, Karen Cook, earlier had advised the Court that she did not have a “complete narative” eonceming what her client had done wrong, and thatthe gis did not seem to be cooperating with her. Respondent asked NT what she had to say; the nine-year old continued crying, leading Respondent immediately to conclude that she did not want to say anything. When RT attempted to pass his sister the note he had read to the Judge, Respondent intervened, stating: 'No, no, NT, don't read what your brother wrote. You're your own person. Do you know what? T know you"re kind of religious. God gave you a brain. He expects you to use it, You have a brain; you are not your brother. You are not Your big, defiant brother who's living in jail. Do you want to five in jail? Just tll ‘me this Fight now.!? ‘After NT apologized to the court and stated that she would try to work with her father during his visits, Respondent told both children: THE COURT: Well, you're going o stay here all day and i's going to be up to your dad, I'm going to see how you two act. Maybe the three of you should go to lunch in the cafeteria? If you have any hesitation at all you're living in Children's Village. You're living in Children's Village. ‘You know what that would do to your mother, going home, riding down the elevator without you? Can you guys think about someone besides yourself? You should be thinking about your father and what your father fas gone throvgh unnecessarily because of I don't know why? And...it's despicable to me what yur father has gone through when he loves and...and he wants to be in your ® rans of ne 24, 2035, show Cause Henig p17. 10.life... ?m so upset with you, P'm so upset with you, I'm even more upset with your brother, and [ won't say what I think about your mother. [think your mom ‘id something nice in the jury room for once, And I like your dad, And...you hhave me us your Judge for five anda hall years. How old will you be, NT? Lets see, you're going o be a teenager, You want to hhave your..birthdays in Children’s Village? Do you like going to the bathroom infront of people? [COUNSEL FOR NT}: She said no, thank you. ‘THE COURT: Is your bed soft and comfortable at home? NT: Yes, [COUNSEL FOR NT}; You need to talk, Speek up. ‘THE COURT: 1 tell you this, you two don’t have a nice lunch with your dad and make this up to your ded you're going, to come back here at 1:30 and I'm going to have the deputies take you to Children's Village. Dad, what do you think? What is your suggestion, dad? And I want you to know, T wanted t do this 0 you all many times, your dad ssid, “Don’t Judge Goreyea....” It was because of your dad that I didn’t do it. Your mom didn’t ‘want me to either, but the bal is in your dad's court. Your dad is in charge. Unless you want to live ia Children’s Village. It's up to you. I have put otter children in Children’s Vilage. You guys can all hang out together." Having leamed that his older brother bad been taken to “jai,” RT changed his pate and refused to engage in lunch and parenting time with his father, stating that be prefered to be with his older brother. Respondent replied that she would ensure ," promising to put In er oder: “Stay avvay from ‘your brother.” At this point, NT stated that she no longer wanted fo have lunch with her father peness to part that he would not be placed in the same “eel ‘either, prompting Respondent to laugh, and reply: Transcript of une 24, 2015, show Cause Heating 1718. aI've never seen anything like this. One day you can watch this video and realize that you two have been brainwashed. Your dad is a good man. Your dad is a ‘200d man who loves you. You have been brainwashed.... This is not normal ‘behavior, Only -- no adult inthis eourtroom, except one, thinks this is normal Every adult in this eourtroom things you have been brainwashed, Your dad is a ‘good man, And wipe that smitk off your face, [RT]. RT: Ws nota smirk, ‘THE COURT: I don’t know what that is, I've never seen anything lke it, You're 1 defiant, contemptuous young man and the court finds both of you in direct contempt. You are both going to live in Children’s Village, ‘Your mother is not allowed to vist, no one on your mom’s side is allowed to visit. Only your father and therapist and Mr. Lansat [the Guardian Ad Litem]. When you are read to have Junch with your dad, to have dinnee with your dad, to be normal human beings, 1 will review this when your dad tells me you are ready. Otherwise, you are living in Children's Village “tl you graduate from high school. ‘That's the order ofthe court, Good bye.!* Sheriff's deputios then placed both children in handeufls, and took them from the courtroom, Court Orders of Contempt [At the conelusion of proceedings, Respondent entered orders finding all three children in contempt of court, and sentencing them to be taken the Children’s Village for an indefinite period of time." The orders provided for therapy, and scheduled review dates for September 8, 2015, but indicated that the father could request an earlier review date if he determined that the children were complying withthe Court's orders and were having a “healthy relationship” with him, The orders also contained provisions forbidding the children from having any contact with ‘each other, of with the mother and her family, during their confinement. "Transp of une 24,2015, Show Cause Hearing, pp 21-22. > buamine’ Exhibits 46-47. The handwrtan orders themselves employ the verb “sentenced” a2Proces is of July 10, 2015 Following reports about the case inthe national press, on July 10, 2015 Respondent held an emergency hearing at the request of Guardian Ad Litem William Lansst. Atiomeys representing the partes and the children were present, and the father, who was in Israel at the time, participated by telephone. Opening the hearing, Respondent read a lengthy statement criticizing the media for ‘reating a hysteria over the cas, claiming they had reported the story of the Isimhont children without getting the facts straight. Respondent noted that she had heard no objection to her actions at the earlier hearing, that no one hod suggested an alternative to placing the children at Children's Village, that her actions were not intended as punishment, and that her primary ‘concem had been to determine what was in the best interests of the children. She stated that her intent was to help the children develop a meaningful relationship with their father, and that placing them in Mandy’s Place at Children’s Village gave them « non-seeure environment where “children fiom difficult circumstances receive outstanding residential mental health care and other services,” as well asthe chanee to participate in fun activities such as field trips, and noted reports that the children were interacting with other children."® Respondent vacated her earlier contempt orders and granted the request of the father, and the Guardian Ad Litem, to transfer the children from Children’s Village to Camp Tamarack, She also ordered intensive reunification therapy and counseling for the family. At the conclusion of the heating, LT's Attomey Jeffrey Schwartz, with the concurrence ‘of counsel forthe other children, noted that the attomeys forthe children had intended to request the appointment of appellate counsel to prosecute appeals of the Court's contempt orders, but that the trial court's aetions had rendered an appeal moot. Respondent's Answer to the Commission’s Twenty-cight Day Letter (On September 1, 2015, the Commission issued a twenty-eight day letter to Respondent, outlining several troubling aspects of the case and asking for @ written explanation. Among the inquiries was a question about « hand-motion Respondent made while speaking tothe father on the record: while comparing the Charles Manson cult to the children in this case —- and speaking specifically about LT — Respondent made a cireular motion with her hand less than a foot away from her right ear or temple while making the following statement: ronsrp fly 10,2016, pp 11-12. aeDad, if you ever think that he (ie, T] has changed and therapy has helped him and he’s no longer like Charlie Manson's cult, then you let us know and we can do it fie, order his release from the Children’s village]. Respondent indicated that while she understood how it could be misunderstood, she believed herself to be referring to the young man's progress rather than communicating a visual description of him as “crazy.” In he testimony atthe hearing before the Master, she had no ‘memory of making the motion, and was unaware that she had done so during the course of the hearing until she viewed the video recording ofthe proceeding. She also repeated her belie! that this motion was not intended to describe LT as crazy, but to refer to the forward progress he right make through therapy. Viewing the video recording, and noting the many references to imental health issues she had made throughout the hearing, the Master concluded that this statement misrepresented her state of mind atthe time, and was a knowingly false answer to the inquiry. IV. Conclusions of law State law holds each judge responsible for his or her own behavior, and responsible as ‘well forthe proper conduct and aciministraton of the court over which the judge presides. MCR 9.205(A), In addition to theie professional responsibilities as lawyers, MCR 9.205(B)Q), our Standards of Judicial Conduct also provide for various methods of judicial discipline — ranging from censure to suspension to removal from office -- for various reasons, including “conviction of a felony, physical or mental disability that prevents the performance of judicial duties, ‘misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform judicial duties, habitual intemperance, or ‘conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.” MCR 9.205(B); 1963 Const, ‘Art VI, §30@). Among the most serious offenses is “Misconduct in Office,” which the Standards deseribe as including, but not limited to, persistent incompetence in performing Judicial duties, persistent neglect in timelines of performing those duties, treating people coming before the court unfaitly due to race, gender, oF any protected personal characteristic, misuse of the office for personal gain, and failing to cooperate with a reasonable request by the ‘Commission in its investigations. Michigan's Code of Judicial Conduct also provides guidance to judges, and this Commission, in determining the proper conduct of our state's judicial officers. It admonishes Judges to remember thatthe judicial system is forthe benefit ofthe litigants and the public, not ‘the judiciary, and chat high standards of personal and professional conduct are essential t0 ranscrip of hme 24, 2016, p10 2 Tanstigt of hme 1, 2016, pp 340 342.‘maintain public confidence in our system of justice, And it ets forth many expectations forthe state's judiciary, including several that our pertinent tothe matter before ws A judge should respect and observe the law, AC all times, the conduct and manner ‘of a judge should promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A. ‘A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it" Code of ludical Condust, Canon 340) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals with in an official capacity... Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A) ‘A judge should adopt the usual and accepted methods of doing justice; avoid the imposition of humiliating acts or discipline, not authorized by law in sentencing ‘and endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(9) In addition to expectations the law imposes on judicial officers, judges also bear the ordinary responsibility of tfomeys. These duties subject lawyers to discipline for conduct that ‘exposes the legal profession or its courts to “obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach”: conduct contrary to “justice, ethies, honesty, or good moras"; and conduct violating “the slandards or rules of professional conduct established by the Supreme Cour.” MCR 9.104(2)-(4). This cate revolves around Respondent's decision to hold three children in contempt of ‘court for declining to participate in parental visitation with ther father tothe Courts satisfaction Generally a lst resort, contempt is among the most powerful tools available to a judge, and not ‘without limitations: a8 our Supreme Court noted in Inve Hague, 412 Mich $32, 555; 315 NW2d 524 1982), “[\Jhe contempt power is awesome and must be used with the utmost restraint.” “Thus, judges have the responsibility to use the power judiciously, and only in circumstances where the contempt is “clearly and unequivocally shown.” Jn re Contemp of Auto Club, 243 Mich App 697, 708; 624 NW2d 443 (2000). Penalties for contempt range from fines wo imprisonment for yp t 99 days, although ‘contempt consisting of acts or duties within the contemnor’s power to perform may be purged upon performing the required act. MCL 600.1715. And the law guarantees that someone facing charges of contempt will be entitled to whatever procedural safeguards due provess may require. See, eg, People v Nowicki, 384 Mich 482, 485-486; 185 NW2d 30 (1971); in re Contempt of ‘Auto Club, 243 Mich App at 715-718, Moreover, given its potential for abuse, the Fimits of the contempt power confine it to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed,” People v 15.Kurz, 35 Mich App 643, 656; 192 Nw2d 594 (1971), and abuse of the contempt power constitutes judicial misconduct, which may warrant imposing disciplinary sanctions on the judge, Inve Hague, 412 Mich at 55S; Inre Del Rio, 400 Mich 665, 692-694; 256 MW2 727 (1977), Count I Misconduct of June 24, 2018 [Respondent is coroct in arguing that mere legal errors inthe contempt proceedings are not grounds for a finding of judicial misconduct." Respondent's misconduct transcends any legal error made during the proceedings before her on June 24, 2016; her misconduct was using 2 Mach 9.2036). However, the [at of an appeliate remedy doesnot preclude a fining of jude misconduct, Se 8 Metter of Laster, 04 Mich 49, 461462; 274 N24 742 (1979), 2 this isnot to say, however, that the Comision finde Respondent's we ofthe Court's contempt power tohave ben proper tn addin tothe knoty procedural questions concerning the dstction beeen crmins and cl onterm,thefct that Respondent largo} delegate the question determing whether the cikren had purged the contempt tothe father, the fact that L's wikation was not scheduled for anther three weeks, the resrtlone on wstaton, and the abbreviated tine between the appointment of counsel and the contempt hearing. there were several options open tern desing with misbehavior by the cilren, who were not tigants before the Court ~~ the actual itgants being the parents, who had largely escaped any sanctions by the court only to have them sted upon thee ciéren. Thus the chideen were made to bear the burden of vistaton orders ‘which haa impore afmtive obligations on the par ofthe adult party Atigant,Asuming tat the Cour found faut ving with the cldren rater than the parents, those options would have Induded fling 3 juvenile petition Under MEL 722A (a(t have the hiren deemed “incor” for fling to obey their parents. However, as Counsel for Respendent acknowedged dutng oral argument to the Commision here was no testimony from the ‘mother othe Cour tht her clren were refusing ber lawful commands to engage ln vistation with thee father. Use of the contpt power seems a porcullyIsulted tol to foster reconciliation between chien and an estranged parent in ation, while thee sppears tobe no direct precedent In Michigan, other tates considering smo sues have conchided that holding 3 chil in contempt of cours beyond the authority of cout. In ne Edwin 6,296 AD24 1,742 wrS2a $3 (2002}, for ample, New York found that thelr Family Court had 96 authory to hold an Ineatigible 15-year old in contr of court fr ceobeying the court's order otto abseond, where state lw proved sternative remedies. And of parca ners she Alaotra case of Shetousev Bentley, 680 S024 £01 (la App, 1997: tn that case, the non-custdl mother had sought told he father in contempt of our for {alg to alow vstation, and sued an order threatening the chid —- who exgresed a strong aversion to visitotion - with contempt of curt for fling to engage in tation. The Alabama Court of Appeals fou that the fathers abligtion ceased upon delivering the ch to the scheded place of visation, and thatthe al court wes without authorty to cite the cl for contempt of cour for refusing to partipate. See ao, Miz v Mz 6 [NC Aop 338; 307 Sed 394 (1983)olation of depress to thveaten custodial parent with contempt for refusal of cd to vst noneustodnl parent onic, unde the Mental Heath Cod, nine-year ol NT would have been deared incompetent or purposes ‘of imposing legal sanctions for her ations, de to er youth. And whe her older brothers would have been presumed competent, Respondent's professed bel that en ear old RT was belng unduly Infuencedbythiteen- 16:the awesome judicial power of contempt to vent her frustration on three children because she ‘wanted them to havea better relationship with her father, Her intemperate language was not only counterpeoductive in accomplishing what she wanted; it may well have been misconduct even if directed against the adult" But the fact remains that she was targeting children, who found themselves in the middle of a protracted legal controversy that was not oftheir own making, ‘While dealing with children poses unique problems for any adult, it makes her ations from the bench even more unacceptable, for it strikes at the heart of the proper role of a judge when ‘dealing with children: to be a safe haven and refuge rather than a bully, a source of guidance rather than just another grown-up barking commands that they cannot understand. ‘The Commission is not privy to everything that occurred during the pendency of the underlying divorce action that gave rise to this Complaint. We can only rely onthe record before us. And the record ofthe first contempt proceedings shows a polite young man apologizing to ‘the court for anything he may have done to offend the judge, and calmly explaining to the Court ‘the reasons for his not wanting to interact with his father: he savr his father hit his mother, ‘explains the young man, and so the young man does not want to talk to him, Rather than ‘addressing his concerns, the judge berates him for not having “a healthy relationship” with the father asthe court had ordered, insults his intelligence, tells him thet be has ne manners, and tells him that he will be confined to the Children’s Village until he turns eighteen. Missing from the judge's actions is any recognition thatthe order she signed the previous day did not order the ‘yourg man to have visitation with his father for another three weeks, and that her order did not “specify the quality of the visitation ~- something that no mere court order could ensure, ‘The record of the second contempt proceeding shows e tevified nine-year old giel who hhad been in court to sce her oldest brother taken away in handcuffs, trembling and in tears ‘throughout the proceeding, appearing beside her ten-year old brother. ‘The boy reads a written statement, apologizing to the cour, promising to communicate with his father in the future, and telling him about his interest in soceer. On prompting from counsel, the boy agrees to start ‘communicating with his father inorder to start building a relationship. Initially oo fightened to speak —- and prevented by the judge from using her brother's writen statement as a guide, midst the judge's description of her oldest brother as “your big defiant brother who's living in - on prompting by counsel the gie!"s response tothe judge is: “I'm sory, 'l ty to work With my father at visits.” The judge's response is to threaten the children with Children's Village if things didn’t go well with their father, and tell them that what they were putting the father through was “despicable.” Having learned that his older brother was “in jail” apparently prompted the boy to change his mind aad choose to follow his brother, leading the giel to do so {ye8 dL, who was engaging what the Cour deseried a “Manson Cult behavior, may well hve suiced to ‘ase the tue of competency for both cen, anyane had thought todo so. MCL 33020621). 24, nee Pst 483 Mich 974; 830 NW 365 (2013). ar‘as well, The judge's response is to tell both children they have been “brainwashed,” and that they would remain in Children’s Village until they graduate from high school, or their fther tells the judge that they are “ready” fo be released The Commission appreciates the frustrations of a judge confronted with the intractable problem of trying to bring children together with an estranged parent, As with King Canute’s attempis to command the tide, however, i is beyond the capacity of a judge to change the hearts of those coming before her simply by issuing orders, The Commission has no doubt that Respondent isan otherwise exemplary judge who was acting from the best of motives, and that her actions were prompted by frustration rater than malice. She erossed the line from legal cervor to misconduct when those frustrations led her to abuse thre children in the middle of the ‘wat zone that theit parents’ divorce ease had become, The language she used was insulting, demeaning, and humiliating; and her use ofthe contempt power to direct her frustrations atthe children for their own emotional turmoil was a misuse of the Cout’s most powerful tool. Both actions constituted misconduct. ‘As. result, the Commission finds that Respondent's actions resulted in the following acts ‘of judicial misconduet occurring on June 24, 2015: ‘© Respondent held LT in contempt of court on June 24, 2015 for refusing to engage parenting time with his father on that date, when the only order applying to him called for him to visit with his father on July 14, 2015, + Having ordered three children confined to Children’s Village for contempt of court, Respondent delegated to a third purty the discretion to determine when they had purged themselves of contempt ‘Respondent failed to act in a patient, dignified, and judicial manner during, contempt proceedings against three children, ages nine, ten, and thirteen, engaging in insulting, demeaning, and humiliating comments and gestures directed toward them far exceeding the proper bounds of ster language permitted toa judge. aased upon the evidence, the Commission concurs with the Master’s conclusions that Respondent's actions constituted violations ofthe following: (1) Misconduct in office, as defined by Const 1963, Article 6 §30(2), and MCR 9.268. @ Conduct clearly prejudicial to the adi Const 1963, Article 6 §30(2), and MCR 9.205. stration of justice, as defined by 18@) Failure to establish, maintain, enforce, and observe high standards of conduct needed to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary, contrary to Canon 1 ofthe Code of Judicial Conduct. (4) _Ireesponsible and improper conduct serving to erode public confidence in the judiciary, contrary to Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct (5) Concvet providing both the appearance and substance of impropriety, contrary to Canon 2A ofthe Code of Judicial Conduct. (6) Pailure to respect and observe the law, and to conduct herself in a manner promoting public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, contrary t9 Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (1) Failure to be faithful to and maintain professional competence inthe law, ‘contrary to Canon 3A(I) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (8) Pailure to be patient, dignified, and courteous to those coming before the Court in an official capacity, contrary to Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (9) Failure to adopt the usual and accepted methods of justice, specifically including the failure to avoid the imposition of humiliating acts of discipline not authorized by lai, and filing to endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment, contrary to Canon 3A(9) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, (10) Conduct exposing the legal profession or courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach, in violation of MCR 9.104(2). (11) Conduct contrary to justice i violation of MCR 9.10403). (12) Conduct violating the rules or standards of professional conduct, in violation of MCR 9.10444) (13) Feilure to take personal responsibility for her own behavior, and forthe proper conduct and administaton of he courtroom, contrary to MCK 9.208. (14) ilure to exhibit due diligence to ensure that her rulings on contempt conformed tothe controlling law, MCR 3.606 and MCL. 600.1701 et seq.Count It Misrepresentation In the rarefied world of logic, if ny part ofa statement is not true, the entire statement is ‘deemed “false.” Inthe practical realm ofthe law, a “falschood" requires more. For our purposes, itis the Commission's conclusion that a false statement requires the speaker’s knovledge that the statement is falsc and intended to deceive. The fact that a statement may be incorrect does not, by itself, render the statement “false” within the context of a legal proceeding. It may be discredited, or deemed unworthy of belief, but given the limits of human memory and perception, as well as the limitations of language, it would be unfair to impute motives of deception or falschood to everyone who says something that someone else finds incredible, or that proves to be incorrect Selective memory does not equal falsehood; incorrect memory does not equal flschood; imprecision in expression does not equal falsehood; even an answer that one chooses to disbelieve does not equal a falsehood, {In tis ease, the only real fact contained in Respondent's response to the question about her “citeular gesture was her “belief” about what she intended. Her subsequent testimony atthe hearing before the Master clarified that she did not recall making the gesture and was unaware she had done so until she viewed the video recording of the proceedings, but that she felt obligated to provide her best guess about what she intended. If this had jogged her memory, she might have been able to recall why she had done s0; as it did not, her ability to interpret the gesture was no better than anyone else's except, perhaps, forthe unfortunate fet that she had a stake in how the gesture was construed ‘Undeniably, such a personal interest may well have affected her ability to interpret her tctions, But as long as she was candid about her lack of memory, we cannot deem speculations about her motives o intentions in performing actions months earlier ~- actions that she could not even recall — to be actionable falsehoods, The entire video is replete with images of Respondent using her hands as visual supplements to her words daring the course of the hearin and itis entirely eredible that she didnot recall making the gesture. While her intial response could have been better expressed, and her subsequent explanation is colored by self-interest, we cannot in good conseience find it to be “false” within the meaning of the law, in that it did not constitute intentional deception, However, the simple answer -~“T do not remember what was in my mind at the time” — would have been both accurate and helpful. The answer given, while not actionably false, was sufficiently misleading to require @ hearing to discover the facts, a facet of the hearing thatthe simpler answer would have prevented 0‘Accordingly, we conclude that the Examiner filed to prove the misconduct alleged in Count il by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Respondent's answer to the 28-day letter was misleading enough to justify the imposition of costs under MCR 9.205(B), Y. Disciplinary Analyst As our Supreme Cout has noted, “the purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish, but ‘to maintain the integrity of the Judelat process.” In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 118; 626 NW2d 374 (2001); In re Chrzynowski, 465 Mich 468, 488; 363 NW2d 758 (2001). The law recognizes that judges are as imperfect as any human beings, but by accepting a judicial office a judge's actions come to reflect on the entre judiciary. While erors and missteps are inevitable in any human institution, we cannot avoid confronting those rare instances in which a judge oversteps the acceptable bounds of judicial conduct. If unaddressed, these acts of misconduct would threaten to undermine public confidence in our courts, and in our entire system of justice. ‘To foster consistency in cases of judicial misconduct, our Supreme Court has outlined several factors for the Commission o consider. Inthe context of a given case, these guidelines, ‘can help determine an appropriate sanction. As a result, our recommendation is based on our assessment of the evidence before us, in light of the factors set forth in Jn re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293; 625 NW2d 744 (1999), and other relevant considerations: ‘The Brown factors (1) Misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct, Tn this ease, the conduct at issue stems from problems relating to seeking compliance with the court's orders in a single ease that presented unique difficulties for the judge. In light of Respondent's exemplary record, the Commission views her conduct as an isolated instance. "Nevertheless, Respondent does not appear to have recognized that her acts far exceeded the bounds of proper judicial conduct. In particular, failing to perecive that her actions in bullying young children in open court exposed the justice system to condemnation and ridicule suggests that it is a patter that may repeat itself in the future, in the absence of any corrective action. @) Misconduct occurring on the beach is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench. The conduct at issue occurred while the judge was on the bench, interacting, with alitigants, their children, and attorneys in open court. ‘This makes the incident more serious than one occurring off the bench in the judge's eapucity as a private citizen, or in chambers, away from publie view. isconduct that is prejudicial fo the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance af propriety. @ ‘Te public expects and is entitled to be trated with courtesy and respect by members of the judiciary. A lack of proper judicial temperament, or indications of favoritism emanating from the bench, erodes public confidence in our system of justice and calls into question the impartiality of our courts, Affirmative actions of abusive conduct on the bench also inhibit the ‘openness and candor from litigants and attomeys that our system of justice needs to funetion properly. And actions that target or bully young children eall into question the abitity of the Judicial system to act in their best interests. Accordingly, the misconduct at issue was prejudicial to the administration of justice In this case, the public was ill-srved by the spectacle of a judge verbally berating and ridiculing young children in open court, and appearing to favor their father over their mother. It ‘was prejudicial to both the administration of justice and the appearance of propriety. The ensuing misuse of the Court's contempt power only exacerbated the misconduct. (4) Misconduct that does mot implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, i less serious than misconduct that does. The conduct at issue stems fiom the judge's actions during litigation of a contentious divorce action. As a result, it affected the actual administration of justice. (5) Misconduct that occurs spontancously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated oF deliberated. Respondent's actions appear to have been contemplated for nearly a year, and she had the chance to refleet upon her actions during the course of u hearing that lasted nearly an hout. Moreover, during her testimony before the Master ~ and again, during counsels oral argument before the ‘Commission ~- the judge expressed no second thoughts about the wisdom or propriety of her tetions. ‘Though the idea of holding the children in contempt appears to have been in 22Respondent's mind for quite some time, the video record of the proveedings suggests that her anger was a spontaneous reaction to her continued frustration and inability to bring order to a ‘dysfunctional relationship between the father and his children. The fact that her actions on the day in question appear entirely out-of-character appears to confirm the fact that this isan isolated instance ofa jue losing her temper, rather than case ofa chronically abusive judge. However, an illeonceived and spontancous action often Ieads to efforts to contain ot repair the damage, after tempers have cooled enough to permit time to reflect. Unfortunately, in this caso, nothing of the kind happened, cuggosting that Respondent may have no real insight ino the nature of her misconduct. (© Misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a cease, i miore serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery. While persistently abusive conduct from the bench can impede the truth-finding process, the isolated nature of misconduct in this case limits any ensuing harm to the individual case in question, Respondent's actions in the case targeted what she perceived to be defiance of the coutt’s orders, and did not intentionally interfere with the fact-finding process in the underiying litigation, "Nevertheless, by filing to respond to the children’s allegations of violence exhibited by ‘heir father, or permitting them freely to articulate their reasons for their behavior on the record the firs time they appeared in court before her, Respondent’s misuse of het contempt power prevented her from taking the children's perspective into account. Whether or not these allegations were factually correct, Respondent's failure to give them the chance to convey information to the Court impeded the Court's ability to determine the best interests of the children before it, and the best course of action to help resolve difficult ease. o jsconduet that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than brenches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. ‘The misconduct at issue targeted no particular class of citizens, did, however, taryet children, 2%Applying the Brown factors: ‘The Supreme Court has had the sad oceasion to provide examples of what it deems appropriate judicial sanctions, depending upon the gravity of the offense, and the past history of the judge, Several of these cases seem relevant to our determination of an appropriate sanction inthis case: In In re Moore, 464 Mich 98; 626 NW2d 374 (2001), the misconduct consisted of a persistent and habitual potter of intemperate comments and insulting language, and persistent lack of proper judicial demeanor. Many past instances of similar behavior had resulted in ‘admonitions and appellate reversal, but did not lead to altered conduct on the bench. The Court ordered the respondent judge suspended for six months without pay In In re Morrow, 496 Mich 291; 854 NW2d 89 2014), the misconduct consisted of the judge's routine disregard of controlling law in multiple eases, stemming from his subjective attempts to “do justice” in the cases before him. Noting that he was not seeking any sort of personal benefit from his misconduct, the Court deemed a suspension of sixty days to be a saffefent sanction In Jn re Post, 493 Mich 974; 830 NW2d 365 (2013), the judge's misconduct consisted of holding an attomey in contempt of court for asserting what the attomey believed to be his client's Fith Amendment right against selfincrimination. During the course of the proceedings, the judge conceded that his intemperate remarks were improper, and served to erode public confidence in the judiciary. The Court determined thatthe appropriate sanction was a thity-day suspension. In Matter of Hocking, 451 Mich 1, 13; $46 NW2d 234 (1996), the judge engaged in & caustic and abusively confrontational exchange with the attomeys at a sentencing hearing. Noting that “[a] judge's mode of articulating a basis for decision may exhibit such a degree of antagonism or other offensive conduct that a single incident would indicate that impartial judgment is not reasonably possible,” and in that event, “the judge has prejudiced the ‘administration of justice because the conduet undermines public confidence inthe impartiality of Justice,” the Court found a three-day suspension to be sufficient. Lastly, in Jn re Servaas, 484 Mich 634; 74 NW2d 46 (2009), the judge’s misconduct consisted of placing lewd drawings on notes in the court file and making demeaning remarks about the “small breast size” of a female staffer. The actions were, however, following by an immediate apology, for behavior deseribed as “aberrational.” In this case, the Court concluded, the misconduct warranted no more than a public censure. ormApplying the lessons of those cases here, it appears that a persistent pattern of abusive ‘misconduct, as in Moore, will justify a six-month suspension, while a persistent distegard forthe controlling law stemming from idealistic motives can justify a suspension of atleast sixty days, as we learned from the decision in Morrow. At the other end ofthe disciplinary spectrum, the lessons of Hocking and Servaas suggest that isolated cases of personal or professional misbehavior may warrant a short suspension or censure, particularly if the harm extends no further than offending the personal sensibilities of the affected partes. However, as we lear from Pas, the combination of legal harm and intemperate behavior seems to call for more than minimal sanction. Here, as in Post, the judge crossed the line ftom proper demeanor to caustic abuse; and here, as in Post, the judge had misused the contempt power during the course of a heated exchange in open court. In this case, both Respondent's insulting and demeaning language, and subsequent finding of contempt, were not only abusive, but directed at children rather than ata tained, albeit inexperienced attorney. If anything, this makes the misconduct worse than the judge's actions at issue in Post, which resulted in the judge's suspension for office for thirty days. \Were it not for Respondent's exemplary record, the Commission might be inclined to recommend a lengthier sanction forthe misconduct in this ease. Under the unique circumstances ofthis ease, however, we believe a thirty-day suspension without pay, and the ensuing public censure, o be sufficient, VI. Costs, Fees, and Expenses, ‘As noted above, Respondent's response to the Commission's 28-day letter contained a misleading answer, requiring an evidentiary heating to correct, Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 9.205(B), the Commission requests that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs, fees, and ‘expenses incurred by the Commission in prosecuting the Complaint. As the Examiner has submitted an affidavit showing costs, fers, and expenses incurred by the Commission in the ‘amount of $12,553.73, the Commission requests an assessment for that amount. ‘VIL Conclusions and Recommendations ‘The Commission conchudes that Respondent committed judicil misconduct by abusing her judicial powers of contempt on June 24, 2015 in ordering three children to be confined at the Oakland County Children’s Village for declining to engage in visitation with their father, "in aio, te attorney ced fr contempt in Post spent only afew hours nthe lockup atthe County al before ‘a crcult judge reversed his conviction the clen inthis care were confined for reventeen dys. 2abusing her contempt powers out of frustration at being unable to convince them to visit with their father, and by using insulting, demeaning, and humiliating language directed atthe three children during proceedings in open court, For these acts of misconduct, the Commission recommends that Respondent be publicly censured and suspended from office without pay for period of thirty days. In addition, the Commission finds that Respondents answer to their 28-day leter was misleading, which resulted in the need for an evidentiary hearing to uncover the facts. AS a reault, the Commission recommends that the Court order Respondent to pay an assessment of cast, fees, and expenses inthe amount of $12,553.73 26-JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION Hon. DAVID H. Sa\ Chaipeson a) oh uo Nd) bh ion, PxaLo Contes Nanci I. Ditit, Esq. VieeChaiperson Secretary Bend? faa Fee NONE Bates no Ga por eden ere . nook / — ZF aay es “be % Cainer Sun A - . E: cA Hon, LAWRENCE 8, TALON “MELISSA B, SPICKLER ae avtheriabe WAGE Commission members Thomas J. Ryan, Esq. and the Hon. Nanci J. Grant, took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.