CARPIO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the
Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it
only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative control over
the PNP thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom
both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP
and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD:
No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the

Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the

exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised
by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are
placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment
that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP
being in large part subsidized by the national government.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7,
1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
Facts:
In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy,
R.A.6683 (2 December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and
voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to
those affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual,
temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two
years.
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded
from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration
Authoruty (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA
projects. Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with the NIA but was

denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead offered
a separation benefits of monthly basic pay for each year of service.
a)

co-terminous with the project When the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability
of funds for the same;

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit
as a coterminous employee.
Held:
It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like
casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same
benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this
case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of
petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is
unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the
benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2)
years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In
four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted
G.R. NO. 187485 CIR V. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION
FACTS: San Roque is a domestic corporation with a principal office at Barangay San
Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. It was incorporated to design, construct, erect,
assemble, own, commission and operate power-generating plants and related
facilities pursuant to and under contract with the Phil. Government. San Roque is
VAT Registered as a seller of services. It is also registered with the Board of
Investments ("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design,
construction, erection, assembly, as well as to own, commission, and operate
electric power-generating plants and related activities. In 1997, [San Roque] entered
into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with NPC. The PPA provides that [San
Roque] shall be responsible for the design, construction, installation, completion,
testing and commissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain the
same, subject to NPC instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-five (25)
years commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will take and
pay for all electricity available from the Power Station. On the construction and
development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose, [San Roque] allegedly incurred,
excess input VAT which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same
year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, representing
unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001. On March
28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since

it increased its unutilized input VAT. Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR a
separate amended claims for refund. [CIRs] inaction on the subject claims led to
the filing of the Petition for Review with the CTADivision on April 10, 2003. Trial of
the case ensued and on July 20, 2005, the case was submitted for decision. CTA
Divisions Ruling: The CTA Second Division initially denied San Roques claim on the
following grounds: lack of recorded zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales; failure
to submit documents specifically identifying the purchased goods/services related
to the claimed input VAT which were included in its Property, Plant and Equipment
account; and failure to prove that the related construction costs were capitalized in
its books of account and subjected to depreciation. The CTA 2nd Division required
San Roque to show that it complied with the following requirements of Section
112(B) of Republic Act No. 8424 (RA 8424)17 to be entitled to a tax refund or credit
of input VAT attributable to capital goods imported or locally purchased: (1) it is a
VAT-registered entity; (2) its input taxes claimed were paid on capital goods duly
supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts; (3) it did not offset or apply the
claimed input VAT payments on capital goods against any output VAT liability; and
(4) its claim for refund was filed within the two-year prescriptive period both in the
administrative and judicial levels. The CTA Second Division found that San Roque
complied with the first, third, and fourth requirements, thus: The fact that [San
Roque] is a VAT registered entity is admitted (par. 4, Facts Admitted, Joint Stipulation
of Facts, Records, p. 157). It was also established that the instant claim of
560,200,823.14 is already net of the 11,509.09 output tax declared by [San
Roque] in its amended VAT return for the first quarter of 2001. Moreover, the entire
amount of 560,200,823.14 was deducted by [San Roque] from the total available
input tax reflected in its amended VAT returns for the last two quarters of 2001 and
first two quarters of 2002 (Exhibits M-6, O-6, OO-1 & QQ-1). This means that the
claimed input taxes of 560,200,823.14 did not form part of the excess input taxes
of 83,692,257.83, as of the second quarter of 2002 that was to be carried-over to
the succeeding quarters. Further, [San Roques] claim for refund/tax credit
certificate of excess input VAT was filed within the two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the dates of filing of the corresponding quarterly VAT returns. For the
first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001, [San Roque] filed its VAT returns on
April 25, 2001, July 25, 2001, October 23, 2001 and January 24, 2002, respectively
(Exhibits "H, J, L, and N"). These returns were all subsequently amended on March
28, 2003 (Exhibits "I, K, M, and O"). On the other hand, [San Roque] originally filed
its separate claims for refund on July 10, 2001, October 10, 2001, February 21,
2002, and May 9, 2002 for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001,
respectively, (Exhibits "EE, FF, GG, and HH") and subsequently filed amended claims
for all quarters on March 28, 2003 (Exhibits "II, JJ, KK, and LL"). Moreover, the
Petition for Review was filed on April 10, 2003. Counting from the respective dates
when [San Roque] originally filed its VAT returns for the first, second, third and
fourth quarters of 2001, the administrative claims for refund (original and amended)
and the Petition for Review fall within the two-year prescriptive period.18 San Roque
filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on 7 April 2006. In its 29

November 2007 Amended Decision,19 the CTA Second Division found legal basis to
partially grant San Roques claim. The CTA Second Division ordered the
Commissioner to refund or issue a tax credit in favor of San Roque in the amount of
483,797,599.65, which represents San Roques unutilized input VAT on its
purchases of capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001. The CTA based
the adjustment in the amount on the findings of the independent certified public
accountant. The following reasons were cited for the disallowed claims: erroneous
computation; failure to ascertain whether the related purchases are in the nature of
capital goods; and the purchases pertain to capital goods. Moreover, the reduction
of claims was based on the following: the difference between San Roques claim and
that appearing on its books; the official receipts covering the claimed input VAT on
purchases of local services are not within the period of the claim; and the amount of
VAT cannot be determined from the submitted official receipts and invoices. The CTA
Second Division denied San Roques claim for refund or tax credit of its unutilized
input VAT attributable to its zero-rated or effectively zerorated sales because San
Roque had no record of such sales for the four quarters of 2001. The dispositive
portion of the CTA Second Divisions 29 November 2007 Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [San Roques] "Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED and this Courts Decision promulgated on March 8, 2006 in the
instant case is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, [the CIR] is hereby ORDERED to
REFUND or in the alternative, to ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of [San
Roque] in the reduced amount of Four Hundred Eighty Three Million Seven Hundred
Ninety Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Sixty Five Centavos
(483,797,599.65) representing unutilized input VAT on purchases of capital goods
and services for the taxable year 2001. SO ORDERED.20 The Commissioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 20 December 2007. The CTA Second Division
issued a Resolution dated 11 July 2008 which denied the CIRs motion for lack of
merit. The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: En Banc The Commissioner filed a Petition
for Review before the CTA EB praying for the denial of San Roques claim for refund
or tax credit in its entirety as well as for the setting aside of the 29 November 2007
Amended Decision and the 11 July 2008 Resolution in CTA Case No. 6647. The CTA
EB dismissed the CIRs petition for review and affirmed the challenged decision and
resolution. The CTA EB cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power,
Inc.21 and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03,22 as its bases for ruling that
San Roques judicial claim was not prematurely filed. The pertinent portions of the
Decision state: More importantly, the Court En Banc has squarely and exhaustively
ruled on this issue in this wise: It is true that Section 112(D) of the abovementioned
provision applies to the present case. However, what the petitioner failed to
consider is Section 112(A) of the same provision. The respondent is also covered by
the two (2) year prescriptive period. We have repeatedly held that the claim for
refund with the BIR and the subsequent appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals must be
filed within the two-year period. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in the case of
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for input tax

is reckoned from the date of the filing of the quarterly VAT return and payment of
the tax due. If the said period is about to expire but the BIR has not yet acted on the
application for refund, the taxpayer may interpose a petition for review with this
Court within the two year period. In the case of Gibbs vs. Collector, the Supreme
Court held that if, however, the Collector (now Commissioner) takes time in deciding
the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must
be started in the Court of Tax Appeals before the end of the two-year period without
awaiting the decision of the Collector. Furthermore, in the case of Commissioner of
Customs and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Honorable Court of Tax
Appeals and Planters Products, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer need
not wait indefinitely for a decision or ruling which may or may not be forthcoming
and which he has no legal right to expect. It is disheartening enough to a taxpayer
to keep him waiting for an indefinite period of time for a ruling or decision of the
Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue on his claim for refund. It would
make matters more exasperating for the taxpayer if we were to close the doors of
the courts of justice for such a relief until after the Collector (now Commissioner) of
Internal Revenue, would have, at his personal convenience, given his go signal. This
Court ruled in several cases that once the petition is filed, the Court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the claims and the Court is not bound to wait indefinitely
for no reason for whatever action respondent (herein petitioner) may take. At stake
are claims for refund and unlike disputed assessments, no decision of respondent
(herein petitioner) is required before one can go to this Court. (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted) Lastly, it is apparent from the following provisions of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 49-03 dated August 18, 2003, that [the CIR] knows that
claims for VAT refund or tax credit filed with the Court [of Tax Appeals] can proceed
simultaneously with the ones filed with the BIR and that taxpayers need not wait for
the lapse of the subject 120-day period, to wit: In response to [the] request of
selected taxpayers for adoption of procedures in handling refund cases that are
aligned to the statutory requirements that refund cases should be elevated to the
Court of Tax Appeals before the lapse of the period prescribed by law, certain
provisions of RMC No. 42-2003 are hereby amended and new provisions are added
thereto. In consonance therewith, the following amendments are being introduced
to RMC No. 42-2003, to wit: I.) A-17 of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-2003
is hereby revised to read as follows: In cases where the taxpayer has filed a
"Petition for Review" with the Court of Tax Appeals involving a claim for refund/TCC
that is pending at the administrative agency (Bureau of Internal Revenue or OSSDOF), the administrative agency and the tax court may act on the case separately.
While the case is pending in the tax court and at the same time is still under
process by the administrative agency, the litigation lawyer of the BIR, upon receipt
of the summons from the tax court, shall request from the head of the
investigating/processing office for the docket containing certified true copies of all
the documents pertinent to the claim. The docket shall be presented to the court as
evidence for the BIR in its defense on the tax credit/refund case filed by the
taxpayer. In the meantime, the investigating/processing office of the administrative

agency shall continue processing the refund/TCC case until such time that a final
decision has been reached by either the CTA or the administrative agency. If the CTA
is able to release its decision ahead of the evaluation of the administrative agency,
the latter shall cease from processing the claim. On the other hand, if the
administrative agency is able to process the claim of the taxpayer ahead of the CTA
and the taxpayer is amenable to the findings thereof, the concerned taxpayer must
file a motion to withdraw the claim with the CTA.23 (Emphasis supplied)

TAADA V. TUVERA No. L-63915 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Taada,
Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism,
Inc (MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders. There is a need for Publication
of Laws to strengthen its binding force and effect: giving access to legislative
records, giving awareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette,
however, does not contain publications of administrative and executive orders that
affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law,
presents all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability.
Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes
effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for some do specify the date of
effectivity) following the completion of the publication in the Official Gazette.
However, the decree has been misread by many; for it has no juridical force, but a
mere legislative enactment of RA 386. Issue: WON to provide publications of the law
elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as it would be essential to the effectivity
of the said legislative or executive act that regulates the acts and conduct of people
as citizens. Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished
issuances in the Official Gazette, serving as a response to the maxim ignorance as
an excuse for noncompliance. The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to
parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for
laws with dates which applied the 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette.