Article VII, Sec.

4
Brillantes vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections. Pursuant to said Act, the COMELEC adopted, in its
Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3)
phases. Despite the scrapping of Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to
implement Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial"
results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an
"unofficial quick count." Senate President Franklin Drilon wrote the COMELEC saying that
under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and
exclusive authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice- President. Thus, any quick count
to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority
of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC can conduct unofficial quick counts.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, the accredited
citizen's arm in this case, NAMFREL is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national
or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized
to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition,
the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the aforementioned laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. This not
only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also
taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns
themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the
COMELEC.

Article VII, Sec. 13

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 85468 September 7, 1989
FACTS:
A preliminary investigation was conducted against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for- violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in connection with his shareholdings and
position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive,
mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). The Supreme Court
annulled the first information. Upon annulment, a new information, duly approved by the
Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a Motion To Quash but was,
however, denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Information should be quashed
because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess any
document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG
Commissioner. That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the
petitioner "participated' in the business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution
or by law from having any interest.
ISSUE:
W/N the contention of petitioner is correct.
RULING:
NO. The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the
application to bid ... is not a sine qua non for, the Ombudsman indicated in his
Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully be
charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13
of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which
Doromal has at least an indirect interest." Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, directly or indirectly... participate in any business."
The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec.
36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or
employee in the civil service.

Article VII, Sec. 16

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986
FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11 by Mayor Florentino Solon. The
appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as
"temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and
another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the
appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority
that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment. After protracted hearings the legality,
the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner
for the contested position and, accordingly, directed that former be appointed to the position, in
place of the latter whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked. The private
respondent was so appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking
his earlier permanent appointment questions that order and the private respondent's title.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter.
RULING:
NO. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had
the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and
call it temporary. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment
it sell And what made the approvaltemporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the
condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the
position. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

Article VII, Sec. 17

Drilon vs. Lim

G.R. NO. 112497 August 4, 1994

FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal
to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy. The Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional. He cited the familiar
distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law." His
conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was
that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Article VII, Sec. 18

Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34

G.R. NO. l-54558 May 22, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge
Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. The
respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. On July 30, 1980, an
amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses. In the course of the proceedings,
particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the Court and filed the instant Petition
for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed
during the period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of
law.
ISSUE:
W/N a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and
functioning.
RULING:
NO. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within
the Philippine judicial system. Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department
of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief. Following the principle of separation of
powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines,
the power and the duty of interpreting the laws is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not,
and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And
as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional
right to due process of the civilian concerned.

Article VII, Sec. 19

Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on Audit

G.R. NO. 75025 September 14, 1993

FACTS:
A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its
decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. Consequently, petitioner sought
reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In an
indorsement dated 7 April 1980, petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive
clemency which was granted. Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for
payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This
was denied by the on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for
the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.
ISSUE:
W/N an employee is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency.
RULING:
YES. The general rule is that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is
based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and
as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. In the case at bar, petitioner
was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service.
However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the
very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
commit the offense, imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Petitioner's
automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to
afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has
suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the
very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner.