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                   Pragmatics: Basic Concepts
                1. Language Use. We begin by setting out a good
                working definition of pragmatics.
                     Pragmatics: the study of language use in
                             particular situations
                This talk about “use” might seem like old hat, after
                our study of semantics. After all, the rules
                for “using” a sentence like “It's raining” are pretty
                simple: you say it when it's raining, and you don't
                say it when it's not. In other words, you say the
                sentence in those contexts where it's true, and you
                don't say it in contexts where it's false. If language
                use boils down to a matter of truth and falsehood,
                then it looks like “the study of language use in
                particular contexts” is just good old semantics. So
                who need pragmatics?
                But that picture of language use is far too simple. In
                fact, we can see, from a couple simple examples,
                that even when we've nailed down the semantics of
                a sentence (its truth and meaning), we still haven't
                settled how the sentence is used in a particular
                context.
                Consider the following example, where the same
                sentence (meaning the same thing throughout)is
                used in two different ways (in two different
                contexts):
                1. My car is in a No Parking zone, and a police
                officer approaches. I tell him: “My car has a flat
                tire”.
                2. I enter a tire store, and tell the person at the
                counter: “My car has a flat tire”.
                Now, the sentence is equally true in both cases;
                and, indeed, the all the words in the sentence (and
                so the whole sentence itself) means the same thing
                in both cases. So in terms of semantics – meaning
 and truth – the sentence is the same in both cases.
 Still, I'm using the sentence to do different things in
 the two situations – to excuse myself in the first
 context, to request help in the second. This feature
 of use, above and beyond the semantic issues of
 truth and meaning, is the sort of thing pragmatics is
 concerned with; and we see that, even when the
 semantic dust has settled, there are still pragmatic
 issues to be dealt with.
 2. Unspoken Messages. A way of understanding
 this talk about "using" is to think of it in terms of
 communicating unspoken messages: In both
 contexts, I'm reporting my flat tire; but in each case
 I'm also communicating some second message as
 well (“It's not my fault I'm in a No Parking
 zone”; “I would like you to fix the tire”.)
 In each case my audience immediately understands
 the unspoken message I'm communicating. And
 notice it's a different unspoken message in the two
 cases – so there was nothing about the words in the
 sentence that tipped off the listener (they remained
 the same throughout). So how do we know which
 unspoken message to 'get'? (We don't hear it – it's
 unspoken!)
 (i) Obviously the context of utterance makes a big
 difference as to which unspoken message gets sent
 (that's what changed from one case to the next).
 (ii) We will propose that we share certain implicit
 (unspoken) conversational rules for how to
 communicate unspoken messages – if you and I use
 the same rules, then you'll be able to figure out
 what I'm leaving unsaid.
 3. Conversations. To spell this out more carefully,
 we introduce some very basic pragmatic notions
 that we will build off of. The most basic is the
 Conversation.
A conversation is any episode of language use to
communicate information from one person to
some other(s)
Notice that a conversation doesn't have to be an
even exchange: a logic lecture is an extended (and
very one-sided) conversation, because it involves at
least two participants and language is being used to
communicate information. So “conversation,” in
the special sense meant here, includes what we'd
ordinarily call a conversation, but much more as
well – any episode of linguistic communication
involving (at least) two parties. (But talking to
yourself doesn't count as a conversation.)
4. The Conversational Background. As
conversations proceed, and as we move from one
conversation to the next, we accumulate
information – for example, all the sentences we've
heard (and accepted). For instance, there are things
I can count on you to know about the definition of
the word “pragmatics” now; but I couldn't have
expected you to know this information (say) a week
ago. So that definition is now in the background of
accepted information that we hold in common, and
we can all count on each other to know that
information in our conversation.
We call this set of accepted background sentences
the Conversational Background.
We might consider defining the Conversational
Background as the set of sentences believed by all
the participants in a conversation. But in fact that
definition would be too narrow, since we
sometimes we share a common assumption, for the
sake of discussion, that in fact we don't all believe.
For example, an atheist could discuss the nature of
God with someone who believes in God (saying
things like “But then why does God allow evil in
the world?” etc.), and speak throughout the
conversation as if God exists, even though he didn't
believe in God. He would then be 'entertaining' the
claim “God exists,” temporarily adopting this claim
for the sake of argument, without truly believing it.
The same sort of temporary assumption occurs in
discussion of fictional people and events. In a
discussion of Sherlock Holmes' behavior and
attitudes, we assume (for the duration of the
discussion) that Sherlock Holmes exists, and has
the characteristics reported in the stories by A.C.
 Doyle, and so on; but we don't necessarily believe
 these claims. On the other hand, if we are
 disagreeing about whether Jupiter is further from
 Earth than Saturn, we are likewise accepting that
 Jupiter and Saturn exist – and here we really
 believe this. In both cases the claims are in the
 conversational background. The claim that
 Sherlock Holmes exists and did those things is only
 temporarily in the conversational background, for
 the duration of our literary discussion; but we don't
 go on through life continuing to assume these
 things. The claim that Jupiter and Saturn exist is, by
 contrast, an enduring part of the conversational
 background, that we remain committed to
 throughout our day.
 (Fans of symbolic logic can think of two other
 familiar cases where we temporarily adopt claims
 for the sake of argument: the assumptions of
 Conditional and Indirect Deductions. In
 Conditional Deductions we temporarily assume one
 sentence, and show that it leads to another
 sentence; but when we're done with the CD, we
 don't remain committed to that assumption, only to
 the claim that if that assumption [the antecedent]
 were true, the second claim [the consequent] would
 be as well. Likewise in an Indirect Deduction, we
 assume a certain sentence for the sake of argument,
 only to show that it would lead to an absurdity or
 impossibility – at which point we kick out that
 original assumption, and believe its opposite
 instead. In both cases the assumption is dropped
 once we close the derivation box.)
 We will use the general word “acceptance” to cover
 both kinds of conversational commitment to a
 sentence – the temporary, hypothetical commitment
 to the existence of Sherlock Holmes, and the
 enduring commitment to the existence of Saturn
 and Jupiter. We can then define the Conversational
 Background in terms of acceptance:
The conversational background is the set of
sentences accepted by all the participants in a
conversation
          We turn next to the various ways of getting
        sentences into the Conversational Background.
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