Ryan Bundy From among We The People Currently interned as a Political Prisoner at: ‘Nevada Southern Detention Center Pahrump, Nevada United States trict Court District of Nevada United States of America 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PAL Prosecutor, ve Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative Cliven Bundy, e¢ al i aCe ORAL Argumenr REQuesreo We, Political Prisoners of the government instituted by our ancestors, as We The People of these States united; intemed by President Barack Obama through his agents and administrators, and to the present since April of 2016 with the agreement and direction of this court; do hereby challenge this court to dismiss the instant case due to this court's lack of jurisdiction, and the congress’ lack of exclusive legislative authority pertaining to certain places herein specified. To the best of our abilities, we have provided our understanding as to why the assertion, that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case and that Congress lacked authority to legislate concerning the places where laws were alleged to have been violated, is based on a true and correct interpretation, and faithful presentation, of the intent and meaning of the Constitutional provisions herein cited, and their correct application as deduced through sound reason, and proper historical and lawful authorities; and thus requires that this court recuse itself from hearings on the matter, and dismiss all charges brought against us. Numerous other Americans, natives of various of the States, also finding themselves charged as Co-Conspirators, and held, at the present, indefinitely and without bail, may choose to join in this challenge and they are invited to do so, CAVEAT This caveat is being written subsequent in time to the greater effort expended in researching and crafting this Challenge. It rose to the author's conscience in the course of this effort, -having reviewed numerous opinions of both supreme and inferior federal courts, and with no lack of due dilligence in attempting to gather enough historical data to present a lawfully sound and contextually accurate challenge to jurisdiction; -that no argument concerning usurpation of jurisdiction, which depends upon the construction, intention, and spirit of the Constitution, can prevail in a federal court of the United States, regardless of the facts and truth on which its presentation relies. “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page | of 26 2:16-CR-00045-GMN-PALEssentially every argument paranoid of the Constitution by the Anti-Federalists, has bome the fruit of its contention; and nearly every argument in defense of the Constitution by the Federalists, bears forth, in the contradictions to them which the subsequent history has provided, an indictment proving the prudence and foresight of the offensive positions which those defenses were thought to allay. We'll not be held to assert some infallability on the part of any man, nor in any devices which he may construct. Experience has now proven the Constitution's antagonist's assailings, and rendered breached its defender’s entrenchments; to rely upon broken defenses is the epotime of insanity Still, the Constitutional arguments shall be set forth, no matter how imprudent it may be to bring them, because the Constitution exists, as yet, unreplaced by We the People, and no other argument may prevail on its lawful integrity; though the reality is witnessed to be in utter violation, and stacked upon violation, upon violation, upon usurpation, upon perversion It is conceivable, no matter how deplorable, that a modern judicial officer might reject, at a glance, many of the assertions made hereafter, and perhaps all of them. Many years of formal education and experience in professions at law will certainly offer many opinions and present many a stance contrary to them, no matter how lawfully unsupportable, Regardless of the impropriety of rejecting them outright, and the immorality of such negligence, to dispose of arguments -put forth with all manner of faith, both their studious citation and sound reason representative of the due dilligence input to researching and presenting them, though the ignorance of youth might be attributed to whatever faults may be found; -could only be admitted as yet another confirmation which might add to their weight, and such innattentiveness to the judicial duty will not be presumed, but in honesty and through myriad observations, it may at this point in time, be expected. The apathy of the People aside, blame is carried by every servant of the People, whether in constructing, purveying, performing, or defending works of tyranny upon a disillusioned populace. But certainly the defense of despotic engagements is the armor of any oppresive offense, and thereby, such armor has ensured the perpetrator's comfort in proliferating unConstitutional designs. Accepting these truths, one must also accept that appeals to tyrants, in leiu of tyrannical acts, has been proven throughout history to produce further and increasingly tyrannical remedies in answer. It is not just as if to expect a crocodile not to bite at flesh, but to do so with one's hand in its mouth, the other zat authorities of the smaller societies. wil become th suzreme law af and. Thee willbe merely ats of usurpation, and will deserve tobe treated (such, Hence we perceive that he cluse which declares the supremacy ofthe law of tie wrion, like the one we have jst before considered, ony declares ‘nih which lows immediately and necessarily from the tntiation ofa federal government. I wil not. presume. have escaped observation that express Confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant fo th Conttuion: which I mention merely as an instance of auton nthe convention; since that limitation Would have been 0 be understood. hough it had not Been expressed "Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #33 emphasis added) “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 2 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALhand in its belly. Grotesque to sound reason; as ludicrous to proceed in as it was to prospect. It might be held, then, that pragmatic wisdom will not often bear that which a stalwart and faithful spirit might rest his life upon, as pragmatism tends to the preservation of life at the expense of ideal, rather than submission of it for virtue. Nevertheless, the security of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is inseperably linked to the establishment of the institutions of American Constitutional governance, and their authors hoped that we would always feel the pull on our spirit, to repel and rebel against attempts to pervert the purpose of them, no matter the cost. “Rebellion against tyranny is obedience to God?,” some of their most poignant voices proclaimed, and which nearly became our union's national motto. “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security ‘Such has been the patient sufferance of these” States and their People, sufferance and the causes of it made clear throughout the compitation of this work; and such may eventually, but hopefully not, be “the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the” federal goverment “is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this,” may this work be added to many others, and submitted to a candid world. In this light, please consider this work as not only a challenge to the jurisdiction of this court and the congress, but also as an impassioned plea to the conscience of those entrusted with the solemn duty of protecting the People and the States from encroachments upon their liberty and rights, in any matter they may take cognizance of, Please understand it not only as an assertion of rights, but as an appeal to the minds and values of public-servants whose positions of public trust are meant to be the bulwark of the Constitution, and not a buttress to repeated violations of it, View it as a reminder of your station, and as hopefully illuminating your predecessor's failures in remebering theirs. 2 Quote from Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin + Satin regard othe mterorng acts ofa superior and subordinate authority ofan original and derivate power the nature and reason of the thing indicee the comers of tha rae as proper 1 be foloved. ‘They teach us thatthe rie ast of a superior cht a othe subse ofan inf porn and that acondingy, Tisecepaacitar tat cnteencs th Costin itil be ty tec buna adhere theater and regard te former “Alexander Halton, Federalist #78 (emphasis added) “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative™ Page 3 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALConsider it a warning to remember the repetitive process of history, as those who have not yet learned from its lessons are doomed, to see again events and circumstances similar to the most atrocious figments from the past, reborn in its next revolution; and even lessons which have previously been learned, still varied applications of them have not all been recorded to gain wisdom from, and must perhaps be experienced again. Memory raises a provocative question from the revolutionary, pre~ independence history of this union: why were the judges and magistrates among the first to be singled out and removed from the governments instituted by the colonists, as agents of the British government against whom the colonists rebelled? An answer might arise, and may even expound an axiom applicable to the future: the bulwark of constitutional violations must needs be overcome before the violations themselves may be addressed. And, although obscure, that fragment of our history, and its reasons, is preserved. In our constitutional republic, when the agents of government abide not by the instrument of their agency, are they not considered as in rebellion against the union, the People, and the Supreme Law of the Land? Is the insurrection by their goverment the state of things, resurrecting American's 1776 Revolutionary spirits? Even if these questions be extreme, are there not still those few in society who will be found to always seek to defend the weak from the strong, the minority from the majority, and the victims of tyranny from tyrants? In closing this caveat, we present an additional challenge to the fortitude of the judges, to examine the full breadth and depth of facts concerning the law in relation to this case, rather than a brief perusal of them, and reliance on precedent. Your oath, your honor, and your countrymen, require such fortitude, now more than ever. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AT HAND We are allegedly accused‘ of having conspired with others, among the 18 Gentlemen allegedly accused’ by the Grand Jury: 1, to.commit crimes against the United States, and against alleged officers of the United States', said ‘The superoeding Indien Hed bythe prosecutor claims to be a True Bll, yt no signatare fom te Grand Jury Foreman verifying it assoc is resent, ‘hus elling ito question whether & Grand Jury ever convened on the current ase, let lone found case to indict und certify such indiciment a a Tee Bil via an authorized signature. The omision ofa clerk ofthis courts-signature onthe alleged indictment, inte place where such signature should obviously be present is a strong butress tothe above question Cerny, rules of procedure are the form given tothe Bil of Right empeatve tha lif, bert, or pope) Shall act be denied without due proces of iw (Am. V ofthe Bll of Right), and compliance with mandated procedure ste substance of aheence i that Fon; sal tbe supposed tht non-compliance with prosedurs be acceptable when commited athe hands of those sworn to uphold? Given the utr lack of demonstrable evidence supporting the United States’ claims this fr, questions might aris as to whether the executive branch's complete monopoly on esess ‘and presentation to Grand fures has established soil primed forthe growth of polical prosecution at every whim of te executive, and which monopoly and whims ae sefeguared specifically by ervants wo, by thet Oaths of Oice, swore o Shield the People ffm exactly such oppresion and perversions ofthe justice system. Let such questions aie, end many more as may be inspied herein and af, if they be just by the Almighty, inthe minds of those whose Conseience's ae lifted to them: and be brought forth by judges, lawyers. and juss with courage enough to stand against the towers of corruption erected on Footings lid in contradiction tthe purpse ofthe office's of those who lid tem. S-Same as fot note 4, and hereafter applicable to similar usage of ters ‘No proof ofthe Constitutional required (At, See. 3) presidental commission ofthese alleged officers has been presented o this court, nr can it be taything but assumed that such proof was presented fo ihe ae Yet mysterious Grand Jury. The proseeuar's and judge's numerous cont on nex pages “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative™ Page 4 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALto have been performing lawful duties in accordance with an allegedly lawful United States District Court Order; 2. to have committed said crimes, either directly, or in aid or abbettment of others; 3. all of which alleged allegations are purported to have occurred in the State of Nevada, excepting Count Thirteen which is purported to have occurred in the State of Utah; on land which has, as a matter of fact, been ceded to the State of Nevada, and such cession made with no expressed reservation of dominium whatsoever; which expression -notwithstanding its probable Constitutional invalidity- when such reservation was intended, was absolute status quo in all congressional cession acts and Enabling Acts pertaining to the States admitted to the union after the original thirteen; 4, then intemed since the 19* of April, 2016, upon the assertions of the United States that we are a fight-risk and pose a danger to the community, no evidence whatsoever having yet been presented which might support such claims, but which baseless claims have been upheld as grounds for indefinite detainment, said detainment executed at the hands of public-servants who presumably swore oaths to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic-as well as private contractors who swore no such oath and profit by such detainment; 5. and have thus been held without bail, in violation of Amendments V & VIII of the Bill of Rights, congressional acts and judicial rulings to the contrary of which are only overt usurpations; at the order of a judicial officer whose oath to support the Constitution must certainly be documented; with no regard for the numerous wives and children forced to make ends meet in the absence of the men whose work normally provides for their homes and sustenance, some of which homes have been lost and said sustenance at times reduced to only the basest necessary for survival, faith and reliance on the benevolent Master of the Universe alone sustaining them through the travesties their public-servants have subjected their families to by force; even when congressionally passed provisions exist which can certainly assure, as supplement to the integrity of the men accused, that ‘we will be present for trial and will by no means present @ threat to the community, thus precluding any argument to the contrary. This challenge of jurisdictions expands on the first and third bullets above, and highlights points in dispute which are brought forth by the allegations, in the superceding indictment and this court's subsequent rulings, which merit contention as to matters of right, law, and supreme authority. fom previous paged asses, that those alleged are ofiers ofthe United States, are nothing move than inadmissible testimony, and canot be bom 2s facta! presentation forthe record “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative™ Page 5 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALA. CHALLENGE TO THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION ‘As asserted hereafter, legislative authority, and thus this court's jurisdiction in leiu of 18 U.S.C. Sec, 3231, over the places where the alleged crimes allegedly were committed, within the boundaries of the soveriegn State’ of Nevada, is limited to objects within the federal sphere’, i.e, those enumerated at Ant I, see. 8 of the Constitution’. Thus, the alleged federal officers that the Accused allegedly conspired with others to impede, assault, threaten, obstruct, and extort, while performing their allegedly lawful duties, could not conceivably -except by numerous executive and judicial officers’ misrepresentations, manipulations, fabrications, misconstructions, and plain & simple lies -have been performing anything but unlawful duties in accordance with an unlawful court order. Simply stated, the alleged officers of the United States, as they are ambiguously referenced in the alleged indictment, could not have been acting as officers of the United States, but only as individuals, using the color of law as a disguise for patently unlawful acts; and all of this at the direction of individuals acting unlawfully and ordering such unlawful acts; in what amounts to a perfect contradistinetion to the crimes alleged against the Accused. Furthermore, the committing of such acts and under such pretexts is to commit the crime of Official Oppression, under the common law and Nevada law’. All acts in furtherance of the crime of 7 Shae sovereignty is no ust an ond m tel Rather, federelism secures to citcens the liberties that derive from the dision of sovereign power."-New ‘York v. United States, $05 US. 144, 181 8-As Madison expressed it" [T]he local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no mare subject, within thir respecte sphere. othe general cuthori than the general athariy ts subject 1 them within its wn sphere.” The Federalist No. 39, ot 245, Se Residual sate sovereign wae also impic, of couse, dhe Contiton' cnferal upon Congress of not cll governmental powers, bu only discret, enumerated ones, dt[.£3 which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amendments assertion that “ihe powers not delegated to the United Stes by the Consitusion or prohibed by 10 the States ae reserved to the Siaes respective, or tothe people. “Print . United States, $2 US. 898, 319) 10-"At oommon law, the crime of offal oppression "conse in the infliting upon any person, trom an improper motive, of any legal bodily harm, Imprisonment, or any injury other than extortion, by a public officer while exercising, or under color of exercising, his offic.” Annotation, What Constitutes Offense of Ocal Oppression. &3 ALR2d 1007, 1008 1962)" (emphasis added) “Nevada's statutory ofese is salogous 10 the common aw ofense: |. Anoflicer,or a person pretending tobe an ofce, who ualawfully and maliciously, under pretense or color of oficial authority (a) Arrests another or detains him against his will a she case with Dave Bundy Being arrested and detained an Apri ™ 2014) {b) Seizes or levies upon another's property (ass cern the case with liven Bundy’ cae being rsled and his offcaly documented and recognized tackler right being ignored and ramped); (©) Diaposseses another of any lands or tenements (ari the case with the State of Nevada's. and thus the People of Nevada's, righ 10 that (proper which was unequtvoedlly ceed ta her via act of congress in 188, yet which the Unued Saves claims possesion of n violation of-and ‘a purposeful misconeraction-f law) (@) Does any act whereby another person injured in his perso, property or rights, commits oppression fs i the casein ll hove nstances leach mentioned. and additionally the case with -Margaret Howsion thrown (othe ground on Apel 9% 2014, Ammon Bundy tsed mulile limes on fpr, 2014 the Schiling brothers oho were psicallyBatered and dened on the 8° of Apri. 20] 4th People threatened with once and attack dos for pettioning and protesting wha! they fl tobe unlafel and immoral actions on April %, 2014, the Bundy fray being ‘reatened wth force and intimidated by mumeroas snipers constantly rained on them once the BLM operation had commenced, all of those Imelved i he April 12 pret, who were opentyassaulied by hese presentation of arms, threatened with force of arm, and inimidated by (sscult and throats ofthe ua of force by ars -all of how allegedly indicted who have been assulied. crested. dezined, punished, and whose families have lived in abject servitude tthe ranaical and oppressive station wrought upon them by so-called “publicservants,” ll of which ‘for exercising their Godage. Consinitnaly recognized and secured rights of redress, protest. free-speech and righ to keep and bear arms for the proiction of hemseives, thir property, and others frm ats of ran usurpation. and oppression. 2. Avoficer or person commiting oppression shal be punished (a) Where physica force orth immediate threat of physical force is used, fr a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. {b) Where’ no physical force or immediate threat of physi! force Is used, for gross misdemeanor: NRS 197.200,".Nevada Any Gen ‘Opinion (Al statment in arenes and ital addedXemphasis via bold added) “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative” Page 6 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALOfficial Oppression are in aid and abbettment of that crime. a. Question Raised By This Challenge Article II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution establishes the extent of the judicial power of the Supreme and Inferior Courts. Given the claimed status of the United States through its president and the departments of government administered by him -as a plaintiff in this case, having brought charges against we eighteen Americans; -it must be ascertained that the provision of Article Ill, Sec. 2 relied upon by the government to bring these charges before this court, and by this court in administering hearings of this case, is the judicial power extended to this court over “..all Cases,...arising under..the Laws of the United States, This is the only apparently arguable, yet nonetheless false, justification for the exercise of this court's jurisdiction over the gentlemen charged in this case, as no other provision of the section could conceivably apply; even this only in ignorance of the facts, or through usurpation, or both. If these assertions are incorrect, the court will surely correct them in providing its proof of jurisdiction de jure, if it can be proven to exist as such. “The question is this: by what Constitutional provision and/or Constitutional congressional act does this court claim jurisdiction over this case, and in conjunction with what Constitutional legislative acts regarding the places where the alleged crimes allegedly took place, and as the exercise of which Constitutional legislative authority as regards those places? +b, Facts Used as Basis for Challenge The sovereign State of Nevada was formed out of the Nevada Territory -a possession of the United States and held by the federal government, through treaty, for the purpose of disposal via the formation and admittance of new States"'; -in 1864, and was subsequently admitted into the union, supposedly upon an equal footing with the original States, “in all respects whatsoever,” as intended and expressed in the ‘Act of Congress (1864) Enabling the People of Nevada to Form a Constitution and State Government (Nevada Enabling Act, hereafter) However, the southern portion of the current State of Nevada, where the asserted acts of Official Oppression took place, was ceded to the State by the United States via Section Two of “An Act Concerning the Boundaries of the State of Nevada,” which was approved by Congress on the 5* of May, 1866. Although the State did consent to the cession via legislative act in 1867, the Constitution for the ‘Trateary of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Article X, in pertinent part ‘The lesan shall be incorporated info the Union of he United Slates, and be admited atthe proper time (to be judged by the Congress ofthe United ‘Sites tothe enjoyment of alte rights of etzens of he United Sates, according othe prietpes of the Consttton: “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative Page 7 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALState of Nevada was not amended to recognize the adjusted boundary until 1982. Notably, absent in the cession act of 1866, is any express provision which asserts a reservation of any right to the unappropriated public lands lying within the newly ceded territory; a provision which may be found in all congressional legislative acts similar to that of the Nevada Enabling Act". In fact, the explicit language of the act states “That there is hereby added to and made a part of the State of Nevada all that territory lying within the following boundaries...” Any assertion subsequent to the act, of some intended or presumed (and still, as yet, invisible) reservation, can be nothing more than authorship of legal fiction, and is voided by the explicit reservation made in all congressional acts where it was rended Notwithstanding such a reservation could even have been made lawfully, still it cannot be proved by the explicit language of the Constitution for the United States, that property within a State of the union may be possessed by the federal government in any event, for purposes other than clearly stated or intended, at Article 1, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen. Though this situation can be proven to have existed de facto, it cannot be proven in any manner other than by force of practice; that is, arbitrarily, abhorent to constitutional government. B. JURISDICTION, NOW CHALLENGED, MUST BE PROVEN It should not need be stated, but shall be nonetheless, that once jurisdiction is challenged, the court is required to prove its jurisdiction over the matter at hand, and is a matter of the highest importance to the due administration of justice by the courts; “Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided. "-Maine v, Thiboutot”. In fact, once questioned, jurisdiction must be proven before any other proceedings in a case may occur, "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause, Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. And this is not less clear upon authority than upon principle. "-Ex Parte MeCardle"*, Again, if this understanding is incorrect, the court will surely prove as much in responding to this 1-From the Arizona Enabling Act "Fourth and al lands yng within said Boundaries owned o held by any Inian ‘or Indian ribes, the right rte fo which shall have Ben acgured throuph or from the United Sites 2 ary prion sovereign. and that. unl he tile of such Indian or Ina tribes shall have been extinguished. te same shal be, and remain, subject te the dispestion and under the absolute ursdtion and contr ofthe Congress of the Und Sis." (emphasis sed) “From the Montana Enabling Act. "Second lL right and tide to the unaporeristed public Lands lving within the boundaries dere, Indian or Indign tribes, and tha until te ile thereto shall have been extinguished bythe United Sates the same shal be and rematn subject othe dupasion of tho Unied Stes, emphasis aided) “Many more examples corespond 13-1008. ct 280 127 Wal $06,518 “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative” Page 8 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALchallenge. C. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF FACTS a, Equal Footing Never Obtained, Thus Equal Sovereignty Violated Although the explicit language regarding the new State's (Nevada's) equal footing with the original States is present in the Nevada Enabling Act", the Supreme Court recognizes that other provisions of an enabling act preclude the attainment of a new State's equal footing status'*. Equal footing cannot be recognized, “in all respects whatsoever,” until the imperatives of Section 10 of the Nevada Enabling Act have been fulfilled by the United States; “The object of all the parties to these contracts...was to convert the land into money"”...; and as soon as these purposes could be accomplished, the power of the United States over these lands, as property, was to cease. the United we full rusts, th z Sover the will be cor and th the original States, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects wl ..."The propositions submitted to the people of the Alabama territory, for their acceptance or rejection, by the act of Congress authorizing them to form a constitution and State government for themselves, so far as they related to the public land within that territory, amounted to nothing more nor less than rules and regulations respecting the sales and disposition of the public lands.-both cites from Pollard v. Hagan'* (emphasis added). To this day, it is asserted that around 89% of Nevada is claimed under United States ownership. Regulation of this 89% of the sovereign State of Nevada, by Congress, is said to be Constitutionally authorized by the provision at the second clause of Article [V, Section Three. The particulars of this ridiculous proposition will be refuted in detail below, but here it should suffice to say, logically speaking, that whilst 89% of a State's territory may be controlled by an authority, said to be plenary, from without its own boundaries, it cannot reasonably be maintained that 11% sovereignty within its borders is, by any stretch of the imagination, complete. Therefore, until the public property within the State of Nevada is sold, as was declared to “shall” Ts-Nevada Enatling Act Secon 1 ~.said ta, when frmed, shall be aited in the Union upon on equal foting withthe crginal Sates. oll respects whatsoever ‘in efrence othe Nevad Enabling Ac the thd caste of Section 4: “Tho the people nhabuing said terior do re a clare that hy freer slam allright and tie 10 the urapproprianed public acs ying win sad treo, and tha the same shal be and remain a he sole ad entre ‘tapi of be Unted Str" a Secon 10, iting impéravsy fvepercntm of th proceeds of he aes of al xi lads bing within seid Ste, whch hall be ld br he Untied Sts subseanent io he admis of sald Stel he Can shal be pad he sai State." (epss 2688) {This statement mst compen the ene he purpose sats Section 10 ofthe Nevada Labling ACE. "proceed ofthe seo el publi ads bong min sd Ste shall be pid oth said See forthe purpose of making and improving public roads, consracting dicen or coal, 0 eet a ‘eneral system of raion ofthe ogra andin he Sta, os the lla sal dire. TH Howard 212.238 “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative” Page 9 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALhave been the case in the language of the Nevada Enabling Act, -and again, notwithstanding that no Constitutional provision other than that of the 17 paragraph of Article I, Section Eight contemplates the ownership of property by the United States within any State of the union; -then the State of Nevada does not have, nor has she ever had, complete municipal sovereignty, throughout her borders, and she and the original States, are not, nor have they ever been, on an equal footing, nor do they possess equal sovereignty, “in all respects whatsoever.” James Madison insisted that “the Western States neither would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other States." In concurrance with Mr. Madison, George Mason, at the constitutional convention in 1787, stated the following: “If she Western States are to be admitted to the Union, they must be treated as equals and subject to no degrading discrimination. They will have the same pride and other passions which we have, and will either unite with or will speedily revolt from the Union, if they are not in all respects placed on an equal footing with their bretheren,”® Of course, the newly formed State of Nevada had faith in Congress, that the United States would uphold the terms it set forth at Section 10 of its own act, the Nevada Enabling Act, wherein Congress laid out that “...flve percentum of the proceeds of the sales of all public lands lying within said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said State into the Union,” and thus the new State believed that she would attain equal sovereignty and equal footing, with the original States, when this obligation of Congress had been upheld. To this date, one-hundred and fifty-three years after Nevada's admission, this obligation has yet to be upheld, Can it be held that Congress may disregard their own stipulations, and be trusted to respect our boundaries upon it (the Constitution)? If Congress violates our solemn compact, is it not, in reality, voided as a compact, rendering a State of Nature to exist between the People, their representatives, and the agents of government carrying forth the violations? Can those ordering and enforcing such violative acts be considered as legitimate agents of constitutional government, or merely usurpers, acting unlawfully and tyrannically? ‘These questions are, of course, rhetorical, and unless an answer might be provided which soundly refutes the rhetoric which produces them, none need be given. Accordingly, it must now be ascertained that former judicial decisions based on these acts have 19-Quot fom 2 Medison, Joumal the Debates inthe Convention which Framed the Constiution,273-Hunts Ed 1908 20-Quote from Clarence 8. Carson, A Basic History ofthe United States, Volume 2, American Textbook Commitee, 1995 “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 10 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALbeen misguided, without proper due dilligence, or purposeful misconstruetions, and perhaps all three, unless it is to be further held that the current situation, of unequal footing and unequal sovereignty, is legally endorsed, by the judicial officers holding and furthering those decisions, as to have been intended by the congressional acts, and allowed to exist Constitutionally. b. Explicit Language of a Congressional Act In her Order and Report of Findings and Recommendation”, concerning Cliven Bundy's motion asking for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction”, with which Judge Gloria Navarro concurs in her subsequent Order®, Judge Peggy Leen notes: “The plain language of the 1866 Act does not transfer title of the 1866 Land to the State of Nevada-it merely added the land to the state boundaries. Section 2 of the Nevada Enabling Act provided the initial boundaries of the new state:...(quote from Chp. 36, 13 Stat. 30, Sec. 2 (1864)... Other sections provided specific land grants to the state for...(quotes Sec. 7 of Nevada Enabling Act: “Grant of public lands for support of common schools”)... Judge Leen then states: “If Congress had intended to grant land to the State of Nevada, it would have expressly said so, just as it did in Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Nevada Enabling Act. Instead, the 1866 Act uses language very similar to Section 2 of the Nevada Enabling Act, which merely established the state's boundaries.” She then cites United States v. Novak™: “[CJourts generally interpret similar language in different statutes in a like manner when the two statutes address a similar subject matter...,"" and continues, in her own words, in utter contradiction to her immediately previous citation, as regards the two statutes at review: "Thus, it is clear that Congress did not grant or otherwise dispose of the 1866 Land in the 1866 Act...Thus the condition of acceptance for the Arizona addition does not show that Congress granted title to the 1866 Land to the State of Nevada.” Judge Leen, and, in concurrance, Judge Navarro, fail to mention, though certainly cannot have failed to notice, that the fourth paragraph of Section 4 of the Nevada Enabling Act provides “That the people inhabiting said territory do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within said territory, and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United States;..,” which, unless such is to be considered as merely a formality (certainly it is not), presents the clear intention of Congress to reserve right and title, ie. ‘ownership, of the unnappropriated public lands within the boundaries outlined in Section 2 of the same act. ‘stn case, Docket No. 1173, Pg. 17 22- instant case, Docket No. 892 25-instant case, Docket No. 1353 24-476 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9* Cir. 2007) “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 11 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALThis expression at Section 4 of the act must be understood as qualifying the language of Sections 7, 8, & 9, which grant lands which had been reserved proprietorially in the earlier section, unless it is to be inferred that some other purpose might be attributed to the provision at Section 4, Paragraph 4, Even then, such would violate standing precedent, and would fly in the face of constructions such as that in United States v. McBratney, 104 US 621, 623 and on. If the language at section 4 of the Nevada Enabling Act is to be understood as Judge Navarro asserts United States v. Gardner sets as precedent, to wit: “Gardners are correct in their argument that the disclaimer is declaratory. However, the United States did not need the disclaimer clause to gain title 40 the public lands in Nevada, The United States already had title to those lands through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the disclaimer clause was merely a recognition of the preexisting United States title, as opposed to a grant of title from Nevada to the United States;” -then the declaration must have been necessary to exclude the transfer of title to the new State, as the explicit declaration of Section 1 of the act states “That the inhabitants of that portion of the territory of Nevada included in the boundaries hereinafter designated be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves, out of said territory, a State government,.., which said state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union...,"(emphasis added), necessarily inferring that the new State was not a part of the Territory of Nevada any longer, nor was the new State a part of the United States, but had been formed “out of” it, and only as a separate and equal sovereign in relation to the United States, could the newly formed State of Nevada “...be admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever.” The limitation on the people of the territory at Section 4, requiring the disclaimer of all right and title to the unappropriated public lands, as a condition upon the formation of that new State, thus recognizes this inferrence, and reserves right and title to the unappropriated public lands, which must otherwise have transferred. To close the argument irrefutably, the very definition of the word “diselaim*,” in its legal sense, must be misunderstood or wrongfully applied in the Ninth Circuit's Gardner ruling. If “the disclaimer clause was merely a recognition of the preexisting United States title,” (emphasis added), then there would be no necessity for the people of the territory to “disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within said territory,” (emphasis added), because there is no need to disclaim right and title which could not otherwise have been presumptively claimed. Rather, it is certain that right and title would, could, and should be claimed by the State of Nevada, without some disclaimer, given prior assertions by the Supreme Court such as: “Had Spain considered herself as ceding territory, she could not 25-DISCLAIMER: a. A renunciation of one’ leg right or claim; esp, a renunciation ofa patent claim, usu, to save the remainder ofthe application from being ejected. 2A repudiation of another’ legal ight or claim. 3. A wring tht contains such 8 renunciation or repudiation. &. RENUNCIATION (2). claim, vb. Blacks aw 9 Ed “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative™ Page 12 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALhave neglected to stipulate for the property of the inhabitants, a stipulation which every sentiment of Justice and of national honor would have demanded, and which the United States would not have refused,” Pollard v. Hagan”. Is it asserted, then, that the United States would neglect a stipulation of its ‘own property, when it would be expected in any other case, and which stipulation had been expressed in a prior act concerning the same State at issue? Thus, in agreement with, but in a more just application of, Judge Leen's cite of United States v. Novak, as mentioned above -“/CJourts generally interpret similar language in different statutes in a like ‘manner when the two statutes address a similar subject matter..." -if, as Judge Leen appears to be asserting, the Nevada Enabling Act and the 1866 Act address similar subject matter, and the language of the Nevada Enabling Act at Section 2, -establishing the territorial boundaries of the State of Nevada, which was to be formed “out of” the Nevada Territory, which language meritted the subsequent explicit limitation at Section 4, Paragraph 4 of the same act, requiring that the people of the territory “disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands;" -then it can only be logically ascertained, that the absence of a provision in the 1866 Act, -whereby a condition might have been proclaimed that the Nevada legislature must have disclaimed all right and title to the unappropriated public lands; -is an intended non- expression. In one instance, Judge Leen would have us belive that language which is expressed, -“That the people inhabiting said territory do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within said territory, and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United States; does not qualify later expressions in an act, -Sections 7, 8, & 9, of the Nevada Enabling Act, which grant lands previously reserved at Section 4, quoted above; -and in another instance, that language not expressed in the 1866 Act, might qualify as the same inferrence which had been “expressly said so" in the prior act. Ludicrous. Stated differently, and continuing to build upon Judge Leen's reasoning in citing United States v. Novak, that the two statutes in question address a similar subject matter, it can only be inferred, then, that (1) the non-expression in the subsequent act, of a provision found to be necessary in a prior act (else it would not have been explicitly made), which exhibits similar language, (2) must necessarily void any and all subsequent assertions, legislative or judicial, that an unexpressed reservation could have been intended in the subsequent act. Without the reservation having been expressly made in the subsequent act, as it had been explicitly stated in the prior act, the prior act's expression negates the stance that any subsequent act's 26-3 Howard 212, 226 “Challenge to Jurisdiction, judicial & Legislative~ Page 13 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALpresumption, without expression, has any foundation in sound reason. It must also be noted that when the Third Session of the Nevada Legislature convened in 1867, Governor Blasdel included, in his biennial message to that body, the following recommendations, relative to Nevada's legislative acceptance required by Congress in the Act of 1866, to make it effectual: “4 further addition, ...was contingently made to become effectual upon the acceptance of the State, through its Legislature ing important aj and lands, is “at importance to the State, and should be promptly accepted.” Was Governor Blasdel confused about the plain language of the Act of 1866? If the public lands were not transferred by the act because of some perceived implication, -contrary to the implication inferred from the absence of explicit language expressing some reservation of them to the United States, a reservation explicitly expressed in the Nevada Enabling Act; -then the “important agricultural and mineral lands,” could not be of “great importance to the State,” as the State would gain no benefit from them, whatsoever, as they would remain in the possession of the United States, The limitation at Section 4, Paragraph 4, of the Nevada Enabling Act, even prohibits United States’ property from ever being taxed by Nevada, which leaves us searching for some demonstration of an “importance to the State” which Governer Blasdel may have been alluding to, if “/t/his grant, ...embracing important agricultural and mineral lands,” did not grant those lands to the State. According to all subsequent judicial rulings, maintaining some presumption of federal ownership of the 1866 Land, Governor Blasdel must not have perceived such an implication by the 1866 Act, and thus recommended that his State's legislature accept the cession under pretenses he falsely construed. It might also be postulated, to his dishonor, that Governor Blasdel deceivingly referenced some “importance to the State” of the “important agricultural and mineral lands,” for some unknown purpose. Shelves of books might be written, expanding on the subject in a similar manner, all es fictional as the perceived implication of some intent which was not expressed. Let it not be mistaken, once again, that it is hereby asserted, or with any of the arguments herein posed, that the Constitution allows for the federal government to own property within the boundaries of a State of the union, in any manner other than that expressly stated at Article I, Section Eight, Clause Seventeen. These arguments are simply put forth to illustrate judicial malpractice on the part of the Judiciary which is meant to uphold the Constitution, and illuminate violations of it. Their own arguments contradict themselves, and such is the plight of those who base their assertions on previous misconstructions. “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative Page 14 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALLack of Exclusive Legislative Authority The laws of the United States which the Accused has been alleged to fall within, as presented by the United States Attorney Daniel G. Bogden in the indictment which purports to bring this case before this court, simply cannot apply to the Accused in any de jure exercise of the federal power. The United States lacks exclusive legislative authority”, in the State of Nevada, wherein the alleged crimes allegedly took place, except in those places and under such circumstances which conform to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, of the Constitution” Unless the United States can prove that it purchased or otherwise acquired the property; the property was ceded”, via the consent of the State of Nevada™, to the United States; and the place is for the purpose of “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other Needful Buildings:” -all of which are the requirements for the Congress to exercise exclusive legislation as stated in the Constitution and via Constitutional legislative act; then the United States government can by no means or justification exert its power within the State of Nevada in any manner not provided for in the Constitution at Article I, Section 8, Concurrent legislative jurisdiction, or any other manner of shared jurisdiction, cannot be exercised within a State of the union, without cession of any jurisdiction from the State legislature of the State 27-"Clanse 17 provides th Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation’ over ‘ll places purchased by the content of he legislature of he ‘Staten which the same shal be, Jor th rection of fers, magazines, arsenals, dockyard, and other needjulbuldings.” ‘Exclusive legislation” i consistent it Surplus Trading Cov: Cook supra (281 US: 652 74 ed. 1095, 30S Ct. 455)"slames v. Dravo Contracting Co, 302 US 134, 142 (emphasis ade). 2s coer The Constitaion res expres recognition to but one means of Fedral acqutscan of legislative Juredctin-by State consent under Avice L. Section 8, Clause LZ. Jusice McLean suggesed the Consnaion provides the sole mode for transfer af uradcion, and if the mode isnot pursed. no transfer of Shrtscition can take plas,” ia 41 I scarcely needs tobe said that uniess there has been a transfer of Jurdlction (1) pursuant 1o Clase 17 by a Federal acquisition of land with State consent, 7 (2) by cession from the Stae to the Federal Government or nies the Federal Goveroment has reserved cirisdicon upon the admission of Be ‘State the Federal Government possesses ne Lailativefuricicion over any area within a State such Jrisdiction being for exercise by the State, ubecs 0 Inomanereronce By the State wth Federal ftir," 48 ‘The government cannot, byunatera action oF spar. equie legate Jurisdiction aver any area within te exterior bowndaries ofa Soe, "Id 46 (On the other hand. while the Federal Government has power under various provisions ofthe Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, cera acis ot ‘omissions occuring arywhor in the Uned States iu has no power ia punish for various other crimes Jurisdiction ver which relined bythe Sales under fu Federal-State stem of goverment. unless such ime occurs on areas as te which legislate Jursaictian has ben vexed inthe Federal Government, dat 107 (all emphasis sce) 2SLCEDE: vb. To yeld upto assign: to gant. Generally used to designate te transfer of testy fom one government to anther. Black's Law 1* Ed CEDE: vb, 1. To sutender or relinquish. 2 To asign er grant. Cesson,n, cessionary, ai. Block's Law Ed. 30-"% sony afer the sate has pared with is juristion. which may be ether bya formal cession shereofo the Ure States, ar simply by assenting to the ‘acqtstion of the land by the later thai Congress became invested with authority hu legisla.” 14 Op. Attys. Gen $57, $59, 3i-in similanty of application, n all particulars, with Art|, sex, 8 ol 17, Alexander Hamilton comments onthe sare notin, in Federalist #83 ‘In relacion ta such a subject (a constitution of government), the nazral and obvious sense ofthe expressions, apart from any technical rule, i the tree ererion of contraction The plan ofthe convention daclares thatthe power of Congres, orn other words, ofthe national esate, shall extend to cerainenumersted case. ‘This specification of particulars evidently excldes al preesion toa general leyslaive auihoriy, because an affirmative grant of recal powers would be absurd a wel as weless fa general authority wee intended. "In like manner the judicial authority ofthe federal jdicaares i declared by the Constition to comprehend certain cases pertcularly specified. The expression of these cases marks the precise limit beyond whick the federal cours cannot extend thet jurisdiction, bc enumerated. pn ould ideas ofa mere extensive authori. (parenthesis semen and emphasis cea) “Challenge to jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative” Page 15 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALwherein the place in question lies", except as regards powers specifically delegated by the Constitution and within the federal sphere of regulation. The very definition of “cession” necessitates this interpretation. Any other interpretation is hostile to the plain meaning of the term, the very nature of the Constitution, and the expressed intention of its authors; and can only thus indicate an intent to usurp an authority not granted by the People”, “Clause 17 governs those cases where the United States acquires lands with the consent of the legislature of the State for the purposes there described. If lands are otherwise acquired, and jurisdiction is ceded by the State to the United States, the terms of the cession, to the extent that they may lawfully be prescribed, that is, consistently with the carrying out of the purpose of the acquisition, determine the extent of the federal jurisdiction. Ft. Leaven-worth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527, 538, 539; Palmer v, Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, 402, 403; Arlington Hotel Co. v, Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 451; United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S, 138, 142; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, supra.”-James ¥, Dravo Contracting Co, 302 US 134, 142 (emphasis added). If then, as understood from the above cited Supreme Court ruling, the extent of the federal jurisdiction, within @ State, for purposes expressly noted in the Constitution at Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17, is determined by the terms of the cession from the State; then jurisdiction not ceded, or ceded with qualifications or particular reservations, limits or prohibits federal jurisdiction. Federal legislative jurisdiction within a State may then be partial, concurrent, exclusive, or non-existent, fully dependent on the discretion of the State, over such places. It can only be reasonably ascertained that: as a precursor, no authority need be ceded if authority were already possessed, but in any event: (1) if no authority is ceded, then no authority is given over; (2) if no authority is given over, no authority can be received; thus, (3) if no authority can be received, then no authority can be possessed; and finally, (4) if no authority is possessed, none can be exercised de jure; only de facto, via foree. Any other construction would necessitate the usage of some word other than “cede” or “cession” as regards the exercise of this power by Congress, as received via the consent of the State to the purchase. Yet, all authori on the subject of this clause uses these words, indicative of the understanding of the 32 "The consent ofthe States th purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named i, however, essential, under the Constinaion, to the ‘ranger to the General Goveramert, withthe ite. of politcal ursdicton ard dominion Where lands are acured without such consent. the posesion of ‘the United States, unless political jurtdicton be ceded 1 them in sama other wey, i imply tat ofan ordinary proprietor. The propery i that case, less sued a8 2 means 10 carry ou the purposes ofthe government, is subject to the legislative authority and antl of the Sates aqua with the property of rovate ndtviduats. “Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. ¥.Lawe, 114 US $25,531 Sd-lenander Hamilton, in Federals 478 ‘Bui easy 03 that t would requir cn uncommon portion of forte i the judges to do their duty as faith guardins of the Comtuton where legate ivasions oft had boon signed by the major voice ofthe community” 3H See fot notes 31 8 32 “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 16 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALintent of the clause. However, “cession” has “expanded” to mean something other than its common and legal definitions clearly indicate, as have other words which were intended as limitations upon this power, and others. Such “growth” of language, professedly by the instrument's authors, intended to be limiting; can only be understood to attempt to justify usurpation, when the education and knowledge of those entrusted with such interpretation is taken into full consideration" However, notwithstanding the reasoned arguments presented above, the compact-nature of the Constitution amounts to an agreement to allow the exercise of powers; granted by the People to the United States government; of legislative authority; pertaining only to those powers specifically granted by that instrument; and limited by their enumeration, and the enumeration of other more restrictive clauses™, This fact requires another, more important point be made, which may trump the logical arguments sofar put forth in this section... Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 states explicitly that "exclusive Legislation" may be exercised, which is an affirmative grant of a particular power, by the people, via the Constitution, necessarily excluding the exercise of any other form of jurisdiction, over matters which are not elsewhere in the Constitution specified or obviously meant to be exercised within a State; “In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and ‘appropriate meaning: for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added The many discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 151, 71 L. ed. 160, 180, 47 S. Ct. 21."-Williams v. United States, 289 US 553 (emphasis added) "Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, @ negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.'- Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)(emphasis added) This is true of Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, as well (pertaining to “exclusive Legislation....” “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other Needful Buildings”). Likewise, exclusive legislative 435-Foot note 32 referenced here again $3S-Jumes Madison in Federalist 1: the idea ofan enumeration of particulars which nether explain nor qualify the general meaning, and cam have no other effec then to confound cor mislead san absurdiy. "=e, ws modernly applied wo the erms of out current discussion hasbeen absurdly maintained that the “enumerated” “particulars of C17 of Art| See 8, ae misleading in ther particularity, and thus the sated itet forthe grant ofthe power has been confounded, 37-For context, he paragraph previous to that already quoted fom Marry v, Madison, 1 Cranch (37 (1803) onl on next pagel “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative™ Page 17 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALauthority cannot be exercised within a State over places not explicitly stated in Article I, Sec.8, Cl. 17. jeedful Buildings" must be understood to infer only those places which the Constitution allows for in other clauses, such as post offices or court houses. "Land" is not stated in this section, nor in any other. An “expansive” reading of “Needful Buildings” can be nothing more than a disguise for an intent to usurp authority not granted, All of this notwithstanding that a proprietorial cession by the State to the United States over places not specified in the Constitution at Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17 cannot permit the exercise of congress’ legislative authority, as no power to legislate over such places is granted, and the expression of specific places in that clause excludes all others" It follows then, that the United States possesses such property and exercises only the rights of a proprietor, and not of a legislature, in relation to that place”. 4. Territory & Property Clause Misapplied Article IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2, cannot be used to establish jurisdiction within a State", nor as a justification for legislative authority within a State, as such would violate the exclusive sense of Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17. Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, would be form without substance if a “plenary power” could be exercised in a location not in accordance with the enumerated particulars of that article. Also, if such were the intention, it would have made sense that such learned men, as the drafters of the Constitution most ‘rom previous pagel? "It had been intended to leave it inthe discretion ofthe legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and infertor courts according to the wil ofthat body, would certainly have been wseles to proceed rer than to have fined the adic power nd the ‘ribunals n which should be vesed. The subsequent part ofthe section i mere surpluses entirely without meaning, such it be the consroction. If Congress remains ct ier fo give thi court appellate radeon, where the Conca has declared ter jraditon aha be orginal: and orginal jurisdiction where the Consiton has declared it shall be appellate: the ditribution of jurisdiction, made i the Conatindon i orm without subtance.” 38-See footnote 30 S9HUGHES. J. The eighth section of the first aricle ofthe constintion of the United States, the seventeenth clase, gives the right of excune legislation tothe United States, 1 exerise authority over all laces purchased by the consent af the lgiltur of the sate im which the sare sal be, or the ‘rection offers, magazines arsenals, doceyards, and other need bulings. The purchase of lands forthe United States, for publ purposes, docs no of self oust the jurstion of such tae over the lands purchased. US. v.Cammell 2 Mason, 60. The constiuton prevcrbes the onl) mode by which they can acquire land as a sovereign power ‘Com. Young, Bright NP. 303: People x. Goday, 17 dohns 225; US. . Travers, 2 Wheeler. Crim. Cas. 490; People, Lent Id $48. If thre be no cession by @ sate, the state juratction sll remains. Com.» Young, | Hall, Law J 471 Kent Comm. 403, 04; ad Story, Conse. § 1127. where ge Story sa “there has been no cession by the sate of he place, although i has been constantly occupied and used, under purchase or others, by the United States, fora fort, arsenal, or other constuional purpose, the state jurisdiction sil remains complete and perfec.” ‘much as we may regret the fact n this particular case, chat ths court hase uridcton fn the premises: and the demurrer ‘accordingly must be overrled, andthe plea susined. nied States. Penn, 48 F659, 870 (emphasis ade) 40-"When Alabama was admited tothe Union on ax equal footing with the orginal tates, she succeeded tall the rights of sovereign jurisdiction. and ‘eminent domain which Georgia possessed atthe date of the cession except 30 far as this right was diminished By the pubile lands remaining In the ‘possession and under the control ofthe United Stats, or the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession, and the legatve act connected With lt Nothing rmcined 10 the United States, according fo the terms ithe agreement, but the public ands. And, if an express spulation had been ls oa St order xen cater a whlch exe granted Winn he Dart of Colma on her laces prc ond aed Jor the purposes above mentioned the national and municipal power of government of every description, are united in the government ofthe Union. And ‘these are the only cases, within the United States, in which all the powers of government are united in a single goverument, excep inthe cases already ‘mentioned ofthe temporary terraral governments, and there local government exist. The right of Alabama dnd every oher new Sate to exert all ‘the powers of roveramen, which belong to and may be exercised bythe original States of the Union, must be admited and remain unquestioned, except 40 far as they are, emporarlls, deprived of control over the public lands..The propositions submited tothe people ofthe Alabama terion, for their acceptance o rejection. by the at of Cangress shoring thm 1 form a coneation and Ste govermmert for thomseles 0 far at they related tothe ‘public land within that territory, amounted 19 nothing more nor les than rules and regulations respecting the sales and disposition ofthe public lands The supposed compac relied on bythe counsel forthe plant, conferred no author, therfore on Congress fo pat the act granting {othe plaints (the land in contrversy, "Pollard eal v- Hagan eal, 3 HOWARD 212 (all emphasis added) “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative Page 18 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALcertainly were, would describe the power in Article I, Sec. 8, where almost all other powers of Congress are granted; not in the section pertaining to the formation of new States, of which Section 3 of Article IV so obviously applies. Certain powers are granted to Congress outside of Article I, Sec. 8, in other articles. The powers outside of Article I, See. 8, granted to Congress, in every case, pertain specifically to the subject-matter of the particular article and section within which the power is granted..except that in the case of modern judicial interpretations of the second clause of the third section of Article IV", the power granted to Congress apparently has nothing to do with the prevailing subject-matter of that particular section, or article. It is as if the particular sentence has been interpreted outside of (1) the context of the section, (2) the limited intent of the powers granted in the Constitution, and (3) with no regard to how the provision had been historically interpreted, and to what end. The notion that a plenary power, to be exercised over lands within the sovereign boundaries of a State, might be granted in the same section, even with the very next breath, which pertains to the formation of new States and even mandates the consent of the States affected, places every sound rule of Constitutional construction and interpretation in peril. It should not warrant further attention. If it were not for the abuses which this perversion has proliferated, it might remain a quiet usurpation, as it indeed was for many years. But it shall now receive a microscopicly detailed dissection. Section Three, Clause One, of Article IV deals only with the formation of new States. One could reasonably venture, then, that the second clause of that section granted Congress the power to dispose of territory or property, for the purpose of forming new States®, and that Congress could “make all needful Rules and Regulations” regarding the disposal and interim governance of the place. If the intent of the clause had been to grant limitless power to Congress with regards to property it might claim within the borders of an established State, it would seem that Article I, Section 8 would have been the logical place to do so; even then, unless explicitly stated, such would be sensible only if that power was not to be understood as an extension of the same subject (admission of new States) as the section and article it was drafted under, and ratified in. If such as aforementioned were not enough to discount judge's re-conveyeances of former case “law” rulings, sound Constitutional construction is confirmed within the very words of the clause. “Power Sex Kieppe v New Mnieo, 426 US. $29, as prime exile, and one which ths cout has placed cn point in his mater The ila proposal ofthis provision cements the notion peste from Yale Avalon Project. ypra fam Maison’ Notes, August 8, 1787 To dapose ofthe unappropricted lands ofthe U. Sais." of which no argument i recorded or know to have taken pace, oly thatthe Inguage adopted is uly ima to the tngaage ofthe Northwest Ordinance To further the notion even more extensively, Maise's Federalist #43 excerpt, pertaining to the “Th a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to these which show the proprity ofthe former” “he former” being (Clause | of the same setin, ineviably linking their nen. “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 19 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALto dispose of” might beg the question of which definition of “dispose” was intended by the usage. The first definition is: “to attend to; to settle.” “Settle” is defined: “to put into order; to rearrange or fix definitely.” This definition of “dispose of” is feasibly applicable if the clause is taken by itself, without regard to its placement in the Constitution. Such a power seems reasonable on its face, but should belong in the list of powers of Congress at the eighth section of Article One, as previously mentioned, Specifically, Clause Seventeen of that section deals with the legislative authority of Congress regarding United States property, or more correctly “places,” within the boundaries of a State. It is difficult to imagine why the framers of the Constitution, such wise and well-thought men as they were, would place two “similar” provisions (already an odd notion) so far away from eachother in the document, and the one within a section obviously intended to address the admittance and formation of new States (perhaps, dare to say again-the second provision of the section addressed the disposal of United States territory and property for exactly the purpose provided for in the immediately previous paragraph...see foot note 32). Such a misconstruction is preposterous. Alas, presumably and thankfully, all other definitions of “dispose” seem to clarify the placement of the clause. Both the second definition: “to transfer or part with,” and the third: “get rid of,” justify the location of the clause within Section Three of Article IV, as they both allude to, what would reasonably appear to be, obvious intents of a limited federal government. This exposes inevitable truths concerning the intent of this clause, which produces many other conclusions which must be reached. For instance, if there had been an intent that the federal government would own and control vast swaths of land within a State, notwithstanding that such a circumstance would violate the sovereignty and equal footing of that State with the original thirteen, then there would have been the inclusion of some language alluding to that intent. One would expect to find, alongside a power to dispose of, a power to aquire, keep, and maintain perpetually, land within a State. An explicit grant of a specific power should manifest, had there been any intent that such was to be allowed; not only to prevent abuse of such a power, but to prevent the future necessity to completely misconstruct a clause of the Constitution in order to justify some power already exercised, but never implied nor proclaimed. Even then, such a power should not be found in the article pertaining to relations between States and the federel government, nor in the section specifically and only pertaining to the formation of new States; but rather, in the article and section which obviously grants powers to Congress in a similar manner with that desired to be apprehended from Clause Two of Article IV, Section Three. To date, no such clause can be found. As has already been shown to be the case, the explicit grant “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 20 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PALof the power specified at Article IV, Section Three, Clause Two of the Constitution, “to dispose of” territory and property belonging to the United States, is exclusive of, and renders unConstitutional, any attempted exercise of a power to keep and maintain perpetually, territory or property, especially in a manner which might, and presently does violate the sovereignty of a State of the union, placing that State ‘on an unequal footing when compared with the original thirteen, as has been proved already. Every construction which might be manufactured beyond the explicit language and placement of the clause, cannot be reasoned with other explicit language and construction of the Constitution, and must be understood as usurpatious. FINAL STATEMENT & CAVEAT II It is hereby and with this challenge asserted, that the only true answer to this challenge is comprehended thus: judicial and legislative jurisdiction over this matter can only be maintained by + authority usurped, and exercised unjustly and unjustifiably; + authorities ill-purchased from the States and their citizens at the cost of over 600,000 American lives by the United States during the War of Federal Aggression’, which have subjegated the States into undue compliance at the risk of further violence committed against their people; + authority wielded only at the barrel of a gun and through the disillusionment of the American citizenry, as no right exists in governments instituted amongst men which may maintain violations of their solemn compacts, except by coercion and force; + authority which the judicial branch of government has supported, as it is by their rulings particularly that the malfeasance has been allowed to metastecize into the monstrous proportions its malignance to life, liberty, and property, is now sown; itis by that body's misconstructions that all other public servants involved in the matter have been allowed to promulgate the notion that they have not violated their oaths “to uphold and defend the Constitution from all enemies foreign and domestic,” and thereby the judiciary has made itself the bulwark of Constitutional violations; + pethaps, an authority which God allowed to be stolen and exercised unjustly for the time being, that those vessels of dishonor which He hath made might be revealed, in their time, which He ‘Commonly, yet mistakenly referred to asthe American Civil War, a civil war takes place within the boundaries of one State. The war referenced was ‘waged ofiensively by the United States of America, aginst the defensive efos ofthe Confederate Siaes of America, two separte and disin® representative ‘odies ofthe cizens and legisturesof many separate and distinct, sovercign Stats. Such can only be deemed ats of atyrant and resiance to tyranny, The Sie subjugation by Qrannieal measures promulgate fo this cayheugh more subversive of ate, they are commited upon a populace shielded from the truth by time end re-constrctonst history as taught in government-run Schools; inevitably to rest in events similar to the instant case. Yet inaccurately and purposely distorted conveyances of fats mill nt change the reality a it oscured; though the vitor may write he prevailing history, it can never be more than representation of he vistors tional perception, so longa the th be preserved. By wht must be recognized as Divine Providence, ithas bea, and is fathlly conveyed Reet the best of my abies, “Challenge to Jurisdiction, Judicial & Legislative~ Page 21 of 26 2:16-CR-00046-GMN-PAL