Crisis in Battle:

The Conduct of the Assault

sion), the term assault of an objective execution will be compensated for
by Major David J. Lemelin or simply the assault means the entry through detailed rehearsals. This situ-
into and overrunning of an enemy posi- ation, where the assaulting force has
tion. Attack is a broader term that in- the luxury of detailed preparation and
Crossing the hostile fire zone until cludes all activity from roughly the task organization, can be termed a de-
our own fire can begin will always Line of Departure forward, including liberate assault.
constitute a crisis in the engagement. assaults along the way or possibly cul- In many possibly most in-
minating in an assault and the sub- stances, this kind of time will not be
von Moltke1 sequent, anticipated pursuit. Actions available. The requisite intelligence on
Closing with an enemy in a prepared on the objective is a term that implies the enemy position may only be gained
position is a fundamental task that lies tasks accomplished after an objective is through binoculars from a support-by-
at the heart of our profession. This task secured. What we are really discussing fire position minutes before the assault
is also, almost unquestionably, the most when we talk about the conduct of the must commence. In this case, the as-
difficult and potentially dangerous of assault is a tactical problem that is as sault force commander must enhance
all combat missions. Surprisingly, how- old as projectile weapons how to command and control through rela-
ever, despite its criticality, it is also one close with a defending enemy, under tively restrictive control measures and
of the least practiced of all the tasks for the fire of his weapons, to the point fight with existing or habitual task or-
which a mechanized unit trains. Institu- that the inherent advantages of the de- ganizations. This situation may be
tional experience at the training centers fense are obviated. The infantry com- termed a hasty assault. However, it is
further demonstrates that when units munity, borrowing a term from the pre- vital to understand that the fundamental
execute this task, they are rarely suc- WWII German General Staff, refers to methodology for the conduct of an as-
cessful. As one senior observer/control- this problem as the last 300 yards.4 sault is the same regardless of how
Given the increased range of weapons
ler at the National Training Center put since WWII, the modern phrase should long a unit has to prepare. Accompany-
it, It is almost as if mounted units are more likely be the last 1000 meters. ing the necessity for an operation of
uncomfortable with the assault, so they Whatever the distance, the problem is this nature is the need for a requisite
avoid it in planning and rehearsal, as if fundamentally the same. Significantly, amount of intelligence. A unit cannot
subordinate leaders will inherently the German term for it from Clause- be sent against a prepared enemy de-
know how to execute.2 witz to the present has remained un- fense with any expectation of success
Army doctrine is also uncomfort- changed, they call it, Krise im Ge- without some degree of knowledge of
able with the assault. Several manuals fecht the crisis in battle. the enemys dispositions. Even with
address it under various guises: actions limited time, the methodical, coordi-
on the objective, attack to seize an ob- As a further introduction to this prob- nated use of the combined arms is fun-
jective, how to assault, etc. However, lem, a brief discussion of the terms damental to success. We do not assault
most manuals give only a cursory and hasty and deliberate is in order. In on line as a method to make up for
incomplete outline of this difficult and order to assault a prepared enemy posi- lack of intelligence. This desperate ex-
essential task. There exists no single tion a certain amount of intelligence is pedient, as history repeatedly demon-
source that discusses this task in suffi- always required. In optimal circum- strates, leads to failure and exorbitant
cient detail for a mechanized team stances, a unit will have intelligence losses. Experience also shows that units
commander to be able to adequately detailing such things as design of must follow up this initial failure with
plan, prepare, and execute this mission. trench lines and fighting positions, ve- something they should have done in
The following is an attempt to collate hicle and major weapons system posi- the first place, a planned and coordi-
existing information from several, dis- tions, location and composition of pro- nated assault. The following is an at-
parate sections of several manuals and tective obstacles, etc., in enough time tempt to illustrate a routine methodol-
then overlay historical experience and for the assault force commander to re- ogy that is not dependent on prepara-
common sense to create a fleshed-out hearse the assault plan for those spe- tion time, but solely on adequate intel-
view of the planning, preparation, and cific conditions. Further, he would have ligence.
execution of a combined-arms com- this information in enough time to task-
pany-level assault of a prepared posi- organize at the lowest levels for spe- The vehicle for this discussion of the
tion.3 cific actions on that particular objec- assault will be a mechanized company-
tive. Command and control (C2) meas- team with tank and armored (BFV) in-
By way of definition (an essential ures can be less restrictive in this in- fantry platoons. The focus of the dis-
starting point for any tactical discus- stance because difficulties in C2 during cussion is on how the commander of

6 ARMOR July-August 1995

this assault force plans for the coordi- assault force must conduct its own re- sive point and the enemy does not
nated use of tanks, BFVs, dismounted connaissance just prior to execution of withdraw or give up, the positional ad-
infantry, and indirect fires. The assault the assault. In all cases, the assault vantage the assault force gains by con-
may be part of a larger, more complex force has the requisite intelligence of trol of the decisive point will make the
task force breaching operation. In this the objective, even if a momentary, lo- remainder of the assault considerably
situation, the assault must be coordi- cal pause in the overall attack is re- easier. In any situation, the ultimate
nated with the actions of sister units quired. History shows that the momen- goal of mass at the decisive point dur-
breaching and supporting. Given an tum of an attack is slowed much more ing the assault is to eliminate the need
adequate combat power ratio, the as- drastically by a failed assault than by a for further assaulting and the associated
sault is conducted against a company brief reconnaissance to ensure the as- loss of time and resources.
objective without external assistance. saults success. The old adage that
In any case, a unit plans for the ob- time spent on reconnaissance is never Planning backward from the decisive
jective assault first, for several reasons. time wasted, is never more applicable. point, the commander assesses the
First, with limited planning time avail- So, the real variable in the conduct of overall enemy situation. He must deter-
able, the unit must focus on the most an assault is time for preparation. But, mine if a mounted assault is possible or
critical tasks. By definition, if we are as we shall see, a thorough under- if a dismounted assault is necessary. By
committing our assets to an assault, standing of the tactical problems of the mounted or dismounted we simply
then it must be a critical task. Second, assault by combat leaders in peacetime mean whether the assault force can en-
the way in which a unit will conduct its can mitigate the lack of preparation ter the enemy position initially with ar-
assault drives how the rest of the attack time. mored vehicles or must penetrate with
leading up to the assault occurs. If any The assault force commander, now dismounted infantry. The exigencies of
activity during the attack is going to be the situation could cause the assault
equipped with a mental and, prefer- force to dismount or remount anytime
swagged, it cannot be this one. The ably, graphic picture of the objec-
preceding phases of an attack should be tive, must plan his assault. The first during the assault because the com-
designed to give the assault force the mander is always looking for an oppor-
consideration is the decisive point of tunity to get armored vehicles behind
greatest positional advantage possible. the objective. The decisive point is an
These phases should also seek psycho- enemy force or piece of terrain that, if the enemy position. Whether these ve-
logical advantage (often closely related hicles go through or around the objec-
controlled or destroyed, will greatly en- tive is less important than that they at-
to positional advantage) for the assault- hance the success of the operation.5
ing force. That is, to make the enemy Since success is tied to achievement of tain the advantages associated with be-
commander think he cannot hold his the missions purpose, the commander ing between the enemy and his with-
position and attempt to withdraw, thus must understand why he is conducting drawal route. Positions are seldom lost
the attack would optimally transition to the assault. Given the intrinsic risk of because they have been destroyed, but
pursuit rather than assault. such an operation, a commander should almost invariably because the leader
commit to an assault only if it is re- has decided in his own mind that the
The relationship between reconnais- quired for success. Generally, the com- position cannot be held.6 This aside
sance and planning for the assault is so mander will be told the effect he is to
for the moment, the following set of
critical that it requires further amplifi- achieve on the enemy force or the ter-
factors will determine the units initial
cation. The assault force must have a rain on his objective. Seize and
posture for the assault.
thorough knowledge of the enemys clear are typical terrain-oriented mis-
disposition before committing to ac- sions that require occupation of terrain.
As a mechanized force, we prefer to
tion. In the best circumstances, scouts Therefore, an assault must be planned
assault mounted and should look for
or other dedicated reconnaissance as- if the enemy desires to retain that ter-
every opportunity to do so. The protec-
sets have detailed the enemy position. rain. The missions destroy and fix
tion afforded by the armor on the
The assault force commander and his may require an assault if the terrain and
M1A1 and the BFV is infinitely prefer-
leaders have also conducted a leaders situation will not allow these effects to
able to BDUs and Kevlar. Additionally,
recon of the objective in ample time be achieved by fire only. Given the
as discussed earlier, we are trying to
for thorough preparation back in the as- above, the commander can specify the
get our vehicles and their combat po-
sembly area. The assault force should, decisive point on the objective.
tential behind the enemy as soon as
however, be prepared for considerably possible. So, the mechanized com-
less than the best circumstances. In The commander develops a scheme mander should look first to see if a
many situations, the recon elements of maneuver that masses his combat mounted assault is possible and only
will be relaying their reports to the as- power at the decisive point as early in assault dismounted, risking his few and
sault force once the attack is under the assault as possible. By definition, highly-prized infantry, if the situation
way, and the assault force commander mass at the decisive point will lead to dictates such a difficult venture.
will only get a visual recon through early success and possibly considerable
binoculars from a support-by-fire posi- damage to the enemys will. This psy- When making this decision, the as-
tion. So, a unit gleans information from chological edge, in the best case, will sault force commander must first con-
scouts early in the planning stage. In drive the enemy to consider the posi- sider the terrain. The enemy entrench-
less than optimal circumstances, units tion untenable and attempt withdrawal. ments, protective obstacles, and close
get it from an advance guard once the Even in the worst case, if the assault terrain (e.g. heavy vegetation and built-
attack is under way. In worst case, the force masses combat power at the deci- up areas) may prevent armored vehi-

ARMOR July-August 1995 7

cles from traversing the objective. Un- find a point on the ground to enter operation is the length of time available
suppressed antitank weapons are an ob- the enemy position. In the case of a to prepare for the assault. With ample
vious deterrent to mounted assault; dismounted assault, the basis for the time for training and rehearsal, the as-
however, the commander probably will rest of our discussion, this point is liter- sault force can task organize to platoon
not be able to assess this factor until ally the point that the infantry will en- and even section/squad level so that
the operation is under way. Smaller an- ter the trenchline. Backward planning each subordinate element is precisely
titank weapons such as RPGs, how- from the decisive point, the com- organized for its tasks during the as-
ever, may not deter an assault by heav- mander looks for a weakness in the en- sault. Subsequent rehearsal together
ily armored M1A1s. It is important to emy defense that is as close as possible will overcome the unfamiliarity of such
understand here that, if the initial entry to the decisive point, since it generally a detailed task organization and the
is to be mounted, then tanks will lead. follows that the less fighting and ex- consequent command and control diffi-
They may be followed by BFVs, but penditure of resources prior to the at- culties. If the assault element has little
because of their superior survivability tack on the decisive point, the better. A or no time for preparation, then it must
if the enemy gets off the first shot, weakness in the enemy defense may be employ existing and familiar task or-
tanks must be in the van. a point at which the terrain affords a ganizations and not create units whose
The presence of antitank weapons covered or concealed route up to the ad hoc nature will exacerbate an al-
notwithstanding, the commander may enemy position, or a point at which the ready difficult C2 problem.
still elect to assault mounted if the en- enemy can only bring a limited amount The other element of the scheme of
emy defense has lost its coherence. of fire to bear. Common sense tells us maneuver that is driven by available
Evaluating the coherence of the enemy that a well prepared enemy defense preparation time is command and con-
defense is one of the assault force com- probably does not have an obvious trol, specifically the level of centraliza-
manders critical tasks throughout the weak point or not, at least, one that can tion. Simplistically, command and con-
operation. The coherence of a de- be determined without extensive, de- trol is a sliding scale of centralization
fense is the defenders ability to shift, tailed reconnaissance. with emphasis on unity of effort at one
focus, and redistribute fire where The assault force commander should end and emphasis on subordinate initia-
needed, as well as reposition assets to always look for some means to enter tive on the other. The commander starts
cope with new threats. It is this coher- the enemy position through stealth or the operation at some point on the
ence that generally precludes a mounted infiltration. Failing this, he will in scale. This starting point depends on a
assault and makes it necessary to as- many, if not most, situations have to set of factors. During the operation, the
sault dismounted, in an effort to disrupt create a weak point, even if the weak- level of centralization of command and
that coherence. Once the combined ef- ness is only temporary. He creates this control will move up or down the scale
fects of dismounted maneuver and sup- weak point by isolating a small enemy based on changes in those same fac-
porting fire defeat the enemys ability sub-unit or position from the rest of the tors. Those factors include knowledge
to defend in this coordinated manner, enemy defense. The chief means for ef- of the enemy, the nature of the opera-
the assault force commander should be fecting this isolation is, of course, tion and its complexity, the time avail-
ready to send his armor instantly through direct and indirect fire suppres- able to plan and prepare for the opera-
through or around to the rear of the po- sion. The assault force commander tion, and the friendly-to-enemy combat
sition. must plan for adequate suppressive power ratio. Command and control, in
fires to prevent other enemy elements most cases regardless of what point
from interfering or otherwise influenc- on the scale it is when the operation
The final point on the question of ing the assault forces combat power starts will eventually move toward
mounted or dismounted assault is that superiority at the entry point and from unity of effort. The prime goal of com-
the nature of the mission may require the dismounted or mounted approach bat is superior concentration at the de-
dismounted clearing of the enemy posi- to the entry point. Indirect fires and cisive point, and, unless one has an in-
tion regardless of the previously dis- smoke, when properly adjusted, further itially overwhelming combat power ra-
cussed factors. Alternately, the initial suppress the enemy and isolate the en- tio, unity of effort of multiple sub-units
assault to the far side of the enemys try point and its approaches from ob- will ultimately be required to achieve
position may not eliminate the rele- servation by the enemy as well as from that superiority.
vance of that position. In these situ- his fires. Clearly, the assault of a prepared en-
ations, an initial assault by tanks should After mission analysis, the assault emy position by mounted and dis-
be followed by BFVs. The infantry
then dismounts behind the enemy and force commander develops his scheme mounted elements is a very complex
assaults his entrenchments from the of maneuver. He has at hand, from this operation; therefore, it will be initially
rear or an undefended flank. The ad- analysis, the enemys disposition on the more centralized than most. If the as-
vantages of assaulting from this direc- objective, the nature of the terrain lead- sault force can thoroughly rehearse all
tion are obvious; however, the com- ing up to and on the objective, the de- its actions, then the commander can re-
mander must be circumspect in how cisive point for the mission, a desig- duce his direct control of subordinate
and when he sends the thinly armored nated entry point, and whether or not a elements. Further, he can maximize his
BFVs across those last 300 yards. dismounted assault is necessary. As re- use of smoke and obscurants since re-
peatedly emphasized earlier, the com- hearsals will compensate for the
For either assault, but especially for a mander must have this information smokes degrading effect on C2. With
dismounted one, the commander must prior to execution. The variable in the little or no preparation time, the assault

8 ARMOR July-August 1995

 Suppression is a psychological phenomenon whose effect is temporary.
Soldiers, either dismounted or mounted, will not expose themselves to
what they think is deadly fire. So, as Rommel and others have pointed
out, the accuracy of the fire is less important than the volume...

force commander will have to be very clearing is a physically-exhausting, am- rarely does the terrain or the nature of
directive in order to unify the efforts of munition-intensive operation. Despite the enemys defensive position allow a
all his subordinates. He will also have this fact, however, fewer infantrymen covered crossing of the terrain from
to be judicious in his use of smoke. In in the trench line is often better, as FM the assault position to the entry point.
any case, the nature of the assault re- 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Therefore, the element that physically
quires close and constant coordination states, Often, a small assault element closes this distance will be exposed to
of the above- and below-ground bat- supported by a large volume of sup- enemy fire. If the assaulting element is
tles, especially during the time when pressive fires is effective...8 This ap- dismounted, as we have seen it often
the infantry is closing on the objective. parent dichotomy is not surprising if must be, the success or failure of the
one remembers that the width of a well entire operation depends on getting the
The assault force commander may constructed trench will accommodate
start the operation at a point that is well infantry across these last 300 yards.
only one man at a time. So, the trench Once they are in the trenches, their bat-
on the subordinate initiative side of clearing drills revolve around this lead tle is on much more even terms. There-
the scale. If he has inadequate knowl- man and his volume of fire. The rest of
edge of the enemy situation, he must fore, the scheme of maneuver must en-
the element is essentially in support of sure that, not only are the tanks and
give some subordinate elements free- this one man, rotating forward as BFVs in position, but that indeed the
dom of action to conduct reconnais- needed, and providing rear security,
sance until the situation clarifies, then enemy is not returning fire before the
demolition teams, grenade throwers, dismounted infantry begins its move
shift back toward the unity of effort evacuation teams, ammo bearers, etc. from the assault position or across the
side of the scale to conduct the assault.
This assumes, of course, that the The below-ground battle, as indi- probable line of deployment (PLD).
friendly-to-enemy combat power ratio cated, is the exclusive realm of the in- A word on the nature of suppression
is such that one properly organized fantry platoon leader and his subordi- is in order. S.L.A. Marshall, in Men
subordinate element cannot conduct the nate squad and team leaders. This bat- Against Fire, says that the relationship
assault alone, in which case the com- tle is fought on a very intense and per- between fire and movement is so inter-
mander remains on the subordinate in- sonal level, with little margin for error. woven that to fire is to move.9 That
itiative side and continues to keep the The above-ground battle, on the other is, good suppressive fire allows free-
reins loose. hand, is the commanders battle. This dom of movement and, conversely, sol-
battle sets the terms for the below- diers and units move to get better firing
When planning the scheme of maneu- ground fight and, if executed properly, positions. Suppression is a psychologi-
ver, the commander must plan for the greatly reduces its difficulty. In the best cal phenomenon whose effect is tempo-
above-ground and the below-ground circumstance, a successful above-ground rary. Soldiers, either dismounted or
battles. The below-ground battle is the battle obviates the need for further be- mounted, will not expose themselves to
clearing of the enemy trenches, bun- low-ground fighting by forcing an en- what they think is deadly fire. So, as
kers, and fighting positions. It is fought emy withdrawal or pushing tanks to the Rommel and others have pointed out,
by dismounted infantry and engineers. rear of the position. The above-ground the accuracy of the fire is less impor-
Squad automatic weapons, demolitions, battle is also concerned with isolation tant than the volume.10 The rounds do
grenades, and bayonets are the primary of the objective and specific portions of not have to hit the enemy, but he must
weapons employed. To reiterate a point the objective and securing the whole think he is going to be hit. The fear of
made earlier, the most critical phase of from enemy reserves or other reposi- death and maiming is the essence of
this battle (if below-ground fighting is tioning forces. In this battle, the com- suppressive fire. The soldier is con-
necessary at all) is the crossing of the mander plans for the coordination of vinced that getting up or moving out of
last 300 yards to begin the below- the below-ground battle with tank and defilade to fire himself is not worth the
ground battle. This battle is fought in a BFV platoons, mortar and artillery risk of death.
one-directional, systematic manner. The fires, and direct fire support from sister
infantry can clear the trench to envelop units. The above-ground activity is the
The fact that MILES lasers do not kill
the decisive point from a flank, clear fire of the fire and movement that
or harm is the reason that the primacy
directly to the decisive point from the is the assault and, as such, has as its
of suppressive fire is lost in training.
entry point, then clear the remainder of chief aim suppression.
Fire directed in the vicinity of the en-
the trench, or clear from front-to-rear emy will achieve suppression for the
or rear-to-front, attacking the decisive The criticality of suppressive fire, es- simple reason that he does not know
point as it occurs geographically. (Each pecially direct fire, cannot be under- that you do not know where he is ex-
enemy trench system will have to be stated. Once the necessity for an assault actly located. He only knows that he is
evaluated for the most advantageous is determined, especially an initially being shot at with potentially deadly
method.) The infantry must clear along dismounted assault, the mission hinges effect. Whether or not we choose to ac-
the trench, in one direction, in a leap- on the commanders planning for and knowledge it, indirect fires greatest
frog fashion, marking intersections as execution of direct fire suppression value is not in its destructive effect but
they go in order to ensure their rear from good support-by-fire positions. At in its ability to suppress, a fundamental
is always secure and to prevent fratri- its simplest, suppressive fire is the truth lost in training. The explosions of
cide by converging friendly units. fire of the fire and maneuver of a fire mortar and artillery rounds will sup-
Squad-level trench clearing techniques team. In the context of a mechanized press armored forces because of the
are adequately covered in several assault, suppressive fire is the means to psychological impact of the detonations
manuals,7 so, suffice to say that trench solve the crisis in battle. As stated, themselves. Even 25-mm high explo-

ARMOR July-August 1995 9

sive rounds, while not tank-killing other techniques for ensuring continu- indirect fire suppression and obscura-
rounds, can also suppress armored ous direct fire suppression. For exam- tion when the infantry is most vulner-
forces until the enemy determines the ple, he may specify rounds fired per able. In general, indirect fire suppres-
type munitions being fired at him and minute, per vehicle, or specify fire by sion should begin simultaneously with
realizes it is not too threatening. As re- alternate sections, or specify certain the direct fire from support-by-fire po-
alization dawns, fear diminishes, and elements to provide a base of fire and sitions. This initial phase, while the in-
so does the suppressive effect. For this others to provide overwatch. fantry is moving to its PLD or dis-
reason, veteran units are harder to sup- mount point and making final prepara-
press because they will more quickly More than any other event, the infan- tions, should make maximum use of
identify what type of fire is threatening trys entry into the objective requires field artillery fires, with delay fuzing,
to them and what is not. maximum direct fire suppression. Dur- for the purpose of actually destroying
ing this critical period, the commander (the ultimate suppression) the enemy in
When planning for direct fire sup- must specify that the tank and BFV position. Fires should initially concen-
pression of the enemy in the above- platoons are providing support by fire
ground battle, the commander must trate on the enemy influencing the en-
as a base of fire in accordance with try point, then as the infantry gets
consider first the positioning of his tank FM 71-1.11 These elements are not close, shifting to other enemy positions
and BFV platoons. In general, the line waiting to identify enemy vehicles or
from these support-by-fire positions to positions, but are firing into the general to increase the isolation of the entry
the enemy position should be at as vicinity of the enemy; volume over ac- point as discussed earlier. Danger
great an angle as possible from the line curacy. Remember, he does not know close to dismounted infantry is 600
the infantry will move along from as- they do not know where he is. The meters for 155-mm artillery and 107-
sault position to the entry point. There mission to support by fire as over- mm mortars. Terrain depending, this
are two reasons for this separation: one, watch should only be assigned to indi- planning factor may be increased or
the enemys attention will be focused vidual vehicles and sections to con- decreased to ensure the safety of the in-
on the mounted elements and not on serve ammunition during less critical fantry from its own indirect fires, while
the relatively vulnerable infantry; thus, times during the assault, and then only still maintaining the suppressive effect
the infantry may achieve local surprise; after the infantry has entered the on the enemy. When shifting indirect
two, once the infantry enters the trench, trench. The commander should also fires away from the infantry, the com-
the enemy will be caught on those consider positioning ammunition resup- mander should step up the direct fire
ever-sought-after horns of a di- ply vehicles within reach of the tank suppression on the enemy at or influ-
lemma. That is, every action he takes and BFV platoons to speed up the re- encing the entry point. The best judge
to avoid the direct fire from tanks and load process. Maintaining continuous of when to shift both direct and indirect
BFVs, such as stay in defilade or down fire is essential, but as the assault pro- fires away from the entry point will be
in his bunkers, makes him vulnerable gresses, less fire will be necessary to the leader of the dismounted element
to attack from infantry moving down maintain suppression as enemy ele- approaching it. On his order or signal
the trench line. Conversely, actions he ments are destroyed or withdraw. Dur- the fire should shift, and the infantry
takes to avoid the attacking infantry ing the inevitable lulls in the direct fire will fire and maneuver this last short
and indirect fire, such as repositioning suppression caused by the necessity to distance using their own small arms
or withdrawing, leaves him vulnerable reload, the commander should redouble and possibly their supporting BFVs for
to the fires from the support-by-fire po- his use of indirect fire to maintain the suppression of the entry point.
sitions. Finally, the commander must suppressive effect. In the conduct of
give as much latitude as necessary to the dismounted assault, there is no sub- Once the infantry is in the trench line,
tank and BFV platoon leaders so that stitute for establishing and keeping fire
they can reposition and jockey around superiority, especially until the infantry the FSO, with the XO as back-up, will
to ensure they have the requisite line of has entered the trench. As Nathan Bed- adjust the indirect fire from an over-
sight to their portions of the objective. ford Forrest so eloquently phrased it, watch position, ensuring it stays for-
These leaders must understand that this Its the first blow that counts; and if ward of the progress of the below-
line of sight is essential and it is their you keep it up hot enough, you can ground battle. The purpose of fires at
duty to find a position from which to whip em as fast as they come up. this point is suppression of enemy ele-
achieve the desired effect on the en- ments to prevent them from interfering
The commander and his fire support with the infantry in the trench. Since
emy. officer (FSO) develop the indirect fire the whole objective may be 600 meters
The second consideration for direct plan to support the above- and below- or less in width, the whole assault may
fire suppression is volume of fire. The ground battles. They also plan for the be done danger close. Partially com-
commander must estimate for how rigid control of indirect fires for the du- pensating for this risk to the infantry is
long the enemy must be suppressed ration of the assault. Known or sus- the fact that they are fighting in a
and then take steps to ensure proper pected enemy positions are targeted as trench designed to protect infantry
fire distribution and appropriate rate of are routes in and out of the enemy po- from artillery. Nonetheless, indirect fire
fire throughout this time period. He sition. Again, the commander must es- suppression should be maintained in
does this primarily by designating the timate the duration of the assault and, these subsequent phases using primar-
critical events during the assault and specifically, the length of time it will ily mortars (with fuzing set to detonate
ensuring that the highest rate of fire is take the infantry to get from assault po- on or above the ground) on the objec-
available then. He may also direct sition to entry point. This will ensure tive itself and artillery fires behind or

10 ARMOR July-August 1995

 Some type of reserve must be formed even in the clearest of
enemy situations, for as the great von Moltke tells us: The
enemy usually has three courses of action open to him, and
of these three he will choose the fourth.

beyond the objective to prevent rein- mander to build redundancy in his plan platoon and squad leaders who need
forcement. The situation may require through designation of a reserve. more detail than 1/50K scale provides.
the actual lifting of indirect fires or So, referring to the accompanying
shifting of them off the objective alto- We have further established that the sketch, our assaulting force com-
gether if our own infantry are endan- most critical event in a dismounted as- manders mission is to seize Objective
gered. In this case, the onus is on the sault is getting the infantry from the as- Orange in order to subsequently sup-
tanks and BFVs to maintain suppres- sault position across the last 300 port by fire from the vicinity of the ob-
sion. To ensure the efficacy of both di- yards. This event is also the most jective to assist an attack by a sister
rect and indirect fires during execution, likely to go wrong. Therefore, part of company on another objective to the
the commander must be in a position to the reserve for a dismounted assault northeast. So, the commander will look
judge the fires effects throughout the should be infantry. The commander of for the opportunity to establish tank
objective area and be in constant com- an armor-heavy company/team may, and BFV support-by-fire positions for
munication with the FSO and the in- for example hold one of his two infan- this supporting task as early in the op-
fantry fighting the below-ground battle. try squads in reserve in the assault po- eration as possible. His decisive point
sition so that if the assault fails at the is tied to the purpose of his assault. In
In planning the assault, the com- entry point, he has not also lost all his this instance it is to control the terrain
mander must designate a reserve. The infantry and can try again. However on Objective Orange to provide sup-
purpose of the reserve is, of course, for with the paucity of infantry available to porting fire. The enemy force itself, in
the commander to influence the battle him, he cannot afford to keep this this case, is only relevant in its ability
with combat power once execution is squad uncommitted for long. So, as the to interfere with the assault force com-
under way. He influences the battle, in rule goes, he will commit his reserves manders establishing support-by-fire
the best circumstances, by having a to the appropriate place on the battle- positions.
fresh force available to pursue a with- field as the situation clarifies. That is,
drawing enemy. In most circumstances, once the lead squad enters the trench After considering all of the previous,
the commander needs to influence the and the time for the potential crisis that the commander concludes that control
battle when the untoward or unex- would require an infantry reserve has of the high ground on the northeast
pected occurs. In these cases, the re- passed, the commander can hand con- portion of the objective will allow him
serve provides redundancy and uncom- trol of this squad back to the infantry freedom of maneuver to support his
mitted combat power. Factors that in- platoon leader for use in his scheme of sister units attack. Reconnaissance by
fluence the make-up of the reserve are: maneuver. the scouts and his own visual recon-
knowledge of the enemy disposition naissance from an overwatching posi-
and intentions and, simply, the number The commander may further desig- tion allows the commander to deter-
of things that can go wrong in the op- nate one of his tank platoons as an ad- mine the details of the enemy disposi-
eration, the what ifs, if you will. Ad- ditional reserve with an eye toward as- tion. He sketches them as shown. He
ditionally, the commander, when de- saulting with tanks to a point beyond notes that the enemys command post
signing his reserve, must have an ar- the objective as the opportunity pre- and reinforcing tank are also on the
mored force available if not uncom- sents itself. Given the situation, he may high ground. Massing combat power at
mitted, then at least alerted to pur- keep that platoon or a section of it un- this point, then, will result in control of
sue. Enemy withdrawal from a position committed to ensure its availability the high ground and destruction or
in actual combat is more frequent than when needed. The commander may withdrawal of enemy assets critical to
in the defend-to-the-last-ATWESS train- also assume some risk by using a com- the defenses coherence. The com-
ing events, where death is not the result mitted force as a reserve. If he feels he mander determines this point to be the
of last stands. needs their firepower for suppression, decisive one and designates the terrain
the commander may commit those encompassing the high ground, CP, and
We have established that an assault tanks to supporting by fire with the ad- the tank position as Objective White.
requires detailed knowledge of the en- ditional mission to be prepared for the The situation is such, with broken ter-
emy dispositions before it can be exe- mounted assault. This same element rain on the objective, criss-crossing
cuted. We might conclude, based on may be the pursuit force if that situ- trenchworks and multiple, active anti-
the factors listed above, that a reserve ation arises. The commander must al- tank weapons, that the commander de-
is not necessary in this case. However, ways be aware of the risk of having a cides that an initially dismounted as-
the enemys intentions that is, what committed force also be the reserve. sault is necessary. He also determines
he will do with his forces are much That is, even in a support-by-fire role, that moving tanks around the objective
harder to establish. Some type of re- such a reserve may not be able to extri- is not immediately possible. Looking
serve must be formed even in the clear- cate itself when called upon. for a weak point at which to enter the
est of enemy situations, for as the great enemy position, the commander notes
von Moltke tells us: The enemy usu- An example scenario, albeit oversim- that the enemy squad on the western
ally has three courses of action open to plified, will serve to illustrate the con- side of Objective Orange cannot be
him, and of these three he will choose cepts discussed previously and demon- supported by fire from the other two
the fourth. The inevitable unpre- strate control measures necessary for squads if the objective is assaulted
dictable events in any battle, let alone executing the assault. The use of a from the west. Additionally, the wood-
one as inherently risky as an assault of sketch is an essential technique for am- line to the west of the objective pro-
a prepared position, require the com- plifying the scheme of maneuver to vides a covered approach up to a point

ARMOR July-August 1995 11

closer to the objective than any other any enemy force on or beyond the ob- ures on the flanks and beyond Objec-
approach from any other direction. So, jective as needed and to be prepared to tive Orange that support the companys
the commander decides to enter the ob- move through or around Objective Or- follow-on, support-by-fire mission.
jective at this western side and desig- ange.
nates that enemy squad position as Ob- The commander develops his plan for
jective Red. He further designates the Our commander also determines, the below-ground battle around which
remaining two enemy squads positions through information gleaned from the the rest of the scheme of maneuver will
as Objectives Green and Blue. Note scouts, that the high ground along develop. Looking initially for a direct
that he includes in each objective those Highway 22 affords excellent observa- assault on the decisive point, Objective
enemy elements and positions likely to tion and fields of fire onto the objec- White, from the entry point, Objective
be controlled by a common leader. Vis- tive. Accordingly, he plans his support- Red, the commander determines this is
ual recon also helps the commander by-fire positions in the vicinity of not possible without attacking through
define the geographical parameters of Checkpoints (CPs) 1 and 2. He plans a Objective Green. Additionally, once
each objective by terrain features rec- company Assault Position on the re- Objective Green is seized, the enemy
ognizable on the ground. This deline- verse slope of the high ground south of on Objective Blue is rendered irrele-
ation is more important to the support- Highway 22. He further plans an As- vant since mounted elements can be
ing elements and less to the assaulting, sault Position for 3rd platoon west of brought up around Red and White once
because the supporting elements will Highway 10 in the woodline in the vi- they are seized without interference
be assigned responsibility for specific cinity of CP 9. The commander plans from Blue. The scheme of maneuver
objectives in the above-ground battle, positions for his subsequent support- will include an eventual assault on Ob-
while the infantry in the below-ground by-fire mission at CPs 4, 6 and 7, north jective Blue, but only after White is
fight have responsibility for the whole. of Objective Orange. He also deter- seized and the mounted elements are
In the below-ground battle, these ob- mines the line formed by these last beginning their subsequent mission
jectives are more for common refer- three checkpoints as the limit of ad- from positions behind Objective White.
ence with the above-ground battle than vance for his platoons. For emergen- Based on this plan, the commander
they are for division of responsibility. cies, he plans an Objective Rally Point plans his assault on Objective Red and
This is so because the below-ground at the company Assault Position. the overall direct fire plan.
battle is a series of fluid drills that vary, To control his all-important direct fire The commander divides his scheme
based on known enemy locations (bun- plan, the commander employs several of maneuver into four phases. The first
kers, vehicles, machine guns, etc.) and direct fire control techniques and their phase comprises the movement from
exigencies, not on artificial and possi- associated control measures. First, he the company assault position to the
bly unrecognizable (to those in the puts target reference points (TRPs) on support-by-fire positions at CP 1, 1st
trench) boundaries. each enemy position, or close to the platoon (-), and CP 2, 2nd platoon, and
position on a recognizable feature. It is the movement of 1st platoon to its as-
essential that the commander ensure sault position. This phase also includes
Our assault force commander has two that each of his subordinates confirm the establishment of fire superiority and
M1A1 tank platoons (1st and 2nd), a that they can identify each TRP on the suppression by the tank platoons onto
BFV-equipped infantry platoon (3rd), ground, either during a leaders recon- Objective Orange. The second phase is
and his own headquarters element, con- naissance or once in support-by-fire the assault, by 3rd platoon, to seize Ob-
sisting of his tank, his XOs tank, and positions. A small number of readily jective Red. The third phase is the
the FSO in a fire support vehicle. He identifiable TRPs, combined with a main attack through Objective Green to
now must allocate these assets to ac- thorough incorporation of the quad- seize Objective White. The fourth
complish the mission. Given his knowl- rant or similar technique in the com- phase is the movement of 1st platoon
edge of the enemy situation, the pro- pany SOP, is a much more flexible and and the BFVs of 3rd platoon to sup-
portional range of unpredictable events, subtly redundant means of fire control port-by-fire positions behind the objec-
and the possible branches to the current than is a myriad of TRPs and sectors of tive in the vicinity of CPs 4 and 6 and
situation, the commander designates fire.12 beginning to suppress the objective to
two reserves. The first is one section of the north. Simultaneously the infantry,
BFVs and its associated squad which with continued supporting fire from
will remain in the infantry platoons as- Regardless of specific technique, the 2nd platoon, assaults to seize Objective
sault position until released by the optimal purpose of direct fire control Blue.
commander. This reserve exists for two measures is to ensure clear assignment
reasons: one, if the initial assault to the of responsibility for all known or po- If written out, the details of the
entry point fails, or two, if the opportu- tential enemy positions and the rapid scheme of maneuver for the first three
nity arises to move mounted around or and accurate shifting, focusing, and re- phases might look something like this:
behind the objective, this force can fol- distribution of fires during execution. Phase I: 1st PLT (-) moves to sup-
low the tanks and complete the trench Our assault force commander has port-by-fire position vicinity of CP1
line assault from the rear. The second placed five TRPs on the objective, and suppresses the enemy on OBJ Red.
reserve is a tank section from 1st pla- plotted on bunkers or berms that all Simultaneously, 2nd PLT establishes a
toon to remain with the commander leaders and gunners can recognize. Not support-by-fire position vicinity of CP
and be used to move quickly to bring shown on our sketch are other, simi- 2 and suppresses the enemy on OBJ
additional suppressive firepower against larly planned direct fire control meas- Green and White. Tank platoons plan

12 ARMOR July-August 1995

for maintaining suppression for 15 nal that they are set via FM and a red to seize Green and White. They will
minutes until 3rd is ready to cross PLD followed by green star cluster over mark forward progress of lead three-
and assault Red. 3rd platoon moves to CP3. man team with orange flag on long-
Assault Position and 1st squad prepares whip antenna extending above-ground
to assault. Alpha section BFVs estab- Phase II: At 3rd platoons signal, the
CO and reserve will move forward to and yellow smoke when each objective
lish support-by-fire vicinity CP 3 to assist 1st platoon in suppression of is seized. 1st platoon (-) will pause to
suppress Red and support dismounted rearm behind CP1, CO and reserve will
assault as needed. Bravo section and Red. 2nd will continue suppression of
Green and White. On order, the infan- move up and continue suppression of
2nd squad remain in Assault Position try will cross the PLD and seize Red. Green. 2nd will continue suppression
as company reserve; be prepared to as- of White and Blue. All direct fires will
sume Alpha section mission. 3rd platoon leader will signal for shift-
ing of direct and indirect fire off of remain 50 meters ahead of 3rd pla-
XO move with 3rd platoon and be Red via FM, two red star clusters, and toons signal flag. Bravo section will
prepared to assist in suppression of Red red smoke. At that signal, 1st platoon revert to 3rd platoon control in this
from CP 3. will shift to suppress Green, 2nd will phase.
FSO establish overwatch vicinity of shift to suppress White and Blue, CO Once 1st platoon (-) has rearmed and
CP2. In this phase, artillery will neu- and reserve will cease fire and move is back at CP 1, reserve tanks will be
tralize Red, White, and Green, in that back. XO and Alpha section BFVs sup- prepared to lead 3rd platoon BFVs un-
order of priority, and suppress Blue. port by fire as needed by 3rd platoon der the XOs control in an assault from
Mortars will smoke the area between leader. Bravo section will remain in CP3 to CPs 4 and 5. FSO will lift fire
CP3 and Red and, as a deception meas- Assault Position. Indirect fires will shift off of Green at the beginning of this
ure, smoke east of Blue. CO and re- off of Red as stated, but will continue phase and continue mortar suppression
serve tank section will move to and oc- as in Phase I. Phase will end when Red of White and Blue. Lift fires off of
cupy a position behind CP 1 and be is seized. 3rd will signal this via FM White on signal from 3rd that Green is
prepared to assist suppression of Red. and yellow smoke from Red. seized.
Phase ends when 1st squad is ready to Phase III: This phase will begin, The reader gets the idea. A final note
assault, and the enemy on Red, Green, without pause from phase II, on the in this example is the positioning of the
and White are suppressed. 3rd will sig- signal from 3rd platoon. 3rd will attack company leaders to provide redundant

ARMOR July-August 1995 13

command and control and observation ible direct fire control techniques. His Chapter 3, pp. 3-156-168. This section is high-
of critical places on the battlefield. The attached infantry must be well schooled lighted by an excellent description of infantry
CO is positioned to get as large a view in the team drills and individual tasks trench clearing procedures.
as possible, but with control of the di- upon which every below-ground battle FM 71-123, pp. 3-112 to 3-116. This section,
rect fire suppression as his focus. The is based. Finally, he must habitually The Assault, delineates the difference be-
FSO is positioned away from the CO practice task-organizing at platoon tween what occurs above and below ground. In
for a necessarily redundant view of the level. Infantry and tank platoon leaders combination with FM 7-10, this manual is the
objective, and to rigidly control the in- must know how to work with one an- best available source for extrapolating a com-
direct fires to ensure suppression and other and with attached engineers, so plete picture of the planning requirements for
avoid fratricide. The infantry platoon that specific task organization for an this mission.
leader, in the trench with his trench assault is possible with little or no FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry
clearing teams, is not in a position to preparation time. Company Team, November, 1988, pp. 3-26 to
accurately adjust the indirect fires, so 3-27, How to Assault is far too brief. Assault
this task is the focus of the FSO. As The principles of the assault outlined of a Fortified Strongpoint, pp. 3-40 to 3-51
stated, the infantry platoon leader is in above are not intended to be applied concentrates almost exclusively on breaching.
the trench with his dismounts because blindly, as if they were some company
battle drill. Like all doctrine, these FM 7-7J, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon
the below-ground battle is his platoons principles are designed to educate the and Squad, May 1993, Battle Drill 6: En-
critical task. As we have seen, the pro- ter/Clear a Trench, pp. 3-38 to 3-43, good de-
gress of the below-ground battle and commanders judgement, not tell him scription of this critical task and the coordinated
signaling of that progress drives the en- what to do. However, these principles use of dismounted infantry and BFVs.
tire direct and indirect fire plan. It is are of no value unless they are thor- 4
oughly assimilated. Frederick the Great John A. English, On Infantry, (Praeger,
essential, therefore, that the platoon Westport, Conn., 1984), p. 49.
leader is present in the trench even summed it up nicely: Gentleman, the
5
though his actual span of control is enemy stands behind his entrench- For a discussion of the decisive point, see
limited to a few individuals. In general, ments, armed to the teeth. We must at- the authors article, The Decisive Point, in

the XO should be at the second most tack him and win, or else perish... If the July-August 1994 issue of ARMOR.

important place on the battlefield. In you dont like this, you may resign and 6
A.A. Vandegrift, as quoted in FM 1, War-
this case, he is positioned to closely go home.13 fighting, p. 1.
7
monitor the progress of the infantry As professionals, we must understand As stated above, FMs 7-10, 71-123, and 7-7J
and provides the commander with an- the assault, the most basic and most have good descriptions of trench clearing drills.
8
other, closer view of the critical entry difficult of all missions. Merely hoping FM 7-10, p. 4-29.
phase of the assault. He is also pos- that we will know what to do when the 9
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, (Smith,
tured to provide supporting tank fire situation arises is not a path to success. Gloucester, Mass., 1978), p. 83. In Chapter 6,
and lead a mounted assault following We must train ourselves, our leaders, Marshall presents an excellent discussion of the
the infantry when the opportunity and our soldiers in the conduct of the relationship between fire and movement.
arises. The first sergeant, not specifi- assault, or else we may as well resign 10
Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, (Har-
cally mentioned in our example, is for- and go home. court, Brace, Jovanovich, New York, 1953), p.
ward with some capacity to quickly re- 7. Rommel repeatedly mentions the importance
arm the support-by-fire elements to of initial fire superiority and the importance of
preclude them from the time-consum- Notes volume over accuracy in the opening moments
ing task of taking ammunition out of of an action.
hull storage. He can put ammunition on 1
Helmuth Graf von Moltke, Moltke on The 11
FM 71-1, pp. 3-23 to 3-25.
his M113 as well as the maintenance Art of War (Presidio Press, Novato, Ca., 1993), 12
track and the M88 recovery vehicle. If p. 158. An excellent discussion of direct fire control
the situation allows, he might even 2 is found in Miller and Avernas article, Direct
Colonel James B. Gunlicks, Cobra Team Fire Planning, in the November-December
control an ammunition-laden HEMMT leader, Operations Group, National Training
behind the support-by-fire positions. 1993 issue of ARMOR.
Center, Ft. Irwin, Ca., in an officer professional 13
The first sergeants critical task is to development session with Armor Officer Ad- Frederick the Great, as quoted in the Dic-
monitor ammunition expenditure and vance Course students, May, 1993. tionary of Military and Naval Quotations, ed.
prevent any pause in suppression be- 3
The following are some of the main doctrinal
Robert Debs Heinl Jr. (United States Naval In-
cause of ammunition shortages. stitute, Annapolis, Md), p. 20.
references on this subject :
Before concluding, a final point on FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, De-
preparation is in order. Preparation for cember, 1990, Chapter 4, pp. 4-22 to 4-32. This
the assault must begin before planning normally excellent manual, as usual, has the
that is, in training in garrison or be- best description of this mission available. In Major David J. Lemelin is a
fore commitment to battle. Given the this chapter, there is an excellent discussion of small group instructor and
fact that the commander may have lit- how a commander plans for an attack. However
tle or no time available between plan- it glosses over the actual assault and jumps
team chief for the Armor Offi-
ning and execution of the assault, he almost immediately from planning to consolida- cer Advance Course at Ft.
can minimize this difficulty by training tion on the objective. The section entitled As- Knox. He has considerable
that anticipates this mission. First and sault of a Strongpoint is good, but brief, and command experience, includ-
foremost, he and his leaders must thor- tends to treat the subject as a unique situation ing command during DESERT
oughly understand the nature of the as- instead of a routine method for dealing with SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
sault mission and the considerations any enemy position.
He is also the 1994 TRADOC
outlined above. The commander must FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Com- Instructor of the Year.
train his company in standard and flex- bined Arms Heavy Forces, September, 1992,

14 ARMOR July-August 1995