HISTORY II TRIMESTER VI

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE IDEA OF

INDIA AND THE NAGA SECESSIONIST
MOVEMENT

Submitted by:

RISHAV RAJ (ID NO. 2167)

II YEAR, B.A., LL.B (HONS.)

Date of submission: April 18, 2016.

Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................4

AIM AND OBJECTIVE........................................................................................................4

SCOPE AND LIMITATION..................................................................................................4

SOURCES..............................................................................................................................4

MODE OF CITATION...........................................................................................................4

The Questions of Research.....................................................................................................4

....................................................................................................................................................6

Chapterisation........................................................................................................................6

The Idea of India........................................................................................................................7

2. Rise of Naga Nationalism....................................................................................................10

3. Indian Federation: A Forced Union?....................................................................................16

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................20

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................22
 Introduction
The Naga secessionist movement, or the Naga Independence movement as the Naga rebels
call it, is the oldest standing secessionist spat in Indian history. It is even older than Indias
Kashmir problem, and yet, paradoxically, little known even in India. This peculiar situation
speaks of the unique nature of the North-East in the Indian consciousness. But these
peculiarities and paradoxes also raise more fundamental questions about the nature and scope
of the Indian Identity.

Moreover, the categorical dichotomy between the Governments and the Naga Radicals
perception of the issue at hand warrants a historical analysis of the emergence of Naga
identity, and the Indian Identity. An attempt shall be made to analyze the ideological
differences between the two.

Nationalist movements are often the doing of an politically active intellectual class. But as it
goes, it gets the support also of the masses. In that regard, an attempt shall be made to analyse
the perception of the Nagas in general to the movement.
 HYPOTHESIS- The
R Naga secessionist
movement is the patent
E disjoint between two
Tseparate
HE QUESTIONS OF and RESEARCH
S nationalities,
its repression by the larger

E Nation-State is against the

principles of its national

A personality.

1. What is the Idea of

R India?
2. What is the nature
C of the demands put
forward by such
H rebel groups as are The Idea of
M termed
India
secessionist in

E mainland
Sunil Khilnani, in his work
perception of the
The Idea of India, states that
T problem in
the idea of the Indian State
Nagaland? What
H are the causes for
was a wager that
heterogonous cultures could
the emergence of
O these tendencies?
be brought together as one

How old is the

D span of this
secessionist
O movement?
3. What was the role
L of British
imperialist policies
O in the formation of

G a non-Indian,
Naga identity

Y among the tribes

of the Naga hills?
4. On what grounds
AIM AND
were the
OBJECTIVE Government of
The aim of this paper is to Indias claims to
trace the idea of India, authority over the
nationality.1 Tagore, whom Khilnani credits to have been the first to discuss what the idea of
India was, made the remarkable claim that the idea of India militates against the
consciousness of the separateness of ones own people from others. 2 Amartya Sen, writes of
the Indian identity as a broad an absorbing one, which reflects an understanding of Indias
past as a joint construction in which the members of different communities were involved. 3 In
the same vein, Shahsi Tharoor highlights how the Indian identity can accommodate multiple
identities harmoniously, and so one can be Tamil Brahman or a Kashmiri Muslim, and also an
Indian.4

But the emergence of this conception of the Indian identity had a complex historical
background. To gauge this development, we must briefly trace the history of the freedom
struggle, of the emergence of the Indian State, and how the idea of India developed within it.

The search for something called the idea of India must begin with the question of what
exactly is India. India is a modern nation state, a form of political organization which is
primarily characterized by a central, organized leadership. But the idea of a nation state is
itself a product of modern historical processes.

Moreover, the idea of a nation, and the idea of the state, are also categorically distinct
notions. As Amartya Sen brings this out, it is not a category mistake to think of the Indian
nation prior to 1947 as encompassing the residents of the so-called native states like
Travancore, and also the non-British administered states like Hyderabad (Sen, in the original
uses the example of a different colonial territory- Goa- but that has been dropped here for
reasons of conceptual coherence within the scope of the research), even though they did not

1 S. Khilnani. THE IDEA OF INDIA (1997).

2 Sen, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE AND

IDENTITY, 349 (2005).

3 Id., at 348.

4 S. Tharoor, Indian Identity is Forged in Diversity. Everyone of us is in a minority, THE

GUARDIAN, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/aug/15/comment.india (Last visited on
April 17, 2016).
belong to the same Nation State.5 The creation of the Indian State was preceded by the
formation of the idea of the Indian nation, and the freedom struggle had a prime role to play
in that.

But before deconstructing the development of the consciousness of the Indian nation, it is
useful to look at what it means to be a nation. The nation is a form of community, and it is
recognized as the dominant form of community prevailing in the present epoch. 6 There are
certain traits that define a nation, and distinguish it from a non-national community. 7 AR
Desai refers to EH Carr in order to delineate these traits, and the researcher finds it apt to
refer to the same for the purpose at hand. EH Carr propounds that the term nation denotes a
group of humans with the following characteristics:

(a) The idea of a common government
whether as reality in the present or the
past, or as an aspiration for the future.
(b) A certain size and closeness of contact
between all its individual members.
(c) A more or less defined territory.
(d) Certain characteristics (of which the
most frequent is language) clearly
distinguishing the nation from other
nations and non-national groups
(e) Certain interests common to the
individual members.
(f) A certain degree of common feeling or
will, associated with a picture of the
nation in the minds of the individual
members.8

5 A. Sen, On Interpreting Indias Past in NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT,

26 (A. Jalal and S. Bose eds., 1997).

6 A. R. Desai, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF INDIAN NATIONALISM, 3 (6th edn., 2000).

7 Id., at 1.

8 Desai, supra note 6, at 2.

It is important to understand that nationalism was an idea that developed in the west, and was
helped by the presence of a largely homogenous culture in the emerging states of Europe, and
territories compact enough for the closeness of contact between its people.

India was a vast country inhabited by a huge population, speaking many languages and
professing different religions.9 Moreover, the diversity of racial types obviated the possibility
of an ethnic uniformity of the Indian people. 10 The extreme social and religious differences of
the Indians presented a peculiar background to the growth of nationalism in India. 11 Thus,
nationalism in India was not based on any of the conventional markers of a uniform national
identity, like a common religion, or a common language, or even a common race.12

To engender the conditions of and bridge the void between the aspiration for a common
government, and a certain degree of will or common feeling associated with the picture of a
nation, the nationalist leaders had to appeal to a broader Indian culture, to the idea of unity
in diversity.13 Moreover, there was a requirement to refute the Imperialist claims of the
impossibility of forging a national identity against the backdrop of patent differences. 14 The
consciousness of the idea of an Indian civilization, or culture, that has an inherent unifying
force, and that thus there was a unity in diversity, was a product of that nationalist
imperative.15

9 Desai, supra note 6, at 5.

10 Tharoor, supra note 4.

11 Desai, supra note 6, at 5.

12 Tharoor, supra note 4.

13 Sen, supra note 5.

14 Sen, supra note 5.

15 Sen, supra note 5.

There had been imperialist inclination to denounce the Indian Union as an artificial union of
separate nationalities, bound to break up in due time. 16 If the belief in the lack of a common
culture was all that made possible these pronouncements about the vulnerability of the Union,
then it was a myopic perception of Indias history. The syncretic Indian culture that the
nationalists invoked had material in Indias past.

This is reflected, for example, in the way different religious groups have interacted in India,
leading to cultural exchanges and formation of a subtle but overarching Indian culture. There
are internalizations of influences from other religions in every religion in India, and thus
there is a distinct Indian Islam and an Indian Christianity, different in many aspects from the
way these religions are practiced in other parts of the world. 17 Islam borrowed a past from the
Judeo-Christian tradition, to which it added its own past, and this combination had an
interface with the Puranic past in India.18 An example of this is Shah Munis Sanskrit text, the
Siddhantha-Bodh, which discusses the possible closeness in concept of terms such as Allah
and Narayan.19 . It is this aspect of shared history and cultural interaction that gave the sense
of being Indian-ness, even before the formation of an independent Indian State.

The State that emerged out of the national movement was well to reflect the ideology of
accommodating pluralism in its system of government and law. Democracy and secularism
sustain pluralism of the Indian society.20 But the challenge to the idea of India in Naga Hills is
not so much a question of accommodating a different people, but a question of what when the
differences are so fundamentally pronounced that attempts at accommodation are frustrated?

16 R. Guha, INDIA AFTER GANDHI, 261 (2007).

17 R. Thapar, PAST AS PRESENT (2014).

18 Id., at 32.

19 Thapar, supra note 17, at 32.

20 Tharoor, supra note 4.

 2. Rise of Naga Nationalism
It is the pull towards internal separateness of communities that that has presented the
strongest challenge in recent years to the integrity of the Indian identity and to the idea of
India at large.21 This is reflected in its most protracted way in the situation that the
Government of India terms as a secessionist movement by the rebels of the Naga leaders.
This section will look at the history of the Nagas and attempt to understand the relationship of
their ideological differences and their history.

The Nagas are a group of heterogeneous tribes, belonging to the Mongoloid and Tibeto-
Burman stock, who inhabit the hills around the present day Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya,
and beyond the Indo-Myanmar border in Myanmar.22

Culturally, these tribes spoke different languages,23 and had different legends of origin.24 They
followed an animist religion, which was distinct from most religions followed in the
subcontinent.25 It was only with the coming of the American Baptists in the mid nineteenth
century that Christianity became the dominant religion.26

The Nagas had always been an independent people, never subjected to the authority of any
ruler commanding political dominance in the Indian subcontinent.27 They were organized into

21 Sen, supra note 2, at 348.

22 C. Chasie and S. Hazarika, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: INDIA AND THE NAGA
INSURGENCY (2009).

23 Id.

24 U. Misra, THE PERIPHERY STRIKES BACK: CHALLENGES TO THE NATION-STATE IN ASSAM

AND NAGALAND (2000).

25 Id.

26 Guha, supra note 16.

27 Misra, supra note 24.

independent village states, with tribal chieftains. The Nagas had been totally outside the fold
of the Congress led national movement.28

The British were the first outsiders to have controlled the Nagas. After the first Anglo-
Burmese war and the extension of British control over Assam, the need to control the tribes
of the hills was felt.29 The Naga tribes were known to constantly launch raids on the
contiguous Assamese region. With the British realization of the economic potential of
exporting such goods as tea from Assam, they also saw the need to guard the Assamese
economy against these skirmishes.30 British annexation of the Naga hills, which was
effectively attained by 1880, was thus out of the need to secure the frontiers.31

It is important to note however that the Naga Hills were effectively kept outside the fold of
the administrative framework of the British Indian territories. After the annexation of
Kohima in 1878, the Naga Hills District was formed in 1881. 32 But this consisted mainly of
the present day area of central Nagaland alone. 33 The remainder of the Naga regions was left
un-administered. Moreover, the Frontier Tracts Regulation II of 1880 provided a framework
within which the Nagas were allowed to govern themselves based on their tribal laws and
customs.34 British interference in administration was minimal.

BRITISH IMPERIALIST POLICIES

28 Guha, supra note 16, at 262.

29 S. Misra, Nature Of Colonial Intervention In The Naga Hills, 33(51) ECONOMIC AND

POLITICAL WEEKLY 3273 (December 19, 1998).

30 Id.

31 Misra, supra note 29.

32 Misra, supra note 24.

33 Misra, supra note 24.

34 Misra, supra note 24.

The isolationist policies were justified by the imperialists themselves as a form of protecting
the culture and the way of life of the Naga tribes from the influence of the plainsmen.35

Nationalist perceptions, however, have differed. It is argued, for example, that had the
protectionist approach of the British been genuinely the case, similar attitudes would have
been taken towards tribals in other parts of India as well. But there is an inclination in
Nationalist writings on the Naga issue to indict the British imperialist policies for having
engendered the identity of non-Indian-ness among the Nagas. 36 The first Prime Minister of
Independent India, Nehru, too shared such a perception, and we shall refer to it more
extensively when dealing with the post-colonial States response to Naga nationalism.

More sober critique of the Colonial policies, in the opinion of this researcher, seem to present
a more objective view of the imperatives for such policies. For one, the Nagas tribes and their
territories were difficult to navigate and tame. Fiercely protective of their independent way of
life, they did not wish to be controlled by an alien other and put up strong resistance to such
intrusions.37 The colonial government was perceptive of this and sought not to interfere with
the Nagas. The relationship between the Nagas and the British that was to gradually emerge
was one of mutual respect.38

Moreover, there seemed to be no economic benefit in controlling the Naga Hills per se,
unlike neighboring Assam which had prospects of chipping in to the export basket. 39 As such,
the cost of active administration in these regions was more than the benefits that the colonial
government thought possible. The ensuing British administration can be described as one
where the British secured a strong foothold in the region, and left the Nagas largely alone.

35 Misra, supra note 24.

36 S. Nag, NATIONALISM, SEPARATISM AND SECESSIONISM (1999).

37 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

38 Guha, supra note 16, at 262.

39 Misra, supra note 29.

But the nature of the Naga history and identity, and their relatively warm relations with the
British, combined later by the emergence of a national identity at conflict with the Indian
identity, had their roles in fomenting Naga nationalism.

THE NAGA IDENTITY AND RISE OF NAGA NATIONALISM

The rise of Naga nationalism was preceded by the formation of a distinct Naga identity. It is
claimed that the people of the so called Naga tribes themselves were alien to the use of the
term Nagas.40 One view is that it was given to them by outsiders, presumably the Assamese,
on the basis of 14 shared cultural and physical traits of the tribes. 41 Another view supports
that the term was used by the British for the first time to denote these people.42

These were a heterogeneous mix of multiple tribes, and each identified itself with the
membership to its own tribe- the Aos, Angamis, and so on. 43 Inter-tribal rivalry was the norm,
and the British control of these regions has been credited for bringing about relative peace.
The spread of Christianity and English education also created a more tangible strand of
common culture bringing these tribes together and more gradually, an English educated
intellectual class that was to later go on to spearhead the Naga movement for independence.

The very first manifestation of political opinion was seen in the formation of the Naga Club,
a group consisting of Government officials and several tribal headmen from around
Kohima,44 which was formed in 1918 with the aim of integration of the Nagas for

40 N. Nibedon, NAGALAND: THE NIGHT OF THE GUERRILLAS (2000).

41 S. K. Pillai, Anatomy of an Insurgency: Ethnicity and Identity in Nagaland, SOUTH ASIA

TERRORISM PORTAL, available at
www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume3/Fault3-GenPillaiF.htm (Last visited
on April 17, 2016).

42 D. Kinon, From Loincloth, Suits to Battle Greens in BEYOND COUNTER-INSURGENCY:

BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN NORTHEAST (S. Baruah ed., 2011).

43 Pillai, supra note 41.

44 Misra, supra note 24.

administrative efficiency. This group made a representation to the Simon Commission in
1929, demanding that the proposed constitutional reforms may not be extended to the Nagas
and the Nagas may continue to be under British control. 45 Hazarika highlights that the desire
to be left alone and outside an Indian State was present from a nascent stage of Naga
nationalism.46 The reason he imputes to it is the perceived threat among the Nagas to their
customs and way of life from the Indians.47

It is interesting that while the Naga Club did not have an integral role to play in the
subsequent movement, the memorandum itself led to the Simon Commission in its report
suggesting that the Nagas were different from the people of India and hence must not be
clubbed with India for administrative purposes.48 As a result, under Sec 91 the Government of
India Act, 1935, the British Parliament designated the Naga Hill Districts as an Excluded
Area, outside the structure of the Indian Federation under the said Act.49

The effect of the provisions of the Government of India Act on the Nagas was a deeper
administrative control on the Hills by the British.50 Moreover, the provisions also ensured that
the Nagas were further separated from the sweep of the National Struggle, which had, as we
have discussed earlier, played an important role in the formation of anti-imperialist, Indian-
nationalist consciousness.51

45 Report of the Simon Commission.

46 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

47 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

48 Report of the Simon Commission.

49 Sec. 91, Government of India Act, 1935; Sec. 2, Government of India (Excluded and
Partially Excluded Areas) Order, 1936.

50 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

51 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

The next important stage in the development of Naga nationalism was the formation of the
Naga Hills District Tribal Council in 1945, overseen by the Deputy Commissioner Charles
Pawsey, which later evolved into the Naga Nationalist Council. The NNC was a body
constituting of the representatives of all the Naga tribes. 52 Self-determination, and integration
of all Naga inhabited territories were its professed goals, and this had varied interpretations. 53
Angamis and Aos were the two dominant tribes in the council. While the martial Angamis,
moved by a consciousness of being a nation, urged for sovereignty and independence, the
more moderate Aos saw that independence was not a practical option, given the finace,
personnel and infrastructure constraints54

Meanwhile, the moderate Aos had begun negotiation with the Congress leadership and had
been assured in 1946 by a letter written by Nehru to the NNC joint secretary S. Shakhire that
the Nagas would have complete autonomy within the Indian State. 55 In June 1947, the NNC
signed an agreement with the governor of Assam, Sir Abar Hydari. The agreement accorded
special rights to the Nagas, including autonomy to manage their affairs and a judicial system,
and provided a temporary framework for 10 years for the Nagas within the Indian Union. The
ninth and last point was that at the end of 10 years the NNC would be asked if the agreement
was to be continued or whether a new agreement was to be arrived at. 56 The NNC construed
this to include the freedom to secede from the Union, but the Indian Government took the
firm stand that secession was out of question. 57 The agreement was repudiated by the
Government of India.58 Dissuaded, the NNC declared Independence on 14 August 1947.

52 Misra, supra note 24.

53 Guha, supra note 16, at 262.

54 Guha, supra note 16, at 262.

55 Guha, supra note 16, at 262.

56 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

57 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

58 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22.

It is important to note the political climate of the subcontinent around this time. The early
years of the Republic were marked by two distinct undercurrents- one was identification with
the emerging Indian State, and the other being withdrawal from it.59 The Naga society and
politics that had remained remote for all socio-political reasons was touched by this later
current.

An important development in Naga politics was the rise of the Angami leader A.Z. Phizo as
the President of the NNC. Phizo, it is said, was deeply impressed by Jinnah and his success. 60
He reiterated the differences of the Nagas and the Indians, and that they constituted a
different nation altogether, and must be so acknowledged. 61 The NNC also repeatedly
reiterated a separate shared history of the Nagas, asserting, as we have traced in the earlier
part of this paper, that other than about seventy five years of British control starting since the
1880s, the Nagas were never subjugated by any other people and that they had never been a
part of what then constituted the Indian nation.62 This was the most important ideological
plank to their conception of their demand as one of independence. The characteristics of
national community, as Carr enumerates, were more immediate and cohesive for an
indigenous Naga identity, than an Indian-Naga identity. To cap it all, since the failure of the
Hydari agreement, the NNC which had largely been only apprehensive of the Indians as the
others, began to see the Indian State as an imperialist power, to be fought against. The
Indians were now projected by the NNC radicals as the Indians had seen their colonial
masters.

It is difficult to answer what was the extent of resentment to idea of accession to India in the
masses. For one, there were still inter-tribal differences on what was the best way for the

59 Nag, supra note 36.

60 Nag, supra note 36.

61 Guha, supra note 16, at 268.

62 Misra, supra note 24.

future of the Nagas.63 There is evidence, in fact, that even the majority Naga population was
not sympathetic with the radicals till the patent military atrocities in the mid-1950s.

Contrary to the Naga radicals, the Government of India maintained that the movement was
one of secession from an Indian Union.64 It is based on the simple belief that the territories
that the Naga radicals wish to carve as a nation is an inheritance from the Independence of
India Act, and the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, empowering the new Indian
Government to continue its administration in the Naga Hills.65 We will attempt to look at the
response of the Indian leadership to the Naga problem and examine the nature of the Indian
Union itself.

3. Indian Federation: A
Forced Union?
The jump from a nation to a nation-state, as Amartya Sen puts it, is a leap across a
considerable conceptual divide.66 The nation state is only a political instrument for
maintaining social order, national-integrity and to achieve common developmental aims. The
creation of a sense of being part of a national community must precede the membership of the
nation-state, to produce the conditions for a voluntary Union that a democratic federation
should ideally be.

It becomes pertinent in this regard to look at the way in which the Government of India has
sought to engage with the secessionist tendencies in general, and the Naga rebels in
particular. The Congress had made a declaration in the ________________ that when India
became independent, no province or princely state would be forced to be a part of the Union
against their will. It was a period in the national struggle still characterized by a greater
63 Guha, supra note 16.

64 Guha, supra note 16.

65 Chasie and Hazarika, supra note 22; Indian Independence Act, 1947; Extra Provincial
Jurisdiction Act, 1947.

66 Sen, supra note 5, at 25.

Hindu-Muslim unity, and the stature of the Muslim League as a dominant party to the
communal polarization was still not on the horizon. The Congress liberalism can be attributed
to a sense of confidence commensurate to the times. Alternatively, it was also important to
ensure the provincial leadership that independence would not bring other forms of political
subjugation, to amass their active support to the cause of the struggle. But the political
conditions by 1946 had changed.

The country in 1947 had been divided on the grounds of religion. At this time, the demand for
linguistic reorganization of states was also strong. The Congress had earlier made official
their commitment to reorganize the Union into linguistic states. 67 But in the fissiparous
situation that followed partition, there was an apprehension in the leadership that such
disruptive forces would lead to the break-up of the union. 68 A committee within the
constituent assembly on the question of Reorganization of Linguistic Provinces, constituted
by Vallabbhai Patel, declared that the first and last need at that moment was to make India a
Nation, and so everything that helped the formation of a nationalist feeling had to be
encouraged, while everything that presented an obstacle in that pursuit had to be rejected. 69
The secessionist demands, as India saw them, were definitely not helping the cause of
advancement of nationalism.

The idea that the Union was being forced on the Nagas was not lost on the NNC. It had met
Mahatma Gandhi in 1947, after the Hydari Agreement, and Gandhi had assured them that
they could not be forced to be part of the Union if they did not so wish. 70 Gandhi is said to
have extended his support to the Nagas were they to be repressed by the Indian State against
their demand for Independence.71 But Gandhi was no more the politically dominant force in

67 Guha, supra note 16.

68 Guha, supra note 16.

69 Guha, supra note 16.

70 Guha, supra note 16.

71 Guha, supra note 16.

the Congress, and was anyway assassinated long before the State unleashed its force on the
Nagas.

The States apathetic response to the Naga problem was a result also of its inability and
refusal to acknowledge the unique history of the Nagas. Nehru in a letter written to Mr.
Medhi, the then Chief Minister of Assam, conceded that the Nagas lacked the feeling of
being part of India, but located the reason for the same solely in British policies which he saw
as having worked deliberately to create a non-Indian feeling. 72 The Constituent Assembly
Debates were even less enlightening, with arguments of cultural superiority being made as a
justification to govern the Nagas.73 Even if we were to overlook the later view, the former,
was not only not entirely objective in itself, but also completely overlooked the more
significant historical causes for the same, as we have highlighted earlier.

The post-colonial State had its own reasons to stick to the Naga Hills in the face of strong
resistance. At stake was not merely the idea that India could endure differences, and the need
to hold on to the territorial inheritance from the British, but also more practical reasons. As
already stated, the State was on a consolidating phase and all disruptive forces were
discouraged. Equally importantly, the Nagas were a strategic frontier flanked by three
countries. The prospect of Chinese or East Pakistan occupation of the Naga Hills, if they were
to be independent, was not at all attractive.

The NNCs appeal in the Hills was swelling. The demand for independence having been
turned down repeatedly by Nehru, Phizo held a plebiscite on the question of Naga
independence and reported a 99.9% ayes.74 Guha compares this to the totalitarian plebiscites
of the Soviet Era,75 and it seems difficult to accept the emphatic consensus. Nevertheless,
Phizo, with the assumed legitimacy to his cause went on to boycott the general elections of
1952.76 The Naga radicals were now openly challenging the authority of the Indian-State. The
NNC started a parallel government in the Hills. Guha, quoting Jayprakash Narayan, who was

72 Guha, supra note 16.

73 Constituent Assembly Debates

74 Guha, supra note 16.

75 Guha, supra note 16.

member of the Peace Mission to Nagaland in 1964, informs that the Naga radicals were the
first to take up arms. Finally, to quell the Naga insurgency, the Government promulgated the
Armed Forces Special Powers Act for Assam in 1958. Introduced in the Parliament as a
temporary provision to provide legal powers to the Armed Forces to deal effectively with a
Law and Order situation, it has been continued for over 50 years.

The continuation in force of the AFSPA on the one hand, and negotiation with the more
moderate Nagas on the other is typical of the Government stance on the Naga issue- one
where they seem ready to grant greater autonomy to the Nagas within the Indian Constitution,
while at the same time cracking down on pro-independence hostiles, who have professedly
refused to abide by the Indian Constitution. 77 Negotiations have proved more effective with
the formation of the state of Nagaland in 1963, under the initiative of the moderate Naga
Peoples Council, and effective safeguard under the Sixth Schedule and Article 371A of the
Indian Constitution.78

But there are many more pro-independence groups in Nagaland today than ever, professing to
represent different tribes. The NNC since Phizo has given way to numerous secessionist
factions, with ideological differences. The NSCN-IN, led by Isak Muviah, is seen as the
major radical group presently. Inter faction rivalries are common, and come in the way of
arriving at a negotiated settlement, as it is difficult to appease all the groups simultaneously.
Latest in a series of such deadlocks is the Khaphlang led NSCN-Ks opposition to the
Government of India-NSCN(IN) peace accord.

Violence is still an everyday reality in the Naga Hills. Demands for integrating all the Naga
inhabited areas into an independent Nagalim are still voiced by certain groups. Hope for
peace requires the rebel groups to drop the demand for an independent Nagaland, and work
within a democratic structure to bring prosperity and peace to the Nagas. Moreover, as
Jayprakash Narayan had stated in 1965 in a speech given in Patna on the issue of Nagaland,
the autonomy within the Indian Constitution is optimum for the development of the Nagas, an

76 Guha, supra note 16.

77 B. Chandra et al, INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE, 146 (2008).

78 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

Independent Nagaland may fall only into chaos. The government too needs to make a grand
gesture and repeal the AFSPA from the region to generate trust in its commitment.

The conflict has been rather long drawn, and an end to it is certainly what the Nagas would
hope for.
 CONCLUSION
As Ramchandra Guha, in Redeeming The Empire points out, the Naga secessionist movement
presents a challenge to the very idea of India, in the form of the notion that the Indian Union
is an artificial cobbling together of rival nationalities that must, in time, break up into its
constituent parts.79 The sense of not being a part of the Indian Nation, arises in part from the
distinctiveness of the Naga people and their history, from their absence from the national
struggle, from the inevitable (and not necessarily pre-meditated) effects of the British
isolationist policies in the region, from their geographical isolation, and from the post-
colonial authoritarian response of the Government of India. This has been at the root of the
NNCs, and later its offshoot NSCN-INs demand for Independence.

This aspect of Naga nationality has not been historically given due recognition by the State,
which led to the high handed response to Naga nationalism. This has also led to the notion
that the Naga-Indian Union was a forced one.

Political problems must have political solutions, and both sides must come half way by
means of dialogue to attain the most acceptable solution to the long standing Naga problem.
The Indian Idea has the space to accommodate and assimilate myriad differences. The
Constitution provides this avenue. While the Naga radicals, representative of the separatist
will of some Nagas, have historically maintained independence as the end, and have resorted
to violence as the means, positives have come only under the framework of the Constitution.

A question that most urgently merits answer is that what explains the persistence of the Naga
movement, while similar movements emerged and died down. The attempt at forging the
sensation of being a nation with India, was expected to be engendered only after the
imposition of the State- a reverse of the pattern that Indian National Movement followed.
Moreover, unlike the tribes of the mainland or other community based identities, the Nagas
had never had any cultural contact with the larger Indian culture. And so the Nationalist
leaders perhaps also underestimated the immediacy, relevance and richness of belonging to
fragments, rather than belonging to the more remote collective of the nation

79 R. Guha, PATRIOTS AND PARTISANS: FROM NEHRU TO HINDUTVA AND BEYOND, 17

(2012).
The Naga issue has aspects unique to the Naga history, with no parallel in other Indian States.
It is a question of what is the best response to a people who do not desire to be assimilated
into the pluralism of the Indian Idea. There are no straightforward answers in a world
dominated by expansionist States. The Nagas have to look at practical implications of their
choices.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:

1. A. R. Desai, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF INDIAN NATIONALISM (6 th edn., 2000).

2. A. Sen, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE AND
IDENTITY (2005).
3. B. Chandra et al, INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2008).
4. B. Chandra, ESSAYS ON INDIAN NATIONALISM (1993).
5. C. Chasie and S. Hazarika, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: INDIA AND THE NAGA
INSURGENCY (2009).
6. MAKERS OF MODERN INDIA (R. Guha ed., 2010).
7. N. Nibedon, NAGALAND: THE NIGHT OF THE GUERRILLAS (2000).
8. R. Guha, INDIA AFTER GANDHI (2007).
9. R. Guha, PATRIOTS AND PARTISANS: FROM NEHRU TO HINDUTVA AND BEYOND
(2012).
10. R. Thapar, PAST AS PRESENT (2014).
11. S. Bhattacharya, TALKING BACK: THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION IN THE INDIA
NATIONALIST DISCOURSE (2011).
12. S. Khilnani, THE IDEA OF INDIA (1997).
13. S. Nag, NATIONALISM, SEPARATISM AND SECESSIONISM (1999).
14. U. Misra, THE PERIPHERY STRIKES BACK: CHALLENGES TO THE NATION-STATE IN

ASSAM AND NAGALAND (2000).

ARTICLES

1. A. Guha, The Indian National Question: A Conceptual Frame, 17(31) ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL WEEKLY (July 31, 1982).
2. A. Sen, On Interpreting Indias Past in NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT (A. Jalal and S. Bose eds., 1997).
3. C. Singh, Nagaland: From a District to a State: Culmination of Democratic Political
Process, 41(4) THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 815 (December, 1980).
4. D. Kinon, From Loincloth, Suits to Battle Greens in BEYOND COUNTER-INSURGENCY:
BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN NORTHEAST (S. Baruah ed., 2011).
5. L. Harding, Naga Rebels Declare End of War with India, THE GUARDIAN (January 14,
2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/14/india.lukeharding
(Last visited on April 17, 2016).
6. N. Goswami, Naga Identity - Ideals, Parallels, and Reality, THE HINDU CENTRE FOR

POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (June 16, 2014), available at

 http://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article6114531.ece (Last
visited on April 17, 2016).
7. R. Guha, Ideas of India: 1884, 1931, 1997 in THE LAST LIBERAL AND OTHER ESSAYS
(2004).
8. S. K. Pillai, Anatomy of an Insurgency: Ethnicity and Identity in Nagaland, SOUTH
ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL, available at
www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume3/Fault3-GenPillaiF.htm (Last
visited on April 17, 2016).
9. S. Misra, Nature Of Colonial Intervention In The Naga Hills, 33(51) ECONOMIC AND

POLITICAL WEEKLY 3273 (December 19, 1998).

10. S. Tharoor, Indian Identity is Forged in Diversity. Everyone of us is in a minority, THE
GUARDIAN, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/aug/15/comment.india (Last visited
on April 17, 2016).
11. S. Tharoor, The Ideas of India, HINDUSTAN TIMES (August 14, 2010), available at
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/the-ideas-of-india/story-
IhAapQT761CBxBuamBjLaP.html (Last visited on April 17, 2016).
12. U. Misra, The Naga National Question, 13(14) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
618 (April 8, 1978).

STATUTES

1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

2. Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947.
3. Government of India (Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas) Order, 1936.
4. Government of India Act, 1935.
5. Indian Independence Act, 1947.

MISCELLANOUS

1. Naga Club Memorandum to Simon Commission

2. Simon Commission Report
3. Constituent Assembly Debates, on schedule VI, 6 september 1949,volume IX