) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS NUEVAS, et. al. G.R. No.

170233

February 22, 2007 Facts: Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a
delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description,
carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas. They confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of
marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. The police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the
place where according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located.
From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as
police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to
Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and
wrapped therein." are violated. All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court
found them guilty with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived his right of appeal. The appellate court found Fami and
Cablings version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. However the other 2 filed
there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they are not guilty and their constitutional
rights against warrantless arrest. However, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is
exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din
voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant
case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?
Ruling: No. The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and
seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof. Our
Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions,
namely: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented
warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. In the
instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. Arrest must preced the search. A
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can make the arrest as the outset of the search. Reliable
information alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113. A peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a concent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced
that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. Thus, the Court would have
affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. However, with respect to the search conducted

1
in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus, their arrest was indeed a
violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest.

8.) PEOPLE v. IDEL AMINNUDIN G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts: PC officers received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for
him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him. Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 .They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It
was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.
An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag
was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. The trial court did not
believe the appellant. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. In the case at bar, there was no
warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of
probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante
nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed
under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of
the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. The present case presented no such urgency.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In the many cases where this Court
has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they
were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents.
25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption
is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him. He must be acquitted.

) PEOPLE v. ROGELIO MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992 FACTS: The Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
2
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them
the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for
investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm
arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the
police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that
he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his
arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and
therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. Section 5 (a) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of court requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. The Solicitor General submits that the
actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on
the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?

G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of
shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and
would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was about to board a tricycle
when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him to the police station. As he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 5

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: (1) WON the warrant of arrest was violated.

(2) WON the evidence was admissible in evidence.

RULING: (1) No. Reliable information alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
3
 (2) No. This is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree. Hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions,
namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

Soliven vs. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law
0
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila

FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or
not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by
the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot
and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscals finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for

4
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April
7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners contention that they have been denied the administrativeremedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is
LIFTED.

RATIO:

Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice
5
 MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed
a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that
is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.

Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants
of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrests.

However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
6
 In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall:

(1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest); or

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf.

The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person
(And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege).

Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a chilling effect on press freedom.

7
 Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage
to rule on the chilling effect point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues.
With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press
freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be
resolved now rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. United States v.
Bustos
No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. People v. Perfecto

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

8
 Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of
public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms
and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported
in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 112659 January 24, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
9
SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at large), accused. FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI
BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, 1 YAMBA LISASI BHOLA,2 and
ZARIATU AMIDU3pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 64254 embodied in an Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and other parts
of Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport 8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act as brokers in any of
the aforesaid transactions with or without consideration.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay City Jail before the
arraignment. He remains at large.5

The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993, accused
Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was in
the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin 6 hidden under the false bottom of a black
suitcase.7 He informed the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people 8 at the
Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.9

Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA for
further investigation. 10 The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO SABLAYAN, formed a team,
headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA, 11 to conduct follow-up operations in the case. 12 The team
and agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel, 13 where they allowed
Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin. 14

At around eight o'clock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri received a telephone
call from his contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten
o'clock that night. 15 He relayed the information to his escorts, NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN
GAPIANGAO 16 and SPO4 ELPIDIO BALNEG. 17Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned
themselves inside the washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual access to the
rest of the hotel room. 18

On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and other NARCOM and
Bureau of Customs agents were watching for unusual and suspicious events. 19 From where he sat at
the hotel's coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu paced around the lobby for nearly an
hour.20 At about ten p.m., Amidu's co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel. 21 As

10
Amidu flashed a "thumbs up" sign to them, they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth
floor of the hotel. 22

They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he sat, 23 opened
the door, and let the three appellants in. 24 Leangsiri took the black suitcase 25 and brought it to the
dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and
Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed its contents to his visitors. 26

Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags which contained
the heroin. 27After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to
appellants. 28 Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when Gapiangao and
Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the
arrest. 29

Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four foreigners in
Room 504. 30Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by presenting their respective
passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in Room 413 of the same
hotel. 31 Further questioning of appellants revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the
Royal Palm Hotel, also located in Manila. 32

Accompanied by the hotel's owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidu's room.
Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name
"SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI" written on it. 33 The paper and Amidu's other possessions were
confiscated. 34

The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the security officers of the hotel,
who stood as witnesses when the former entered and searched said appellants' room. Their efforts
yielded two black suitcases each with false bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from
Leangsiri. 35 Masking tape and an empty transparent bag were also found in the room. 36
37
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told a different tale.

Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that fateful night of March
31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu and an American named
David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as they made their way to Room 413
(Amidu's room), they were accosted by some people who forcibly brought them to Room 504. They
explained that they were at the hotel to meet Amidu. Some of those who intercepted them left the
room and returned with Amidu. Appellants' money and jewelry were taken from them. Those who
dispossesed them turned out to be policemen.

Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered its premises as
appellants and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were brought to NARCOM
headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were presented to the media as members of an
international drug syndicate.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of conspiring to transport
heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

11
 xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the accused
(herein appellants ) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and ZARIATU
AMIDU, "guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime described in the Information, and
hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of "life imprisonment" plus a fine of P30,000 for
each of (them).

The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.

The "Heroin" of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner provided by
law.

SO ORDERED.

On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the following -

I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE

TRIAL PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN
APPELLANTS);

II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED WHICH THE
ACCUSED (APPELLANTS) COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE HAVE
DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND
ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE THE JUDGMENT.

The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita Thach
Camerino, a Thai citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:

1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid Prison
Compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila;

2. That on or about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed the arrival of
inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;

3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the concrete wall,
but after a few attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another woman;

4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was behaving
that way, and found out that she and the two other male detainees were just sentenced by the
Court of very severe penalty of life imprisonment;

5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience rebelled and
started tormenting (her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the crime charged against
them of transporting heroin into the country;

6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered (her) help, if
it is still possible under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could extend to let justice

12
 prevail and reveal the truth out of that incident on the evening of 31 March 1993, at Las
Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA, acting as an interpreter between
Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the former was being interrogated at the NARCOM
Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in the afternoon of 31 March
1993, and into the evening of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;

7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them) that he
was going to deliver his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not identify the
person whom he was going to meet at the hotel nor mention the name/s of the same;

8. That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda Leangsiri,
and the police team arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri were instructed
to proceed to the desk counter and check-in, and got Room 504 to occupy;

9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went to Room
504 to await for someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the claim or
testimony that SP03 Gapiangao and SP04 Balneg were also inside Room 504 together with
Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;

10. That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black males
whom (she) later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;

11. That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati
Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting and complaining to the police why they were brought inside
Room 504;

12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady friend
billeted at Room 413 of the same hotel;

13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to go with
him, and (they) immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu Amidu to
Room 504 to join with the two male black nationals already inside;

14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel, where
(they) search the room of the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;

15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at NAIA, where
(she) divested the three black nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn them over
to Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping;

16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in court during
my testimony in the trial of the case against (appellants);

xxx xxx xxx38

The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:

xxx xxx xxx

13
 The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and
conclusions regarding the guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well as the sufficiency of
the evidence against them, are amply supported by the evidence, and the present motion did
not ventilate any new matter as to warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set aside.

With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the stance
taken by the accused (appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could
not be considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to the premises of the Court
for identification during the trial of this case. Besides, her testimony, summarized in the
undated Affidavit submitted by the accused (appellants) on September 24, 1993, does not
inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted by this Court for violation of the
dangerous drugs law, as amended.

xxx xxx xxx39

Appellants now impugn the trial court's decision and its denial of their motion for new trial, and raise
the following assignments of error:

I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXISTENCE OF

CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;

II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT AND/OR

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE

TESTIMONIES AND OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE
ACCUSED.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING

TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE
ACCUSED;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 40

We affirm appellants' conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.

One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport
eight-and-a-half kilos of heroin.

Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The first prong urges
that there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the transport of heroin by
Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiri's testimony can prove their alleged conspiracy.
The running fault in appellants' line of reasoning is obvious to the eye.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 41 It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that conspiracy need not
be proved by direct evidence. 42 Proof of previous agreement to commit the crime is not also essential
14
to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct
before, during, and after the commission of the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we
have upheld the finding of conspiracy where it is shown that the accused acted in concert to attain the
same objective.

In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution

witnesses Gapiangao, Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants aimed at
carrying out the unlawful design of transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. when Leangsiri
was interrogated after his arrest, he revealed to the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband
to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel. Later, while in Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri received
a telephone call in the presence of Gapiangao and Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin
would be picked up from him at ten o'clock in the evening. Shortly before the designated pick-up time,
Samala saw appellant Amidu (who had been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour) flash
a "thumbs up" sign to appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola when they arrived at the hotel. The three
(3) appellants then took the elevator and went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room
504, and Leangsiri let them into the room. In full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants examined
Leangsiri's heroin, and took it and the suitcase with the false bottom in which it was hidden.
Appellants were on their way out of the room with the suitcase and heroin when they were arrested
by Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show beyond doubt that appellants conspired with Leangsiri
to transport the illegal drug heroin.

Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, from Leangsiri
to appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the control of the NARCOM
on the evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the fringes of reason is appellants' argument that
since the NARCOM agents had already taken Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody and control,
it is the NARCOM agents who should be liable for transporting the said heroin confiscated from
Leangsiri.

Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:

The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. . . .(Emphasis supplied)

The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri and the heroin to
Las Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in furtherance of their follow-up
operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend appellants to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to
be made.

Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in possession of the heroin,
they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were neither delivering nor
transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not penalize the recipient of the
delivered contraband. 43

The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho Wing. 44 In Lo Hong
Wing, the authorities gathered from their intelligence and surveillance activities that the accused were
going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the country. The accused were arrested while on-board a taxi

15
cab which they hailed and boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that there was no
delivery, transporting or dispatching of shabu made by the accused therein, we held:

xxx xxx xxx

The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea
bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or" was used, thereby
implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative.
Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a
source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that
"dispatching" cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for
"transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act
of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non-existent under
the given facts.

The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which
appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no
doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of
transporting a prohibited drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one
place to another." The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that
there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was
committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the
argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co-accused did not
intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no place of destination.

The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted
by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already
been commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel carrying
the suitcase with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were arrested by the
NARCOM agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying the heroin to an unknown
destination. Their act was part of the process of transporting the heroin. They were all involved in a
conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the heroin is appellants' act. They cannot isolate and
separate themselves from Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. "C" and its sub-exhibits) and the suitcase with false
bottom (Exh. "F") are admissible against appellants.

It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally offered only
against Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General in
his Brief:

xxx xxx xxx

16
 The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo and
State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits "A" to "Q" and their submarkings
against Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original Records, pp. 67-71). . . .45

Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in Amidu's hotel
room, with the name "SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI" written on it, 46 should not have been admitted by the
trial court.

The Revised Rules of Court provide that "(a) person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. 47 We interpreted this provision in Nolasco vs. Pao, 48 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided . . . that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at
the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot
be made in a place other than the place of arrest.

We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accused's apartment which
was located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal for being "an untenable
violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we validated warrantless
searches made not only on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible area within his
reach. 49 We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless search goes beyond the person of the one
arrested and includes the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 50 The immediate
control test was enunciated in the American case of Chimel vs. State of California. 51 In that case,
defendant was arrested in his home for burglary of a coin shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers
conducted a search of his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, a small
workshop, and drawers. Various items - primarily coins - were found through the search, and were
admitted in evidence against him by the trial court, which convicted him of burglary. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction as it struck down the warrantless search on the ground
that the search of the accused's home went far beyond his person and the area from within which he
might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against
him.

The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the
suspect's person and the premises under his immediate control admits of an exception. The
exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as explained in People vs. Musa, 52 in this
wise:

. . . Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information
that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the
17
 building manager a passkey to defendant's apartment, and entered it. There they found the
defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one
of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, as
small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green
leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the
package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it
was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing
the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not
constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view." . . .
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the
basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecution's evidence.

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer
is not, searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. . . . Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine.

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain
view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper
bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel,
and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the
warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as
evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate
appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining
evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a quo. The trial court
judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand, and his findings are
entitled to great weight.

The inconsistencies in Gapiangao's, Balneg's, and Samala's testimonies alluded to by appellants

hardly relate to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved the elements of the
crime at bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that corroborative testimonies, in order to be
credible, need not coincide on all aspects. Given the natural limitations of the human senses, the
immaterial and slight discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses, far from weakening their
18
probative value, serve to strengthen their credibility. Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect
testimonies. 53

Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the testimonies of
some prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally reflected in their Joint
Affidavit, dated April 1, 1993. 54 We have held before that:

The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in
his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. . . . 55

In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The story proffered
by appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and incredible to be believed.
His story begins in February, 1992, with his wife and two children being killed in a civil war in his
native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to migrate to the United States of America. 56 He first
flew to Thailand, where he stayed for six months without managing to learn a single Thai
word. 57 Despite his language inadequacy, he was able to land a job in a cargo company in that
country. He did not befriend any Thai national. Neither did he apply for an American visa in
Thailand. 58

He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to obtain an American
visa from the United States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan flew from Thailand to our
country. He stepped on Philippine soil on March 16, 1993, only to learn that Jabar and Samsi had
long left the country. 59 Instead of going to the United States embassy at Roxas Boulevard or any of
the many travel agencies doing business in the country, he spent his first two weeks here making the
rounds of bars and clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow Africans and American citizens
who could help him obtain an American visa. In this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-appellant
Bhola 60 and an American named David whom he was supposed to meet on the fateful night of March
31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved in with Bhola at the Royal Palm Hotel, and David promised to
help him obtain his American passport. 61

Omogbolahan's a story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a convenient defense and
to elicit sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-appellants are equally incredulous. They
are also tattered with inconsistencies. As observed by the Solicitor General, they could not even get
their occupations straight, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she testified, a
widow and as shown in her passport, a seamstress by occupation. However, in her testimony;
she stated that she is a plain housewife, (tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)

On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central
Africa, 37 years old at the time he testified, married and a high school graduate. . . . In his
testimony, he stated that he is a trader . . . Later on, he stated that he was working for the New
Star Investment in Thailand as marketing officer. 62 (tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)

19
 Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an elementary
graduate and plumber according to his passport. In his testimony, however, he claimed to be a
technician.63 (tsn July 13, 1993 p. 4).

Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying appellants'
motion for new trial.

We find appellants' first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As discussed above, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against the substantive rights of
appellants do not exist.

Appellants' second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise unmeritorious. Section 1
Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved party the right to move for new trial on the
ground, among others, of "(n)ewly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the
result (thereof)." 64 Newly discovered evidence, in order to warrant a new trial, must meet three
requirements, viz: (1) it must have been discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if presented, it would probably alter the
results of the action. 65

In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of reasonable diligence,
they could not have obtained Camerino's testimony during the trial. On the contrary, as correctly
noted by the trial court, Camerino was identified in open court by appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerino's prospective testimony would acquit appellants. Firstly, her
affidavit embodies a narration of events almost identical to that presented by appellants. As has been
discussed earlier, the defense version of what occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is
incredible and difficult to believe. Secondly, Camerino's claim that she was a member of the team that
arrested appellants is belied by the testimony of prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

STATE PROS.:

One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused through
counsel claim she was a member of the team which arrested the three Africans now the
accused in this case. What can you say to that?

A: I don't know that person, sir.

Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when you met
this Julita Camerino?

A: I don't know, sir.

Q: You don't recall any?

A: I don't recall any, sir.

20
 xxx xxx xxx

Court:

Cross?

ATTY. BORJA:

Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your interpreter during the
custodial investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the person of Suchinda
Leangsiri?

A: No, sir.

ATTY. BORJA:

She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the police
headquarters or at the Las Palmas Hotel?
66
A: I don't know that person, sir.

Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been previously convicted
of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order, dated October 11, 1993, of
the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

21