CASE 43

LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

GR L-12486 31 AUG 1960

Facts:

The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square
meters of residential land which they have inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos
Bongato and Eusebia. The former were ordered by the to vacate and deliver it to said
respondents and to pay a monthly rental of P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until
they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's fees and costs.

The Petitioners alleged that the said property became a subject of a cadastral survey due
to conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. In that survey, Gregorio Bongato's lot,
according to petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and that of Isidaria Trillo, their
predecessor in interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-72 (138) covers 295 square meters of land, while the sketch plan of the second
cadastral survey of Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230 square meters,
petitioners maintain that it is the latter area properly belongs to respondents and that the
land in question is part of the adjoining land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their
predecessor in interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or that it included part of the contiguous
land of petitioners' predecessor in interest?

Held:

Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was presented to show that the first survey was
erroneous or that it included part of the contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in
interest as part of the lot now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138).
Note that the difference in area between the land covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of
the resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area of the land in dispute if 87 square
meters. And what is more, the alleged sketch plan of the resurvey was not presented in
evidence.

Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the land in question is part of the lot covered
by the Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the name of respondents' predecessor in
interest. Said title has not been contested up to the present, and, therefore, has become
inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the land covered by it. Well settled is the rule
that a Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive and indefeasible after the lapse of
the period within which it may be impugned (Reyes, et al. vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791;
Yumul vs. Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however,
were found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon
in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner
of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building,
after payment to the builder of necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case,
expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the
land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either
appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the
proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which
stands the improvement. It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for
respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house
standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The
more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part
of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are
unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they
do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the
case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement
as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the
same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article 448 of the new).
Case 55

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176929 July 4, 2008
INOCENCIO Y. LUCASAN for himself and as the Judicial Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late JULIANITA SORBITO LUCASAN, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) as receiver and
liquidator of the defunct PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
The Case:
On appeal is the March 23, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81518, affirming the July 24, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 43, granting respondents motion to dismiss, as well as its
subsequent Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Petitioner Inocencio Y. Lucasan (Lucasan) and his wife Julianita Sorbito (now
deceased) were the owners of Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E situated in Bacolod City,
respectively, subject of a mortgage loan and for failure to pay, the lots were sold at
public auction and were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder.
Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the properties
within the redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition for consolidation
of ownership.
In January 1997, Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), PBCs receiver and liquidator seeking the cancellation of
the certificate of sale and offering to pay PBCs claim against Lucasan.
Not long thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. Consequently, the
mortgagee banks executed their respective releases of mortgage, resulting in the
cancellation of the prior encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.
On August 13, 2001, PDIC denied Lucasans request for the cancellation of the
certificate of sale advising the latter that said properties be disposed of in a public
bidding in accordance with its policy.
Lucasan then filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief with the RTC of Bacolod
City
On July 24, 2003, the RTC granted PDICs motion to dismiss, finding the claim of any
cloud over the titles of Lucasan to be bereft of basis in fact and in law.
Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on October 20, 2003.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared that Lucasan already lost
his right to redeem the properties when he failed to exercise it within the prescribed
period. The effect of such failure was to vest in PBC absolute ownership over the
subject properties.
Issue:
WON the RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans complaint for quieting of title.
Held:
Unfortunately for Lucasans complaint, the foregoing requisites to avail of the remedy of
quieting of title are wanting.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy Stated differently, the plaintiff must show
that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute,
and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject
parcels of land was held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and was registered and
annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or
redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months
from the registration of the certificate of sale. With the expiration of the twelve-month
period of redemption and no redemption having been made, as in this case, the
judgment debtor or the redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in
question.
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period,
on account of his then limited financial situation.23 It was only in January 1997 or fifteen
(15) years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus,
he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997 cannot, in any way,
operate to restore whatever rights he had over the subject properties. Such payment
only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which
Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo
and certificate of sale.
Case 67

G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982

Facts:
The subject lot was originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife and after
their death, the lot was succeeded by their children, Maria, Evaristo, Faustino, Estefanio
and Tropinio. Petitioner then averred that he purchased the 2/5 of the lot from Estefanio
and respondents purchased 1/5 of the lot from Evaristo. The part of the land in
controversy was the 1/5 portion. This prompted the private respondents to file a case of
ejectment and recovery of possession, where in fact there has been no partition yet on
the subject lot. Both the lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the co-owners may sell a specific part of the co-owned property without
partition.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative and reversed the decision of the lower court.

The fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and the
sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition
of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and
both sales are valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and
respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio
and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate 7 subject to provisions on
subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in
Article 1088 of the Civil Code.

Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite
portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of
by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For
where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih
respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it
remains undivided