Mejoff vs.
Director of Prisons
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein
(Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, as
impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not
enemy, against whom no charge has been made other than that their
permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and
except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens,
regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in
violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The
petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by
the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees
were law during the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights"
and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings
are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2); that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,
this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an
order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the
Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee's right to
bail.
Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia
This Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growing importance of the individual person in public international law who,
in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root.
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and
all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not
a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part
of the law of the land.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution.
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While
this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It
is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full- blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee's rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object
of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing
our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting
bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Cario vs. CHR
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members
of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education.
They complained to CHR.
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power
to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights?
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules
of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.
EPZA vs. CHR
P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in
Rosario and General Trias, Cavite as the Cavite Export Processing Zone. A
parcel in Phase IV was brought by the Filoil Refinery Corporation and was
later sold by Fioil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Several
individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products
therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Fioil. According to
the CHR, the private respondents (farmers), filed in the Commission on
Human Rights a verified complaint for violation of their human rights.
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining
order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease
and desist from continuing the acts complained of?
In "Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice
nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.
It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid services mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court
of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court
