VOL.

167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 363

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
*
No. L-73998. November 14, 1988.

PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and
TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Evidence; The rule that the

findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect
and will not ordinarily be disturbed is not inflexible; it is subject to
some established exceptions.Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the
review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that its findings of fact
are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by
this Court. For if we have to review every question of fact elevated
to us, we would hardly have any more time left for the weightier
issues compelling and deserving our preferential attention. Be that
as it may, this rule is not inflexible. Surely there are established
exceptionswhen the Court should review and rectify the findings
of fact of the lower court, such as: 1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case if the
findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and the
appellee; 6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 8) the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and 9) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted on record.
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the
personal judgment of the actor in a given situation; It is the law that
determines

________________

* SECOND DIVISION.

364

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

what would be reckless or negligent.The question before us is who

was negligent? Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as
Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury." In Picart vs. Smith, decided more
than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we held: The test by
which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, Defined.At this juncture, it may be enlightening and
helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to
examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine is stated
thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa
loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive
control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing
which caused injury is shown to have been under management and
control of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ.
App., 484 S.W. 2d 113, 115. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negli-

365

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 365

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

gence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was

caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
particular to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine
is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence,
it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising
from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where
plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury
complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise
cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant
on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of
injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or
by the defendant, 110 presumptions will be involved and the
doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this
case.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Negligence of Master or
Employer; The presumption of negligence on the part of the master
or employer is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the
employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection or supervision of his employees.The private respondent is
sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the
Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was

366

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the

selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption
is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability
for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence
of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his
driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and
that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then

 Intermediate Appellate Court. Veloso, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edralin S. Mateo for petitioner.
Orlando L. Espinas for respondent Travellers Multi-
Indemnity Corp.
Roberto T. Vallarta for respondent Godofredo Isidro.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Assailed1 in this petition for review on certiorari are

2
1) the
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. CV No. 01055, entitled "Pedro T. Layugan, Plaintiff-
Appellee, versus Godofredo Isidro, Defendant-Appellant
and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Travellers
Multi-Indemnity Corporation, Third Party Defendant- 3
Appellant, "which reversed and set aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch
XXVI, Cabanatuan City, and also dismissed the complaint,
third party complaint, and4
the counter claims of the parties
and 2) the resolution denying the plaintiff-appellee's
(herein petitioner) motion for reconsideration,

_______________

1 Veloso, Marcelino R., ponente; Sison, Porfirio V., Bidin, Abdulwahid

A., and Britanico, Ramon B., JJ., concurring.
2 Fourth Civil Cases Division.
3 Rendered by Judge Leticia P. Morales.
4 Veloso, Mercelino R., J., ponente; Sison, Porfirio V., Bidin,
Abdulwahid A., and Britanico, Ramon B., JJ., concurring.

367

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 367

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

for lack of merit.

The findings of fact by the trial court 5 which were
adopted by the appellate court are as followsd:

xxx xxx xxx

"Pedro T, Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo
Isidro, alleging that on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the
tire of their cargo truck with Plate No. SU-730 which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck
bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano
bumped the plaintiff; that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center
and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and will incur more expenses as
he recuperates from said injuries; that because of said injuries he
would be deprived of a lifetime income in the sum of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00); and that he agreed to pay his
lawyer the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
As prayed for by the plaintiff's s counsel, the Court declared the
defendant in default 011 October 12, 1979, and plaintiff s evidence
was received ex-parte on January 11, 1978 and Febraury 19, 1980.
The decision on behalf of the plaintiff was set aside to give a chance
to the defendant to file his answer and later on, a third-party
complaint.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the
accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that the
plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a
brotherin-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly
being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane
towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the
proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the
parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the
driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by
the truck of the herein defendant in the amount of more than
P20,000.00; that plaintiff being a mere bystander and hitchhiker
must suffer all the damages he incurred. By way of counterclaim
defendant alleged that due to plaintiff s baseless complaint he was
constrained to engage the services of counsel for P5,000.00 and
P200.00 per court appearance; that he suffered sleepless nights,
humiliation, wounded feelings which may be estimated at
P30.000.00.

_______________

5 Decision of IAC, Rollo, 46-49.

368

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed by the

defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity
Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff, without admitting his
liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant is
liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by
virtue of their contract under Insurance Policy No. 11723 which
covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily
injuries and damage to property.
Third-party defendant answered that, even assuming that the
subject matter of the complaint is covered by a valid and existing
insurance policy, its liability shall in no case exceed the limit
defined under the terms and conditions stated therein; that the
complaint is premature as no claim has been submitted to the third
party defendant as prescribed under the Insurance Code; that the
accident in question was approximately caused by the carelessness
and gross negligence of the plaintiff; that by reason of the third-
party complaint, third-party defendant was constrained to engage
the services of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00.
Pedro Layugan declared that he is a married man with one (1)
child. He was employed as security guard in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, with a salary of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (600.00) a month.
When he is off-duty, he worked as a truck helper and while working
as such, he sustained injuries as a result of the bumping of the
cargo truck they were repairing at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya by the driver of the defendant. He used to earn TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) to THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P300.00) monthy, at the rate of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P1
00.00) per trip. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so
he had to use crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he supported
his family sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family is now
being supported by his parents and brother.
GODOFREDO ISIDRO, defendant/third-party plaintiff, testified
that his truck involved in this vehicular accident is insured with the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation covering own damage and
third-party liability, under vehicle policy No. 11723 (Exh. T) dated
May 30, 1978; that after he filed the insurance claim the insurance
company paid him the sum of P18,000.00 for the damages sustained
by this truck but not the third party liability.
DANIEL SERRANO, defendant driver, declared that he gave a
statement before the municipal police of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya
on May 16, 1979; that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that
before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to
instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being
repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop

369
 VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 369
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

position.
From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's
driver, Daniel Serrano. The police report confirmed the allegation of
the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-examination.
The collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned
the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained
injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left leg of the plaintiff
from below the knee was later on amputated (Exh. 'C') when
gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work
depriving him of his income." (pp. 118 to 120, Record on Appeal.)
xxx xxx xxx

Upon such findings, amply supported by the evidence on

record, the trial court rendered
6
its decision, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendant is hereby

ordered:

a) To pay the plaintiff SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00)

PESOS actual and compensatory damages;
b) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for attorney's fees;
c) FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for moral damages;
and
d) To pay the costs of this suit.

On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant is

ordered to indemnify the defendant/third party plaintiff:

a) The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for

actual and compensatory damages; and
b) The costs of this suit.

The Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated

reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint, the third-party 7
complaint, and the counter-
claims of both appellants.
Hence, this petition. 8
The petitioner alleges the following errors.

_______________
 6 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Rollo, 32.
7 Ibid., p. 52.
8 Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-9.

370

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

1. WHETHER UPON THE GIVEN FACTS, THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ACTED
CORRECTLY IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE AND DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT.
2. WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH
PROPER JURIS-PRUDENTIAL (sic) BASIS.

The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error

of the decision of the respondent court finding the
petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur
(The thing speaks for itself), Corollary thereto, is the
question as to who is negligent, if the doctrine is
inapplicable.
The respondent corporation stresses that the issues
raised in the petition being factual, the same is not
reviewable9 by this Court in a petition for review by
certiorari.
Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals that its findings of fact
are entitled to great respect
10
and will not ordinarily be
disturbed by this Court. For if we have to review every
question of fact elevated to us, we would hardly have any
more time left for the weightier issues 11
compelling and
deserving our preferential attention. Be that as it may,
this rule 12is not inflexible. Surely there are established
exceptions when the Court should review and rectify the
findings of fact of the lower court, such as:
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

_______________

9 Rollo, 108.
10 The Executive Secretary, et al. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-37999, June 10,
1988, citing Chan vs. CA, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737;
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-37783, January 28,1988.
11 Anderson Co., et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-65928, June 21,1988.
12 Director of Lands vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46068, September 30, 1982,
117 SCRA 346, citing Macadangdang vs. CA, No. L-49542, September
12,1980, 100 SCRA 73; Manero vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49824, February
20,1981; 102 SCRA 817; Pio L. Padilla vs. C.A., January 29,1988; G.R.
75577, January 29,1988; Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs. IAC,
G.R. L-72126, January 29,1988.

371

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 371

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference made

is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; 5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case if the findings are contrary to the admission of both
the appellant and the appellee; 6) the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 7) the
said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; 8) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and 9)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
on record.
Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case
to warrant a deviation from the general rule.
From its finding that13
the parked truck was loaded with
ten (10) big round logs, the Court of Appeals inferred that
because of its weight the truck could not have been driven
to the shoulder of the road and concluded
14
that the same
was parked on a portion of the road at the time of the
accident. Consequently, the respondent court inferred that
the mishap was 15
due to the negligence of the driver of the
parked truck. The inference or conclusion is manifestly
erroneous. In a large measure, it is grounded on
speculation, surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent
court could have reversed the finding
16
of the trial court that
a warning device was installed escapes us because it is
evident from the record that really such a device, in the
form of a lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver
of the parked truck
17
three to four meters from the rear of
his parked truck. We see this negative finding of the
respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts and
the evidence on record and directly contravening the
positive finding of the trial court that an early warning
device was in proper place when the accident happened and
that the driver

_______________

13 Decision, Court of Appeals, 50.

14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Petition, 13.

372

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

of the private respondent was the one negligent. On the

other hand, the respondent court, in refusing to give its
"imprimatur to the trial court's finding and conclusion that
Daniel Serrano (private respondent Isidro's driver) was
negligent in driving the truck that bumped the parked
truck", did not cite specific evidence to support its
conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and nebulously
18
adverted to unspecified "scanty evidence on record."
On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent
corporation would want us to dismiss this petition on the
ground that it was filed out of time.
19
It must be noted that
there was a motion for extension, albeit filed erroneously
with the respondent court, dated March 19,1986,
requesting for 30 days from March 20,1986, to file the
necessary petition or pleading before the Supreme Court".
Also, on April 1,1986, an appearance of a new lawyer 20
for
the petitioner before the Supreme Court" with motion was
filed, again erroneously, with the Court of Appeals,
requesting for 20 days extension "to file the Petition 21
for
Review on Certiorari." Likewise a similar motion was
filed with this Court also on April 1, 1986. On the other
hand, the instant petition for review was filed on April 17,
198622 but it was only23 after three months, on August
1,1986, in its comment, that the respondent corporation
raised the issue of tardiness. The respondent corporation
should not have waited in ambush before the comment was
required and before due course was given. In any event, to
exact its "a pound of flesh", so to speak, at this very late
stage, would cause a grave miscarriage of justice.
Parenthetically, it must be noted that private respondent
Isidro did not raise this issue of late filing. We now come to
the merits of this petition.
The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct

_______________

18 Decision, CA, 50.

19 Annex K, 59.
20 Annex M, 62.
21 Motion for Extension, 2.
22 Petition, 4.
23 Comment, 65.

373

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 373

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something 24

which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as
Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances 25
justly demand, whereby26such other person suffers injury."
In Picart vs. Smith, decided more than seventy years
ago but still a sound rule, we held:
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along
the highway, like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a
moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway.
He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case
was a threat to life and limb and property, it was
incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who
claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise
extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road
would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked
vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care
and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for,
as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right
to be on the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no
business, so to speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers
that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a
reasonable

_______________

24 Black Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930.

25 Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, 265.
26 37 Phil. 809, 813, No. L-12219, March 15, 1918; Hedy Gan vs. The
Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-44264, September 19,1988.

374

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided

an early warning device, like that required by law, or, by
some other adequate means that would properly forewarn
vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle
posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as
in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as his helper, the petitioner
27
herein, who was
fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
 The evidence on record discloses that three or four
meters from the rear of the 28
parked truck, a lighted
kerosene lamp was placed. Moreover, there is the
admission
29
of respondent Isidro's driver, Daniel Serrano, to
wit:

"Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)Will you

narrate to me in brief how the accident happens (sic) if
you can still remember?
Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
That on or about 10:40 p.m., 15 May 1979 while driving
Isuzu truck at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at
KM 285, I met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his
(sic) lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded with intense
glare of the light that's why l did not notice a parked truck
who (sic) was repairing a front flat tire. When I was a few
meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round
logs. / step (sic) on my foot brakes but it did not function
with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the
fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks
did not function." (Italics supplied).

Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on

half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no

_______________

27 Memorandum of Private Respondent, 2-3.

28 Rollo, 13.
29 Id., 11, quoting the police investigation report by Patrolman
Josefino Velasco at about 10:00 a.m., on May 16,1979, the morning after
the accident, of the statement of Daniel Serrano, the driver of respondent
Isidro.

375

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 375

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

moment taking into account the warning device consisting

of the lighted kerosene lamp 30placed three or four meters
from the back of the truck. But despite this warning
which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by
Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent,
still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained
injuries on his left forearm and left foot. His left leg was
later amputated
31
from below the knee when gangrene had
set in.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the
absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows
that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by
respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the
respondent court committed
32
reversible error. The
respondent court ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

In addition to this, we agree with the following arguments of
appellant Godofredo Isidro which would show that the accident was
caused due to the negligence of the driver of the cargo truck:
xxx xxx xxx

"x x x In the case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence
was (sic) observed is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as adverted to,
the motorists have the right to be on the road, while the immobile truck
has no business, so .to speak, to be there. It is thus for the plaintiff to
show to the satifaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he
himself did employ early warning device such as that required by law or
by some other adequate means or device that would properly forewarn
vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed
considering the time, place and other peculiar circumstances of the
occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, will evoke the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, on the
part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as plaintiff who was
fixing the flat tire of said truck. (pp. 14-17, Appellant's Brief)." (Italics
supplied).

_______________

30 Petition, Rollo, 13.

31 Decision, RTC, Rollo, 13.
32 Decision, IAC, Rollo, 50-51, 52.

376

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the
proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by 33 the
defendant, that the accident34
arose from want of care." Or
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable

presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided
character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v.
Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 133,155. Under
doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an
inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality
under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the
occurrance was such that in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if reasonable care had been used.

In this jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a

number
35
of cases, notably in Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et
al., and36 the latest is in the case of F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc.
vs. C.A.
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and 37furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The

_______________

33 Cooley on Torts, Vol. 3, 369.

34 Fifth Edition, 1173.
35 L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.
 36 L-52732, August 29,1988.
37 Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 5A, 525.

377

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 377

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

38
doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but39 merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense
with the requirement of proof40 of culpable negligence on the
part of the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden
41
of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, 42
direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has
generally been held that the presumption of inference
arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which
is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and
all the facts and
43
circumstances attendant on the occurrence
clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or
by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the
doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances
have been so completely eludicated that no inference of
defendant's liability can
44
reasonably be made, whatever the
source of the evidence, as in this case.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in
relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the
latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee,
or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If

_______________
 38 Id., 527.
39 Id., 529.
40 Id., 529-530.
41 Id., 530.
42 Id., 543-544.
43 Id., 544-545.
44 Id., 548.

378

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the

satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the
45
presumption is overcome and he
is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the
incident, the private respondent stresses that the
negligence of his employee has already been adequately
overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his
responsibilities as a driver and that the 46
truck owner used
to instruct him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his
submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver did
not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not
check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he
could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on
the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the
accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind,
the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his
driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident,
as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to
destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional47
Trial
Court given the facts established at the trial The private
respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent,
should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle
before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro
failed to prove the-diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision of his employees which would exculpate
him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner.
But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of
a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his
driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the
observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in
the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be
directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his
(Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof
that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good

_______________

45 Bahia vs. Litonpia and Leynes, No. L-9734, March 31,1915 30 Phils.
624.
47 Decision, IAC, Rollo, 52.
46 Memorandum of private respondent, 6.

379

VOL. 167, NOVEMBER 14, 1988 379

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. IAC

father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel

Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any,
in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus
prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of
Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of
the Civil Code has not ceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the respondent court as well as its Resolution
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are.
hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court,
dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto.
With costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras and Padilla,

JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Note.Factual findings of trial court and Court of

Appeals entitled to great respect. (Vda. de Roxas vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 77.)

o0o
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