AIR SAFETY

Air safety is a term encompassing the theory, investigation, and categorization of flight
failures, and the prevention of such failures through regulation, education, and training.
It can also be applied in the context of campaigns that inform the public as to the safety
of air travel.

AIR SAFETY HAZARDS

Foreign object debris

Foreign object debris (FOD) includes items left in the aircraft structure during
manufacture/repairs, debris on the runway and solids encountered in flight (e.g. hail
and dust). Such items can damage engines and other parts of the aircraft.

Misleading information and lack of information

A pilot misinformed by a printed document (manual, map, etc.), reacting to a faulty
instrument or indicator (in the cockpit or on the ground), [5][6] or following inaccurate
instructions or information from flight or ground control can lose spatial orientation, or
make another mistake, and consequently lead to accidents or nearmisses. [7][8][9][10]

Lightning
Boeing studies showed that airliners are struck by lightning twice per year on average;
aircraft withstand typical lightning strikes without damage.

Ice and snow

Even a small amount of icing or coarse frost can greatly impair the ability of a wing to
develop adequate lift, which is why regulations prohibit ice, snow or even frost on the
wings or tail, prior to takeoff.
Airlines and airports ensure that aircraft are properly de-iced before takeoff whenever
the weather involves icing conditions. Modern airliners are designed to prevent ice
buildup on wings, engines, and tails (empennage) by either routing heated air from jet
engines through the leading edges of the wing, and inlets[citation needed], or on slower aircraft,
by use of inflatable rubber "boots" that expand to break off any accumulated ice.
Airline flight plans require airline dispatch offices to monitor the progress of weather
along the routes of their flights, helping the pilots to avoid the worst of inflight icing
conditions. Aircraft can also be equipped with an ice detector in order to warn pilots to
leave unexpected ice accumulation areas, before the situation becomes critical. [citation needed]

Engine failure
An engine may fail to function because of fuel starvation (e.g. British Airways Flight
38), fuel exhaustion (e.g. Gimli Glider), foreign object damage (e.g. US Airways Flight
1549), mechanical failure due to metal fatigue (e.g. Kegworth air disaster, El Al Flight
1862, China Airlines Flight 358), mechanical failure due to improper maintenance
(e.g. American Airlines Flight 191), mechanical failure caused by an original
manufacturing defect in the engine (e.g. Qantas Flight 32, United Airlines Flight
232, Delta Air Lines Flight 1288), and pilot error (e.g. Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701).
In a multi-engine aircraft, failure of a single engine usually results in a precautionary
landing being performed, for example landing at a diversion airport instead of
continuing to the intended destination.
Page | 1
Structural failure of the aircraft
Composite materials consist of layers of fibers embedded in a resin matrix. In some
cases, especially when subjected to cyclic stress, the layers of the material separate
from each other (delaminate) and lose strength. As the failure develops inside the
material, nothing is shown on the surface; instrument methods (often ultrasound-based)
have to be used to detect such a material failure. In the 1940s several Yakovlev Yak-
9s experienced delamination of plywood in their construction.

Stalling
Stalling an aircraft (increasing the angle of attack to a point at which the wings fail to
produce enough lift) is dangerous and can result in a crash if the pilot fails to make a
timely correction.
Devices to warn the pilot when the aircraft's speed is decreasing close to the stall
speed include stall warning horns (now standard on virtually all powered aircraft), stick
shakers, and voice warnings. Most stalls are a result of the pilot allowing the airspeed
to be too slow for the particular weight and configuration at the time. Stall speed is
higher when ice or frost has attached to the wings and/or tail stabilizer. The more
severe the icing, the higher the stall speed, not only because smooth airflow over the
wings becomes increasingly more difficult, but also because of the added weight of the
accumulated ice.

Fire
Safety regulations control aircraft materials and the requirements for automated fire
safety systems. Usually these requirements take the form of required tests. The tests
measure flammability of materials and toxicity of smoke. When the tests fail, it is on a
prototype in an engineering laboratory rather than in an aircraft.
At one time, fire fighting foam paths were laid down before an emergency landing, but
the practice was considered only marginally effective, and concerns about the depletion
of fire fighting capability due to pre-foaming led the United States FAA to withdraw its
recommendation in 1987.
One possible cause of fires in airplanes is wiring problems that involve intermittent
faults, such as wires with breached insulation touching each other, having water
dripping on them, or short circuits. These are difficult to detect once the aircraft is on the
ground. However, there are methods, such as spread-spectrum time-domain
reflectometry, that can feasibly test live wires on aircraft during flight. [18]

Bird strike
Bird strike is an aviation term for a collision between a bird and an aircraft. Fatal
accidents have been caused by both engine failure following bird ingestion and bird
strikes breaking cockpit windshields.
Jet engines have to be designed to withstand the ingestion of birds of a specified
weight and number and to not lose more than a specified amount of thrust. The weight
and numbers of birds that can be ingested without hazarding the safe flight of the
aircraft are related to the engine intake area. [19] The hazards of ingesting birds beyond
the "designed-for" limit were shown on US Airways Flight 1549 when the aircraft struck
Canada geese.
The outcome of an ingestion event and whether it causes an accident, be it on a small
fast plane, such as military jet fighters, or a large transport, depends on the number and
weight of birds and where they strike the fan blade span or the nose cone. Core
damage usually results with impacts near the blade root or on the nose cone.

Page | 2
The highest risk of a bird strike occurs during takeoff and landing in the vicinity
of airports, and during low-level flying by military aircraft, crop dusters and helicopters
for example. Some airports use active countermeasures, ranging from a person with
a shotgun through recorded sounds of predators to employing falconers. Poisonous
grass can be planted that is not palatable to birds, nor to insects that
attract insectivorous birds. Passive countermeasures involve sensible land-use
management, avoiding conditions attracting flocks of birds to the area (e.g. landfills).
Another tactic found effective is to let the grass at the airfield grow taller (approximately
12 inches (30 cm)) as some species of birds won't land if they cannot see one another.

Human factors
Human factors, including pilot error, are another potential set of factors, and currently
the factor most commonly found in aviation accidents Much progress in applying human
factors analysis to improving aviation safety was made around the time of World War
II by such pioneers as Paul Fitts and Alphonse Chapanis. However, there has been
progress in safety throughout the history of aviation, such as the development of the
pilot's checklist in 1937.[20] CRM, or Crew Resource Management, is a technique that
makes use of the experience and knowledge of the complete flight crew to avoid
dependence on just one crew member.
Pilot error and improper communication are often factors in the collision of aircraft. The
barriers to have an effective communication have internal and external factors. [21] The
ability of the flight crew to maintain situation awareness is a critical human factor in air
safety. Human factors training is available to general aviation pilots and called single
pilot resource management training.
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and error during take-off and landing can have for
example causing the crash of Prinair Flight 191 on landing, also in 1972.

Pilot fatigue
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines fatigue as "A physiological
state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss or
extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload." [22] The phenomenon places great
risk on the crew and passengers of an airplane because it significantly increases the
chance of pilot error. Fatigue is particularly prevalent among pilots because of
"unpredictable work hours, long duty periods, circadian disruption, and insufficient
sleep".[24]These factors can occur together to produce a combination of sleep
deprivation, circadian rhythm effects, and 'time-on task' fatigue. [24] Regulators attempt to
mitigate fatigue by limiting the amount of hours pilots are allowed to fly over varying
periods of time. Experts in aviation fatigue [who?] often find that these methods fall short on
their goals.
.
Controlled flight into terrain
CFIT is a class of accidents in which an aircraft is flown under control into terrain or
man-made structures. CFIT accidents typically result from pilot error or of navigational
system error. Failure to protect ILS critical areas can also cause CFIT
accidents[dubious discuss]. Another anti-CFIT tool is the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
(MSAW) system which monitors the altitudes transmitted by aircraft transponders and
compares that with the system's defined minimum safe altitudes for a given area. When
the system determines the aircraft is lower, or might soon be lower, than the minimum
safe altitude, the air traffic controller receives an acoustic and visual warning and then
alerts the pilot that the aircraft is too low.[27]

Electromagnetic interference
The use of certain electronic equipment is partially or entirely prohibited as it might
interfere with aircraft operation,[28] such as causing compass deviations] Use of some
types of personal electronic devices is prohibited when an aircraft is below 10,000',
Page | 3
taking off, or landing. Use of a mobile phone is prohibited on most flights because in-
flight usage creates problems with ground-based cells

Ground damage
Various ground support equipment operate in close proximity to the fuselage and wings
to service the aircraft and occasionally cause accidental damage in the form of
scratches in the paint or small dents in the skin. However, because aircraft structures
(including the outer skin) play such a critical role in the safe operation of a flight, all
damage is inspected, measured, and possibly tested to ensure that any damage is
within safe tolerances.[citation needed]

Volcanic ash
Plumes of volcanic ash near active volcanoes can damage propellers, engines and
cockpit windows.[31] [32] In 1982, British Airways Flight 9 flew through an ash cloud and
temporarily lost power from all four engines. The plane was badly damaged, with all the
leading edges being scratched. The front windscreens had been so badly "sand"
blasted by the ash that they could not be used to land the aircraft. [33]
Prior to 2010 the general approach taken by airspace regulators was that if the ash
concentration rose above zero, then the airspace was considered unsafe and was
consequently closed.[34] Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers enable liaison
between meteorologists, volcanologists, and the aviation industry.[35]

Runway safety
Types of runway safety incidents include:

Runway excursion an incident involving only a single aircraft making an

inappropriate exit from the runway.
Runway overrun a specific type of excursion where the aircraft does not stop
before the end of the runway (e.g., Air France Flight 358).
Runway incursion incorrect presence of a vehicle, person, or another aircraft
on the runway (e.g., Tenerife airport disaster).
Runway confusion crew misidentification the runway for landing or take-off
(e.g., Comair Flight 191, Singapore Airlines Flight 6).

Airport design
Airport design and location can have a large impact on aviation safety, especially since
some airports such as Chicago Midway International Airport were originally built for
propeller planes and many airports are in congested areas where it is difficult to meet
newer safety standards. For instance, the FAA issued rules in 1999 calling for a runway
safety area, usually extending 500 feet (150 m) to each side and 1,000 feet (300 m)
beyond the end of a runway. This is intended to cover ninety percent of the cases of an
aircraft leaving the runway by providing a buffer space free of obstacles. Many older
airports do not meet this standard. One method of substituting for the 1,000 feet
(300 m) at the end of a runway for airports in congested areas is to install
an engineered materials arrestor system (EMAS). These systems are usually made of a
lightweight, crushable concrete that absorbs the energy of the aircraft to bring it to a
rapid stop. As of 2008, they have stopped three aircraft at JFK Airport.

Emergency airplane evacuations

According to a 2000 report by the National Transportation Safety Board, emergency
aircraft evacuations happen about once every 11 days in the U.S. While some
situations are extremely dire, such as when the plane is on fire, in many cases the
Page | 4
greatest challenge for passengers can be the use of the evacuation slide. In
a Time article on the subject, Amanda Ripley reported that when a new supersized
Airbus A380 underwent mandatory evacuation tests in 2006, 33 of the 873 evacuating
volunteers got hurt. While the evacuation was considered a success, one volunteer
suffered a broken leg, while the remaining 32 received slide burns. Such accidents are
common. In her article, Ripley provided tips on how to make it down the airplane slide
without injury.[36]
Statistics: Accidents and incidents
ICAO safety report,[37] the total number of plane accidents in 2013 was 90 world-wide.
Only 9 of these accidents were fatal accidents, that is, accidents involving fatalities. The
Global Fatal Accident Review of the Civil Aviation Authority gives a total number of 0.6
fatal accidents per one million flights for the ten-year period 2002 to 2011. [38] When
expressed as per million hours flown, this number is 0.4. The corresponding number of
fatalities is 22.0 fatalities per one million flights or 12.7 when expressed as per million
hours flown. The total number of fatalities in 2013 was 173, which is the smallest number
of fatalities since 2000, even though the total number of departures in 2013 was a record
32.1 million. This corresponds to 5.39 fatalities per one million departures in 2013. The
following chart shows the development of the rate of fatal and non-fatal accidents in
recent years.
Airplane accident statistics (world-wide) [37]
Number of accidents /1mn
Year
departures
2009 4.1
2010 4.2
2011 4.2
2012 3.2
2013 2.8

Not all phases of flight are equally prone to accidents. Most accidents (55%) occur during
landing or take-off. Only 10% occur when the aircraft is en route.
Accidents by phase of flight (2013) [37]
Phase Percentage of accidents that occur in this phase
Landing 43
Approach 18
Take-off 12
En route 10
Standing 9
Taxi 8

Page | 5
National investigation organizations

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Flugunfalluntersuchungsstelle im BMVIT (Austria)
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Air Accidents Investigation Institute (Czech Republic)
Danish Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
Bureau d'Enqutes et d'Analyses pour la scurit de l'Aviation Civile (France)
Bundesstelle fr Flugunfalluntersuchung (Germany)
Air Accident Investigation Unit (Ireland)
Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission (Japan)
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand
Transport Accident Investigation Commission (New Zealand)
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
Comisin de Investigacin de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviacin Civil (Spain)
Swedish Accident Investigation Board
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (Switzerland)
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK)
National Transportation Safety Board (USA)
European Co-ordination Center for Aircraft Incident Reporting
Systems (ECCAIRS)
International Civil Aviation Organisation
Page | 6
 South African Civil Aviation Authority (South Africa)

Air Safety Investigators

These individuals are trained and authorized to conduct aviation accident and incident
investigations for the government organizations responsible for aviation safety. They
possess specialized expertise and training in specific fields, such as aircraft structures,
air traffic control, flight recorders and human factors. They may be employed by
governments, manufacturers or unions and perform fact-finding, analyses, and report
writing as part of their duties.[43]

Safety Improvement Initiatives

The safety improvement initiatives are aviation safety partnerships between regulators,
manufacturers, operators, professional unions, research organisations, and
international aviation organisations to further enhance safety. Some major safety
initiatives worldwide are:

Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in the US. The Commercial

Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was founded in 1998 with a goal to reduce the
commercial aviation fatality rate in the United States by 80 percent by 2007.
European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) . The European Strategic Safety
Initiative (ESSI) is an aviation safety partnership between EASA, other regulators
and the industry. The initiative objective is to further enhance safety for citizens in
Europe and worldwide through safety analysis, implementation of cost effective
action plans, and coordination with other safety initiatives worldwide.

NOTIFICATION OF INCIDENTS AND INVESTIGATION

The objective of incident/occurrence reporting and investigation is to contribute to the
improvement of aviation safety by ensuring that relevant information on safety is
reported, collected, analysed, stored, protected and disseminated. The sole objective of
occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to attribute
blame or liability. Incident/Occurrence reporting is an essential part of the overall
monitoring function of the operator. The detailed objectives of the incident/occurrence
reporting systems are:

1.1 To enable assessment of safety implications of each occurrence, including

previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary action is initiated to
prevent similar occurrences in future.

1.2 To ensure dissemination of information, A thorough and objective investigation

of an aircraft incident would enable identifying where relevant deficiency in
operational techniques, Air traffic control and human performance etc. lies.
This in turn could lead to the formulation of appropriate corrective actions to
obviate their recurrence. The aircraft accident prevention programme is a
Page | 7
 continuous search for detection and elimination of all such factors, which are
hazard to safety of aircraft operation. One of the best and most effective
methods for accident prevention is proper and systematic investigation of
incidents and occurrences.

1.3 Rule 18 of Aircraft (Investigation of Accident and Incident) Rules 2012

provides for the reporting of the occurrences to DGCA and AAIB. Rule 13(1) of
Aircraft Rules 2012 empowers the DGCA to institute investigation into
incidents and in case of serious incidents wherein the aircraft AUW is below
2250 kg and is not a turbo-jet aircraft.

1.4 This Civil Aviation Requirements is issued under the provisions of Rule 133A
of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Rule 4 & Rule 18 of Aircraft (Investigation of
Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2012. It prescribes the manner in which the
occurrences are to be reported and investigated and the responsibilities of
various organizations like the Operators and other Departments/ agencies at
the airport etc. in providing assistance with regard to investigation.

1.5 This CAR supersedes Air Safety Circular 5 of 1982, ASC 08 of 2009, ASC 5 of
2009, ASC 6 of 2013 & ASC 2 of 2011.

2. APPLICABILITY:

2.1 This CAR applies to all incidents/occurrences including Serious Incidents

involving Civil Registered aircraft in India. It also applies to occurrences to
foreign civil registered aircraft occurring in India and Indian Administered
airspace.

2.2 This Civil Aviation requirements applies to All Scheduled, Non- Scheduled,
Aerial work aircraft, State Government / BSF aircraft & private aircraft
operators, flying clubs, aircraft manufacturer, Aerodrome operator, Air
Navigation service provider, MROs, Ground handling agents, fuel vendors and
service provider.

3. DEFINITIONS:

Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which-

(i) in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person
boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such
persons have disembarked; or
(ii) in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the
aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it
comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is
shut down, in which -

a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as

a result of:
- being in the aircraft, or

- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have
become detached from the aircraft, or

- direct exposure to jet blast

except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted
by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the
areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:

Page | 8
 - adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component,

except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a

engine, (including its cowlings or accessories); or for damage limited to
propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, tires, brakes, fairings, panels,
landing gear doors, windscreens, small dents or puncture holes in the
aircraft skin, or for minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades,
landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in
the radome); or

c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible

Accredited representative: A person designated, on the basis of his or her

qualifications, for the purpose of participating in an investigation conducted by
another state and where the State has established an accident investigation
authority, the designated accredited representative would normally be from that
authority.

Adviser: A person appointed by a State, on the basis of his or her qualifications,

for the purpose of assisting its accredited representative in an investigation.

Airprox (Aircraft Proximity) A situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or Air

Traffic Services Personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative
positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved may
have been compromised.

Causes: Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which

led to the accident, serious incidents or incident.

Communication Navigational and Surveillance (CNS) Incident

Significant degradation or failure of the CNS facilities including VHF/ VOR/NDB/

ILS/Surveillance systems, ADS/CPDLC, A-SMGCS, ground-communication.
Failure of any facility used in, available for use in, or designated for use in aid of
air navigation, including landing areas, any apparatus or equipment, for
signaling, for radio direction finding, or for radio or other electronic
communication, and any other structure or mechanism having a similar purpose
for guiding or controlling flight in the air or the landing or takeoff of aircraft.

Flight recorder: Any type of recorder (CVR/FDR/QAR/PMR/PCMCIA

CARD/FLASH DRIVE) installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing
accident/incident investigation process.

Ground Handling (RAMP) Incidents Occurrences during (or as a result of)

ground handling operations.

Includes collisions that occur while servicing, boarding, loading, and

deplaning the aircraft also during boarding and disembarking while
helicopter is hovering.
Includes injuries to people from propeller/main rotor/tail rotor/fan blade
strikes.

Includes pushback/powerback/towing events.

Includes Jet Blast and Prop/rotor down wash ground handling occurrences.

Includes aircraft external preflight configuration errors (examples: improper

Page | 9
 loading and improperly secured doors and latches) that lead to subsequent
events.
Includes all parking areas (ramp, gate, tie-downs).

Except for powerback events

Includes operations at aerodromes, heliports, helidecks, and unprepared

operating sites.

Ground Collision incidents Collision while taxiing to or from a runway in use.

Includes collisions with an aircraft, person, animal, ground vehicle,

obstacle, building, structure, etc. while on a surface other than the runway
used for landing or intended for takeoff.

Ground collisions resulting from events categorized under Runway

Incursion (RI) or Ground Handling

NOTE: Taxiing includes ground and air taxiing for rotorcraft on designated
taxiways.

Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident / serious incident, associated

with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could have seriously affected
the safety of operation leading to an accident/serious incident.
Investigation: A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention,
which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of
conclusions, including the determination of causes and, when appropriate, the
making of safety recommendations.

Operator: A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage

in an aircraft operation.

Preliminary Report: The communication used for the prompt dissemination of

data obtained during the early stages of the investigation.

Reportable Occurrence: Any incident which endangers or which, if not

corrected, would endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.

Runway incursion: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect

presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface,
designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

Runway excursions: When an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end or
the side of the runway surface. Runway excursions can occur on takeoff or
landing. They consist of two types of events:

- Veer-Off: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of a

runway.

- Overrun: A runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the end of a

runway.

Safety recommendation: A proposal of the investigation authority of the State

conducting the investigation, based on information derived from the
investigation, made with the intention of preventing accidents or incidents.

Serious incident: An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a

high probability of an accident and associated with the operation of an aircraft
which,-

Page | 10
 (i) in the case of manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person
boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such
persons have disembarked, or

(ii) in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the
aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it
comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system
is shut down, in which:Significant Incident: An incident involving
circumstances indicating that an accident or a serious incident could
have occurred, if the risk had not been managed within safety margins.

4. NOTIFICATION
It is incumbent that the notice and information of occurrences as listed in
Appendix A in the prescribed format shall be sent as soon as possible by

the quickest means available and in any case within 24 hours by the person in
command of the aircraft or if he be killed or incapacitated the owner, operator,
the hirer or other persons on whose behalf he was in command of the aircraft/
Airport Director/ATC In charge/Communication In charge/Aerodrome In
charge/Safety Investigation Coordinator (SIC) In charge to the Director General
of Civil Aviation (Attn: Director Air Safety, HQ) and the concerned Regional Air
Safety Office(s) where the Operator is based and where the location of the
occurrence falls. In addition the information regarding incident / accident shall
also be provided to Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB). Operator shall
develop a procedure for reporting of occurrences and include in their Flight
Safety Manual/Safety Management System Manual/Airport Emergency
Planning Manual.

The reportable occurrences are listed in the Appendix A. Occurrences which

are likely to endanger the safety of aircraft operations would classify under the
category of incidents.

To facilitate consistent reporting and subsequent storage and analysis of data,

occurrences are to be notified as per the formats provided in Appendix B.

5. PROCESSING OF OCCURRENCE/ INCIDENT REPORTS

5.1 DGCA will evaluate each occurrence report received to decide which
occurrence require investigation by the DGCA or by the concerned operator /
AAI through PIB/AIB under the supervision of the DGCA.

5.2 It may make such checks as is considered necessary to ensure that

operators, manufacturers, maintenance, repair and overhaul organizations
(MROs), air traffic control services, aerodrome operators and any other
applicable organization as per para 2.2 are taking any necessary remedial and
preventative action in relation to reported occurrences and recommendations
made in the investigation reports.

5.3 For occurrences concerning the foreign operators, DGCA will take such steps
as are open to it to persuade foreign aviation authorities and organisations to
take any necessary remedial and preventive action in relation to reported
occurrences;

0 Occurrence data shall be assessed and analysed in order to detect safety

hazards which may not be apparent to individual operators and where
appropriate to issue specific advice or instructions to particular sections of the
industry.

6. INVESTIGATION

Page | 11
 The sole objective of the investigation of an incident/occurrence shall be the
prevention. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

6.1 The Director-General may order the investigation of any Incident/Serious

incident as under Rule 13 (1) of the Aircraft (Investigation of Accident and
Incident) Rules 2012 involving an aircraft or a person associated with the
maintenance and operation of aircraft, or both, and may, by general or special
order, appoint a competent and duly qualified person as Inquiry Officer for the
purpose of carrying out such investigation.

6.2 Investigation by Permanent Investigation Board

Incidents shall also be investigated by the Permanent Investigation Board of

the air operator under supervision of Officer of the Regional Air Safety Offices.

6.2.1 Each air operator shall establish a Permanent Investigation Board (PIB) for
investigation of incidents occurring to its aircraft. The board shall consist of
Chief of flight safety/Dy. Chief of Flight Safety/personnel assigned with duties
of flight safety activities (with fleet size of less than three), a senior pilot on
type, preferable instructor/examiner and Manager Quality/Engineer qualified
on type preferably not involved with the certification work. The board shall
determine the frequency of its meetings on the basis of fleet size and average
number of incidents. During the meeting all the occurrences for the intervening
period be discussed and plan further action. If occurrence is of nature that
further investigation serves no purpose a summary investigation report may
be prepared. However for all other investigations the PIB report shall be
prepared as per the format in Appendix C. Involved flight crew and
maintenance crew if required be made available for the purpose of recording
their account of the incident.CVR transcript/DFDR readout of the relevant
parameters, site report, test report of the relevant system to the extent
possible should be made available.

6.2.2 For incidents to aircraft other than as given in 6.2.1 investigation shall be
carried out by DGCA. All efforts should be made to complete the
investigation within the time limits stipulate in Para 7.

All operators shall fill ADREP using ECCAIRS or compatible excel sheet for
the incidents that are investigated by PIB and submit along with the PIB
report to the Concerned Regional Air Safety Office and O/o DAS (DGCA
HQ)

6.3 Investigation by Airprox Investigation Board

AIB will be constituted and notified at all Regional Offices of Air Safety
Directorate i.e. Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, and Hyderabad. Teams
will investigate all Airprox incidents and any other occurrences as advised
by DGCA HQ in their respective regions.

Page | 12
 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES
I. AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL

A) Structural

Damage to a principal structural element that has not been qualified as damage
tolerant (life limited element). Principal structural elements are those which
contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground and pressurisation loads and
whose failure could result in a catastrophic failure of the aircraft.
Damage or defect (exceeding allowed tolerances) to a structural element whose
failure could reduce the structural stiffness to such an extent that the required
aeroelastic characteristics are no longer achieved.
Damage to or defect of a structural element, which could result in the liberation
of items of mass that may injure occupants of the aircraft.

Damage to or defect of a structural element, which could jeopardise proper

operation of systems.

Loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight.

B) Systems

Loss, significant malfunction or defect of any system, sub-system, equipment,

etc. when standard operating procedures, could not be satisfactorily
accomplished.

Inability of the crew to control the system e.g. uncommanded actions, incorrect
and/or incomplete response, etc.

Failure or malfunction of the protection device or emergency system associated

with the system.

Loss of redundancy of the system.

Operation of any primary warning system associated with aircraft systems or

equipment unless the crew conclusively establishes that the indication is false
provided that the false warning did not result in a hazard arising from the crew
response to the warning.
Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which may result in a fire
hazard or possible hazardous contamination of aircraft structure, systems or
equipment or risk to occupants.
Malfunction or defect of any indication system which results in a possibility of
misleading indications to the crew.

Any failure, malfunction or defect in a system during critical phase of flight.

Flight controls malfunction.

Examples of reportable occurrences resulting from the application of these generic

criteria to specific systems are as follows:

i. Air conditioning/ventilation

0 Complete loss of avionics cooling.

Page | 13
 1 Depressurization.

ii. Auto-flight system

0 Failure of auto-flight system to achieve the intended operation while

engaged.

1 Difficulty to control the aircraft linked to autoflight system functioning.

2 Failure of any auto-flight system disconnect device.

3 Uncommanded auto-flight mode change.

iii. Communications

0 Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or

inaudible passenger address.

1 Total loss of communication in flight.

iv. Electrical system

0 Loss of one electrical system distribution system (AC/DC).

1 Total loss or loss of more than one electrical generation system.

2 Failure of the backup (emergency) electrical generating system.

v. Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo

0 Pilot seat control loss during flight.

1 Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including emergency

evacuation signalling system, exit doors, emergency lighting, etc.

2 Loss of retention capability of the cargo loading system.

vi. Fire protection system

0 Fire warnings, except those immediately confirmed as false.

1 Undetected failure or defect of fire/smoke detection/protection system,

which could lead to loss or reduced fire detection/protection.

2 Absence of warning in case of actual fire or smoke.

vii. Flight controls

0 Asymmetry of flaps, slats, spoilers etc.

1 Limitation of movement, stiffness or poor/delayed response in the

operation of primary flight control systems or their associated sub-
systems.
2 Flight control surface runaway.

3 Flight control surface vibration.

4 Mechanical flight control disconnection or failure.

f) Significant interference with normal control of the aircraft or degradation
of flying qualities.

8. Fuel system
Page | 14
 a) Fuel quantity indicating system malfunction resulting in total loss or
erroneous indicated fuel quantity on board

b) Leakage of fuel resulting in loss, fire hazard, significant contamination.

c) Malfunction or defects of the fuel jettisoning system resulting in

inadvertent loss of significant quantity, fire hazard, hazardous
contamination of aircraft equipment or inability to jettison fuel.

d) Fuel system malfunctions or defects having significant effect on fuel

supply and/or distribution.

e) Inability to transfer or use total quantity of usable fuel.

9. Hydraulics

a) Loss of hydraulic system.

b) Leakage of hydraulic fluid.

c) Loss of more than one hydraulic circuits.

d) Failure of backup hydraulic system.

e) Inadvertent Ram Air Turbine (RAT) extension.

10. Ice detection/protection system

a) Undetected loss or reduced performance of the anti-ice/de-ice system.

b) Loss of more than one of the probe heating systems.

c) Inability to obtain symmetrical wing de-icing.

d) Abnormal ice accumulation leading to significant effects on performance

or handling qualities.

e) Crew vision significantly affected.

11. Indicating/warning/recording systems

a) Malfunction or defect of any indicating system with a possibility of

misleading indications to the crew.

b) Loss or malfunction of more than one display unit or computer

display/warning function in a glass cockpit environment.

12. Landing gear system /brakes/tyres

a) Brake fire.

b) Significant loss of braking action.

c) Unsymmetrical braking.

d) Failure of landing gear free fall extension system.

e) Unwanted gear or gear doors extension/retraction.

f) Tyre burst.

Page | 15
1. Navigation systems

0 Total loss or multiple navigation equipment failures.

1 Total loss or multiple air data system equipment failures.

2 Significant misleading indication.

3 Significant navigation errors attributed to incorrect data.

4 Unexpected deviations in lateral or vertical path not caused by pilot

input.

2. Oxygen

0 For pressurized aircraft: loss of oxygen supply in the cockpit.

1 Loss of oxygen supply to a significant number of passengers (more than

10%).

3. Bleed air system

0 Hot bleed air leak resulting in fire warning or structural damage.

1 Loss of all bleed air systems.

2 Failure of bleed air leak detection system.

4. Propulsion system

Flameout, shutdown or malfunction of any engine.

Over speed or inability to control the speed of any high speed rotating
component.

Failure or malfunction of any part of an engine or power plant resulting in any

one or more of the following:

- Non-containment of
components/debris
- Uncontrolled internal or external fire

- Thrust in a different direction from that demanded by the pilot

- Thrust reversing system failing to operate or operating inadvertently -

Inability to control power, thrust or rpm

- Failure of the engine mount structure

- Partial or complete loss of a major part of the powerplant

- Dense visible fumes or concentrations of toxic products sufficient to

incapacitate crew or passengers
- Inability to shutdown an engine by use of normal procedures -
Inability to restart a serviceable engine
An uncommanded thrust/power loss, change, etc. classified as a loss of thrust
or power control.
Any defect in a life controlled part causing retirement before completion of its
full life.

Defects of common origin resulting in in-flight engine shut down.

Page | 16
 An engine limiter or control device failing to operate when required or operating
inadvertently.

Exceedance of engine parameters. FOD resulting in damage.Failure or

malfunction of any part of a propeller or powerplant resulting in any one or
more of the following:

- Overspeed of the propeller

- Development of excessive drag

- Thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot

- Release of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller

- Failure that results in excessive imbalance

- Unintended movement of propeller blades below the established

minimum in-flight low-pitch position

- Inability to feather the propeller

- Inability to command a change in propeller pitch

- Uncommanded change in pitch

- Uncontrollable torque or speed fluctuation

Damage or defect of main rotor gearbox/attachment resulting into in-flight

separation of the rotor assembly and /or malfunctions of the rotor control.
Damage to tail rotor, transmission and equivalent systems.

Shut down or failure when the APU is required to be available by operational

requirements.

Inability to shut down

the APU. Overspeed
of APU.
Inability to start the APU when needed for operational reasons.

C) Human Factors

Any incident where any feature or inadequacy of the aircraft design

contributes to a hazardous or catastrophic effect.

II. AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Operation of Aircraft

Risk of collision with an aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe situation

when avoidance action would have been appropriate.

Avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with an aircraft, terrain or

other object.

Avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.

Take-off or landing incidents, including precautionary or forced landings.

Incidents such as under-shooting, overrunning or running off the side of
Page | 17
 runways. Take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a
closed, occupied or incorrect runway. Runway incursions.
Inability to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb.

Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of
usable fuel.

Loss of control (partial or temporary) from any cause.

Occurrences close to or above V1 resulting from or producing a hazardous or

potentially hazardous situation (e.g. rejected take-off, tail strike, engine power
loss etc.).

Unintentional significant deviation from airspeed, intended track or altitude.

Descent below decision height/altitude or minimum descent height/altitude

without the required visual reference.

Loss of position awareness relative to actual position or to other aircraft.

Breakdown in communication between flight crew or between flight crew and

others (cabin crew, ATC, engineering).

Heavy landing - a landing requiring 'heavy landing

check'. Exceedance of fuel imbalance limits.
Incorrect receipt or interpretation of radiotelephony messages.

Fuel system malfunctions or defects, which had an effect on fuel supply and/or
distribution.

Aircraft unintentionally departing a paved surface.

Collision between an aircraft and any other aircraft, vehicle or other ground
object.

Inadvertent and/or incorrect operation of any controls.

Inability to achieve the intended aircraft configuration for any flight phase (e.g.
landing gear and doors, flaps, stabilisers, slats etc).

Abnormal vibration.

Operation of any primary warning system associated with manoeuvring of the

aircraft e.g. configuration warning, stall warning (stick shake), over speed
warning etc. unless the crew conclusively establishes that the indication is false
provided that the false warning did not result in a hazard arising from the crew
response to the warning.

GPWS warning.

ACAS/TCAS RAs.

Jet or prop blast incidents resulting in significant damage or serious injury.

B) Emergencies

Fire, explosion, smoke or toxic or noxious fumes.

Use of any non-standard procedure by the flight or cabin crew to deal with an
emergency.

Event leading to an emergency

Page | 18
 evacuation. Depressurisation.
Use of any emergency equipment or prescribed emergency procedures in order
to deal with a situation.

Event leading to the declaration of an emergency.

Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including exit doors, etc.

Events requiring any emergency use of oxygen by any crew member.

C) Crew Incapacitation

Incapacitation of any member of the flight crew.

Incapacitation of any member of the cabin crew which renders them unable to
perform essential emergency duties.

D) Meteorology

Lightning strike which resulted in damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of

any essential service.

Hail strike which resulted in damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of any
essential service.

Severe turbulence resulting in injury to occupants or deemed to require a

turbulence check of the aircraft.

Windshear encounter.

Icing encounter resulting in handling difficulties, damage to the aircraft or loss or

malfunction of any essential service.

III. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

Incorrect assembly of aircraft parts or components found during inspection or

test procedure.

Hot bleed air leak resulting in structural damage.

Any defect in a life controlled part causing retirement before completion of its
full life.

Any damage or deterioration (i.e. fractures, cracks, corrosion, delamination,

disbonding etc) resulting from any cause (such as flutter, loss of stiffness or
structural failure) to:
Primary structure or a principal structural element requiring repair/complete
or partial replacement of the element

Secondary structure which may have endangered the aircraft

Engine, propeller or rotorcraft rotor system.

Products, parts, appliances and materials of unknown or suspect origin.

Misleading, incorrect or insufficient maintenance data or procedures that could

lead to maintenance errors.

IV. AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES, FACILITIES AND GROUND SERVICES

Page | 19
A) Air Navigation Services

Provision of significantly incorrect, inadequate or misleading information from any

ground sources, e.g. Air Traffic Control (ATC), Automatic Terminal Information
Service (ATIS), Meteorological Services, navigation databases, maps, charts,
manuals, etc.

Provision of less than prescribed terrain clearance.

Provision of incorrect pressure reference data (i.e. altimeter setting).

Incorrect transmission, receipt or interpretation of significant messages when

this results in a hazardous situation.

Separation minima infringement.

Unauthorised penetration of airspace.

Unlawful radio communication transmission.

Significant degradation / failure of CNS facilities.

Aerodrome movement areas obstructed by aircraft, vehicles, animals or foreign

objects, resulting in a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation.

Errors or inadequacies in marking of obstructions or hazards on aerodrome

movement areas resulting in a hazardous situation.

Failure, significant malfunction or unavailability of airfield lighting.

B) Aerodrome and Aerodrome Facilities

Significant spillage during fueling operations.

Loading of incorrect fuel quantities likely to have a significant effect on aircraft

endurance, performance, balance or structural strength.

unsatisfactory ground de-icing / anti-icing

C) Passenger Handling, Baggage and Cargo

Significant contamination of aircraft structure, or systems and equipment arising

from the carriage of baggage or cargo.

Incorrect loading of passengers, baggage or cargo, likely to have a significant

effect on aircraft mass and/or balance.

Incorrect stowage of baggage or cargo (including hand baggage) likely to create

a hazardous situation in the aircraft or to impede emergency evacuation.
Inadequate stowage of cargo containers or other substantial items of cargo.
Dangerous goods incidents.

D) Aircraft Ground Handling and Servicing

Failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment used for test or checking of

aircraft systems and equipment when the required routine inspection and test
procedures did not clearly identify the problem when this results in a hazardous
situation.

Loading of contaminated or incorrect type of fuel or other essential fluids

(including oxygen and potable water).
Page | 20
V. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION

Any airframe, engine, propeller, component or system

defect/malfunction/damage found during scheduled or unscheduled aircraft
(airframe/engines/components) maintenance activities which could possibly
lead to an aircraft operational accident or serious incident (if not properly
rectified.

VI. DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING ORGANIZATIONS

Any design- or manufacturing-related deficiency/defect/malfunction of product

or services discovered by or brought to the attention of the
design/manufacturing organization which is deemed to warrant the possible
issue of an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD), airworthiness directive
(AD) or alert service bulletin (ASB);

VII. WILDLIFE ACTIVITY

All Wildlife Strikes and wildlife movement is required to be reported in the enclosed
performa at Appendix E

FLIGHT SAFETY AWARENESS & ACCIDENT/INCIDENT PREVENTION

PROGRAMME

1.1 Investigations of accidents in the past have resulted in the identification

of several common causes of accidents and the deficiencies which led to the
accidents. Investigations will continue to yield information leading to safety
improvements but major gains from this activity are unlikely. It is, therefore, now
time for the aviation industry to shift its focus from reactive to pro-active system,
anticipating safety issues rather than making corrections after an event has
occurred. To enhance the safety of aircraft operations, it is essential for every
operator to have a Flight Safety Awareness and Accident/ Incident Prevention
Programme. The programme should enable review of the entire system and
identification of the hazards and system deficiencies. The programme should
also educate all personnel engaged in civil aviation industry about the
measures, which help in promoting safety in aviation.

1.2 With a view to achieve these objectives, this CAR is issued under the
provisions of Rule133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 and Section 5A of the Aircraft
Act, 1934.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Civil Aviation Requirement is applicable to all operators engaged in

scheduled air transport services / Cargo Services/ non-scheduled air transport
services.

3. FLIGHT SAFETY MANUAL

3.1 All operators shall prepare a Flight Safety Manual and shall get this
manual approved from the Director Air Safety, DGCA Headquarters.

3.2 The Flight Safety Manual shall clearly lay down the Companys safety
Page | 21
 policies, flight safety awareness and accident/incident prevention
programme. The Flight Safety Manual shall be prepared as per the
guidance given in Appendix A to this CAR.

4. FLIGHT SAFETY DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM

All operators shall establish an effective Flight Safety System for use and
guidance of operational personnel. The guidance material for preparation of
Flight Safety Documentation System is given in Appendix B. The procedure for
preparing Flight Safety Documentation System its monitoring and adherence
shall be incorporated in the Flight Safety Manual.

5. SAFETY AWARENESS

Imparting safety awareness amongst the personnel of an organisation is an

important step for enhancing safety in aviation. Sustained education of these
personnel will go a long way in achieving this objective. Without prejudice to the
generality of this measure, the Safety Awareness Programme of an operator
should have the following minimum features:

5.1 All flight crew, maintenance engineers, cabin crew and other key
personnel shall be given periodical refresher courses to update their
knowledge.
5.2 The operator shall organise periodic safety seminars for the benefit of
their personnel. Specialists in the field of safety may be invited to give
presentations so that lessons could be learnt from the experience of
others. Pilots, engineers and safety managers of the operators should
participate in the safety seminars organised by the DGCA and other
agencies in the country and abroad.

5.3 Appropriate safety posters should be developed and displayed at

different work places.

5.4 Safety bulletins highlighting case studies and safety lessons from serious
occurrences in aviation industry in India and abroad should be prepared
and circulated to the concerned personnel.

5.5 The operators should bring out their own periodical safety journal.

6. ACCIDENT/INCIDENT PREVENTION PROGRAMME

6.1 Reactive Programme

Investigation of accidents/incidents brings out the deficiencies which have

contributed to occurrences. Appropriate safety measures could prevent similar
occurrences. Thorough investigation of the accidents/incidents is very essential not
only to determine what happened but also to find out why it happened.
Organisational deficiencies and weakness in the systems and policies should also
be investigated. The operator should have a Permanent Investigation Board to
promptly investigate the occurrences and possibly within six weeks of its
occurrence to determine the cause of the occurrence and weaknesses, if any, in the
above areas which are contributory factors to the occurrences. The operator should
ensure quick implementation of the safety recommendations made by the Courts of
Inquiry, Committees of Inquiry, Inspector of Accidents, Safety Audit, Spot Checks,
Permanent Investigation Boards etc. The Flight Safety Department of the operator
should periodically review the implementation of the recommendations. The
operator should issue Safety Bulletins on important safety aspects highlighted in an
accident/incident involving an Indian or foreign aircraft.

6.2 Proactive Programme

Page | 22
The proactive programme is aimed to detect the weak areas in the system through
various measures as mentioned below which should be taken on regular basis. To
recognise weaknesses in a system or organisation and to take corrective measures
are the key factors to ensure safety in aviation. This way the potential hazards and
problem areas shall be detected and nipped in the earlier stages itself. Necessary
records shall be maintained by the operators of all the checks. While the operators
shall evolve their own detailed accident/incident prevention programme keeping in
view the nature and scope of their operations, the following salient measures shall
form part of their programme :-

a) The operators should take steps for building safety culture in the organisation
and declare their firm commitment to safety.
b) The operators shall carry out periodically their internal safety audit of different
divisions like operations, maintenance, commercial, security, ground support,
etc. This shall be carried out by a dedicated group comprising of at least a
senior pilot and an engineer.

c) The value of data retrieved from the Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) and Digital
Flight Data Recorders (DFDR) has been proven. Periodic monitoring of CVR
and DFDR must be carried out by all operators. As the DFDR systems are
enhanced with greater recorder capacity, they will become even more valuable
tools not only for accident investigation but also accident prevention. The
recorded data can be analysed for the purpose of checking deviations in flight
parameters beyond acceptable limits which are critical to flight safety. The
operator should develop suitable computer software to determine the
deviations of different flight parameters beyond acceptable limits.

d) The cockpit procedures must be standardised and the Examiners/ Instructors/

Check Pilots of the airlines, while flying with other pilots, should ensure strict
adherence to the laid down procedures and cockpit discipline. The Flight
Inspectors of DGCA should also monitor this aspect.

e) Frequency of flight checks shall be increased during bad weather conditions like
monsoon, fog, etc. Under such conditions crew should not hesitate to initiate a
missed approach whenever the visual reference to the runway is lost. They
should abandon the approach in weather conditions below the applicable
minima and divert, if necessary.

f) A system should be introduced for detection and prevention of weather minima

violations. A regular check is required to be carried out for the flights especially
during bad weather i.e. during monsoon and foggy season.
g) The crew shall be given assurance that their safety related decisions (e.g. go
around, diversion, etc.) shall be supported by the management. If the crew
fears action against him for diversion, then the operator is inviting a big safety
problem.

h) Pilot recruitment is an important aspect from safety point of view. Operators

should assess pilots not only for their flying skills but also for their attitude and
compatibility. Careful recruitment is the best investment of an airline for safety.

i) The critical operational areas shall be monitored closely so that these do not
result in any serious safety hazard. Such areas are initial induction of new
airline pilots, transition to a totally new type of aircraft like glass cockpit
aircraft, operations to and from marginal runways, operations during monsoon,
loading of aircraft under high ambient temperature and elevation conditions,
operations to airfields located in mountainous terrain, airworthiness and
operational control of leased aircraft, etc.

j) Flight and Duty Time Limitations shall be laid down for the operating crew to
ensure that the crew are not fatigued which may affect safety of operations.
Rostering of the crew should be done keeping in view the flight and duty time

Page | 23
 limitation requirements. All scheduled airlines shall establish
electronic/computer based system for monitoring Flight and Duty Time
Limitations. Also crew pairing should be done carefully for better crew
coordination.

k) In order to ensure that maintenance of aircraft is up to the mark, only the firms
approved by DGCA as per CAR 145 or CAR Section 2, Series E Part IV
system shall carry out maintenance of aircraft.

l) The organization shall have adequate number of quality assurance staff which
are able to monitor compliance with CAR 145/ CAR Section-2, Series E part
IV.

m) Compliance with MEL requirements shall be ensured and proper

documentation shall be maintained.

n) Regular checks shall be carried out by the operator to ensure that standard
weights of crew and passengers are being used and loading of aircraft is
within the limits as per RTOLW charts with proper centre of gravity. Load and
trim sheets shall also be checked periodically to ensure their accuracy and
their proper filling up for any irregularity. Check whether loading of the aircraft
is being supervised.

o) Periodic inspection shall be carried out to ensure adherence to apron discipline

and procedures by ground support personnel, serviceability of ground support
equipments and other facilities at

p) Periodic review of emergency response procedure shall be carried out to

ensure the preparedness .

q) Regular statistical analysis of the accident and incident data shall be carried out
to determine whether there has been an improvement or decline in level of
safety. This analysis shall provide a useful hazard alerting technique.

Appendix D contains the guidance for the quantum of accident prevention programme.

7. SAFETY AUDIT

A detailed checklist shall be prepared for conducting internal safety audit. These
audits shall review and analyse all matters having bearing on safety of operations,
particularly with reference to the following:-

(a) Management Practices Relating to Safety Aspects

The management policy has been clearly defined for the commitment and
priority to safety of aircraft operations. The management has issued guidelines
to this effect and has also taken action for violations of safety requirements by
their employees.

(b) Operational Policies and Procedures

The Operations Manual and other circulars issued from time to time clearly
define the operational policies and procedures for all types of aircraft in
operation. For example, whether:
i. the pilots are filling the flight reports properly giving complete details of
the snags;

ii. operational control is being exercised and the concerned officials are
posted at the airports for discharging the duties;

iii. detailed study/trial has been carried out before starting operation to a
new airport;
Page | 24
 iv. procedures and precautions have been laid down for operations at
critical/marginal airfields and for operations during the monsoon period;
and

v. proper alternate aerodromes have been selected for a given flight

keeping in view the ATC watch hours and aircraft handling facilities etc.

(c) Flight Operations

Flight operations offices at the main base and sub-bases are adequately manned
and equipped with communication and other assisting equipments. The operator
should have sub-bases at stations where there are night halts. The flight
despatchers shall be approved by DGCA. Company doctors and proper medical
equipments are available at the main base and at sub-bases for carrying out pre-
flight medical check. The flight operations offices shall maintain the records of
FDTL, validity of licence/IR, medical check, proficiency check, refresher and flight
safety courses which shall be updated regularly.

(d) Safety Promotion Meetings

As a part of accident/incident prevention programme, the operator shall organise

frequent meetings of the pilots and engineers to discuss important safety issues.

(e) Training

Regular refresher courses are being conducted for the flight crew, AMEs, cabin
crew and other key personnel and whether the commercial staff engaged in loading
of aircraft is being given regular training/ refresher regarding proper filling up of load
and trim sheets.

(f) Maintenance Standards and Procedures

DGCA approval for maintenance organisation is current and the operator has
adequate number of AMEs/approved personnel/authorized personnel/certifying staff
and the infrastructure to cope up with maintenance of aircraft fleet. It shall also be
ensured that only type rated AMEs/approved personnel/authorized personnel carry
out rectification of snags. Check availability of trained technicians for engine start,
marshallers, etc. The operator has necessary tools and equipment required for
maintenance of aircraft and whether their shops have required maintenance
facilities.

(g) Quality Control

In respect of organizations approved in accordance with CAR Section 2 Series E

Part IV, check that the Quality Control Manager or Dy. Quality Control Manager are
having licence on the type of aircraft being operated. The quality control manual
covers all types of maintenance/shop activities carried by them and these be
updated regularly as per the applicable regulation in force. Defect/ snag, delay and
incident investigation records shall be maintained and updated.

(h) Manuals, Documentation and Other Records

The operator is in possession of various manuals and is on the mailing list of the
manufacturer for relevant literature, and whether all the documents related to
aircraft operations and maintenance, log books, etc. are maintained properly and
regularly updated.

(i) Buildings and Other Facilities

The operator has sufficient and proper space for maintenance/ shops and is being
maintained properly. Whether sufficient space is available for office work, for proper
keeping of records, stores etc. Check for proper environment control.
Page | 25
(j) Support Equipment

The operator has proper ground support equipment like baggage trolleys, step
ladders, motorised vehicles, etc. and whether they are maintained in serviceable
condition. Check that the personnel engaged in handling ground support equipment
are trained and regular refresher is given to them.

(k) Security

The operator has a Security Programme approved by BCAS, maintains a set of

necessary instructions/ circulars on civil aviation security, has trained personnel to
oversee security and whether these personnel are aware of their role in case of
bomb threat, hijacking, accident etc.

8. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME

8.2 The operator shall have dedicated flight safety department having adequate
number of competent personnel for implementation of the flight safety awareness
and accident/incident prevention programme appropriate to the size and scope of
operations, that addresses the broad range of risk involved in commercial aviation
to include, but not limited to, flight, maintenance and ground safety . The guidance
material for flight safety organization set up is given in Appendix C. The flight
safety department shall obtain approval of DGCA. A person of Indian nationality
either a flight crew member or aviation engineer shall be appointed as the Chief
of Flight Safety after approval of the DGCA. In addition organization shall
nominate Deputy Chief of Flight Safety for approval of DGCA. It shall be ensured
that if Chief of Flight Safety is a pilot, the Deputy Chief shall be an engineer and
vice-versa. Detailed qualification requirements are given in Appendix C. For
existing post holder, the organisation shall put up for their approval within three
months of the date of revision of the CAR. The personnel other than Chief of
Flight Safety shall be competent and appropriately qualified in civil aviation
activities such as operations, maintenance etc. to handle the assigned duties. The
Chief of Flight Safety shall report directly to the top management to ensure
effectiveness of the flight safety organization and to accord high priority to safety.
The flight safety department shall prepare monitoring checklist to enable the
safety officers to carry out the checks thoroughly. Flight Safety organization shall
maintain a record of the checks carried out by them and of any deficiencies
observed. They shall take prompt action to have the deficiencies attended to.
Periodic returns for compliance of this CAR shall be sent by the operator to the
concerned Regional Air Safety Office with a copy to the Director of Air Safety,
DGCA Headquarters.

8.3 While the Director of Air Safety, DGCA Headquarters shall monitor the overall
implementation of the programme, the Regional Air Safety and Airworthiness
Offices, Flight Inspection Directorate, Audit Teams, accident/incident investigators
shall also check implementation of the provisions of this CAR during the course of
their day-to-day work. The programme may be reviewed to assess its effectiveness
and amended, if necessary, in the light of the experience gained and the
developments in the civil aviation sector.

8.4 These requirements shall take precedence over any other similar requirement
specified in any other CAR which will be amended in due course.

GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR PREPARATION OF FLIGHT SAFETY MANUAL:

The Flight Safety Manual shall contain at least following chapters:

1. Table of contents
2. Record of revision
3. List of effective pages
Page | 26
 4. Distribution list of the manual

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

i. Statement of the Accountable Manger/Chief Executive regarding Safety Policy.

ii. The Rules/Regulations in compliance of which the Manual has to be prepared.
iii. Brief description of the company in terms of scope and extent of operation, fleet
size, type of Aircrafts to be operated by the company, main bases, layover
stations etc.
iv. Procedure for issuing amendments and person competent to issue amendment

CHAPTER 2: MGMT AND STRUCTURE OF FLIGHT SAFETY ORGANIZATION.

i. Aim of the Flight Safety Orgnisation.

ii. The organizational setup and organizational chart.
iii. Qualification Requirements and training requirement of the officials flight safety
organization.
iv. Duties and responsibilities of officials of flight safety organization.

CHAPTER 3: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENT REPORTING.

i. Accident and Incident Reporting Procedure.

ii. Definition of Serious Incident, Incident, Accident and other relevant

definitions as given in CAR section-5, Series C Part I.
iii. List of reportable occurrences.
iv. Format for submitting initial report.

CHAPTER 4: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

A. Incident PIB Investigation

i. Composition of PIB members (Main & Alternative), Convener Flight

Safety Advisor, Members Ops: Must be Sr. Pilot (Instructor/Examiner
Preferred), Engg- QCM/Dy. QCM/Approved DDI.
ii. Procedure for investigation of incident by PIB.
iii. Action taken on the recommendations made in the PIB report and their
communication to Regional Office/DAS Hqrs.

iv. Format for final Investigation Report.

B. Investigation of Serious Incident and Accident

i. Authority issuing order for the Investigation of accident and serious

incidents.

ii. Role/Duty of operator in assisting the investigation by Inquiry

Officer/Inspector of Accidents/Committee of Inquiry/Court of Inquiry.

iii. Family Assistance Programme (Crew & Pax).

CHAPTER 5: ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROGRAMME

i. Inspection of load and trim sheet.

ii. Apron Inspection.
iii. Oversight of Engineering Activities (Stores, MEL Release Line
Maintenance, Base Maintenance)
iv. Inspection of pre-flight medical.
v. Inspection of Dispatch operation Office.
vi. FDTL monitoring.
vii. Ramp Inspection.
viii. Inspection of ground equipment and Apron discipline.
Page | 27
 ix. Inspection of the training set up. In flight inspection by Inspector (checklist,
programme manager, counseling of the crew, analysis of the data).
x. Implementation of Recommendation of Inspector of Accident/Committee of
Inquiry/ Court of Inquiry.
xi. Flight Safety documentation system

CHAPTER 6: FLIGHT OPERATION QUALITY ASSURANCE

A. Monitoring of DFDR

i. Procedure for monitoring Exceedence Trend Monitoring.

ii. Utilisation of Exceedence Monitoring Data.
iii. Exceedence limits for each type of aircraft in the organization.
iv. Analysis of Exceedence data especially the Red Alert.
B. CVR Monitoring

i. Set up for CVR Monitoring.

ii. Check List for CVR Monitoring.
iii. Action on the deficiency observed during CVR Monitoring.
iv. Correlation of CVR & DFDR

CHAPTER 7: INTERNAL/REGULATORY SAFETY AUDIT PROGRAMME.

A. Internal Audit

i. Team Composition.
ii. Qualification and experience of the member.
iii. Procedure for Internal Audit.
iv. Format for Internal Audit.
v. Procedure for action taken on the recommendation of the Internal Audit
Report.
vi. Review of action taken for their adequacy and submission of the
Internal Audit Report along with Action Taken Report to DGCA (DAS
Hqrs.).

B. DGCA Audit.

i. Role of the company in the DGCA Audit.

ii. Procedure for taking action and submit report to DGCA.
iii. Format for submitting Action Taken Report.

CHAPTER 8: CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT).

i. Monitoring of CFIT prevention Programme.

ii. CFIT Risk Assessment.

CHAPTER 9: DANGEROUS GOODS.

i. Description of dangerous goods.

ii. Monitoring action by flight safety organization.
iii. Checklist for monitoring.

CHAPTER 10: ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATION

viii. Action by different departments of the airlines.

ix.Monitoring adverse weather operation by Flight Safety Department.

CHAPTER 11: RAMP SAFETY

i. Definition and related terminologies.

ii. Responsibility and Procedure to Report and investigate the Ground incident.
Page | 28
CHAPTER 12: EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE

i. Emergency response plan in the event of Incident/Accident

ii. Disabled aircraft removal plan

CHAPTER 13: RISK MANAGEMENT

i. Definitions
ii. The true cost of risk
iii. Risk Profiles
iv. Summary
v. Decision Making
vi. Cost/Benefit Consideration

FLIGHT SAFETY DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM

5. INTRODUCTION

a. Development of a flight safety documents system is a complete process.

Changes to each document comprising the system may affect the entire system.
Guidelines applicable to the development of operational documents have been
produced by DGCA based on the recommendations of ICAO, current best
industry practices and analysis of previous accident with emphasis on high
degree of operational relevance.

Nevertheless, it may be difficult for operators to make the best use of these
guidelines, since they are distributed across a number of publications. Air
operators who have yet to establish a flight safety documents system should
Page | 29
 utilize the information contained in this Attachment in establishing such a
system. Air operators who have established such a system should verify that the
functionality of their system is in compliance with the concepts outlined in this
Attachment. DGCA inspectors will conduct a review of the flight safety
documents system to ensure that it is effective in providing vital safety
information to flight crew in a timely manner.

b. Furthermore, guidelines applicable to operational documents development tend

to focus on a single aspect of documents design, for example, formatting and
typography. Guidelines rarely cover the entire process of operational documents
development.

c. It is important for operational documents to be consistent with each other, and

consistent with regulations, manufacturer requirements and Human Factors
principles. It is also necessary to ensure consistency across departments as
well as consistency in application. Hence the emphasis should be placed on an
integrated approach, based on the notion of the operational documents as a
complete system.

6. ORGANIZATION

a. A flight safety documents system should be organized according to criteria

which ensure easy access to information required for flight and ground
operations contained in the various operational documents comprising the
system and which facilitate management of the distribution and revision of
operational documents.

b. Information contained in a flight safety documents system should be

grouped according to the importance and use of the information, as follows:

(i) Time critical information, e.g., information that can jeopardize the safety of
the operation if not immediately available;

(ii) Time sensitive information, e.g., information that can affect the level of
safety or delay the operation if not available in a short time period;

(iii) Frequently used information;

(iv) Reference information, e.g., information that is required for the operation
but does not fall under (2) or (3) above; and

(v) Information that can be grouped based on the phase of operation in

which it is used.

c. Time critical information should be placed early and prominently in the flight
safety documents system.

d. Time critical information, time sensitive information, and frequently used

information should be placed in cards and quick-reference guides.

e. The flight safety documents system should be validated before deployment,

under realistic conditions. Validation should involve the critical aspects of the
information use, in order to verify its effectiveness. Interactions among all
groups that can occur during operations should also be included in the
validation process.

f. A flight safety documents system should maintain consistency in terminology

and in the use of standard terms for common items and actions.

g. Operational documents should include a glossary of terms, acronyms and their

standard definition, updated on a regular basis to ensure access to the most

Page | 30
 recent terminology. All significant terms, acronyms and abbreviations included in
the flight documents system should be defined.

h. A flight safety documents system should ensure standardization across

document types, including writing style, terminology, use of graphics and
symbols, and formatting across documents. This includes a consistent location
of specific types of information, consistent use of units of measurement and
consistent use of codes.

i. A flight safety document system needs to include a verification mechanism to

ensure that, whenever a section of a document is amended, all other documents
likely to be affected are identified and that consequential amendments are duly
coordinated and agreed to by the responsible departments before the
amendment is processed.

3. DEPLOYMENT

Operators should monitor deployment of the flight safety documents system to

ensure appropriate and realistic use of the documents, based on the
characteristics of the operational environment and in a way which is both
operationally relevant and beneficial to operational personnel. This monitoring
should include a formal feedback system for obtaining input from operational
personnel.

4. AMENDMENT
4.1 Operators should develop an information gathering, review and distribution
system to process information resulting from changes that originate within the
operator, including:

a) Changes resulting from the installation of new equipment;

b) Changes in response to operating experience;

c) Changes in an operators policies and procedures;
d) Changes in an operator certificate; and
e) Changes for purposes of maintaining cross fleet standardization.

Note.- Operators should ensure that crew coordination philosophy,

policies and procedures are specific to their operation.

4.3 A flight safety documents system should be reviewed:

a) On a regular basis (at least once a year);

b) After major events (mergers, acquisitions, rapid growth,

downsizing etc.)
c) After technology changes (introduction of new equipment); and
d) After changes in safety regulations.

4.4 Operators should develop methods of communicating new information. The

specific methods should be responsive to the degree of communication urgency.

Note.- As frequent changes diminish the importance of new or modified

procedures, it is desirable to minimize changes to the flight safety
documents system.

4.5 New information should be reviewed and validated considering its effects on the
entire flight safety documents system.
4.6 The method of communicating new information should be complemented by a
tracking system to ensure currency by operational personnel. The tracking
system should include a procedure to verify that operational personnel have the
most recent updates.

Page | 31
Procedure for medical examination of aircraft personnel for alcohol consumption

3. INTRODUCTION

1.1 It is a well-known fact that even when the blood alcohol levels are zero in the
body, there could be some effect of hangover, which is mainly due to
congeners. These congeners may take 15 to 18 hours to get dissipated and
may produce ill effects for up to 36 hours depending upon the amount of alcohol
consumed. Even 12 hours after a bout of drink, when blood alcohol level
remains zero, there is decrement in task performance. Alcohol present in body
even in small quantities jeopardises flight safety on several counts and is likely
to adversely affect an aviator well into the hangover period.

1.2 Alcohol also interferes with the enzymatic cellular process or oxidation, causes
hypoxia and reduces individuals tolerance with increase in altitude. It is known
that a low alcohol blood level between 30 mg% to 50 mg% disturbs the sensor-
motor, visual and cortical reaction. Consumption of alcohol results in significant
deterioration of psychomotor performance and decreases the amount of mental
capacity available to deal with many essential tasks involved in the conduct of
safe flight. Should an emergency occur in-flight, the crew member under the
influence of alcohol is not capable of dealing with the problem.

1.3 Two ounces of whiskey raises the alcohol level to 50 mg. The amount of alcohol
in a can of beer is approx. the same as in a single mixed drink. Wine,
champagne, ale and other alcoholic beverages have same effects as liquor,
though the con centration of alcohol varies from one beverage to the other.

1.4 Therefore, in the present state of our know ledge, the level of blood alcohol
compatible with safe flying is Zero, which is also recommended by ICAO. It
is equally important to intensify the educational programme for crew
members regarding the inherent dangers of flying after consumption of
alcohol.

1.5 This Civil Aviation Requirement lays down the procedure to be followed for
the breath-analyzer examination of the crew members for consumption of
alcohol and actions to be taken by the operators. It also dwells on the
procedure to be followed by the authorities concerned in the event of an
accident.

1.6 This CAR is issued under the provisions of Rule 24 read with Rule 133A of
the Aircraft Rules, 1937 for information, guidance and compliance by all
concerned.

2. DEFINITIONS

Crew Member A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during

a flight duty period.

Flight Crew Member A licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the
operation of an aircraft during a flight duty period.

Cabin Crew Member A crew member other than a flight crew member.

Other operating member of Any person, who is present in the cockpit for the purpose of
crew duty, assessment, audit, observation, training, etc.

Maintenance Personnel Aircraft Maintenance Engineer or any other technically

Page | 32
 trained person authorized to carry out taxiing of aircraft.

Pre-flight Breath-analyzer
Test conducted on crew member before departure of aflight to
Examination measures alcohol in his exhaled air so as to determine the
concentration of alcohol in the blood.

Post-flight Breath-analyzer Test conducted on crew member after arrival of a flight to

Examination measures alcohol in his/her exhaled air so as to determine
the concentration of alcohol in the blood.

3.1 APPLICABILITY

7. Indian operators engaged in scheduled air transport services for carriage of

passengers, mail or cargo.

8. Indian Non-scheduled/private category operators/flying training institutes, etc.

9. Central Government and State Government Civil Aviation Departments,

Public Sector companies under Centre and State Government.

4. SAFETY REGULATIONS

4.1 As per the provision of Rule 24 of the Aircraft Rules, no person acting as, or carried
in aircraft for the purpose of acting as pilot, commander, navigator, engineer, cabin crew
or the other operating member of the crew thereof, shall have taken or used any
alcoholic drink, sedative, narcotic, or stimulant drug preparation within 12 hours of the
commencement of the flight or taken or use any such preparation in the course of the
flight, and no such person shall, while so acting or carried, be in state of intoxication or
have detectable blood alcohol whatsoever in his breath, urine or blood alcohol analysis
or in a state in which by reason of his having taken any alcoholic, sedative, narcotic or
stimulant drug or preparation his capacity so to act is impaired, and no other person
while in a state of intoxication shall enter or be in aircraft or report for duty.

4.2 The holders of license/ratings/authorisation/approval shall not exercise the

privileges of their licenses/ratings/authorisation/approval while under the influence of
any psychoactive substance which might render them unable to safely discharge their
duties.

6.3 The operator/crew member/maintenance personnel shall ensure that there is no

contravention of Rule 24 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 by conduct of breath-
analyzer examination before operation of flights in India as well as outside
India.For all scheduled flights originating from India, each flight crew and cabin
crew shall be subjected to pre-flight breath-analyzer examination. For all
scheduled flights originating from destinations outside India, post-flight breath-
analyzer examination of each flight crew and cabin crew shall be carried out on
reaching in India.

6.4 For operators other than the scheduled operators, each flight crew and cabin
crew of all flights originating from India shall be subjected to pre-flight breath-
analyzer examination. However, where infrastructure does not exist, the flight
crew and cabin crew shall undergo post-flight breath-analyzer examination. In
case the flight crew and cabin crew are away from base station for more than
two days and operates a flight from there, the operator shall provide facility for
conduct of their pre-flight breath-analyzer examination, which may include
Govt./Govt. licensed private hospitals located at the airport or in the city. Such
facilities shall be subjected to periodic checks by the DGCA.

6.5 In case of flying training institutes, instructors and student pilots undertaking
solo flying shall undergo pre-flight breath-analyzer examination before first flight
Page | 33
 of the day.

6.6 In case of diversion of flights, due to unforeseen circumstances, to an airport

where facility for pre-flight breath-analyzer examination is not available, the
flight crew and cabin crew shall undergo post-flight breath-analyzer
examination at first landing.

6.7 All maintenance personnel shall be subjected to breath-analyzer examination

for alcohol consumption before undertaking any taxi operation of the aircraft.

f) No crew member shall consume any drug/formulation or use any substance

mouthwash/tooth gel which has alcoholic content. Any crew member who is
undergoing such medication shall consult the company doctor before
undertaking flying assignment.

g) Save as provided, representative of Air Safety Directorate/DMS (CA) of DGCA

at his discretion may order a breath-analyzer examination of any of the crew
members prior to or on completion of a flight.

r) EQUIPMENT USAGE

8. Operators shall make available at least two serviceable breath-analyzer

equipment capable of giving accurate digital value upto three decimal places
with a memory to store and recall at least last 1000 records.

9. The breath-analyzer equipment shall be used only in auto mode.

10. The breath-analyzer equipment shall be attachable to a printer. At least one

serviceable printer for the breath-analyzer equipment shall be available at all
times.

11. The breath-analyzer equipment shall be calibrated after 10,000 blows/six

months/at a frequency as recommended by the equipment manufacturer from
an agency having ISO certification to undertake the calibration activity. The date
of the last calibration shall be appended on the instrument. Record of such
calibrations shall be maintained by the operator. It shall be the responsibility of
the operator to ensure continued serviceability of the breath-analyzer
equipment and maintain such records.

b PROCEDURE FOR PRE-FLIGHT AND POST-FLIGHT BREATH-ANALYZER

EXAMINATION

6.1 Operators shall have Doctor holding MBBS degree/trained

Paramedics/Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) on full-time employment of
the company to conduct pre-flight breath-analyzer examination at a designated
place within the airport premises. Alternatively, operators may pool their
resources or avail the pre-flight breath-analyzer examination services of
Govt./Govt. licensed private hospitals located in the premises of the airport.
Such facilities shall be subjected to periodic checks by the DGCA.

6.2 Post-flight breath-analyzer examination shall be carried out preferably in the

aircraft after its arrival. The time consumed in the post-flight breath-analyzer
examination shall not be counted towards duty.

6.3 Before each test, the Doctor/Paramedics/EMT shall run an air blank on the
instrument and obtain a reading of 0.000. The Doctor/Paramedics/EMT shall
also carry out a control test on daily basis and keep a record of printout to
ensure serviceability of both the breath-analyzer equipment and the printer.

6.4 Operators shall keep the pre-flight and post-flight breath-analyzer examination
record separately in a bound volume with all pages serial numbered. Breath-
analyzer examination record shall be maintained as per the format given in
Page | 34
 Appendix I. Scheduled airlines may maintain breath-analyzer examination
records as per the format given in Appendix II.

If the breath-analyzer examination result is positive, a repeat test shall be

carried out after an interval of maximum 15-20 minutes. During this time, the subject
crew may be permitted to wash his face and rinse his mouth, if desired. Before the
second test is carried out, a control test must be taken with the same equipment to
verify the serviceability and correctness of the breath-analyzer. Both the readings so
obtained shall be recorded and print out taken. The second test shall be carried out in
the presence of a witness either from flight dispatch or operations department of the
operator, who shall countersign the test report.

The make, serial number and calibration status of the breath-analyzer shall be
recorded in the event the crew member/maintenance personnel is detected positive for
alcohol consumption. Under no circumstances third test shall be conducted.

If the second test is satisfactory, the crew member may be cleared for flight. If
the crew member refuses to undergo the second test, it shall be recorded and the
concerned crew member shall not operate the flight. In such case, action against the
crew member shall be taken in accordance with Para 8.1 of this CAR.

Additional crew member travelling as a passenger on completion of duty or for

positioning to operate flight from the destination may not undergo pre-flight breath-
analyzer examination. Such crew member shall be subjected to pre-flight breath-
analyzer examination from where he/she undertakes the flight.

All the breath-analyzer examination positive cases shall be promptly reported

but not later than 24 hours of occurrence to the concerned Regional Air Safety Offices
of the DGCA and Director of Air Safety (HQ).

CARRIAGE OF VIP

0 Whenever a designated VIP is to be carried on board for the purpose of flying,

the operator shall ensure pre-flight breath-analyzer examination of the crew members
assigned to operate such flight.

ACTION ON POSITIVE TEST

0 Any crew member that tests pre-flight breath-analyzer examination positive for
the first time/refuses to undergo the pre-flight breath-analyzer examination/refuses to
undergo the pre-flight breath-analyzer examination second time upon tested positive
during the first test/operates the aircraft without undergoing pre-flight breath-analyzer
examination/attempt to evade the pre-flight breath-analyzer examination by leaving the
airport premises shall be kept off flying duty and their license/approval suspended for a
period of three months.

In case of a repeat violation of the provisions contained in Para 8.1 of this CAR, the
license/approval of the crew member shall be suspended for a period of three years.

8.3 In case of a second repeat violation of the provisions contained in Para 8.1 of
this CAR, the license/approval of the crew member shall be cancelled.

8.4 An Instructor/Examiner/Check Pilot/Check Cabin Crew detected positive for

alcohol consumption during pre-flight breath-analyzer examination, will lose such
ratings/ authorisation for a period of three years in addition to the action mentioned in
Para 8.1 and 8.2 of this CAR.

8.5 Maintenance personnel detected positive for alcohol consumption during

breath-analyzer examination shall be off-rostered. Penal action on such cases shall be
taken as per the provisions of Para 8.1 and 8.2 of this CAR.

Page | 35
8.6 All such violations shall be endorsed on the individuals license by DGCA. It
shall be the responsibility of Chief of Flight Safety/Accountable Manager to submit the
license/authorisation to DGCA for necessary endorsement.

8.7 Whenever an expatriate pilot, operating in India is detected positive for alcohol
consumption during pre-flight breath-analyzer examination, the FATA shall be cancelled
and the expatriate pilot shall never be considered for issue of the FATA. In addition, the
concerned license issuing authority of the country shall be informed.

9. POST-FLIGHT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

9.1 Any crew member who tests positive for alcohol consumption in a post-flight
breath-analyzer examination shall have contravened Rule 24 of the Aircraft Rules 1937.
The details of his/her post-flight breath-analyzer examination, licenses, ratings and
approvals shall be immediately submitted along with original
license/authorization/approval to the Director of Air Safety (HQ), DGCA. Action on such
cases shall be taken in accordance with the proviso of Schedule VI of the Aircraft
Rules, 1937. Pending action under Schedule VI of the Rules, the involved crew
member shall surrender the licenses forthwith.

9.2 In addition to action indicated in Para 9.1 of this CAR, the license/ authorization/
approval of person shall be suspended for a period of one year. In case of an expatriate
pilot, the punitive action shall be in accordance with Para 8.7 of this CAR.

9.3 Any crew member that refuses to undergo the post-flight breath-analyzer
examination/attempts to evade the post-flight breath-analyzer examination by leaving
the airport premises shall be kept off flying duty and their license/approval suspended
for a period of three months.

9.4 An Instructor/Examiner/Check Pilot/Check Cabin Crew detected positive for

alcohol consumption during post-flight breath-analyzer examination, will lose such
ratings/ authorisation for a period of three years in addition to the action mentioned in
Para 9.1 of this CAR.

9.5 In case of a repeat violation of the provisions contained in Para 9.1 of this
CAR,the license/approval of the crew member shall be cancelled.

7. MEDICAL EXAMINATION AFTER ACCIDENT

10.1 In the event of an accident at an airport or in its near vicinity, the Officer In-
charge of the airport shall ensure that the crew members are immediately subjected to
medical check-up for consumption of alcohol. The doctor conducting such check-up
shall take samples of blood, urine, etc. required for detailed chemical analysis. Such
examination and collection of samples shall be done at the Airport Medical Centre,
wherever available.

10.2 In case where medical centers are not available at the airports or when the
condition of crew members requires immediate hospitalisation, Aerodrome Officer In-
charge shall ensure that the sample of the blood, urine, etc. is taken at the nearest
hospital. These checks should be expeditiously carried out without any loss of time.

10.3 In case where accident is at a location far away from the airport and the police
authorities are able to reach the site before the aerodrome authorities and the crew
members are alive, the procedure for collection of blood/urine samples shall be
performed by the police at the nearest hospital. Such samples shall be properly
preserved.

10.4 For the purpose of chemical analysis, the sample may be forwarded to local
forensic laboratory giving the details of tests to be conducted, names of flight/cabin
crew, etc.

11. PRESERVATION OF RECORDS

Page | 36
11.1 The operator shall maintain separate records of pre-flight and post-flight breath-
analyzer examination for the flight crew, cabin crew and maintenance personnel. All the
relevant records must be preserved for a period of one year.

12. GENERAL

12.1 It shall be the responsibility of the operator to bring to the notice of its crew
members/maintenance personnel, the provisions of this CAR during their annual
refreshers and records maintained with the acknowledgement from each crew member.

12.2 Each operator shall submit monthly data in respect of Para 8 and 9 of this CAR
to the Director of Air Safety (HQ), DGCA latest by 10th of every month for the preceding
month.

Safety HazardUse of M obile/Cellul ar Telephones inside the aircraft during flight.

1. I NTRODUCTION

1.1 Safety infor mation internationally exchanged reveals sp ecific cases where us
e of mobile telephone by passenge rs inside the aircraft c abin had ca used
erratic performance of aircraft airborne equipment leading to serious safety
hazard s during the flight of the aircraft.
Passengers are not guaranteed to meet the stringent electromagnetic
emission standards imposed on certified airborne equipment. Many of these
portable electronic devices have shown significant radio frequency
emissions in excess of allowable levels within the frequency band of aircraft
communication and navigation systems. The Boeing Co. have, therefore,
suggested to the operators that any passenger electronic device which
intentionally transmits radio signals should be prohibited for use by
passengers at all times while on board airplane. These electronic devices
include mobile/cellular phones, amateur radio transceivers, CB radios and
transmitters that control devices such as toys, etc. The other type of
passenger carry on electronic devices which is not an intentional transmitter
of radio signals such as laptop computers, video cameras, electronic
entertainment devices, electric shavers, etc. should also be prohibited for
use during taxi, take-off, climb out, descent, final approach and landing
phases of the flight in transmitting mode.

1.2 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) has determined that airlines can safely allow use of
Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) by passengers during all phases of
flight and have provided the airlines with implementation guidance. The
usage of PEDs is recommended only in flight/airplane mode during flight.
The above decision is based on the advancement in technology and
research on usage of mobile phones in air, inputs from airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, travelling public, pilots, cabin crew and mobile technology
companies.

1.3 In order to ensure safety of aircraft operation in flight, this Civil Aviation
Requirement is issued under the provisions of Rule 29B read in conjunction
with Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937.

2. APPLICABILITY

2.1 This Civil Aviation Requirement is applicable to all persons on board all Indian
Civil Registered aircraft and to all Indian operators engaged in scheduled and
non-scheduled operations.

3. REQUIREMENTS

Page | 37
3.1 No person shall use any electronic device, which intentionally transmits
radio signals like mobile/cellular phones, amateur radio transceivers, etc. at
all times while on board an aircraft for the purpose of flight.

3.2 Electronic devices, intentionally transmitting radio signals like mobile/cellular

phones, amateur radio transceivers, etc., if carried on board, shall be kept in
non-transmitting mode (commonly referred to as Flight/Airplane Mode).

3.3 Passenger carry on electronic devices which are not intentional transmitter
of radio signals such as laptop computers, video cameras, electronic
entertainment devices, electric shavers, etc., if carried on board, shall not be
used by any person, as announced by the cabin crew, inside the aircraft
during taxi, take-off, climb out, descent, final approach and landing phases of
flight.

3.4 All operators shall by suitable means address passengers on board their
aircraft emphasizing the above mentioned prohibition regarding the use of
mobile/cellular phones and other carry on electronic devices inside the
aircraft in transmitting mode prior to commencement of the flight highlighting
safety aspect.

3.5 Cabin crew, besides their other duties, during the flight shall keep a watch
on the passengers to ensure compliance of the above prohibitory
requirements.

3.6 Any violation of these requirements during the flight should be brought to the
notice of the Commander by the cabin crew and recorded in the flight report
book for subsequent action by the operator against the defaulting person.

3.7 All operators shall include contents of this Civil Aviation Requirement in their
company policy document and other operational documents like Operations
Manual, Cabin Crew Manual, etc. for compliance by their concerned
personnel.

3.8 All operators shall report PED events related to suspected or confirmed PED
interference, smoke or fire caused by PED to DGCA (Kind Attn: DAS Hqrs.).
They shall also evaluate their aircraft as being transmitting PED resistant.

4. GUIDELINES FOR CREW TRAINING

All operators shall develop training program for crew on the following aspects:

4.1 PEDs, if any, that cannot be used on board.

4.2 Situation where PEDs are to be switched-off/on/kept in non-
transmitting mode.
4.3 Stowage of PEDs during take-off and landing.
4.4 Applicability on type of aircraft.
4.5 Update on PED policy of the operator.
4.6 Procedure for handling PED interference normal, abnormal and
during emergency.
4.7 Procedures to recognize, respond and report suspected PEDs
interference.
4.8 Cabin crew responsibilities and procedures concerning use of PEDs.
4.9 CRM and workload issues.

Page | 38