Province of Batangas Vs.

Romulo
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004
Relevant Background:
It was a case filed by Hon. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, Governor of Batangas petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certainprovisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of
1999, 2000 and 2001,insofar as they uniformly earmarked (allocated) for each corresponding year the amount offive billion
pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the LocalGovernment Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
It started in 1998 when then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled
ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION to facilitate the process of
enhancing the capabilities of local governmentunits in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
pursuant to the LocalGovernmentCode.Included in theEO No.48 is the appointment of the Oversight Committee authorized
to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the
LGUs..Subject of the case are the resolutions passed by the Oversight Committee .These are the resolutions with numbers
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, and OCD-99-003. Further, these OCDs were approved by then Pres.Estrada on October 6,
1999. The guidelines along with these OCDs as formulated by theOversight Committee requires the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under theportion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
forappraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release ofcorresponding funds.For the year
2000 and 2001, the same LGSEF of 1999 GAA were adopted due to failure ofCongress to enact general appropriation
laws.The standing point was when Gov. Mandanas received the LGSEF in the GAA of 1991.
ISSUES:
1. Unconstitutionality and void provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001.
2. Unlawful and illegal imposition of conditions issued by the Oversight Committeerequiring project proposals and
documentary requirements prior to the release ofLGUs just share in the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local
autonomy asembodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 (and that thepossible disapproval by the
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs is adiminution to then latters share in the IRA).
HELD:
The Court finds the petition to involve a significant legal issue. Issue No.1 is the crux of the instant controversy as
contained in the GAAs of1999,2000and2001and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991 and undoubtedly a legal question. However, the earmarking of the LGSEF, the promulgation of the assailed
OCD resolutions and the release of the LGSEF to the LGU following therequirements are not disputed.Substantive issues
stated above, in the course of the argument, although the superveningevents as the IRA including the LGSEF for 1999,
2000 and 2001 had already been released,still, there was a compelling reason to resolve the substantive issue raised in the
instant petition, whether intended or incidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision ifgrave violation of the
Constitution is proved even where the supervening events had made thecases moot in order to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controllingprinciples to guide the bench, bar and public.The court held that, the
state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. (Art. II Sec.25 of the Constitution). Consistent with the principle of
local autonomy, the Constitutionconfines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision and has
nopower to controlTheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991wasenactedtofleshoutthemandateoftheConstitution. The State policy on
local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared unconstitutional.
Maquiling vs. Comelec
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10 July 2008. On the same
day an order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In 2009, Arnado again took
his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009,
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent Linog Balua, another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record indicating that Arnado has been using his
US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the petition,
Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his answer.
COMELEC first division ruled for his disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a
motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
him, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En
Banc held that it shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and
granted Arnados MR.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Arnado vs COMELEC
Topic: Citizenship Requirement
Facts:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of
the USA. Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship
Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a
petition to disqualify Petitioner Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen because
he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of
Renunciation. While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division
issued held that Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The COMELEC
First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be followed.
Issue: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run
Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELECs decision is affirmed.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. The phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''
RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisitebecause, as held inMaquiling v. Commission on Elections, his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet
to comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for
the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Bancmerely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it
would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation.Arnado's use of his US
passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the
2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his
qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case.
Labo v Comelec
176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual Citizenship Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere
technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian
in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to
return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship
when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a
Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act
of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had
they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor
by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective
offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Mercado v. Manzano
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation
was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as
a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV
Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any
one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Topacio vs. Paredes
Facts:
This is an original action instituted in this court wherein the petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the judge of
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, directing him to certify to this court a transcript of the record of the
proceedings it had in that court on a certain election contest.
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president.
The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he
was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by
Act No. 2045 having intervened.
The petition alleges that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in the course of the election contest in that he
declared that no one has been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town
on June 4, 1912, and the petitioner prays that the judgment thus rendered and all subsequent proceedings based thereon
be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge (Court of First Instance) had jurisdiction, under the provisions of section 27 of the
Election Law, as amended by Act No. 2170, to declare that no one was legally elected president of Imus on June 4, 1912.
Held:

As amended by Act No. No. 2170, the same section provides:

SEC. 27. Election contests.The Assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and disqualifications of its
members. The time for the filing of the contests, the notification thereof, and the expenses, costs, and the bonds shall
be until repealed. Contests in all elections for the determination of which provision has not been made otherwise shall
be heard by the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction in the judicial district in which the election was held, upon
motion by any candidate voted for at such election. The contest shall be filed with the court within two weeks after the
election and shall be decided by the same as soon as possible after the hearing of the contest. Such court shall have
exclusive and final jurisdiction, except as hereinafter provided, and shall forthwith cause the registry lists and all ballots
used at such election to be brought before it and examined, and to appoint the necessary officers therefor and to fix
their compensation, which shall be payable in the first instance out of the provincial treasury, and to issue its
mandamus directed to the board of canvassers to correct its canvass in accordance with the facts as found. If in any
case the court shall be determine that no person was lawfully elected it shall forthwith so certify to the Governor-
General, who shall order a special election to fill the office or offices in question as hereinbefore provided: Provided,
however, That an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court, within ten days, from any final decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance on contests of elections for provincial governors, for the review, amendment, repeal, or
confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon shall be the same as in a criminal cause.

The SC thinks that the statute limits the power of the county court to contests of elections. That court has no other or further
jurisdiction than to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected. The question whether or not a party already
elected possesses the necessary qualifications for the office is one which must be determined in another way and by a
different proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elect municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general
election
Frivaldo vs Comelec
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating
in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The
Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Florante Quizon versus COMELEC, GR 177927 (2008)
FACTS
Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national and local
elections.Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against Puno alleged that
Puno failed to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election. Punos claim in his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) that he is a resident of Antipolo City for four years and six months before May 14, 2007 but he was in fact a resident
of Quezon City. Quizon also filed a Supplement to the petition claiming that Puno cannot validly be a candidate for a
congressional seat in the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the First District
of the Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district. Quizon then filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the
COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that the unreasonable delay in rendering
judgment deprived him of his right to be declared as the winner and assume the position of member of the House of
Representatives.
Comelec dismissed Quizons Petition and held that Respondent is a resident of the 1st District of Antipolo City, and is thus
qualified to run as a Member of the House of Representatives of the same district.Quizon filed a motion for reconsideration
with the COMELEC En Banc which remains unresolved. Puno argues that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. He also alleged that the petition must be dismissed for the act sought to be
performed is a discretionary and not a ministerial duty; and for failure of Quizon to show that he is entitled to the writ.

ISSUE
Whether the Petition for Mandamus was properly filed.
HELD
No. Petition dismissed. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate.Here, Quizon prayed that COMELEC be ordered to resolve the petition for disqualification. However,
pending resolution of the instant petition for mandamus, the COMELEC issued its Resolution on the petition for
disqualification rendering the instant case moot. Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been
accomplished, there is nothing else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform. As a general rule, the writ of
mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise
of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other.
The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of
the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the Court may only compel
COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such
discretion.
RANILO A. VELASCO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and BENIGNO C. LAYESA, JR.,

Facts:
This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and prohibition to set aside the Resolution dated 10 February 2003 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and the Resolution dated 18 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc in an election protest
case involving the office of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Ana, San Pablo City. Petitioner Ranilo A. Velasco and respondent Benigno C.
Layesa, Jr. were two of the four candidates for Punong Barangay of Sta. Ana, San Pablo City in the 15 July 2002 barangay elections.
After the canvassing of votes, the Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner winner with 390 votes. Petitioners nearest
rival, respondent, received 375 votes. Claiming that some votes cast in his favor were erroneously excluded from the canvassing,
respondent filed an election protest in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City (trial court). Respondent prayed for the
revision of 26 ballots from four precincts. Petitioner initially moved to dismiss the case but, in an Amended Answer, counterclaimed for
the revision of ballots cast in another precinct.

In its Decision dated 23 August 2002, the trial court declared the election results tied, with petitioner and respondent each obtaining
390 votes. The trial court ordered the drawing of lots to break the tie and determine the winner. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC,
contending that the trial court erred in crediting respondent with 15 more votes. Petitioners appeal was raffled to the COMELECs
Second Division.

In its Resolution dated 10 February 2003, the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the trial courts ruling, applying in its appreciation of
some ballots the "neighborhood rule." Petitioner and respondent both sought reconsideration. In his motion, petitioner limited his
objection to five ballots,

In its Resolution dated 18 January 2005, the COMELEC En Banc denied reconsideration of the Second Divisions ruling. On the
contentions respondent raised in his motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that Exhibit "A" is not a marked ballot
and that the vote for petitioner was properly credited in his favor under the "neighborhood rule." The COMELEC En Banc further ruled
that Exhibit "4" cannot be credited to respondent as intent to vote for respondent cannot be ascertained.

Petitioner has narrowed the scope of his appeal to three ballots Exhibits "9," "10," and "13." Petitioner reiterates his contention below
that the votes cast for respondent in these ballots are stray and should not have been credited to respondent under the "neighborhood
rule."

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC correctly credited respondent with the votes cast in the three ballots in question.

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious. The vote cast for respondent in Exhibit "10" is valid while those in Exhibits "9" and "13" are stray.

Accordingly, the votes in Exhibits "9" and "13" are deducted from the total number of votes credited to respondent, leaving a total of
388 votes in his favor. As petitioners total number of votes remains unchanged at 390 votes, he is the duly elected Punong Barangay
of Sta. Ana, San Pablo City.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition. We set aside the Resolution dated 10 February 2003 of the Commission on Elections Second
Division and the Resolution dated 18 January 2005 of the Commission on Elections En Banc. We proclaim petitioner Ranilo A.
Velasco as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Sta. Ana, San Pablo City.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
ZamboangaSibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application
was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was
denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of ZamboangaSibugay Province. Erasmo filed
a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of
a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC
en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, ZamboangaSibugay.

RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for ZamboangaSibugay. The Court will respect the
decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their
manifest will.

Court granted the petition and set aside the Resolution of the COMELEC
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
FACTS:
Fr.NardoCayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is
serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng
and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it
was declared final and executory. Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition
for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly
elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second
placer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.
HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the
elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes
cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsansfavor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1)
the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final
only after the elections.
EDUARDO T. SAYA-ANG, SR., and RICARDO T. LARA, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HONORABLE PIO
JOSE S. JOSON, HONORABLE JOSE P. BALBUENA, HONORABLE LIRIO T. JOQUINO and MANTIL D. LIM.
G.R. No. 155087. November 28, 2003
FACTS:
Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of Barangay Captain of Barangays
Congan and New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) and Barangay
Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand,
petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-
report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec which stated that petitioners
herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) submitted its study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to
the certificates of candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc
Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein.
Despite the abovementioned Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July 16, 2002, having
garnered the most number of votes in their respective barangays. On July 31, 2002, petitioners took their oath of office
before Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the promulgation of the en banc resolution no. 5393 is patently erroneous being without basis in fact
and in law and the issuance of which is grave abuse of discretion amounting even as it does to lack or excess of jurisdiction
HELD:
The Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the winners in the elections. They have
already taken their oaths of office and are, at present, serving their constituents in their respective barangays. In Lambonao
v. Tero the Court held that defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been questioned on or before the election
and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards
election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. The rationale for this principle was explained in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez,
where the Court said that these various and numerous provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in
the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should
not be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did
not do their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 5393 of the respondent Commission on Elections en
banc is set aside. No pronouncement as to costs.