Learning from the Bear: Urban Operations Experience during the Chechen Wars

I. Introduction

Urban areas across the world are growing. The UN World Urbanization
Prospects 2014 Revision, estimates that about 54% of the worlds population live in urban
areas. By 2050, it is estimated that around 66% of the worlds population will be living in
urban areas. For the Philippines, by the same year around 56.3% of the population will
be living in urban areas roughly 88 million Filipinos.

The urban environment is a multidimensional environment characterized by the

interaction of three vital elements: the society, the terrain, and the infrastructures. The
society or the population describes the people living in a particular urban environment.
The population is vital in ensuring the success or failure of urban operations. The local
civilian population in an urban environment provides both advantages and disadvantages
in both forces involved in urban operations. Local population can be a source of HUMINT
on enemy activity, location, and strength. On the other hand, stay-behind civilians in an
urban environment can become collateral damage or slow down the advance of an
attacking force. Worst case scenario is for asymmetric threats to use civilians as human
shields. Understanding the local population is necessary either to rally their support or to
ensure that they remain neutral in the duration of the conflict.

The terrain in an urban environment is made up of the various man-made

horizontal and vertical structures superimposed on the physical terrain. These structures
are made of varying types, sizes, materials, and the construction of which is either in an
orderly manner e.g. grid like or concentric pattern, or in an arbitrary manner. Important
consideration in the urban terrain is the airspace, surface areas, supersurface areas, and
subsurface areas. The airspace is the area above ground useable by aircraft and air to
surface munitions. In the urban terrain, the airspace varies due to the different heights
and densities of man-made structures. Surface areas in urban terrain are the ground level
areas of streets, roads, parks, fields, and any other exterior space. Supersurface areas
are the roofs and upper floors of man-made structures. Subsurface areas on the other
hand are below ground level that includes sewers, drainage systems, subways, and other
underground passageways.

The infrastructure of an urban environment is its foundation. This includes the

vital facilities and structures related to communications and information; transportation
and ports of embarkation/debarkation; energy; economics and commerce; governance
and public services; and, cultural sites.

Relatedly, understanding the threat in an urban environment is of paramount

importance. Threats in urban environments can be conventional forces defending a city.
World War II presents many cases of urban operations between conventional forces such
as the Battle of Stalingrad and Berlin between the Germans and the Soviets in the
European Theater of Operations. In the Pacific Theater of Operations, there was the
Battle of Manila between a combined American and Filipino Guerilla force against
stubborn Imperial Japanese Navy defenders. It can also be against asymmetric threats
either in the form of terrorists groups or local rebels vying for independence. Examples of
which include the episodes of the Chechen Wars in Grozny and the various campaigns
of the Israeli Defense Force against the Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestine.
In the local scene the Armed Forces of the Philippines faced rogue MNLF elements in
Zamboanga in 2013 and a combination of Hapilon led Abu Sayyaf faction and Maute
Group in Marawi City in 2017.

Why focus on urban operations experience in Grozny during the Chechen

Wars? Urban operations experience in Grozny during the Chechen Wars is quite
fascinating. It is fascinating in the sense that it was a battle between a conventional force
and a band of rebels or freedom fighters aiming to preserve their independence from the
Russian Federation and it all happened in an urban area called Grozny which roughly
translates to English as terrible.

The rift between the Russians and the Chechens stretches way back to the 18th
Century as the area of Chechnya and the North Caucus in general was subject to the
squabbling of territory between the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid
Iran. In addition, the conflict had certain religious undertones as the North Caucus region
had significant Islamic influence emanating from neighboring Safavid Iran against the
Orthodox Christian values of the Russian Empire. Looking into Chechen society, while
there may be differences between families, they have no problem uniting to confront a
common enemy especially an outsider and once the threat has been defeated they may
again go back into fighting each other. Such dynamics defined the Chechen efforts
against the Russian attack in Grozny.

The occupation of Imperial Russia and subsequent occupation of the Soviet

Union in Chechnya were marked by local uprisings. Thus Chechnya earned the reputation
of a land rich only with troublesome locals. At the height of the Soviet campaign to bring
Chechnya into it heels, in 1944, Stalin ordered the mass deportation of the Chechen
population from Chechnya and dispersed them across Central Asia, Siberia, and
Kazakhstan.

The downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its fragmentation into 15 different
states paved the way for Chechnyas assertion as an independent nation. Chechnya,
calling itself as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) refused to be part of the Russian
Federation when a Federation Treaty was drafted in 1992. With its refusal to be part of
the Russian Federation, Chechnya was slowly growing as a challenge to Moscows power
and Moscow cannot be seen to be on the weak side. In October and November 1994,
Moscow launched a proxy attack on Chechnya using Chechens disillusioned with ChRI
backed by Russian air forces. Also included were several Russian tank crew and their
tanks who were clandestinely recruited by the Federal Counter Intelligence Service in
exchange for double a years worth of pay for participating in the attack. The attack
resulted in a disaster, ChRI was further galvanized in their resolve to defend their
independence and some of the Russian soldiers who were captured were paraded on
Russian television.

By the end of November 1994, Moscow has come reached the decision to use
Russian armed forces to hammer ChRI into submission. By December, the Russians
were mustering forces for a multiple prong approach into Grozny.

II. Lessons from the Bear

The following lessons are some of the lessons that can be gleaned from
Russian Urban Operations experience in Grozny during the two Chechen Wars (1994
1996 and 1999 2000)

1. Assumption is the mother of all fuck ups

The Russians believed that the by marching into Grozny with tanks rolling, rifles
on their shoulders, and with jets and helicopters roaring in the sky, they can intimidate
and scare the Chechens out of Grozny. They were wrong. In the absence of a thorough
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, the Russians that entered Grozny did not know
that they were about to face a determined and entrenched enemy.

The Chechens took steps to prepare the city for combat. The little tanks they
had were emplaced in fortified positions along streets that were the most likely avenue of
approach of Russian tank columns. Ground level of buildings, windows and doors were
reinforced or barred thus preventing easy entry. Basements were hardened and some
had slits that can be raised using hydraulic jacks purposely to allow for Chechens to fire
at approaching Russian troops and then lowered after strafing the Russians. A network
of passageways including underground tunnels and through building corridors provided
the Chechens a concealed road network by which they can move day and night.

2. Clear Command and Control Infrastructure

The Russian forces that assaulted Grozny reported to different agencies and
organizations. The Ministry of Defense had its own troops deployed. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs also had its own troops in Grozny. There were also forces from the Federal
Security Bureau, air forces, paratroopers, and Spetsnaz forces. This becomes a problem
as the apparent lack of a centralized Command and Control Infrastructure causes
confusion among the operating troops. The inability to communicate with each other
brought about by incompatible communication systems exacerbates the problem with
coordination. Thus, there

i. Who reports to whom?

ii. Especially since there are units from different agemcies and
different services in the same AO
iii. Too many stars that confuses people

3. Establish lines of communication and secure them

In urban operations, as in any other types of operations, communication

between the forces on the ground and their C2 infrastructure is of paramount importance.

forces communicating through unsecured lines of communication are putting

themselves through unnecessary risks. During the 1994 invasion in Grozny, the Russians
often talked in the open. That is, the Chechens can easily tap into the same frequency
that the Russians were using. Through this loophole, the Chechens were able to monitor
Russian troop movements as well as prepare ambush sites for approaching Russian
troops. Sometimes, the Chechens would intentionally communicate false Chechen
positions in order to lure the Russians into an ambush.

i. Can be used by red force to misfeed info

ii. Need to be able to communicate with one another esp if different
services/agencies are involved
iii. Identification friend or foe purposes

4. Tanks have awesome firepower but inherent weaknesses are more

apparent in urban operations

Tanks are a balance between firepower, protection, and mobility. One can
design a heavily armored tank with a large caliber gun but this will require a more powerful
power pack and in turn eventually affecting the overall size and weight of the tank. Tanks
by design are intended to go toe-on-toe against other tanks. Armor is concentrated on the
front and sides of the tanks. The top, rear, and underside usually have less armor
protection not only to save on weight but also because such surfaces are rarely exposed
on a tank on tank engagement. In urban operations though, these weak spots are more
exposed to enemies on foot with anti-tank weapons. Multi-story buildings allows skinnies
with RPGs to target the top and rear of tanks. Tank hunters waiting in basements can
easily target the rear and underside of tanks.
 Tanks have a limited elevation and depression of their main gun. This is an
important consideration in urban operations because it determines which targets a tank
can blast to a thousand pieces. The American M1A2 Abrams tank has an elevation range
of about -9 to +20 degrees. Translating in the urban terrain, this means that an Abrams
tank at a distance of 100m can engage targets up to the 10th or 11th floor of a building or
basement level targets. Shortening the distance to 25m, the Abrams can only engage
targets up to the 3rd or 4th floor of a building.

In Grozny, the Chechens maximized the weaknesses of Russian tanks to their

advantage. Ambushes typically included either waiting or closing in with Russian columns
and massing fire on the Russians a tactic known as hugging. Hugging not only
prevented armor from maximizing their firepower, it also ensured that Chechens would
not be vulnerable to indirect artillery fire or air to surface attacks.

Tank crews were sometimes overwhelmed with the mass of fire towards them
and couldnt react to the ambush. The T-72s and T80s that participated in the assault on
Grozny had an elevation range of -5 to +14 degrees. Comparing it with an M1A2 Abrams,
the T72s or T80s could not even engage 3 rd or 4th Floor targets at a distance of 25m.
Favored targets were the weak spots of tanks. Adding to the debacle of the armor was
the ineffectiveness of the infantry in spotting and engaging Chechens during ambushes.
Some were of the belief that they will be safer inside armored vehicles.

Eventually the Russians realized that self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAG)

such as the ZSU-23-4 Shilka and 2K22 Tunguska can be used to suppress Chechen
rebels. While they lack firepower to blast Chechen positions (quad 23mm guns for the
Shilka and dual 30mm guns for the Tunguska combined with surface to air missile), the
high rate of fire from their main guns made Chechen rebels duck for cover while other
units maneuver to destroy the enemy position. In addition, the high elevation of their guns
(+ 85 degrees for both SPAAGs) allowed them to reach targets positioned at higher floors
of buildings at shorter distances. Though originally designed against low altitude, low
velocity flying aircrafts, the high rate of fire and high elevation of guns of SPAAGs made
them crucial in Grozny.

5. Exploit the information spectrum

One thing the Russians failed to account or control during the First Chechen
War was the media. Media personnel freely mingled with Russian troops, civilians, and
even with the Chechen rebels. The unrestricted access of the media to Grozny allowed
the Chechen rebels free media mileage that they utilized for their own benefit. Interviews
with Chechen rebels and their leaders propagated the war as a war for independence
and called for the sympathy of the international community if not for their cause but for
the welfare of Chechen civilians in the middle of the war in Grozny. Adding to the blow
against the Russian attack on Grozny were images of killed Russian soldiers which had
a demoralizing effect back home. Looting by Russian soldiers were also among the
images played the media that had negative effects on the Russian campaign in Grozny.

While the First Chechen War was the age prior to widespread internet use and
social media, Russia lost the information war through the unrestricted access of the media
in the battlefield and to the Chechen rebels.

At the tactical and operational level, the information war may have little effect,
however it is quite important at the strategic level as this influences the political
atmosphere and subsequently the decisions that will be made by top decision makers. In
a democratic society, public clamor against a war or military actions inside or outside the
country may lead to a shift in electoral preferences during elections. The international
community on the other hand may impose economic sanctions against a state. During
the 1st Chechen War, the Russians had a backlash due to their lack of control of
information. In contrast with their experience during the 2nd Chechen War, Russian control
on information more or less legitimized their conflict and catapulted Vladimir Putin to
power.

6. Thermobaric weapons are useful in UO especially if collateral damage

is of little concern

Thermobaric explosives are an example of enhanced blast explosives.

Thermobaric explosives initially dispense an aerosol cloud of gas, liquid or finely
powdered explosive that flows around objects and cavities before being ignited. The
ignition of the cloud produces an overpressure and in confined spaces consumes oxygen
in the area. Thermobaric explosives are highly effective in confined spaces because the
resulting overpressure or shockwave from the explosion bounces back and forth in a
building or a bunker stressing its walls or foundations which can result to its collapse.
Setting aside injuries from flying shrapnel, the shockwave causes internal injuries ranging
from internal hemorrhage, collapsed lungs, blindness, or ruptured ear drums.

In Grozny, the Russians made use of the RPO-A Shmel, a man-portable, 93

mm disposable rocket launcher with a thermobaric warhead. Although classified as a
flamethrower, the Shmel, was far from one. With an effective range of about 600m, the
Shmel was effective in destroying Chechen positions in buildings and houses. The Shmel
had a comparable destructive effect with a 152mm artillery round thus earning the
nickname pocket artillery.

Aside from the man-portable Shmel, the Russians also made extensive use of
the TOS-1 Buratino during the Chechen Wars. The Buratino is a 30-tube, 220mm, heavy
flame thrower system capable of firing incendiary and thermobaric rockets. It is a multiple
launch rocket system mounted on a T-72 chassis capable of engaging targets up to 3,
500m and as close as 400m. The rebel occupied village of Komsomolskoye was leveled
to the ground partly due to the salvos of thermobaric rockets from the Buratino.

7. The night is not just for sleeping

i. Russkies withdrew during thw night
ii. Chechens used it for moving into position, consolodiating and
moving men and materiel
iii. Lack of night fighting capability for troops, AVs, and Aviation assets

8. UO is manpower intensive

Urban operations is the modern day version of a siege. The sieges during
the antiquities and the medieval ages, placed importance on the attackers ability to
ensure that the defenders are isolated and contained in their fortress or castle. Failing to
do so would mean that defenders can get supplies outside or attempt to launch a
counterattack in order to lift a siege. In urban operations, isolating and containing the
enemy is also of paramount importance. Failing to do so either means that that enemy
can still get reinforcements and sustain their combat power.

Effectively encircling an enemy in urban operations is difficult owing to the

physical characteristics of the urban terrain. While an attacking force can physically
impose checkpoints or restrictions on the surface of urban environments, the defenders
can utilize the sub-surface for their movement. Existing sewer networks act as pre-made
underground tunnels that defenders can use to maneuver personnel and supplies.
Defenders can create hidden passageway between buildings thus bypassing the
attackers check points.

During the 1st Chechen War, Russian plans for the invasion of Grozny
attempted to encircle the city. During the initial operations, they, however failed.

i. Casualty rate
ii. Manpower necessary to occupy buildings cleared from enemies
iii. Number of units needed to contain the AO IOT prevent enemy
reinforcements

9. Learn the lessons from the past

The Soviet Army had vast urban operations experience during World War
II. These include successes both as a defender and attacker. Elements of the Red Army
successfully held Stalingrad until additional Red Army units encircled the attacking
German 6th Army paving the way for Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The Soviet Army was
also the first at Berlin, where the roles were changed and the Soviets were on the
attacking side. Berlin capitulated which subsequently ended the war in the European
Theater of Operations

i. Red army had vast UO experience during WWII e.g. Stalingrad,

Berlin,
ii. UO lessons disappeared
iii. UO units did not exist except for spetsnaz units

10. Unit cohesion cannot be developed overnight

i. Unita were hastily tasked organized
ii. Soldiers only knowing each other inside BMPs

11. Sustainment of units is important in UO

In any military operations, sustaining the force is important.

i. High expenditure in certain classes of supplies

ii. Adequate rotation of troops
iii. Weapons/ammo for drugs (sometimes they get shot)
iv. Troops that loot from the people generally reap hatred from the
people

12. UO is a snipers nirvana

13. The local population is a consideration

The local population in an urban environment needs to be considered in

planning for any urban operations for they can used by the attacker or the defender to its
advantage. The chaos emanating from the disorganized diaspora of the local population
however presents problems. The fleeing civilian population and the attacker will most
likely use the same road/s. If this road happens to be the attackers main supply route,
the ensuing traffic of military and civilian vehicles as well as the civilian and military foot
traffic will eventually cause congestion. For the civilians, the congestion means theyll
spend more time near the battle zone, for the attackers, the congestion means a delay in
the movement of their supplies and/or troops thus, the congestion is a zero sum game for
both the civilians and the attackers.

The situation described above plagued Russian forces approaching Grozny

once the firefight had begun. Russian convoys were halted by the evacuating civilians
trying to flee from Grozny. Exacerbating matters is the lack of non-lethal weapons that
could have been used to control the crowd and ensure the smooth passage of Russian
convoys.
 The civilians that remained in Grozny however were unsympathetic with the
Russians. Inherently, they would ally themselves with the rebels and provide them
support in whatever way they can. Civilians can be used by the attacker as guides in
navigating through an enemy occupied territory however, as the Russians would
eventually learn, some of their civilian Chechen guides would lead them to rebel ambush
sites.

If the defenders share ethnic similarities with the local population e.g. they
have more or less similar physical appearance, language, culture, etc., they can easily
blend in with the left behind civilian population. In such a situation, once the defenders
drop their weapons and change clothes, they can easily pretend to be part of the civilian
population. Sifting legitimate civilians from defenders pretending to be civilians can be
challenging task. The same was true during the Chechen wars. Since the Russians were
fighting Chechen rebels, the moments the rebels dropped their weapons and changed
into different clothes, they passed themselves as civilians in order to cross Russian lines.
To this end the Russians employed measures to distinguish Chechen rebels pretending
to be civilians from legitimate civilians. These include physical inspection for powder
burns on the hands, inspection on shoulders for bruises or discoloration due to the recoil
coming from the use of firearms, inspection of pockets for gunpowder residue or empty
shells, among others. Military working dogs were eventually employed to sniff gun powder
or explosives residue on individuals.

In the case of the American experience in the Battle of Manila from February
to March 1945, the residents of Manila welcomed the arriving American forces. As
residents piled the streets to greet the incoming Americans, it also slowed down the
advance of American troops though such a sight probably provided a boost in moral of
for the Americans and hope for the civilian residents. As the Americans reached the
POW/internee camps of the University of Santo Tomas and New Bilibid Prison, they soon
learned that they will have to feed, cloth, shelter, and provide health services to the POWS
and civilian internees they found there. The provision of such services to the POWs and
internees strained the supplies that the advancing American units brought with them
which meant less supplies for use of the troops at least not until resupplies arrived. In
addition, they also had to transport them away from their prison camps to a safer area
using US military vehicles. A quagmire the Americans encountered during the Battle of
Manila was the proclivity of the Japanese to take civilians as hostages. A case in point is
the Japanese garrison at the University of Santo Tomas which took some civilian
internees as hostages and only freed them after the Americans granted them safe
passageway to rejoin other Japanese units in Manila.

In addition,
 III. Conclusion
UO will be a future possibility not only against a conventional forxe but
also against asymmetric forces
The approach to UO is not bypass it rather there is a need to train for it
For the PA, UO will eventually become the new jungle by which army
forces as part of the joint force will operate.

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