Republic of the Philippines Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than 500 million from

nvest not more than 500 million from the fund in

SUPREME COURT the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.3
Manila
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares
EN BANC without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the incorporators
held one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012 worth 495 million.4

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents
vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar,
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA CLARA LOBREGAT, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala,
JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE CONCEPCION, ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved another amendment to
EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IAKI UNICOMs capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock to one billion shares
R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, divided into 500 million Class "A" voting common shares, 400 million Class "B" voting
ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM, common shares, and 100 million Class "C" non-voting common shares, all with a par value
SIGFREDO VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, Respondents. of 1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value (consisting
of one million shares for the incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB) were then
DECISION converted to 500 million Class "A" voting common shares at the ratio of 100 Class "A"
voting common shares for every one without par value share.5
ABAD, J.:
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 30196 against respondents, the
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on
acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue of prescription. Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a
The Facts and the Case capitalization of only 5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of
conversion to voting common shares, the governments 495 million investment was
On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, reduced by 95 million which was credited to UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG
Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in
(UNICOM)1 with an authorized capital stock of 100 million divided into one million shares line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
with a par value of 100 per share. The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth Government,7 which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in
20 million and paid 5 million. the case.

On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1) increasing its About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
authorized capital stock to three million shares without par value; (2) converting the original issued a Memorandum,8stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict respondents
subscription of 200,000 to one million shares without par value and deemed fully paid for for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already prescribed. Respondents
and non-assessable by applying the 5 million already paid; and (3) waiving and amended UNICOMs capitalization a third time on September 18, 1979, giving the
abandoning the subscription receivables of 15 million.2 incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million
shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Articles of Incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February
composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. 8, 1980, making public respondents acts as board of directors, the period of prescription
Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel began to run at that time and ended on February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already
M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with the PCGG for preliminary investigation
S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut on March 1, 1990.
In a Memorandum9 dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the OSPs incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPBs Constitution may be barred by prescription.15
subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper
point at which the prescription of the action began to run since respondents act of investing Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law
into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the investment was prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on
a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019
on September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive was only 10 years.16 Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of
period for it had not yet been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A.
provided for prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time. 3019, as originally enacted.17

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsmans action but Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in
the latter denied the same;10 hence, this petition. accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326,18 which provides:

Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria Clara L. Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.11 violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
The Issue Presented punishment.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the prescriptive
3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed. period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if
such commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the
The Courts Ruling institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. 19

Preliminarily, the Court notes that what Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) filed in this Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the same
case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an adverse began to run only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.
action of certiorari under Rule 65.12 Still, the Court will treat this petition as one filed under
Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from
discretion and reversible jurisdictional error to the Ombudsman for dismissing the the discovery of such loans.1wphi1 The reason for this is that the government, as
complaint. The Court has previously treated differently labeled actions as special civil aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed when they were made.
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity, and fair Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the
play.13 government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when
the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans.20
was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its
efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here is
family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye
the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees is not by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. is UCPBs investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent
Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest have been withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or
Loans v. Desierto14 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against the board of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the
respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or investment.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when Republic of the Philippines
UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing house for SUPREME COURT
increases in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPBs investment. Changes in Manila
shareholdings are reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations have been
mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request. FIRST DIVISION

The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPBs investment in G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010
UNICOM during martial law at the Presidents or anyone elses instance. Indeed, no
accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
transactions of whatever kind during martial law since even that regime had a stake in
vs.
keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant.
Philippines.
DECISION
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB
investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second elementthat the action could not
have been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial lawdoes not apply to PEREZ, J.
this case. The last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about
four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period of prescription No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
run its course before bringing the proper action. counts of rape.

Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of organized In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of
society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage of time, of access to Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant
defense witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that was accused of raping AAA,2 allegedly committed as follows:
would have been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of
witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati, Metro
actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court. Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who was then _________ years
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show probable of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with
cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOMs capitalization, the [AAA] by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.3
stated value of the one million shares without par value, which belonged to its
incorporators, was 5 million. When these shares were converted to 5 million shares with Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
par value, the total par value of such shares remained at 5 million. But, the action having stipulated on the following facts:
prescribed, there is no point in discussing the existence of probable cause against the
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. 1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of prescription the
subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against respondents Eduardo M.
3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA
Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P.
was one and a half years old.4
Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R.
Mendezona, Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The following facts are undisputed: PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of Makati Police
Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin.
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,5 since she was just a few months old.6 BBB is She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal
married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in examination.10
1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00
p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week. P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA.
Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is
Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 2
(Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), oclock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded that AAA is in a "non-
and Maximo Duran (Duran). virgin state physically."11 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been
caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia.12
The prosecutions version of the facts follows
Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18
October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the
on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of appellant to invite
house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as
him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and
there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked
asked appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant
appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to
mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police station. 13
his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep.
Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father
to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again
denied raping AAA.14 He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was
touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened
that he will kill her and BBB. even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16
October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a "project." She never came home.15
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed
reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis
into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was
able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos.
again raped her by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND
raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE
when she was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1.
and instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin.7 Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of
rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA]
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral
Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for
damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for
going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have
each count of rape.16
done to her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has
been raped by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a complaint. 8
The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of
rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed "straightforward,
AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She,
consistent and credible." The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive
together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went
with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate,
escape.9 testimonies of witnesses, and admission made by AAA.17 Finally, the trial court dismissed
appellants defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged
testimony.18 assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away from her
and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for
Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the
Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.19 However, the Court of circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the imposition of the death penalty.
Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellants He contends that an adopting parent is not included within the purview of qualifying
brief.20 When the case was brought before us on automatic review, we set aside the relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an
Resolution of the Court of Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant argues that the term
disposition on the ground that review by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment "adopting parent" must be given a definite and technical meaning in that the process of
imposing the death penalty is automatic and mandatory. 21 adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been
issued.26
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by
appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts. The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that
appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than
sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed
The fallo of the Decision reads:
to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.27
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows:
The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does
not dent her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact
1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03- that she was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA
260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby from reporting said incidents.28
acquitted;
The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without
2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03- eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.29
261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision
eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the
of the Court of Appeals.
Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.22
Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the
span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord
The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape in
with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution
appellants conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
beyond reasonable doubt.23 With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate
court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped
on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. In rape cases, "the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
to prove the other charges of rape.24 committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof."30
On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision.
In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC
submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor considered it "straightforward and consistent on material points," while the Court of Appeals
General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any described it as "spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions." Well-
Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or innocence of an accused
Briefs, respectively.25 hinges on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when duly supported by sufficient and convincing
evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
be disturbed on appeal."31 We see no reason in this case to depart from the principle.
Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts assessment of AAAs credibility, having A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude
under grilling examination.32
xxxx

Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender age and
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering a knife?
not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has
been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on A: Yes, sir.
her."33
Q: Who was that person?
Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to
prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,34 the Court of Appeals correctly A: "Papa"
declared, thus:
Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused?
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against
accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of A: Yes, sir.
AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped by the accused-
appellant on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Q: What happened next?
AAAs bare statement is evidently inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of
rape as each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of
A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed his shorts.
them must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite
testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate
and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
required quantum of evidence.35
A: Pajama, sir.
As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to
have sexual intercourse with him, thus: Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?

Q: What happened after two (2) weeks? A: He undressed me.

A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head. Q: Which one did he remove?

Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you A: My pajama.
noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
A: He did not remove.
Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what
A: At work, sir. happened?
 A: He slowly parted my legs. A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he
removed my shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: And then?
Q: Then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that? the house.38

A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong. Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of
rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man
having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?

A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso." AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical
findings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed
laceration only confirms AAAs claim of rape.
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in
A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko."36 imposing the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having
carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
certificate.37
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated: ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until
when? xxxx

A: The last time was in October 15, 2002. The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again? still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian.
One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a
A: In our house. minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this
interpretation and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
Q: At about what time? qualifying circumstance of relationship.

A: 9:30 in the evening. Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of
AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be
condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or
admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital
punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344
information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would
and her relationship to the offender."39 have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where
he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn
his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his
early case of People v. De la Cruz.40 The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of
victim could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept
still living and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the
the legal guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court latter article.
rejected this contention and ruled as follow:
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows: point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears
in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code.
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but,
sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis,
despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or
judicial guardian.1wphi1 It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a
casos." Without passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may
file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian
party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111,
would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian,
has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of
or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be
given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a
guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by
of Civil Procedure.41 Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances
specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant
Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a
circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still
"guardian" as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein
denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by
raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in
partner of the victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death.
contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he
should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was xxxx
answered in the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was
explained in this discourse: The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not
Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere
is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian
crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the
xxxx ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall
either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same
enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact
conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of exemplary
children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we damages is proper.
cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category. 42 WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the
crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
People v. De la Cuesta43 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple
asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is
relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.44 also ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar45 where it was held that the amount of P30,000.00.
"guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a
legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, SO ORDERED.
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two
clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered
accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of
the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term
"guardian" in this manner:

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or
phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. 87 Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator
and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the
perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this
description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has
a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the
wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is
neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.46

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned
in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting father" of
AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant
could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.47 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.48 While no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of rapes, it was established during trial that
 Republic of the Philippines Acting on the Committees recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the acquisition
SUPREME COURT of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 26770-75
Manila and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario
Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel,
THIRD DIVISION Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019,
Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.
G.R. Nos. 166948-59 August 29, 2012
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004
the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the
vs.
MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, MANUEL S. SA TUITO, **** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the
JOELITA TRABUCO, ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y. OMB, which challenges such order.
VILLAROSA, RAUL APOSAGA, HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO BARBASA-
PERLAS, Respondents. The Issue Presented

DECISION The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding
that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of
ABAD, J.: government-owned and controlled corporations.

The Ruling of the Court

This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges filed against
the Legal Department Head of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and
Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused. In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or non-
stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled
The Facts and the Case corporation. Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall
under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.2 On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged Sandiganbayan changed its position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-
anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring owned and controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public
lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized function.
bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale
that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since
Department while the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use
these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime
according to the Committee, to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes.

Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General Jose
Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of
sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article cases involving:
171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g). a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for
the time of the commission of the offense: example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board,
the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement.
xxxx Since "managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees
or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the
definition above, has charge of a corporations "divisions or departments." This brings
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
Bellos position within the definition.
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours)

Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction over
him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of Police
"manager" used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its
Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information does not
businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount of
charge him for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank. He
discretion and independent judgment.
is rather charged for offenses he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a
"manager" of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a government-owned and controlled
The Sandiganbayan cited Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support this corporation.
definition.3
What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the offense
After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the Court described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in
finds this additional definition of "manager:" relation to the office being held.7 Here, the OMB charged Bello of using his office as Legal
Department Head to manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of its businesses, or of its prejudice of the government.
branch establishments, divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a certain amount
of discretion and independent judgment.4 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision
dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes "divisions, or 75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases,
departments," which are corporate units headed by managers. The United States case of immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposagas motion for
Braniff v. McPherren5 also referred to "divisions" and "departments" in relation to the reinvestigation.
position of "manager." Under this definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term
"manager," he having charge of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned SO ORDERED.
transactions took place.

In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the
Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper
construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase
in question is founded or with which it is associated.6 Given that the word "manager" was in
the company of the words "presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to
the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term "manager" to officers who have
overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled corporations.

But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section
4(a)(1) should be understood to refer to a range of positions within a government
corporation. By the variety of the functions they perform, the "presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers" cannot be taken to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control
and supervision of such corporations.1wphi1
 Republic of the Philippines from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to
SUPREME COURT November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.6
Manila
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of
THIRD DIVISION Neypes for his guidance.7

G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011 On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed
10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. 8
JUDITH YU, Petitioner,
vs. On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. 9
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.

DECISION On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
BRION, J.: the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision.10
We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent
Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, The Petition
from taking further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al."1 The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions
when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the
The Factual Antecedents Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized below. The Case for the Respondents

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal
actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her period provided in the Rules.11
a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of 3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on
the same amount as the fine.2 the petition.12

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in
the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil
of the crime for which she was convicted.3 case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules"
referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period
for lack of merit.4 to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mentioned.13
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days Issue
The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period
to appeals in criminal cases. within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a
denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Courts Ruling
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
We find merit in the petition. prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the
law.14 The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129),15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from:
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
(48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 16
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order. The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in
the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted
reconsideration shall be allowed. from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following
for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reasons:
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been
served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
begins to run. makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case.
Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal
appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17 pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law Quod est
inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the
the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1
Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed. In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of
appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it
involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa
petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction
Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The
apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioners appeal in
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus: Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
No pronouncement as to costs.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. SO ORDERED.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason
exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to
the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to
the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd
situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in
a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly
discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment
when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation
 Republic of the Philippines That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Vicente,
SUPREME COURT Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Manila accused, ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime herein charged, in relation to and taking
SECOND DIVISION advantage of his official functions, conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M.
Tiape, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously appoint ORLANDO M. TIAPE
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008 as a Municipal Administrator of San Vicente, Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando
knowing fully well that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty
candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the May 1998 elections,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, hence is ineligible for appointment to a public office within one year (1) from the date of the
vs. elections, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of public interest.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, Respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
DECISION
The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and raffled to the Fourth
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the
This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred
Special Prosecutor assails the May 20, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth on July 26, 2000.9
Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos
Demurrer to Evidence2 and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under
Article 2443 of the Revised Penal Code. After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied his motion but gave him five days
within which to inform the court in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer
The facts culled from the records are as follows: to Evidence for resolution without leave of court.10 Villapando then filed a Manifestation of
Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence,11 and was given 15 days from receipt to file his
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Demurrer to Evidence. He filed his Demurrer to Evidence12 on October 28, 2003.
Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division found Villapandos
Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as follows:
Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.4 A Contract of Consultancy5 dated February 8,
1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby
the former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development The Court found the "Demurrer to Evidence" impressed with merit.
Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from
January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly salary of 26,953.80. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando Article 244. Unlawful appointments.Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.6 The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. (underscoring supplied)
and the following Information7 dated March 19, 2002 charging the two with violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the Sandiganbayan: A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following elements, to wit:

xxxx 1. the offender was a public officer;

 2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public office; In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of Municipal
Administrator. As such, the law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications [therefor;] and, municipal administrator is Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit:

4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not have the legal "Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.(a) No person shall be appointed
qualifications at the time he made the nomination or appointment. administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government
unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public
Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed. administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and
a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in
management and administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial
1. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.
Palawan when the alleged crime was committed.
xxx xxx x x x"
2. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality
of San Vicente, Palawan.
It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much less prove that Mayor
Villapandos appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on
3. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called upon to determine the position of Municipal Administrator. Prosecutions argument rested on the assertion that
whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as Municipal Administrator, since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked the required legal
was lacking in legal qualification. Stated differently, does "legal qualification" qualifications.
contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on appointment as provided for in Sec. 6,
Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local Government Code,
It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of
mandating that a candidate who lost in any election shall not, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government? legal qualification. A person who possessed the required legal qualifications for a position
may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one
year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be
The Court answers in the negative. temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all
of the required legal qualifications imposed by law.
In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, "there
must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" 4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the same.
therein. To illuminate further, Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that
the qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided
WHEREFORE, finding the "Demurrer to Evidence" filed by Mayor Villapando with merit, the
for by law, which may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility or experience:
same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer who nominates or
SO ORDERED.13
appoints a person to a public office. The person nominated or appointed is not qualified and
his lack of qualification is known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided by Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
law. The purpose of the law is to ensure that the person appointed is competent to perform Prosecutor, representing the People of the Philippines.
the duties of the office, thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.
Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the petition. Despite several
The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational attainment, civil service notices, however, he failed to do so and in a Resolution14 dated June 7, 2006, this Court
eligibility or experience. For instance, for one to be appointed as judge, he must be a informed him that he is deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the case shall
lawyer. So if the Judicial and Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as judge be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner.
knowing him to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such act constitutes a violation of
the law under consideration. Petitioner raises the following issues:
 I. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided
by law and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of
INTERPRETING THAT THE "LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION" IN ARTICLE 244 OF Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ONE YEAR disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications
PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING CANDIDATES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE stated in the law.
CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the contrary, legal
II. disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification
under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
GIVING DUE COURSE TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING, THE DEMURRER controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
TO EVIDENCE.15
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:
prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost
election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the in Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or
government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that
except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or
shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
the absence of lack of legal qualification.
corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisions interpretation of the term
subsidiaries. legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states: disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan16 that once a court grants
the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution
of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
of a grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1 Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of where none is indicated.
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapandos Motion for Leave to File
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which
hostility.17 to inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without
leave of court.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void,
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. 18
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision granting
Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare
its decision null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and
VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.