A.C.
2387, September 10, 1998
DOCENA v. ATTY. LIMON
FACTS:
Atty. Limon was Docenas lawyer on appeal in Civil Case for Forcible Entry. While
appeal was pending, Atty. Limon required Docena spouses to post a superseadas bond
in the amount of P10, 000 to stay the execution of the decision. To raise the amount,
Docena obtained a loan from Development Bank Borongan, Eastern Samar branch and
from a private individual in which the amount of P4, 860 was produced by Docena
spouses in response of Atty. Limons demand letter.
After the receipt of the decision in the appealed case, Docena spouses went to CFI to
withdraw the superseadas bond but discovered that no such bond was ever posted.
When confronted, Atty. Limon promised to restitute the amount but never complied
despite repeated demands. Also, in answer to the allegations, Atty. Limon claimed that
the P10,000 which is the amount of the bond was supposedly his attorneys fees for
representing the spouses. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Limon should be disbarred
HELD:
Yes.
Although at first the IBP recommended that he be suspended from practice for 1 year,
the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:
Canon 1, Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest immoral or
deceitful conduct
Canon 16.01- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received from the client
And that these rules were all infringed and breached. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to legal profession, but it must also be possessed at
all times to maintain ones good standing. It has been said time and time again, that the
law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public service
and secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets
and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent
Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and
most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has,
indirectly, eroded the peoples confidence in the judicial system.
A.C. 4749, January 20, 2000
SANTOS v. ATTY. LLAMAS
FACTS:
Complainant Santos, a member of the bar, alleged that on the matter of Atty. Fransisco
Llamas, who, allegedly for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP OR numbers and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates IBP Rizal
259060 but he has been using this for at least three years already.
The matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law. There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that default in the
payment of annual dues for 6 months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for removal
of name of delinquent member from Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent Atty. Llamas, in his comment memorandum, alleged that he, who is now of
age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his
IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was
his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings
were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that
he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income
tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas has misled the Court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings for at least 6 years
HELD:
Yes, he has.
By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is
also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
B.M. 1370, May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM IBP DUES
FACTS:
Atty. Arevalo sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in amount of P12, 035 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
admitted in Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of Philippine Civil Service then
migrated to, and worked in, USA until his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed for IBP dues for the years he was working in Philippine Civil
Service considering the law prohibits practice of ones profession while in government
service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in USA.
The said letter was referred to IBP for comment.
In reply, IBP stated membership in IBP is not based on actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues
as determined by IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by Supreme Court that
the validity of imposing dues on IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray
cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that policy of IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of Courts directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained
that there is no rule allowing exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by Atty.
Arevalo, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership.
It asserted that what Atty. Arevalo could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in Civil Service and
when he was working abroad?
HELD:
No, he is not entitled. Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in
the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The payment of
dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
A.C. 5737, October 5, 2004
FERDINAND CRUZ v. ATTY. CABRERA
FACTS:
The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law
student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor
who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the respondent
uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance
of his duties as a lawyer. The manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words
appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered with the intention to annoy, vex
and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate, and discredit complainant before the public.
Respondent Atty. Cabrera contends that the complaint filed against him is merely a
vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for Mina Family against
whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
complainants illegal practice of law; and the reason he informed the court that
complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he
is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka
muna" out of indignation because of complainant's temerity in misrepresenting himself
as lawyer.
The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended suspension of
respondent in the practice of law for 3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the
IBP Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.
HELD:
The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to
such a magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. It is but
a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument
between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account
for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 8
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
A.C. 6296, November 22, 2005
ATTY. MAGNO v. ATTY. VELASCO-JACOBA
FACTS:
Disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement between Atty. Magno and her uncle
Lorenzo Inos over a landscaping contracted they entered into. Atty. Magno addressed a
letter styled Sumbong to the barangay captain of San Pascual in Nueva Ecija.
At the barangay conciliation, Atty. Jacoba, on the strength of a special power of attorney
signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared in his stead. Atty. Magnos objection to Atty. Jacobas
appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer inasmuch as Atty. Magno is a lawyer herself. Atty. Jacoba in response retorted
that heer being a laywer is merely coincidental and that she is appearing as an attorney-
in-fact in behalf of Lorenzo Inos.
Atty. Magno enumerated specific instances such as Atty. Jacoba going to the barangay
for a recording in the blotter and that in a letter sent to the barangay captain Atty.
Jacoba addressed herself as Inos family legal counsel. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Jacobas appearance in the stead of Lorenzo Inos is valid and if
she violated Section 415 of LGC of 1991 and Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Atty. Jacobas appearance is invalid and thus violated LGC of 1991 and Code of
Professional Responsibility. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991 provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person- In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
Above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in
katarungang pambarangay conciliation proceeds, unassisted by counsel or
representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable
the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about facts and issues, exception
being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling
that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between
themselves without what sometimes is unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence
could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.
Court joins with the statement of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination
that Atty. Jacoba transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Local Government Code.
However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must be modified.
A.M. MTJ-99-1203, June 10, 2003
NELIA ZIGA v. JUDGE RAMON AREJOLA
FACTS:
Ziga and Judge Arejola are two heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue of inheritance, they
and 8 others became owners in fee simple of land in Naga City. While Judge Arejola
was employed as attorney in Public Attorneys Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in
behalf of his co-heirs, an application for registration of title of lot. In its decision, RTC
granted the petition and ordered the imperfect title of heirs to the property confirmed
and registered in the name of heirs of Fabiana Arejola free from liens and
encumbrances of any kind whatsoever. Subsequently, a substantial portion of the lot
has been agreed to be sold in favor of City of Naga by a deed of Conditional Sale.
Ziga alleges that Judge Arejola should be disciplined for appearing before a court as
counsel without securing the permission of Supreme Court and for asking contingent
attorneys fees and agents commission of the gross selling price of property subject of
land registration case.
In his comment, Judge Arejola argues he does not need to ask permission from PAO or
from Supreme Court since he has every right to appear before lower court as co-heir.
According to him, he has been appearing in the land registration case as representative
of heirs of Fabiana and not as counsel. Respondent explained that being one of the
heirs of the late Fabiana Arejola, he is a party-litigant and therefore a party-in-interest in
the land registration case. He believes that this case was filed to harass him because of
the misspelled name of complainant in the RTC decision on the registration of land title.
He further claims that complainant is shown to have disturbed mind and to be suffering
from manic depression.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Arejola should be disciplined
HELD:
Yes. Judge Arejola is guilty of violating Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly be
suspended.
Judge Arejola failed to refute the documents submitted by complainant stating that he
signed as counsel for the heirs. Against these documentary evidence, defense of
respondent, that he merely participated in the land registration case as party-litigant and
a co-heir, fails. Also, the term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court of participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or
papers in anticipation of litigation, giving advice to clients or persons needing the same,
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and
preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings. Based on the records,
practice of law was clearly exercised by Judge Arejola. His act of writing pleadings and
defending rights of his co-heirs amounts to private practice of law. Tenor of the letters
and pleadings, taken with his acts of appearing, representing and defending the rights
of heirs over the property shows that he as representative of the heirs was defending
their rights over the disputed property.
B.M. 914
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE CHING
FACTS:
Vicente Ching is the legitimate son of spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen and
Prescila Dulay, a Filipino. Ching was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11,
1914. Since birth, he resided in the Philippines. He is also a Certified Public Accountant
and a registered voter of Tubao, La Union and in fact was elected as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 1992 synchronized elections.
On 1998, having completed Bachelor of Laws course at St. Louis University, Baguio
City, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was conditionally
admitted to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of Philippine Citizenship. On April 5, 1999, the 1998 Bar Examinations
were released and Ching was one of the successful examinees. However, because of
the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath and
instead, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In compliance
therewith, on 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation with attached Affidavit of Election
of Philippine Citizenship and Oath of Allegiance dated 15 July 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching validly elect Philippine Citizenship
HELD:
Ching failed to validly elect Philippine Citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship was clearly
way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching had offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.
B.M. 1678, December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN DACANAY
FACTS:
Dacanay was admitted to Philippine Bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006 pursuant to RA 9225, Dacanay reacquired his Philippine Citizenship.
On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as Filipino citizen before Philippine
Consulate in Canada. He returned to Philippines and now intends to resume practice of
law. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law
HELD:
Yes. As a rule, practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved and
limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, Philippine
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a
Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to
do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
B.M 674, June, 14, 2005
VILLA v. AMA
FACTS:
Ama, along with other members of Aquila Legis fraternity of Ateneo De Manila School of
Law, was implicated and criminally charged for the death of Jose Leonardo Lenny Villa.
On April 16, 1993, Villas father filed a petition with the Court praying that Ama bee
disallowed from taking Lawyers Oath and from signing the Roll of Attorneys pending
final judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.
On February 8, 1996, MTC acquitted Ama while RTC rendered a guilty decision through
conspiracy. The decision was appealed in CA and CA set aside lower courts decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense is considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the
community enough to disallow him to take the lawyers oath and sign roll of attorneys
HELD:
No, the offense made is considered as a light violation.
Court therefore, grants Juniel Ama the authority to take the lawyers oath and sign the
roll of attorneys as the crime committed for which he was convicted was a light offense
and cannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the people and
certainly not a crime involving moral turpitude.
A.C. 3967, September 3, 2003
ARTEMIO ENDAYA v. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA
FACTS:
The case stemmed for an unlawful detainer case filed against Spouses Endaya. Atty.
Oca entered the scene when he appeared as counsel for Spouses at the continuation of
the preliminary conference. He moved for amendment of the answer previously filed by
Spouses Endaya but his motion was denied. Thereafter, Court ordered parties to submit
their affidavits and position papers within 10 days from receipt of order. However, Atty.
Oca failed to submit required affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned from the
decision of MCTC where it was noted that, only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits
and position papers.
Nonetheless, Court dismissed complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the ground
that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. Spouses Endaya appealed the decision
to RTC. Once again, Atty. Oca failed Spouses Endaya. As observed, Atty. Oca did not
file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as
submitted for decision. Having lost the unlawful detainer case, Artemio Endaya filed the
present complaint against Atty. Oca for professional delinquency consisting of his failure
to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Endaya
contends that due to Atty. Ocas inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause
and ultimately the case itself.
Atty. Oca denied that he committed professional misconduct in violation of his oath,
stressing that he was not the original counsel of Spouses Endaya. He further avers that
when he agreed to represent Endaya at the continuation of the preliminary conference
in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of Court to file an amended
answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was
prepared by a non-lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Endaya will prosper
HELD:
Yes, it will prosper considering that Supreme Court ruled that respondent violated the
lawyer's oath and several of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence
in handling the case. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill,
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. In other words, whatever the lawyer's reason is for accepting a case, he is duty
bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it. When respondent was directed to
file the required pleadings, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did
not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence
and malpractice.
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably showed respondent's failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the
practice of law.
CASE DIGESTS IN
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
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Tampus, Mary Grace G.
