Case Digest:Union Bank v.

Santibanez Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of
452 SCRA 228 the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
FACTS:

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez
has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
provision which reads as follows:
payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, provision which reads as follows:
Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo
City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of
the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint o (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
three(3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other
Bank. properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three(3) subject tractors. This being
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of
filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under
the joint agreement.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
document. distributees, legatees, or heirs.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability
money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. notes and continuing guaranty.

ISSUE:

ALVAREZ vs. IAC May 7, 1990

W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate
estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and
Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.
is probated. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while
the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
HELD: survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib.
It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died,
of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the Japanese time up to peace leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.
time, they did not visit the parcels of land in question but after liberation, when her brother Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the
went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three
After Fuentebellas death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by
Deeds of Negros Occidental for the return of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to
823. Union Bank.
During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued
could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
law and due process. and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence
RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid under the joint agreement.
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs
heirs would have been entitled to receive. (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under
the said document.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of
money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the
probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of
those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
a specific person and by no other. . . .

ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between
consequences of their fathers transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it
had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs
before the will is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
Union Bank v. Santibanez, 452 SCRA 228 | Abu inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of
another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the HELD:
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other 1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom
for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).
of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As this Court aptly said, The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This same before his death. From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor over the lands in question became vested.
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may
acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any
liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the 2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are
the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the impaired.
said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.

Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in
favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
Uson v. Del Rosario, 92:530| Andres impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land Borja v. Borja, 46 SCRA 577 | Ang
in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
enjoyment. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole
administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate
proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of
which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of
appealed. the compromise agreement.

ISSUE: She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband. without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will
was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are
probated. transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary
share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of
their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be
heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in
Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
Art. 777)there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is
not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in
litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 | Angliongto survives even after her death.

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did,
certain parcels of land located in Abra. upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dismiss the complaint.
dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by
her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the
case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure
personality to sue. the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with
HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case
by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975
while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed
on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over her person.
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant

Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court whenever a party to a pending case dies it Civil Law Wills and Succession Transmissible Obligations
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the
name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives. This Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on indemnity agreements
duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the (counterbonds) subscribed by distinct principals and by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety
respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper (solidary guarantor). As a contingent claim, Luzon Surety prayed for the allowance of the value of
substitution of parties in the case. the indemnity agreements it had executed. The lower court dismissed the claim of Luzon Surety
on the ground that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his
estate, because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on ISSUES: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent
the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. claims chargeable against the estate?
HELD: Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is that Contracts take effect only as
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of fathers hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their
law. While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that
these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
and 776 of the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311.
inheritance.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of
the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article
661) and can not be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased
was a party, touching the estate of the deceased x x x which comes in to their hands by right of ALVAREZ vs. IAC
inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of
him from whom they derive their rights. The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations ALVAREZ vs. IAC
under Article 1311 exists when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision
makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are May 7, 1990
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a
piece of work, partnership and agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate FACTS:
guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of
the guarantor or the surety. Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
to the nature of the undertaking, nor by stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
of law, his eventual liability therefrom necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her
contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate. A contingent liability child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle
of a deceased person is part and parcel of the mass of obligations that must be paid if and when in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the
the contingent liability is converted into a real liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
of the estate must be deferred until such time as the bonded indebtedness is paid. liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was
informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of
Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to
Rosendo Alvarez.

On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a
ALVAREZ v IAC complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of
185 SCRA 8 May 7, 1990 Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the ISSUE:
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survivedby her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. There are two parcels of landwhich are involved in this WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-
case. Said lots were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes. Fortunato D. Santiago B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of
was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title. Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. law and due process.
The lots were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez. The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the RULING:
return of the ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce
of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the
the heirs be delivered to them, and damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect
lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of
Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
ISSUE: Whether the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus
Dr.Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the
his death. paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.

As a general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the "Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
successors. However, in this case Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, cannot obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
escape the legal consequences of their fathers transaction, which gave rise to the present claim 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation from
for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the
by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation
is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . .
."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor, The Parish Priest, G.R. No. L-
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. 22036, April 30, 1979.

20JUL

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984. [AQUINO, J.]
FACTS
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testators three sisters. The will also
20JUL contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical
career until his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise
[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.] and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right
FACTS to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of ISSUE
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, Whether the testators nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the testators death falls
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the bequest is to be given.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things
that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the
RULING
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracions will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testators nearest male relative living at the
of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the
heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
ISSUES representation, when it is proper (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not survived
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question
by an undisputed foreigner. was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the parish priest
of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracions
heirs. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, SC L-5620, July 31, 1954.

RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as 25
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).It is therefore JUL
evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has FACTS
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Benedicto delos Reyes, during his lifetime, sold some of his properties to the heirs of his
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039, executor. The said sale was challenged by the heirs of the decedent, contending therein that
Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., said properties cannot be legally disposed by the decedent because it forms part of his estate to
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law be inherited by petitioners, the decedent heirs. Both the trial court upheld the validity of the sale
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a between decedent and the heirs of the executor having said that the sold properties were sold
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be before the death of the decedent and can no longer be part of the inheritance.
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions
of Philippine Law.
ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled of the property sold by the decedent during his
lifetime.

RULING
 allowed by law. On January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Banks
favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Subsequently Rufo died
It depends. The general rule is that the heirs cannot validly claim ownership over the properties on July 6, 1984. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
in question if alienated prior to the decedents death. The rights to succession are transmitted at Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the
the moment of death of the decedent (Art. 777 of the Civil Code) Exception is when said subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
alienation is subsequently declared void as when there is intent to defraud and to deprive the provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
heirs of their legitimes. In such case, said alienation is void. Here, the sale was declared void for subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
being absolutely simulated and because of intent to defraud heirs of their legitimes. Hence, said time.
properties still form part of the inheritance of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned land is part of the Estate of Rufo.

HELD: No the subject lang is not part of the estate of Rufo. ART 777 provides that the rights to a
alus v. Balus persons succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.Theinheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death,
as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. Rufo lost
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010 ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death,
the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are the children of the spouses Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on 6 September 1978. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged a
parcel of land as security for a loan obtained from a bank. When Rufo failed to pay the loan,
the property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. The same was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. Hence, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Rufo died on 6 July 1984. On 10
October, 1989, petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate adjudicating to each of the a specific one-third portion of the subject property. Three Case Digest: Uson v. Del Rosario
years thereafter, respondents bought the subject propertyfrom the Bank and a new title was 92 P 530
issued in their name. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. The
respondents thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession. However, petitioner alleged that
respondents act of buying back the property without notifying him inures to his benefit as co- FACTS:
owner and that he is entitled to a one-third share of the property.
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property forms part of the estate of petitioner and respondents Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children. Maria
father Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved
in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of the estate of Rufo considering took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
that ownership over the same was transferred to the bank prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a
consists of existing property, as well as accrued property, and transmissible rights and obligations public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of
at the time of death of the decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost ownership over the which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
subject property during his lifetime, the same no longer forms part of his estate to which his heirs property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants
may lay claim at the time of his death. Consequently, his children never inherited the property. appealed.
The Court further ruled that petitioner and respondents are not co-owners of the
subject property and there is no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of
the estate of their deceased father. ISSUE:

1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.

HELD:
GR No. 168970 Balus vs Balus
FACTS: On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan he obtained
from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the 1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at the five parcels of lands litigated in the presentcase. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del
a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with
executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much priorto the effectivity
of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is
only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said, The property belongs to not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. From that moment, therefore, the
rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
2. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deedof separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that You are here: Home 2013 June Case Digest: Bonilla v. Barcena (71 SCRA 491 )
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
3. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which CASE DIGEST: BONILLA V. BARCENA (71 SCRA 491 )
gave rise to them may have occurred under the priorlegislation only if no vested rights are
impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became Published by paul on June 24, 2013 | Leave a response
vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the Borja v. Borja
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. 46 SCRA 577

FACTS:

Borja v. Borja On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
46 SCRA 577 and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain
parcels of land located in Abra. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
FACTS: ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing
for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and
asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest
the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became and has no legal personality to sue.
the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted
testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed ISSUE:
the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs
cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.
time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

HELD:
ISSUE:

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated. heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975.
HELD: This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was
still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court whenever a party to a pending case dies it shall be the duty of his
YES, the compromise agreement is valid. attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives. This duty was complied with
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that
her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the
case.The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance the death of the decedent. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the
by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they
the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
other claimant, creditor or legatee. of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in
And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in
Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in
interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in
Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in
interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the
respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in
was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17, litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the
deceased. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17,
in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to
appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff
FACTS in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

FACTS:

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet RIOFERIOvs.COURTOFAPPEALSG.R.No.129008.January13,2004(SpecPro2016)
title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Posted onJUNE 22, 2016
complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to
sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Issue: Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the the appointment of an administrator?
court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot
be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
Ruling:
ISSUE:
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint. suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.

HELD:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
of the New Civil Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
death of the decedent.
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975.
This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was
still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court whenever a party to a pending case dies it shall be the duty of his The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives. This duty was complied with by interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that the decedent are violated or dissipated
Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the
case.The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that a dead personhas no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 RIOFERIO vs. CA
of the Civil Code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004
absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they
cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also
left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the
herein respondents. Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are proceedings. On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for
petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Hearing on the aforesaid ground.
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner
Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person Issue:
with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings
for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Ruling:
Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
appointment of an administrator. transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777
of the New Civil Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
While permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of
death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property,
the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration
addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already
proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator
been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be
has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
the heirs in the rules on party representation.
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent
are violated or dissipated.
Rioferio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004 Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2)
Facts: when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of31 and he is made
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving a party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents. Apart from the respondents, the parties himself.
demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of
with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions,
Veronica,Alberto and Rowena. the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered
that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of
the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to
obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement. On December 4, 1995,
respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate
of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.

On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer interposing the defense that the
property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles thereof were delivered to
her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.
Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest
but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration