Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal
protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to
minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on
the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime.
Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even
before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court.
The cases at bar, involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this
ultimate judicial intervention.

Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional
Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:

In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:

That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot
Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat
and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage
and prejudice.1

In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of
Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and being a teacher of the
victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a
period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her
will and consent and without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said
Mia Taha.2

During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after
the pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3

According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the
boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near
the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the
house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that
there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked
a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie
down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light
coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her
Physics teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the
knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside
her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried.
Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her
because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the
incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.

Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood.
Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding
house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When
she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the
incident.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan,
Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might
make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained
to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind
appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for
the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her
if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion,
Brooke's Point where they alighted.

At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three
days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped
by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have
sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and
locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994,
they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to
settle the case with appellant.

Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she
was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:

GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent

Filipina.

BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.

EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora,
hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at
the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.

INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal

opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix
closed.

CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance,

presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm.
length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection with
laceration.4

Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the
inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force
applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also
examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she
was raped.

During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1"
and "2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to
her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She
narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that
even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not
remember with which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time she
was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to
rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there
was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked
permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her.
When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid.
However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the
cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She likewise
did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.

Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of
the courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there
was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days
and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up,
appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.

Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the
morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen.
When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That
afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However,
when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril,
went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of
appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told
her that he did not come home.

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at
Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they
went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the
police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where
she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem
was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed
appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen
Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.

In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch
complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped
by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of
this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen
Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.

Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of
them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met
with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the
prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha
testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha
was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.

The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.

According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National
School (PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I
love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret
from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers.
Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was
the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived
at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there
with him.

Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher
at the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of
PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen
and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas
tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and
Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour
but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the
door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair
with appellant. Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed
appellant's wife about it when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the
present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was
executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in
evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha
about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant
retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.

Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking
for help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to
meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place,
the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench
near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had
earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to
her boarding house just across the street while appellant headed for home some fifteen meters
away.

It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher
of Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked
what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for
somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering
the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant
talking with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding
hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told
appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also
advised Mia to go home.

Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench.
Filomena further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife
had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's
grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing
on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia
was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on
the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it
appear as if appellant was pleading with her.

In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near
their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty
minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and solicit
funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag
and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her
cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M.
and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.

Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available
transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was
nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had
repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to
stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and
subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however,
appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at
the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to
Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.

The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and
informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just
fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00
P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting
near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied
him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from
the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.

Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely
answered that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was
not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know,
however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to
tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that
when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.

Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is,
from January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to
prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid
Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant,
on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a
policeman, to report the matter.

Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for
assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were
already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them
to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused
to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.

Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against
appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem
who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared
everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but
appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just
mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that
day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.

The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay
their hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando
Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national
highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven
hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto
Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they
always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having a relationship.

In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were
there, she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch
television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the
fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and
Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped
as it was later claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood
and if complainant had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that fact
to them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never
locked because the lock had been destroyed.

On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his;
that it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's
mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant
from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.

Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision
and informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next
day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's
parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her
mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he
told her that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they
could settle everything there.

After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by
Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police
station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00
P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994,
appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her
parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.

During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions
two letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's
teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters
as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it
was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00
to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk
to complainants in order to settle the case.

Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January
21, 1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already
on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations.
Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to
testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died.

Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to
have a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed
upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly
asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on
January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her
permission to go.

He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January
22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January
27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.

Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994
but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a
counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary
since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a
"Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases.

On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to
appellant when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination,
that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she does not have
any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.

Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding
the incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the
boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna
Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant
contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having
seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed
that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time
that they became sweethearts.

She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense
witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered
"wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant; that
she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her
at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed
there for five minutes, because the only other person who went there was the room boy who served
their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and that she
was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.

Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra,
Palawan to have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still
in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to
Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she
threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her;
and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.

However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as
Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits
"1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on
Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.

On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered
to testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on
February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she
wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had
a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters
away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately
read. This witness declared that appellant never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of
January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by
Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers
inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the
Sunset Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these
cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.

The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape7 and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's
Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case against
appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of
desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention.10 However, pursuant
to a joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.

Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following
assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape
despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the
evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision
reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).

III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated
the crime of rape against private complainant.

IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as
evidence of the defense.

V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.

VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the
part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.

VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum
of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes
committed.

IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes
charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly
committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.12

A. The Rape Case

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and
the accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to
bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can
testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of
proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable
to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.15

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is
accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him.
Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The
evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is clear,
positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable
crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.19

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince
this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of
rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual
wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime
of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force
or intimidation.

1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had
sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January
21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn
Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on
said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's
version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was
already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known
that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even
live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who
happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the
fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated
by the prosecution.

Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that
plagues it as regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the place
where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where
several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even
bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained
closed for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at
any given time.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon
the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the
Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and
there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of
appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in
the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench
outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already late
and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school
building. On rebuttal, complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.21

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and
then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually
parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the
side of the woman he had raped,22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth
that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident
impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid
discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to
dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and
circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the
slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene
of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a
circumstance tending to identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it is not in accord with human
experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so
foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic
location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street,25 and the PNS
schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away.26

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding
house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to
corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very first person she
came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan
boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the
landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the
theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair,
bloody skirt and all.

We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited
him to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest.
This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to
solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.

In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous.
At first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she
said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to
her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was
at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave
another version and said that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was
nobody inside.

The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign
the same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this
single episode, thus:

Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the

evening, do you remember where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.

COURT:

Q Conversing with whom?

A With my cousin, Your Honor.

Q Your cousin's name?

A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

 PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please
relate to this Honorable Court how that rape happened?

A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

COURT:

Q Of what date?

A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q Then what happened?

A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I

passed (through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door
somebody grabbed me suddenly.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding
house where you said Danny Godoy raped you?

A None, Sir.

COURT:

Q So, the house was empty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?

A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor.27 (Corrections
and emphasis supplied.)

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation,
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's
theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that
rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21,
1994.

The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already
healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the
date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion
are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of
complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.28 Further, rather than substantiating the
prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there
were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's
claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of
physical force.29In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant
must be corroborated by physical evidence showing use of force.30

Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid
medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On
further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not applied.31 He also added
that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises.32 The absence of any
sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the
act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim
does not necessarily negate the commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this
rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated
complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to
the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered
sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative
proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime.35

Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of
appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless
strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did
not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity.36 She failed
to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There
is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the
floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her
genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to
any force of whatever nature or form.

Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully
unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on
her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the involuntary
intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman defending
her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful her
charge of rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in the context of her
asseverations.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not
be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the view,
however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently
and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other
way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other
physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical
report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of
the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-
presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the
prosecution's cause.

II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a
conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the
woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape
was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her
under all the circumstances of the
case. 40

Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house
and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy.
Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by
reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated
by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant
does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no
showing of any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced
any. On the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from
her parents for her to accompany him.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon
seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or
denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust.42Instead, she meekly went with appellant
despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts,
would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does
not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of
complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that
would naturally be expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her
womanhood.43

III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration
and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation,
and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice,
judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution
and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of
every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser.
While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law.44

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or
substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or
where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.46

The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the
January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the
victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted
and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that
confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible.47 The technique in
deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct
meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire testimony.
Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated.48

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below
made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the
offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity.49 In finding that the crime of rape was
committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant
regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would
be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her
testimony concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a
quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily
exposed.

There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its
being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other,
the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and
weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal
of said judgment.50 Thus:

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and
around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations.
If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these
facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with
only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the
fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this
aspect of her testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.

2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his
innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant
now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she
never noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she
slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was
invariably in bed beside her.51

4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not
be opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:

Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?

A No, Sir, it was locked.

Q Can you describe the lock of that room?

A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.

ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the
door be locked and opened from the inside.
 COURT:

Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if
you can open that door from the inside.

CLERK OF COURT:

Witness holding the doorknob.

COURT:

The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic)
inside you can open it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?

A There was, Your Honor.

Q What is that?

A The one that slides, Your Honor.

Q And that is used when you are already inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond
supposedly offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no
attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight.53 In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that
when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter where
appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was
admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and brought
them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible
opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's
failure to present these two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or
corroborated complainant's story.

6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house
together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant
went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that
careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in
complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant,
and run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances therefor.

7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant
was dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and
commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were
heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be
adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were
never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think
and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken
by the school and the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.

On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with
sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's
testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that
appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally
repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of
strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution.54

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the
"sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard
fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is
usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her
parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the
court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion.
And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of
several witnesses for the defense, viz.:

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place,
and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with
appellant.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision,
testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man.
Mia answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call appellant "Papa".56 The couple looked
happy and were sweet to each other.57

3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked
Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved
Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to
appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit suicide.58 He could see
that the couple were happy together.59

4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked
was located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that
when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is
his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave
Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her.60 He also observed that they were
happy.61

5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident,
inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal
na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."62 She tried to dissuade complainant
from continuing with her relationship with appellant.63

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant,
which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The
rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive,
definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible
disinterested witnesses.65

Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with
details which could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability
thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say
that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored
his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless,
there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is
enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality.67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one.68 It does not apply where there
is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise
merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely.69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the
defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she
sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters
are herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong
mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng
nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng
pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot
sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong
maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong
kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon
ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan
kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin.
Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa
lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor
Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag kang
tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo maari bang
magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.

alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan
nila.

Please sir . . .

(Sgd.)
Mia
Taha70

3/1/94

Dane,

I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag
usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa
pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa
narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende
sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS para
matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng
wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa
kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako
ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil gusto kong
masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako
sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat
kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan
lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa
iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis
na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka
pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas
ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang
pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga
magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon
tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.

Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay
na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo
na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay
inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi
ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.

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M
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1

There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It
was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other
defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are
Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and
highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring
the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two
vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was presented
to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.72 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to
be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.73

The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the
examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise
carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing
on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions
of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same
person. More importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the
questioned letters belongs to her.

It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a
deaf ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:

ATTY. EBOL:

Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and
Filomena Pielago were your teachers?

A Yes, sir.

Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this
incident of January 21, 1994, am I not correct?

A That is true, sir.

Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been
your teachers you took examinations in their classes in their particular
subject(s)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your

teachers, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.
 Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it
appears to be your test paper and with your signature and the
alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha,
please examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test
paper?

A Yes, sir.

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit
"4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are familiar with that.

A What subject is that?

Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.

A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.

Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that
signature?

A That is min(e), sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are
you familiar with that signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q Also Exhibit "2"?

A Yes, sir.74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant
to herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was
the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that
what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him
to testify for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason
whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan
actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.

V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an
admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim,
which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.75

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's
innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from
appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who
likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant.
As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that
he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his
mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother,
Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and
appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.76

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.77 In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim
practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the
parties.78

VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may,
however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges.79

In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably
written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents,
complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo,
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in
helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge
was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and
appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted
upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face
in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.

Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of
defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose
too many instances of false charges of rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the
judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended
parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure
indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction
and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape
charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission.82 This is a
case in point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed
to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took
advantage of complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her
teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in
manners and virtue instead of corrupting her.83Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in
a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience
as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal
options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.

VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina
will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the
more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven
otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes
the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine
what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues.84

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the

complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at
all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation will entail unless
she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as a
woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In the
eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind
that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At
the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated
by the intimate details of her violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she
describes how her honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the
intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her
motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever
the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her
purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim
chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather than
denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to
come out openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . .85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and
is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or
conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the
opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the
accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a
doubt.87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the
theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.88

On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding
that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular
indictment.

B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.89 In the present charge for that crime,
such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the
Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave
and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious
doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:

To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the
day after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to
permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant
walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is
difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any
felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case
where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by
complainant.

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with
her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at
Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto
Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed
to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the
criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without
comment.

Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied,
whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from
the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind
of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the
door of the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was
easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could
also be opened from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never
assailed by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room
which was occupied by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the
lock thereof was broken.

When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in
broad daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other
people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by
the latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they left
complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.

According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset
Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned
by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha
that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any
corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly
reported the incident ever identified or presented in court.

We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for
the commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where
there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime.91 It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not have to be
proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the
evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is
in order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a
criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst,
immoral though it may be.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of
clothes belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its
announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a department store.
Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on
rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant
about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of
discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly
dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then
drawn by said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court
against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered
where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it
is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of
the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of
the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first
instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and
logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning
the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as
to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to
either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the
 irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the
Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the materials before it necessary
to make a correct judgment.94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and
substantial evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take
this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and
societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed,
it generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its
publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and
Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-
appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith,
unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part

FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum
penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny
Codoy(Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and
by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her and kidnap or detained her,
for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the
complainant (Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated by the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?

RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions
without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any
material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence,
the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while rape is a
most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be
borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to
be defended by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place,
and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a
truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no
serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for
the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the
testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In
finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only
that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently
deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed
raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the
events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily
exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present
charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge
which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies
bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of
appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the
Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and
prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother
wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else,
and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging
tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this
rape drama.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 141644. May 27, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLANDO PINEDA y

MANALO, CELSO SISON y LLOREN (at large), VICTOR
EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET alias VICTOR COLET
(acquitted), TOTIE JACOB alias TOTIE (at large), JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE (at large), accused,
ROLANDO PINEDA y MANALO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
 On automatic review is the Decision dated 21 January 2000 of
[1]

the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, National Capital
Judicial Region (trial court) in Criminal Case No. C-53860 (98). The trial court
found appellant Rolando Pineda (appellant) guilty of robbery with homicide,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of commission by a band. The trial
court sentenced appellant to suffer the death penalty and to pay the legal
heirs of the victim SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida (Fuensalida) civil indemnity and
damages.

The Charge

The Information charged appellant, along with Celso Sison y

[2]

Lloren (Sison), Victor Emmanuel Colet (Colet), Totie Jacob (Jacob), John
[3]

Doe and Peter Doe, with the crime of Highway Robbery resulting in Homicide,
as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of October 1997, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with intent
to gain and posing as passengers of an AIRCONDITIONED BUS DREAMLINE
AIRCON BUS then cruising along Quirino Highway, Malaria, Caloocan City with
more or less sixty (60) passengers, said accused by means of violence and
intimidation upon all passengers as well as the bus driver and conductor, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stage a HOLD-UP by pulling out their
respective firearms and poke the same against everybody especially against the bus
driver and conductor and they started to take and rob cash and personal belongings of
all and on the occasion of said robbery in order to instill more fear among passengers,
said accused in pursuit of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill shot in different parts of his body one SPO1
ARNEL FUENSALIDA Y INCINARES, PNP, who as a consequence of the wounds
died shortly thereafter to the damage and prejudice of all passengers, bus driver,
conductor and the family of deceased SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida y Incinares.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [4]

The police arrested appellant on 5 September 1998 and detained him on 8

September 1998 in the Caloocan City Jail for other criminal cases. The police
arrested appellant for Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 54651 before Branch
[5]

131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. [6]

Arraignment and Plea

Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment on 24 May 1999. After

appellant had rested his case, the police arrested Colet. Colet pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment on 27 September 1999. When the trial court
rendered its decision, the other accused remained at large.

The Trial

The Version of the Prosecution

 The prosecution presented six witnesses:(1) the victims wife Amalia
Fuensalida; (2) bus driver Camilo Ferrer (Ferrer); (3) conductor Jimmy Ramos
(Ramos); (4) PO3 Napoleon Andaya; (5) PO3 Celerino Susano; and (6)
Philippine National Police (PNP) Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra.
The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence thus:

At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while bus driver Camilo Ferrer (Ferrer for
short) was driving his assigned passenger bus, the Dreamline Aircon Bus bearing
Plate No. PWZ-208 with around fifty (50) passengers on board and heading for
Tungko, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused Rolando Pineda (Accused Pineda for
short) and his five (5) companions boarded the bus along Quirino Highway near
Lagro. Thence after the bus conductor Jimmy Ramos (Ramos for short) had collected
the passengers individual fares, he posted himself at the front door of the bus when
suddenly accused Pineda who was seated behind Ramos rose from his seat, prompting
Ramos to turn his head and look at Pineda. Forthwith the latter held driver Ferrer by
the neck while poking a gun at his nape and shouted to his companion: TOTIE,
IKUHA MO AKO NG SAPATOS DIYAN PARA MAUMPISAHAN NA ANG
LARO, and then announced a hold-up. While Ferrer was looking at accused Pineda
through the rear-view mirror in front of the drivers seat, Pineda warned the former,
AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO KUNG AYAW MONG MAMATAY with
additional warning to maintain the same speed as the vehicles preceding them. Thence
accused Pineda instructed his companions to close all the windows and bus curtains
and commanded the passengers to bow down their heads. Irked by Ferrers act of
stepping on the brake too often accused Pineda pressed the gun on his nape telling
him PUTANG INA MO KUNG GUSTO MONG MABUHAY AYUSIN MO ANG
PAGMAMANEHO MO and then followed by another instruction to his cohorts:
SAMSAMIN NINYO LAHAT ANG MASASAMSAM NINYO DIYAN or words of
similar import. At this juncture, Ramos, who was at a distance of one-half (1/2) meter
from accused Pineda was ordered by the latter to surrender to him his collections
which out of fear he readily obeyed by handing over to Pineda the days earnings
of P5,700. It was at that point while Ramos was giving the money to Pineda when he
took a glance at the left side of Pinedas face. Thence while his cohorts were divesting
the passengers of their cash and valuables accused Pineda was continuously poking
his gun at Ferrers neck and would press it harder whenever he stepped on the
brake. Thence after Ferrer was divested by the robbers of his wallet containing his
drivers license and cash in the amount of P1,000 which incidentally he borrowed
earlier from a loan shark in EDSA and while the bus was somewhere in Malaria,
Caloocan City, a commotion ensued inside the bus when one passenger later
identified as Victim SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida grappled with one of the hold-uppers for
the possession of his clutch bag containing his service firearm. In the course thereof
the concerned malefactor shouted: BOSS INAGAW ANG BARIL KO prompting
accused Pineda to shout back TIRAHIN NA, PATAYIN NA, PAG LUMABAN,
PATAYIN NA. Immediately thereafter and while the bus was
in Pangarap Village, Caloocan City, six (6) shots rang out. Apparently fearing that the
gunfire would catch the attention of the highway patrol, accused Pineda commanded
his cohorts to check through the window if any patrol car was following them and
uttered: HUWAG KAYONG MAGPAPAPUTOK. Not long afterwards accused
Pineda remarked: MALAPIT NA TAYO and again ordered Ferrer: DIRETSO MO
LANG. As directed, Ferrer kept on driving until accused Pineda ordered him to stop
the bus upon reaching Sampaguita Street, Caloocan City where all the malefactors
alighted with their loot including victim Fuensalidas service firearm i.e. a caliber .38
Smith and Wesson revolver bearing Serial No. 47840. Thereafter the passengers
started crying and some even lost consciousness. As suggested by one passenger, they
all alighted at the Tungko Police Station, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where a lady
passenger screamed: PATAY NA, PATAY NA, referring to the victim whose body
was lying face down on the bus flooring. However for lack of jurisdiction the police
officers thereat referred Ferrer, Ramos and the crying lady to Malaria Police
Station, Caloocan City. The police officers after looking at the victims cadaver and
conducting an initial investigation referred them to the Urduja Police Station. At the
Urduja Police Station, police investigators PO3 Celerino Susano and SPO1 Ernesto
Mandanas of the Investigation Section were dispatched to Malaria, Caloocan City
where subject bus bearing Plate No. PWZ-208 and body no. 2657 was found parked in
front of the Kababayan Center. An ocular inspection of the bus disclosed the lifeless
body of victim lying facedown on the flooring. Recovered inside the bus were two (2)
slugs (Exhs. I and I-1) and two (2) empty shells (Exhs. J and J-1). Thereafter the body
was brought to El Ruaro Funeral Parlor where the same was subsequently identified
by victims widow Mrs. Amalia Fuensalida. Meanwhile the police investigators took
down on the same day the sworn statements of Ferrer (Exh. E) and Ramos (Exh. H
with submarkings H-1 and H-2) as well as that of the private complainant Amalia
Fuensalida (Private Complainant for short) (Exh. B with submarking B-1).

It came to pass that P/Supt. Benjamin Cabiltes, Chief of Urduja Police Sub-Station
4, Camarin Road, Caloocan City assigned the team of SPO1 Carlito Alas, PO3
Napoleon Andaya, Sgt. De Guzman and other operatives of the Special Operations
Group to conduct follow-up investigation of the case. Initially the team repaired to the
police station in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where the bus was first brought and
based from [sic] information furnished by an unidentified bus passenger to the effect
that the robber called for one Totie in the course of the robbery, an inquiry was
accordingly made as to whether they know persons by that name to which the San
Jose del Monte police identified the man as Totie Jacob, a member of the gang of
accused Rolando Pineda who with another companion named Celso Sison was said to
be detained at the Municipal Jail of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan for another case of
robbery. Proceeding to the said place the team found out that the duo were already out
on bail. Thence, after the pictures of accused Pineda (Exh. B) and Sison (Exh. C) from
the file of said Municipal Jail were shown by the Team to Ferrer, the latter positively
identified the duo as two of the six (6) malefactors involved in the robbery with
homicide in question (Karagdagang Salaysay dated 6 Nov. 1997 Exh. E-1).

With the above findings together with the sworn statements of witnesses and the Joint
Affidavits of SPO1 Carlito Alas and PO3 Napoleon Andaya (Exh. D with
submarkings D-1 and D-2), as well as Affidavit of PO3 Celerino Susano (Exh. F with
submarkings F-1 and F-2), and other pertinent documents such as the Death
Certificate of victim (Exh. P with submarkings P-1 and P-2), the case against accused
Rolando Pineda, Celso Sison, Victor Colet, Totie Jacob, and two Does, John and
Peter, were referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor, Caloocan City for
appropriate action by P/Supt. Cabiltes per referral slip dated 10 November 1997 (Exh.
G with submarking G-1) which resulted in the filing of instant charge against the
aforenamed accused after a preliminary investigation conducted by Asst. City
Prosecutor Sancho G. Lomadilla.

Per the record, the cadaver of the victim was autopsied on 16 October 1997 by
Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory Services,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, per Request for Laboratory Examination of the
Caloocan City Police Station (Exh. K) and the Certification of Identification and
Consent for Autopsy (Exh. L) signed by the Private Complainant. Dr. Freyras findings
was [sic] embodied in her Medico Legal Report No. M-1509-97 (Exh. M with
submarkings M-1, M-2 and M-3) with its annexes, i.e. sketches of Human Head and
Body (Exh. N with submarkings N-1 to N-4 and Exh. O with submarkings O-1 and O-
2, respectively), which disclosed the following findings and conclusion:

FINDINGS:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, male cadaver in rigor mortis with post mortem
lividity at the dependent portions of the body. The conjunctiva are pale. The lips and
nailbeds are cyanotic.

HEAD, TRUNK, EXTREMITY:

(1) Gunshot wound, left parietal region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm just left of the midsagittal
line, 167.5 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar measuring 0.1 cm uniformly,
directed posteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, fracturing the left parietal and
left sphenoid bone, lacerating both left cerebral hemisphere, with subdural and
subarachnoidal hemorrhages. A deformed slug recovered embedded at the left
sphenoid bone.
(2) Gunshot wound, left post auricular region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 11 cm from the
posterior midline, 156.5 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar measuring 0.1 cm
uniformly, directed anteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, fracturing left temporal
and left sphenoid bone, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with subdural and
subarachnoidal hemorrhages. A deformed slug recovered embedded at the left
sphenoid bone.
(3) Contusion, left supraorbital region, measuring 4 x 3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline.
(4) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 8 x 3 cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline.
(5) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, right submanibular region measuring 0.8 x
0.7 cm, 7 cm from the anterior midline, 146 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar,
measuring 0.1 cm uniformly, an area of smudging measuring 4.5 x 2, 2.5 cm, 146 cm
from the heel, directed posteriorwards, upwards and to the left fracturing the left
mandible, lacerating the larynx, making a point of exit at the left preauricular region,
measuring 1.5 x 1 cm, 14 cm from the anterior midline, 154 cm from the heel.
(6) Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of entry, epigastric region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm,
2 cm left of the anterior midline, 115 cm from the heel with an abraded collar, measuring
0.1 cm uniformly, directed posteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, passing thru
the 4th left intercostal space, lacerating the left dome of the diaphragm, stomach and the
spleen, making a point of exit at the left posterior costal region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm,
10 cm from the posterior midline, 109 cm from the heel.
(7) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, vertebral region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm,
just left of the posterior midline, 122 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar,
measuring 0.2 cm inferiorly, 0.1 cm superiorly, medially and laterally, directed
anteriorwards, upwards and lateralwards, fracturing the 9th left thoracic rib, lacerating
both lobes of the left lung, making a point of exit at the left anterior axillary region,
measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 14 cm from the anterior midline, 126 cm from the heel.
(8) Gunshot wound, right shoulder, measuring 0.9 x 0.7 cm, 4 cm from the posterior
midline, 144 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar, measuring 0.5 cm laterally, 0.2
cm superiorly, 0.1 cm inferiorly and medially, directed anteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards. A deformed slug recovered embedded thereat.

There is about 800 cc of blood in the abdominal cavity.

The stomach is full of partially digested food particles, negative for alcoholic odor.

The rest of the visceral organs are grossly unremarkable.

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds, head and trunk.

Elucidating on her medical findings, Dr. Freyra testified that she found six (6) gunshot
wounds in the victims body, one abrasion and one contusion. Gunshot wounds
designated in the Medico Legal report as Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were fatal; that judging
from the nature of the wounds, wherein the six (6) gunshots had the same points of
entries all measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, the fatal weapon was possibly a .38 cal. revolver;
however, she could not form any opinion as to the number of assailant[s]; that the
contusion on the left eye was brought about by the blood in the head owing to several
fractures in the skull while the abrasion could have been brought about by the rubbing
of the affected area with a rough surface. On the relative position of the victim with
the assailant/s it is possible that when gunshot wounds nos. 1, 2 and 6 were inflicted,
the assailant was somewhere at the extreme left of the victim who could be in a lying
or sitting position or at a lower level than the assailant with the muzzle of the gun
pointed downward. Gunshot wound no. 5 was inflicted at close range. Gunshot wound
no. 7 which was located at victims back could have been sustained while victim was
in any of the three aforecited positions as nos. 1, 2 and 6 while the trajectory of
gunshot wound no. 8 was also going downward toward the lateral side of the body.

Dr. Freyra went on to add that some of the gunshot wounds had points of entries and
exits while others did not have any exit wound thus this explains her extraction of the
deformed slugs (Exhs. Q-1, Q-2 and Q-3) from the victims body and the recovery of
police of slugs at the crime scene.

On the hearing of 16 July 1999 the Defense Counsel agreed to stipulate that the
private complainant incurred the total amount of P60,000 representing the funeral and
other related expenses for the deceased.

Testifying on the civil aspect of the case the private complainant alleged that as Senior
Police Officer I, victim was receiving the monthly salary of P9,277.50; that as a result
of the death of her husband she suffered mental block, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights and was very sad thinking of what would be in store for their three small
children.[7]

The Version of the Defense

The defense presented four witnesses: (1) appellant; (2) his contractor
Lillian Tan (Tan); (3) his acquaintance Efren Quiton (Quiton); and (4) his co-
accused Colet. The trial court summarized appellants bid for an acquittal in
this wise:

On that day of 15 October 1997 from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., accused was in the house
of one VICTOR INTING VILLENA in Gumamela St., Malaria,
Tala, Caloocan City where he installed the electrical wiring per contract with
contractor LILLIAN TAN. He never left his said place of work on that particular day
and as a matter of fact LILLIAN TAN even served him lunch and snacks in the
morning and afternoon. After finishing his work he was paid P500 by his contractor
and at 5:00 p.m. he went home which is only one hundred meters away or a five
minutes [sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENAS house.Upon arriving home he rested
for 5 minutes then took a bath and at around 6:00 p.m. he went to the nearby house of
his contractor LILLIAN TAN where he talked with her and drunk [sic] some beer
until 9:00 p.m. when he went home and ate dinner then retired to bed at around 10:00
p.m.; that he does not know anything about the shooting incident in question; that his
house in Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City is about 30 to 45 minutes ride to
or from Lagro, Quezon City and a distance of around 4 to 5 kilometers to Quirino
Highway, Malaria, this City where according to prosecution witnesses CAMILO
FERRER and JIMMY RAMOS the shooting incident in question occurred; that he
had no previous encounter or quarrel with these FERRER and RAMOS and did not
know them prior to the incident; and that he saw for the first time police investigator
PO3 CELERINO SUSANO in court; that [the] instant charge against him was
fabricated as he was just implicated by his co-accused VICTOR COLET, who is a
brother of a policeman, and CELSO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO, an asset of the
police which arose from the rivalry over a woman he had with CELSO SISON who is
a good friend of VICTOR COLET; that the duo who managed to elude arrest, were
heard to say that he would rot in jail; that CELSO SISON was also instrumental for
[sic] his arrest by SPO2 ABRAHAM FERNANDEZ and SPO1 LEOPOLDO DAVID
for alleged violation of P.D. 1866 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan which was however subsequently dismissed after he posted the
required bailbond on 5 August 1999 (Exh. 1); that his picture shown by the Caloocan
City Police to the witnesses in the instant case must have been secured by them from
the Courts file; that he was again framed-up by the police on 15 November 1999 when
he was arrested by elements of the Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6,
Bagong Silang for allegedly concealing a deadly weapon and assault which was
referred for inquest by Sub-Station Commander Capt. VALDEZ to Inquest Prosecutor
ACUA who however ordered his release as no evidence was confiscated from his
person, thus, he was released from detention on 18 November 1997; that his alleged
involvement in the instant case which occurred on 15 October 1997 was not even
brought up by the Sub-Station 6 operatives during his custodial investigation before
Prosecutor ACUA; that in furtherance of the police efforts to file trump-up [sic]
charge against him the Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6, Bagong Silang
implicated him for alleged Violation of P.D. 1866 and Robbery which allegedly
happened on 5 September 1997 despite the fact that he was detained as early as 5
August 1998 [sic] at the Caloocan City Jail and ironically this resulted in the filing of
two Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 54651, respectively, against him
now pending before RTC Branch 131, this City (Exhs. 2 and 3 with submarkings 2-A
and 3-A, respectively); that while in jail he met fellow inmate EFREN QUITON from
Bulacan who expressed surprise on why he was implicated in the instant case as he
claimed to know what really happened and the persons really involved in this case and
volunteered to testify for him in Court.

On 1 September 1999, the Defense Counsel recalled Accused PINEDA (TSN 1

September 1999) to the witness stand who testified that he remembered an event
which occurred on 15 August 1997 when he figured in a rumble and the unnamed
male person who was seriously wounded as a result of his punches turned out to be
the nephew of police officer TITO ALAS who was the one who arrested him in
connection with instant case and whose house was a distance of around 300 meters
away from his house; that subsequently his sister informed him that after he stepped
out of the house, police officer TITO ALAS came looking for him and had he found
him then he could have been killed.

The defense presented Miss LILLIAN TAN who corroborated the alibi defense of the
Accused, further professing lack of knowledge about the incident in question and
maintained that except that of a contractor-worker relationship, no other relation exist
[sic] between her and Accused PINEDA.

The other defense witness EFREN QUITON corroborated the testimony of the
Accused relative to his getting acquainted with him at the City Jail and his knowledge
about the offense for which he (accused) was being implicated. He testified in this
wise:

He (EFREN QUITON) was a resident of Grotto, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan prior to
his detention and is detained at the Caloocan City Jail on charge of illegal possession
of shabu during pot session which occurred on 10 June 1999; that while thus under
detention he came to know his fellow inmate ROLANDO PINEDA and on 10 June
1996 (p. 3, TSN of 31 August 1999 QUITON) the latter intimated to him about his
(Accuseds) case to which he expressed surprise considering that sometime on 16
October 1997, SPO4 MARIO LARENAS approached him inquiring on whether he
saw BOYET TARTARO, VICTOR COLET and one TITO who were said to be the
suspects in the bus hold-up incident wherein one policeman was killed and that the
name of the Accused PINEDA was never mentioned as among those he suspected;
that he knows very well this BOYET TARTARO, a police aide, who used to handle
the traffic at the crossroad of Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte and a certain
COLET because both were often seen together. While SPO4 LARENAS had
mentioned to him that the incident for which the aforenamed trio were the suspects [in
the robbery with homicide case that] happened in CaloocanCity, however, no mention
was made to him with reference to its date of occurrence.

As records have it, after the defense was deemed to have rested its case following the
admission of its formal offer of evidence, a Motion To Reopen Trial was filed on 17
September 1999 by Defense Counsel, for the purpose of admitting newly discovered
evidence brought about by the arrest of accused VICTOR EMMANUEL COLET who
was committed to the BJMP Caloocan City on 10 September 1999 in connection with
another case involving Violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425. Aforecited Motion
was given due course by this Court in its Order of 24 September 1999 and the case
was thus set anew for the reception of Accused PINEDAs additional evidence which
consists solely of the testimony of co-accused COLET to corroborate his (Accused
PINEDAs) defense of alibi. In the course of Accused COLETs testimony he gave his
true name as VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET hence upon motion of the
Trial Prosecutor, the Information was accordingly amended to reflect his alleged true
name.

As synthesized by the Court the following were Accused COLETs declarations:

He, Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET, aka PINOCCHIO x x x

is a resident of 686 Quirino Highway, Bankers Village II, this City which is one-half
to one kilometer away from accused PINEDAs place at Barracks II, Bukid Area,
District I, this City. The first time he saw Accused Pineda was in 1996 in Bukid Area
and subsequently he used to see him passed-by [sic] the house of the woman he
(Accused COLET) was courting in Barracks II.

On that fateful day at about 7:15 p.m. of 15 October 1997, Accused COLET boarded
subject air-conditioned bus in Lagro, Quezon City purposely to go home and had
himself seated at the bus right side, third seat from the last. At that juncture he noted
the presence of CELSO SISON, SPENCER and TOTIE JACOB inside the bus. When
the bus was approaching Grotto, Guandanoville Subdivision, between Amparo and
Pangarap Village, this City Accused TOTIE JACOB, a neighbor of his in Bankers
Village II, who was armed with a handgun then seated on the first seat, right side of
the bus, suddenly stood up and declared a hold-up shouting: WALANG KIKILOS,
HOLDAP ITO, HOLDAP ITO, PARE UMPISAHAN NA NATIN. Simultaneously,
TOTIEs companion who was holding a grenade, stood up and ordered the passengers
to bow down by saying: YUMUKO KAYONG LAHAT. And while the passengers
bowed down their heads, TOTIEs four (4) other companions who were all armed,
started divesting the passengers of their cash and valuables which the passengers
dropped in a black duffel bag upon instruction of the hold-uppers. Accused COLET
claimed that his co-accused PINEDA was neither a passenger of the bus, nor one of
the six hold-uppers and that he did not see PINEDA at anytime on that evening of 15
October 1997.

On cross-examination, COLET explained that while stooping down, he managed to

peep surreptitiously and saw ROBERTO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO @ CELSO
SISON shooting the policeman victim who was then in seating position with his .38
caliber handgun; that it was SPENCER then sporting a barbers cut at the sides with
curly and wavy hair on top, who was pointing his gun at the driver; that the hold-
uppers were armed as follows: CELSO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO aka
ROBERTO SISON, a .38 gun; BAROK, a knife; EDISON PALMARIO, a hand
grenade; SPENCER, a .38 caliber handgun; TOTIE JACOB, a .45 caliber handgun;
and the sixth unidentified robber, a knife. Accused COLET is familiar with TOTIE
JACOB since he used to hear the latters name in 1994, it was this TOTIE JACOB
whom he (Accused COLET) saw divesting the bus conductor of his money; that he
used to see EDISON PALMARIO at Phase I, Pangarap Village, this City, whenever
he went around their place on board his scooter. In 1976, he used to see alias
BAROK, a jeepney barker, while he was yet a student at the Novaliches Elementary
School. Prior to his arrest, he was jobless since he was the one taking care of his
father who suffered a stroke. In 1997, he was a volunteer confidential agent of the San
Jose del Monte Police. He received no salary therefor except certain personal doleout
from Major TINIO. He was arrested in 8 September 1999 for illegal possession of
shabu and he learned that he was implicated in this case three days after his detention
at the City Jail and on the following day he learned that PINEDA is one of his co-
accused.

Accused COLET further stated that although he was one of the passengers of the bus,
nothing was taken from him as not all passengers were victims of robbery; that soon
after he alighted at Pleasant Hill he immediately contacted and reported the incident to
SPO1 TITO ALAS of Sub-Station 4, Bukid Area, this City telling him that they could
still catch up with the hold-uppers since they just alighted at Sampaguita St., Malaria
Caloocan City and SPO1 ALAS gave words [sic] that he would take care of the
matter. The latter also asked him if he knew PINEDA who was once detained at the
San Jose del Monte Jail to which he answered in the affirmative. He assured SPO1
ALAS that he will testify in this case once the suspects are apprehended. [8]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that contrary to the offense designated in the
information, the proper charge against appellant is robbery with homicide
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and not highway robbery
[9]

resulting in homicide under P.D. No. 532. The trial court declared that the
situation covered by P.D. No. 532 contemplates acts of brigandage against
any prospective victim anywhere on the highway. [10]

The trial court found the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos positive,
spontaneous and forthright and observed that they remained steadfast and
convincing despite the rigid cross-examination by defense counsel and the
clarificatory questions of the trial court judge. After evaluating the evidence,
[11]

the trial court convicted appellant and acquitted Colet, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond

an iota of doubt the guilt of Accused ROLANDO PINEDA Y MANALO of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of, by a band, sans any mitigating circumstance to offset it, which per
Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code called for the imposition of the greater penalty, this
Court hereby sentences said Accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to
indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased, SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA, the civil
indemnity of P50,000; and to pay the private complainant AMALIA FUENSALIDA
the following:

a. stipulated actual damages of P60,000;

b. moral damages of P40,000;
c. exemplary damages of P60,000;
 d. compensatory damages of P167,872.50

as well as to return the loot in the amount of P1,000 and P5,700 to driver FERRER
and conductor RAMOS, respectively; to restore thru this Court, for its proper
disposition, the service firearm of victim SPO1 FUENSALIDA described as .38 cal.
revolver Smith & Wesson with serial no. 47840; and to pay the costs.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, let the
entire records hereof including the complete set of the transcript of stenographic notes
be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review within 30 days
but not earlier than 15 days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of
any motion for new trial or reconsideration.

With respect to Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET, the

prosecution having failed to overcome with the required quantum of proof his
constitutional presumption of innocense his motion to dismiss by way of Demurrer to
Evidence, is granted. Correspondingly a judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby entered
in his favor.

Accused COLETs release from detention is in order unless he is being detained

further for other lawful cause/s.

Let an alias order of arrest issue forthwith against Accused CELSO SISON Y
LLOREN @ BOYET TARTARO and TOTIE JACOB @ TOTIE and thereafter let
the case as against them be archived without prejudice to its revival once they be
arrested later on.

SO ORDERED. [12]

Errors Assigned

Appellant states that the trial court gravely erred to the point of abusing its
discretion in the following matters:
1. Holding that the prosecution witnesses have positively identified appellant.
2. Giving probative weight and value to the testimonies of Camilo Ferrer and Jimmy
Ramos despite being inconsistent on material and relevant points and being
untruthful to the court.
3. Not giving probative weight and credibility to the testimony of accused Victor
Emmanuel Gonzales Colet that appellant was not one of those who held-up the bus
and killed the victim.
4. Ruling out the defense of alibi appellant interposed.[13]

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. In overturning the ruling of the trial court, we

follow the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties. [14]

The findings of a trial court, given its vantage point to assess the credibility
of witnesses, are entitled to full faith and credit. On appeal, reviewing courts
do not disturb such findings of the trial court. However, the reviewing court
may overturn the trial courts findings when there is a showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance, which, if considered, could materially affect the result
of the case. This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial courts
[15]

appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law
presumes an accused innocent, and this presumption must prevail unless
overturned by competent and credible proof. [16]

A conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing
testimony establishes the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime; and (2) the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that all
elements of the crime are attributable to the accused. The trial courts
[17]

conviction of appellant fails in both bases.

Identity of the Perpetrator

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the prosecution
witnesses positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Ferrer gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of the Caloocan City Police
Station on the night of the incident. In his statement dated 15 October 1997,
Ferrer describes appellant thus:
12. T: Sa anim na kataong nangholdap may natatandaan ka ba sa
kanila?
S: Ang natatandaan ko ay ang taong tumutok sa akin ng baril na
.45 sa ulo at ang kanyang itsura ay balinkinitan ang katawan,
25-30 taong gulang, may hati sa gitna ang buhok, walang
bigote, kayumanggi, nakasuot ng polo shirt [na kulay] berde,
nakamaong na kupas, salitang tagalog. [18]

On 6 November 1998, the police invited Ferrer to identify the perpetrators

of the crime from photographs the police showed to him. Ferrer gave a
subsequent statement on the identity of the perpetrators as follows:
4. T: Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto sa tanggapan na ito at
nagbibigay ng isang salaysay?
S: Upang alamin ko kung aking makikilala ang taong
nangholdap sa pampasaherong Bus na aking minamaneho.

5. T: Paano mo makikilala ang mga holdaper?

S: Nabalitaan ko lang po na may litrato dito sa presinto na

pinaghihinalaan na nangholdap sa bus.

6. T: Natatandaan mo pa ba ang mukha ng holdaper?

S: Kung sakali ko pong makita ang litrato.

7. T: May ipakikita akong mga litrato, tingnan mong mabuti kung

mayroon tao na kasama sa mga nangholdap sa
pampasaherong bus?
S: Iyan po sir ang isa at isa pa po ito sir na nangholdap sa Bus
na aking minamaneho. (When the Investigator on case
presented couples of picture [sic] to the affiant he positively
identified two pictures who were responsible in a Bus Hold-
up who were identified as (Number 1) Rolando Pineda y
Manalo @ Lando, 36 years old, married, jobless, native of
 Valenzuela and with last known address at Phase 3, Bgy. San
Rafael IV, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, and/or Gumamela
St., Malaria, Caloocan City and (Number 2) Celso Sison y
Lloren @ Boyet @ Boyet Tartaro with last known address at
Gumamela St., Malaria, Caloocan City. (Emphasis supplied)
[19]

Like Ferrer, Ramos also gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of the

Caloocan City Police Station on 15 October 1997, the night of the
incident. However, unlike Ferrer, Ramos candidly admitted that he could not
identify any of the perpetrators.

9. T: Sinabi mo kanina na anim yong hold-uppers na pawang

armado ano ba mga dala nilang baril at may mamumukhaan
ka ba sa kanilang sakaling muli mo silang makita?
S: Armado po sila ng kalibre .45 at .38 revolver. Hindi ko sila
mamumukhaan dahil agad po ako nilang
pinayuko. (Emphasis supplied)
[20]

The police later arrested appellant based on an out-of-court identification

by Ferrer. Ferrer first identified appellant and Sison through mug shots the
police presented to them. Although he testified against Colet, SPO1 Carlito
Alas (SPO1 Alas), the investigating police officer, admitted that there were
only two photographs presented to Ferrer. The police showed Ferrer only the
photographs of appellant and his co-accused Sison. [21]

In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects,

courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors: (1) the witness opportunity to view the perpetrator of the
crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by the
witness of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. [22]

Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established

methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is
[23]

unacceptable. The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is

that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the
suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of
[24]

pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one
of the pictures pertains to the suspect. Thus: [25]

[W] here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any subsequent
corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon the witnesss recollection
of the features of the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the photograph. Thus,
although a witness who is asked to attempt a corporeal identification of a person
whose photograph he previously identified may say, Thats the man that did it,
what he may actually mean is, Thats the man whose photograph I identified.

xxx

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that

where a witness has made a photographic identification of a person, his subsequent
corporeal identification of that same person is somewhat impaired in value, and its
accuracy must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first saw a
photograph. (Emphasis supplied)
[26]
 In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two
accused. The police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by
[27]

showing only appellant and Sisons photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.

The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their identification of
appellant fails the totality of circumstances test. The out-of-court identification
of appellant casts doubt on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
In its decision, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos
to prove that appellant is one of the perpetrators. On closer examination,
however, we see that Ferrer and Ramos failed to establish that what they saw
of the perpetrators is sufficient to produce an accurate memory of the
incident. During direct examination, Ferrer testified that one of the
perpetrators, who poked a gun at his nape, did not allow him to turn back his
head. There was limited opportunity for Ferrer, while driving the bus, to see
the perpetrators. Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Did you hear that utterance made, Umpisahan na ang laro?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you heard that, was your bus in motion?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A Someone held me at my neck while poking a gun at my nape, sir.
xxx
Q What other utterance was made?
A I saw one of the bus passengers grappling of [sic] one of the hold uppers who was
trying to retrieve from [sic] his clutch bag, sir.
Q Did you see that person with the clutch bag and the other person who was
trying to grapple the clutch bag?
A No, I was not allowed to turn my head back, sir.
xxx
Q After you heard the shots what happened?
A The one who poked a gun at me said deretso mo lang.
Q He never leave you at [sic] your place?
A Hindi po.
Q How many shots did you hear?
A Six (6) shots, sir.
Q After those six (6) shots what happened?
A I could not turn my head to see whether the person who was shot was dead,
sir.[28]
xxx
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q After the words which someone uttered, you felt somebody held you by the
nape and poked a gun at your head, is that correct?
A Yes, he jumped from one of the front seats, sir.
xxx
Q Is this two seater seat where the person who poked a gun at your nape seated
located somewhere to your right?
 A Yes, sir.
Q This seat and the drivers seat, are they parallel line or side by side or abreast with
the drivers seat?
A Slightly slanted from the drivers seat, sir.
Q In other words, this seat is situated somewhere to your back side?
A Parang tagiliran po.
Q How far from your shoulder?
A (Witness pointing more than a meter.)
Q In other words, you would not see the person sitting on that particular seat not
unless you turn over your head to the right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that time you were concentrated in driving, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a driver, its not your business to look around and check on the passengers, its
the duty of the conductor, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so sensing that no untoward incident that might happen, you just continued
driving peacefully until that very moment when somebody shouted umpisahan na
ang laro, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then immediately after that, someone approached you from your behind and
poked you something at your nape which you later felt to be a gun, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you to concentrate in your driving, if you want to live, correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q For fear that something might happen to you if you disobey the instruction of
that person at your back, you just concentrated in your driving not even
trying to turn your head to look around, correct?
A Yes, sir.[29] (Emphasis supplied)

Ferrer insisted that he saw what was happening through the rearview
mirror. Although Ferrer felt the presence and heard the voice of the
perpetrator at his back, it is not clear if he saw the perpetrators face or only
his back.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q At the time you heard the gunshots, the person at your back was still there pointing a
gun at your nape?
A Yes, he never left, sir.
Q So you could not turn your head to check what was going on at the back of the
bus for fear that the man at your back will shoot you?
A Hindi po ako lumilingon pero nakikita ko sa salamin dahil mayroon po akong
rear [view] mirror sa harap.
COURT: (butts in)
Q How big is that mirror?
A (Witness demonstrating with hands for about a foot long and 8 inches in width.)
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Where is that mirror installed or positioned?
A In front of the driver, sir.
 Q When you looked in the mirror you could see the back portion of the bus?
A Yes, sir.[30] (Emphasis supplied)

During cross-examination, Ramos remembered that he saw part of the

perpetrators face.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q And you were apprehensive even lifting your head to try to take a look at the suspect
because it could be very noticeable [and] you might be shot?
A Yes sir.
Q That is why when that suspect demanded money from you your head [was] vowed
[sic] down?
A Yes sir. But when I handed the money I took a look at his face particularly the
left portion.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

The relative positions of Ferrer, Ramos, and the perpetrator who poked a
gun at Ferrers nape, is as follows: Ferrer on the left (drivers) side of the bus
and facing the windshield, Ramos on the second step of the running board at
the right side of the bus and facing the road, and the perpetrator somewhere
[32]

in between them, on a level higher than Ramos. Based on Ramos testimony,

[33]

Ferrer could not have seen the perpetrators face by looking at the rearview
mirror. Ramos testified that he saw the left side of the perpetrators face. This
meant that the perpetrator was facing the passengers and not the
windshield. Thus, if Ferrer while driving could see the perpetrator who was
situated at his back, the most he could see through the rearview mirror was
the back of the perpetrator who was facing the passengers.
Ferrer, however, is certain that he took a fleeting glance of the perpetrators
face, even as he concentrated on his driving. Obviously, this view of the
perpetrators face did not come from glancing at the rearview mirror. Ferrer
claimed to have seen the perpetrators face before the robbery started, thus:
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Were you able to [lift your head to look at the rear view mirror] despite the fact that
the person who was at your back was poking the gun at your nape and telling you
not to make any wrong move because he will shoot you?
A Bago po nag-umpisa, nakita ko na iyong mukha niya dahil napalingon ako
noong nag-umpisa ang laro.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Ferrers identification of the perpetrator is inconsistent on how he saw the

perpetrator, through the rearview mirror or by looking back at him.
Ramos testified that he saw how appellant and his companions robbed the
passengers and killed Fuensalida. However, even if during trial Ramos
pointed to appellant as the perpetrator, an examination of Ramos testimony
shows that he did not actually see, much less remember, the faces of the
perpetrators. Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Those persons whom you saw who sat near the driver if you can see him will you be
able to identify him?
A I cannot point to him because when he said those words we were made to vow
[sic] our head [sic] down and whenever I made a moved [sic] I was kicked.
xxx
Q You said you cannot identify the persons who sat by the driver of the bus. How about
the five other companions [of] that person if you see them again will you be able to
identify them?
A Hindi po.
 Q Were you able to see the face x x x of that person who sat near the driver [at any
instance]?
A I only see [sic] the back of the head because when he turned sidewards I was only
able to see the back of his head.
Q How about the side view of his face. Were you able to see?
A Opo.
Q Now, look around the courtroom and point to anyone and look at their [sic] side view
of these persons one by one and tell us if any of them resembles that person
whom you saw?
A (Witness pointing to the person who identified his name as Rolando Pineda).
COURT:
Q How were you able to identify?
A Iyong haba ng konti ng buhok, side view.
Q Was he sporting the same kind of hair?
A Medyo maigsi po.[35] (Emphasis supplied)

A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of 12

[36]

danger signals that exist independently of the identification procedures

investigators use. These signals give warning that the identification may be
erroneous even though the method used is proper. The list is not
exhaustive. The facts of a particular case may contain a warning not in the
list. The list is as follows:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no
accusation against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original
description and the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified
some other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to
see the accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness
was unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and
his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.

Three of these danger signals apply to the prosecution witnesses

identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Ramos originally
stated that he could not identify any of the perpetrators. Ferrer had a limited
opportunity to see the perpetrators before the robbery started. When he first
saw appellant, Ferrer had no inkling that appellant would rob them.
The more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the crime. For even if the
commission of the crime is established, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the trial court cannot convict any
one. Ferrer and Ramos mental conception of the incident, the resulting
[37]
inaccuracy in their narration, and the suggestiveness of the pictures presented
to them for identification cast doubt on their testimonies that appellant is one
of the perpetrators of the crime.

Denial and Alibi as a Defense

The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive identification
of the accused. Courts look with disfavor on the defense of alibi. However, we
explained in Tuason v. Court of Appeals: [38]

Judges seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability of
eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the accused,
whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or other testimony. They are
unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by
her experience that her powers of perception become distorted and her identification
frequently most untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally the desire to requite a
crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously or unconsciously, an
identification already made by another.

The defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence for the
prosecution is weak and there is no positive identification of the accused, as [39]

in this case. The rule that the accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was
never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases. Otherwise, we
will have the absurdity of the accused being put to a greater burden if the
prosecutions evidence is weak than if it were strong. [40]

While it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of

the crime, corroboration of his alibi comes from three separate sources: Tan,
Quiton, and Colet. Tan corroborated appellants testimony on his whereabouts
at the time of the crime. Quiton testified that a day after the crime, he was
asked by SPO4 Mario Larenas (SPO4 Larenas) of the San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan police force if he had knowledge of the whereabouts of Boyet
Tartaro, Kulit and Tito. SPO4 Larenas approached Quiton because he knew
that Quiton was acquainted with the three. SPO4 Larenas did not mention
appellants name as one of the suspects. [41]

Colet, on the other hand, claimed to have knowledge of the crime and the
perpetrators as he was a bus passenger at the time of the crime. Thus:
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q When you boarded that bus where did you take your seat?
A Right side of the bus, third seat from the last seat.
xxx
Q When Totie Jacob declared a hold-up as you say, what did he say?
A While standing Totie Jacob declared a hold-up and said Walang kikilos. Holdap ito,
holdap ito. Pare, umpasahan [sic] na natin and his companions stood up and said
Yumuko kayong lahat and then his companion who stood up holding a grenade
and told them to vow [sic] down.
xxx
Q How about the passengers? What did they do when they [were] ordered to bowed-
down [sic]?
A They all bowed down.
Q How about you? What did you do?
 A I also bowed my head down but I was peeping clandestinely at them because I did
not expect that I would be in that situation and looking at what they are doing.
xxx
Q What did the hold-uppers do when all the passengers were no longer looking at
them because their heads were bowed down?
A The other hold-uppers nearest to the passengers ordered the passengers to put their
things down in a black duffel bag (parang supot ni Hudas).[42]

Colet testified that appellant was not a perpetrator in the crime and
absolved him from liability.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q You said that there were six hold-uppers all in all?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said you have taken a good look at these hold-uppers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda was one of those six hold-uppers that you
have seen?
A Wala po, hindi po.
Q Will you kindly tell us also if Rolando Pineda was one of the passengers of the bus, if
you know?
A Hindi rin po, wala rin po.
Q Will you kindly tell us or if you likewise see [sic] Rolando Pineda at any time of the
night of October 15, 1997?
A Wala rin po.
Q You said that you know Rolando Pineda having met you and seen him for several
times. If you will see Rolando Pineda again will you be able to recognized [sic]
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda is inside this courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly point to us the person of Rolando Pineda?
A (Witness correctly pointing to accused Rolando Pineda.)
xxx
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q What was the position of the policeman who [was] shot at the bus at the time
accused Celso Sison shot him?
A The person who shot the policeman was at the policemans back.
xxx
Q When you saw Celso Sison shot [sic] the victim inside the bus were you standing
then?
A I was still stooping down and at the same time peeping.[43]
Colet knows the names and faces of the perpetrators of the crime, as they
all live near each other. Colet asserted that he was an eyewitness and that he
remembers the perpetrators and even the weapons used.
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q You said you saw the person who shot [the policeman]? Who was that person who
shot [the policeman] inside the bus?
A Roberto Sison alyas Boyet Tartaro.
xxx
 Q And who was that hold-upper who was near the driver of the bus?
A Ang nasa likod po ng driver ay si Spencer.
Q Who is Spencer?
A Iyon lang po ang pagkakakilala sa taong iyon. Malapit din po sila sa amin nakatira.
xxx
Q You also saw Totie Jacob, right?
A In front of the door.
xxx
Q x x x Do you know the three others?
A Maam iyong dalawa, iyong isa hindi ko po kilala.
Q Who were the other two?
A Edison Palmario, the one holding the hand grenade, and alias Barok.
xxx
Q x x x [W]hich came first, the shooting of the police officer or the taking of personal
belongings of the passengers?
A Sabay po.
Q And the hold-upper also took away the collection of the bus conductor. Did you see
that?
A I saw Totie Jacob commander the bus conductor.
xxx
Q Tell us again what were those weapons used by them?
A Celso Sison alias Tartaro .38 gun, Barok a knife, Palmario a hand grenade, Spencer
a .38 gun, Totie Jacob a .45 gun and the 6th one a knife.[44]

The prosecution asks this Court to ignore Colets testimony that appellant
was not at the crime scene and did not participate in the criminal act. The
prosecution considers Colets testimony as polluted, coming from a co-
accused. The flaw in this argument is that Colet is not a discharged co-
accused. The trial court acquitted Colet when it granted his Demurrer to
[45]

Evidence, which the prosecution did not even oppose. The defense [46]

presented Colet who testified that neither he nor appellant participated in the
crime. Colets testimony corroborates those of Ferrer and Ramos on the
number of perpetrators and the manner of commission of the crime. Colet
gave his testimony in an unhesitating and straightforward manner.
Appellant even believed that Colet falsely implicated him in the crime at
the beginning. Appellant and Colet had a previous rivalry over a woman and
Colet is known in their area as someone with influence, being a police
informer. Unless he simply wanted to tell the truth, Colet was unlikely to testify
on appellants innocence when he himself is charged with the same crime and
was present at the crime scene. Appellant also attributes the motive of
revenge to SPO1 Alas, as appellant previously beat up SPO1 Alas nephew
during a brawl. The prosecution did not present evidence to rebut this
[47]

statement.
In its attempt to pin the crime on appellant, the prosecution dug up other
criminal cases filed against appellant. Appellant was previously charged with
robbery and illegal possession of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly
weapon, and assault, for which he was released after posting bond. Section
34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point:
SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. ─ Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that the

accused in a criminal case has committed a crime independent from the
offense for which he is on trial. A man may be a notorious criminal, and may
have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the crime charged on
trial.
[48]

Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden
of proof. We hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the trial court is
REVERSED. Appellant Rolando Pineda y Manalo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. His immediate release is ordered, unless there are other
valid causes for his continued detention.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this
Decision and report to this Court immediately the action taken not later than
five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chief Justice), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., on official leave.
FACTS:
Rolando Pineda together with several others allegedly staged a hold-up
while on board a bus. The bus driver, Camilo Ferrer, testified that while driving
he had witnessed what was happening through his rearview mirror and
identified Pineda as one of the perpetrators. Ferrer again identified Pineda
through a mugshot of the latter shown to him in an out-of-court identification
by the police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pineda was properly identified as the perpetrator of the
crime

HELD:
NO. Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established
methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is
unacceptable. The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is
that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the
suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of
pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of
the pictures pertains to the suspect. In the present case, the police obviously
suggested the identity of Pineda by showing only the photographs of Pineda
and Sison. The testimony of Ferrer fails the totality of circumstances test.