EN BANC disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he

has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

[G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001]
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
DECISION ours)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the
definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
nullification of two Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
(COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second honesty, modesty, or good morals.[13]
Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao
del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as
of candidacy; and the second is the en banc Resolution dated May 10, encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or
2001 denying his motion for reconsideration. good morals.

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on
candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Elections[15] that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and
Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court
candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001,[1] while Cagas to determine.[16] We further pronounced therein that:
filed his on February 28, 2001.[2]
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained
Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a
consolidated petition[3] to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which
certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are
that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In
Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
(1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.(Emphasis
P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral ours)
turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he
is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of
Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in CA-
whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and
G.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber
frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation
filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
of the statute.
Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 106709.However, in
its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division)
dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
final and executory.[7] Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he
material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any
for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude
deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela
the Omnibus Election Code. Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special
law.[18]
In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly
that his conviction has not become final and executory because the Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following
affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation Information:
in his presence.[9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was
already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
turpitude.
make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for
value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the
the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution. amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in
presentment, which check, when presented for payment within
Cagas petition, issued the challenged Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058
ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently
declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from holding any
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves
pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make
moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11]
days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)

Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which
COMELEC en banc in a Resolution[12] dated May 10, 2001.
provides:

Hence, this petition.

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes
or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any imprisonment at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis ours).
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account SO ORDERED.
or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she

does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment.[19]

The presence of the second element manifests moral

turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person.[21] The effects of the
issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case
of Lozano vs. Martinez,[22] through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.[23]Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty.

Fe Tuanda,[24] insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a
lawyer.

This argument is erroneous.

In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuandas conviction

for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the
practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her
suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the said
offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted

also import deceit and violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to
obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg.
22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. x x
x.[25] (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the
offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such
offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of
the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member.

We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this Courts ruling

in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa
Lim vs. People of the Philippines,[26] which reiterated the ruling
in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner
insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the offense no
longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such
pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa Lim:

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty

to be imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem
valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence
imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the
amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg.
22 was committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison
term. We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the
ends of criminal justice.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent

COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.