Preciolita V. Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co.

By: Von Ryan Emmanuel Adrias G02 Torts & Damages

GR No. L-21291 March 28, 1969 J. Fernando Topic: NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED
FACTS
The instant case is an appeal on the decision of the lower court dismissing Preciolita Corliss’ complaint for recovery of
damages against Manila Railroad Co.

On the evening of February 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Pampanga in front of Clark Air Force Base,
the husband of Preciolia, Ralph Corliss, an air police, was driving a jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Clark base to return
said jeep. Said jeep Ralph was driving collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad. Ralph died of serious burns in the base
hospital the next day.

Preciolita filed a complaint for recovery of damages against Manila Railroad. The lower court, however, ruled in favor of
Manila Railroad. The lower court opined that Ralph was a victim of his own wrongdoing and miscalculation when he took the risk
and attempted to beat the oncoming locomotive and aiming to reach the other side of the railroad crossing before said locomotive
could pass the jeep by. Hence, the present case.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Manila Railroad and therefore, should be held liable for damages - NO
HELD

The Court ruled that the present action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.

The Court cited the cases of U.S. v. Juanillo and U.S. v. Barias in defining what is negligence: “The failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly
demand whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Also cited was case of Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. which defined Negligence as: “want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and
the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”

In determining the presence of negligence, the court explained that every case must be dependent on its facts. The
circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the
objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

In the present case, it is improper to impute negligence on Manila Railroad since material facts show that it is clear that
Ralph Corliss was so sufficiently warned in advance (the lower court pointed out that moments before the collision, Teodorico
Capili who was manning the locomotive which was then 300 meters away from exact point of accident, blew the siren and
repeated it in compliance with the regulation) of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident
— and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.

A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in such a manner, but unfortunately, Ralph had failed to do
so despite him having been crossing the checkpoint frequently, if not daily and must have been aware that locomotive engines and
trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place.

In addition, the Court reiterated the ruling the case of U.S. v. Manabat & Pasibi: “…we think it is incumbent upon one
approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously
and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the
track."
NOTES
Witnesses:
Ronald J. Ennis
- a witness of the plaintiff.
- he said that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50
yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down
before reaching the crossing, Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that
was what he meant by a brief stop.

Virgilio de la Paz
- another witness of the plaintiff.
- he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field.
He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He
helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad
crossing, according to him." 4

Teodorico Capili,
- one who operated the locomotive.
- testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the
crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep
suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied
the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks."
 JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI v. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA CARDAÑA
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

AUTHOR: Pio Aguilar

FACTS:
1. On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña, a 12-yr old grade 6 student, was walking along the perimeter fence of the
San Roque Elementary School (Leyte) when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on
her, causing her instantaneous death.
2. Her parents, Dominador and Rosalita, filed a case for damages before the RTC against Joaquinita Capili, school
principal..
3. The Cardañas alleged that:
1. A resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported 2 months ago on the possible danger the tree posed to
passersby.
2. Lerios even pointed to Capili the tree that stood near the principal’s office.
3. Capili’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
4. Capili: Denied the accusation and said that Lerios only offered to buy the tree w/c he would use fo firewood. Also
denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting and even presented witnesses who attested that she had
brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting and assigned her next-in-rank, Remedios
Palaña to negotiate the sale.
5. RTC: DISMISSED complaint for failure to establish negligence of Capili.
- Capili exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances require.
- Absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that required by the
attendant circumstances.
6. CA: REVERSED. Found Capili liable for Jasmin’s death and ordered to indemnify the parents of Jasmin: the life of
Jasmin P50k; burial expenses P15k; moral damages P50k; attorney’s fees and litigation expenses P10k
- Capili should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting.
- No matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and NOT merely delegated
the task to Palaña.
- The dead caimito tree = nuisance that should have been removed.
7. Hence, the instant petition for review.
8. Capili:
- That she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned Palaña, to see to its
disposal.
- That she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers
inform her that the tree was already rotten despite her physical inspection of the school grounds.
- That moral damages should NOT be granted against her since there was no fraud nor bad faith on her
part.
9. Sps. Cardaña:
- That Capili knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.

ISSUES & RULING:

1. W/N Capili was NEGLIGENT and therefore liable to pay damages under Article 2206 of the Civil Code. YES

Negligent act defined.

A negligent act is an inadvertent act. It may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be
one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a
third person, an animal, or a force of nature.

A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a
more careful manner.

 The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is
foreseeable. As the school principal, Capili was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety
of the children within the school and its premises. Being unaware of the rotten state of a tree only shows that she
failed to discharge the responsibility of her position.

Requisites of a tort.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence:
1. damages suffered by plaintiff
2. fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond
3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred

Res ipsa loquitur.

 The fact that Jasmin died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where the accident:

1. was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would NOT have happened were it not for the
defendant’s negligence
2. must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of
3. must NOT have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured

 In this case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur warrants a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the
branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of Jasmin was a result of Capili’s negligence, being in
charge of the school.

As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
Once the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to the defendant to explain.

While negligence is NOT ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, “the thing or transaction speaks for itself,” the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

Where it is shown (1) that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and (2) that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of
things would NOT happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence,
or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury
arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.

 As the school principal, Capili was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on
her part.
- That Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition and that neither did any of
her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone does NOT constitute sufficient
explanation to overcome the presumption of negligence.
- Even if Capili had assigned the disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her
assignee. Howeve, more than a month had lapsed from the time she assigned her assistant Palaña, to the
time the incident occurred. She obviously failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree
had been removed. Thus, the Court cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.

2. W/N moral damages should be awarded.

NO. Moral damages should not be awarded because Capili was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive.

Moral damages are awarded if the following elements exist in the case:
1. an injury clearly sustained by the claimant
2. a culpable act or omission factually established
3. a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant
4. the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code

However, the person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence
for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and
serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. The action must be shown to have been willfully done in
bad faith or with ill motive. No bad faith or ill motive in this case.
Case Name: Elcano & Elcano vs. Hill & Hill By: Marjorie L. Alvarez
GR No. L-24803 Topic: Negligence - Quasi Delict
Date: May 26, 1977
FACTS
1. Agapito, son of Elcano was killed by Reginald Hill, a minor. Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No.
5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
2. After due trial, Hill was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.”
3. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad, Marvin Hill for recovery of damages.
4. The defendants in that Civil Case filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a. Present action is not only against but a violation of Sec. 1, Rule 107 which is not Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court;
b. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or in res-adjudicata;
c. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of
Reginald through emancipation by marriage;
5. The MTD was first denied by the trial court and only upon motion for reconsideration of defendants that it was
granted. Hence, this appeal of the Spouses Elcano.

ISSUES
1. Whether the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.
2. Whether Art. 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill even though Reginald was
already married.

HELD
1. NO. In Barredo v. Garcia, it was held that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code
but also under the Civil Code.
Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Art. 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that Articles. 1902 to 1902 of the Civil Code refer only to a fault or negligence not punished by
law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana
would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs.
Fourthly, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking Arts. 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
 “ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.” Criminal negligence is a violation of criminal law, while civil negligence is a
‘culpa aquiliana’ or ‘quasi-delict.’ Under Art. 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana.’ But said article forestalls a double recovery.
 Article 2176, where it refers to “fault or negligence” covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results, therefore, that the acquittal
of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
 to the instant action against him.
2. YES. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Art. 327 of the Civil Code),
and under Art. 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant
to Art. 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian.”
Under Article 2180, “the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.” In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence
in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father. Article 2180 applies to
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, in as much as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

Order appealed from is reversed and trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Doctrines Notes
1. The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in Aquino, J., concur. Article 2176 of the
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Civil Code comprehends any culpable
2. Under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal act, which is blameworthy, when judged
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a by accepted legal standards. “The idea
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal thus expressed is undoubtedly board
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana.’ But enough to include any rational
said article forestalls a double recovery. conception of liability for the tortious
acts likely to be developed in any
society.”
Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc vs Court of Appeals
G.R No. 57079 September 29, 1989
Topic: Proof of Negligence
Author: Jalaine B. Aratan
Facts :
1) July 30, 1968 when the jeep of Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
2) As a result of the accident, Gloria Estaban sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek
and her husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was shattered too.
3) PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by the spouses Esteban were the result of their own negligence
and that the entity which should held responsible would be BARTE, an independent contractor which undertook the construction.
4) The RTC ruled in favor of the Sps. Esteban. However, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
complaint of the respondent spouse.

Issue and Ruling

Whether or not the Sps. Esteban was able to established that there was negligence on the part of PLDT? No ,
Held:
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and
warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations.
It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission
to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the
doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury.

It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries were their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care
was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger,
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof. The facts constitutative of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whoever relied on
negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
must fail.

Doctrine : One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof.
Case Name: CHINA AIRLINES, LTD v. CA, PAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE By: Patricia Arbolado
AIRLINES, INC. and ESPIRITU Topic: Presumptions of Negligence:
GR No. 45985 and GR No. 46036 Respondent Superior
Date: 18 May 1990
FACTS
1. PAGSIBIGAN, VP and General Manager of Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., purchased a plane ticket from the Transaire Travel
Agency for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight. Said agency contacted Philippine Airlines (PAL)’s Manila Hotel branch.
PAL was a sales and ticketing agent of China Air Lines (CAL). On 6 June 1968, PAL, through its ticketing clerk ESPIRITU,
cut and issued him CAL Ticket No. 017991. According to the plane ticket, Pagsibigan was booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812
to depart from Manila to Taipei on 10 June 1968 at 5:20pm.

2. On 10 June 1968, when PAGSIBIGAN arrived at the airport 1 hour before his scheduled flight to check in, he was informed
that the plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had left at 10:20am of that day. PAL made arrangements for Pagsibigan to
take PAL’s flight to Taipei on 11 June 1968. PAGSIBIGAN took said flight and arirved in Taipei around noontime.

3. PAGSIBIGAN filed a complaint against PAL and CAL and prayed for moral damages (P125,000) arising from the gross
negligence of ESPIRITU in indicating an incorrect time on his ticket. He claimed that the purpose of his trip to Taipei was to
confer with Peng Siong Lim, president of Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation, scheduled at 9:00am on 11 June 1968. He
suffered from besmirched reputation, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded feelings and sleepless nights from his failure to
take the plane on 10 June.

4. According to PAL, CAL had not informed or provided them of the revised schedule of its flight. Moreover, PAL and
Espiritu, disclaim any liability on the theory that the former is merely an agent of CAL and that the suit should have been
directed against CAL alone.

5. CAL disclaims liability. It claims that it had revised its schedule of flights since 1 April 1968, which PAL was informed. In
fact, PAL’s Manila Hotel branch office had been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time schedule before June 10,
1968.

ISSUE
1) Who is liable to Pagsibigan? – PAL and Espiritu.
2) W/N PAL could be held liable by the negligence of Espiritu, its employee. – YES.
HELD
1) As to CAL – There is no basis to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. Espiritu is solely and exclusively
responsible for the error. He is not an employee or agent of CAL, and CAL did not contribute to the negligence committed by
PAL and Espiritu.
There is no question that the contractual relation between both CAL and PAL is one of agency. However, in an action premised
on the employee’s negligence, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employer under
said Article 2180.

As to PAL – PAL is only an agent of CAL. As a general rule, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable to third
persons. However, the exception is, as in this case, where the agent is being sued for damages arising from a tort committed by
his employee. Hence, PAL is liable.

As to ESPIRITU - As an employee of PAL, the nature of his functions requires him to observe that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. He committed a clear neglect of duty. Hence, for his negligence, he is
primarily liable to Pagsibigan under Art. 2176.

2) When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the employer either in a) the selection of the employee or in the b) supervision over him after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this case, however, PAL failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Hence, PAL is liable under Art. 2180.
Case Name: Pantranco North Express Inc vs. Maricar Baesa and Fe Ico By: Caro, Monica Celine A.
GR No. 79050-51 Topic: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Date: November 14, 1989

FACTS
1. The family of Baesa, together with spouses Ico with their son and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger
jeepney on their wait to a picinic at Malalam River to celebrate the 5th anniversary of Spouses Baesa.
2. David Ico, owner of the jeepney, was driving.
3. Upon taking the highway the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20kmp, and a
speedy PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve and collided with it.
4. As a result, David Ico, Sps Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa died while the rest were injured.
5. After the accident, the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and has remained in hiding.
All victims settle the case under the “No Fault” insurance coverage of Pantranco.
6. Maricar Baesa thru her guardian, and Fe Ico filed a separate action for damages arising from quasi-delict against
PANTRANCO. The latter invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver Ramirez.
7. CFI ordered PANTRANCO to pay 2,304,647.00 and 652,672 to Maricar and Fe, respectively.
8. On appeal, CA modified the award to 1,189,927 and 344,000. MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner claims that under the circumstances the jeepney driver who had the last clear change to avoid the collision
and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competent to avoid the harm. Petitioner
claims that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the jeepney driver.
ISSUE
WON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANGE IS APPLICABLE AS TO THE JEEPNEY DRIVER - NO

HELD
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the
plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages.

For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of the period or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be
expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could have known the existence of the peril.

In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a
distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction. [In the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, a motorist who is properly proceeding on
his own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side,
will return to his proper lane of traffic]

Further, the speed at which the bus was running prevented David Ico from serving the jeepney to the right shoulder to avoid the
collision. Thus he had no opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine “can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have discovered”.

The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of its employees but also in
adequately supervising their work rests with the petitioner. Petitioner failed to show that the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.
Doctrine Notes
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last clear chance to avoid the
injury and failed to do so is made liable for all the consequences of the accident.
Case Name: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC and Casiano Pacua By: Chua, Dane Larieze
G.R. No. 66102-04 Topic: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Date: August 30, 1990

FACTS
1. Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaide Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and
Zenaida Parejas (passengers) boarded the jeepney, owned by the spouses Mangune and driven by Manalo, bound for
Carmen Rosales, Pangasinan. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip.
2. Upon reaching Barrio Sinayoan, the right rear wheel of the truck detached, causing it to run in an unbalanced position
so Manalo stepped on the brake. Such action caused the jeepney to make a U-turn, eventually stopping on the opposite
lane of the road (from where it came from) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). It thus blocked
the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus 73 of Philippine Rabbit Lines.
3. Philippine Rabbit Lines (bus driven by De Los Reyes) claimed that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn, the
bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep. It resulted in a collision and the death of three passengers (Catalina
Pascua, Meriales and Estomo). Others sustained injuries.
4. Police investigators of Tacpal found that at the time of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney,
neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair. Thereafter, the police
filed a criminal complaint for multiple homicide against the two drivers. The case against De Los Reyes was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence, but Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
5. 3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, anchoring the suits against
Spouses Mangune and Manalo on their contractual liability while culpability for quasi-delict for Philippine Rabbit and
De Los Reyes.
6. TC found Manalo negligent. The same was reversed by IAC when it applied the doctrine of last clear chance (the
presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle is guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence) and the substantial factor test so De Los Reyes was guilty.
ISSUE
W/N the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable? NO.
W/N De los Reyes is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers? NO.
HELD: The IAC erred when it applied the doctrine of last clear chance as it only applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of two colliding vehicles, not in a suit where passengers demand responsibility from a carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. The reason for such is that it would inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence (Anuran v Buno).

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger does or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.

The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a
vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its
course either through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given
the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation.
However, the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt so De Los Reyes could not have anticipated it.

As to the substantial factor test (if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable), the bus driver’s conduct was not a substantial factor in bringing about harm. It cannot be said that the bus
was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour is within the speed
limit allowed in highways. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the
accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If 80km per hour is adopted, De Los
Reyes would have covered that distance in 2.025 seconds, not giving him enough time to react to the situation.

Proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune as they failed to exercise the precautions
needed. The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, Manalo’s conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious
Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The
negligence of the spouses was also shown through their non-attempt of establishing that the collision was caused by a fortuitous
event but even then, an accident caused by defects in the automobile or negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito.
Doctrine Notes: Manalo cannot be solidarily liable
(1) The principle of “last clear chance” is only applicable in a suit between the because the carrier is exclusively
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. responsible to the passenger even if it is
due to the negligence of the driver.
Case Name: Capili v Cardaña
GR No. 157906 Date: 2 November 2006
By: Kylie Dado
Topic: Res Ipsa Loquitur
FACTS: On Feb. 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a
branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents -
Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for damages before the RTC against petitioner. They alleged that even as early
as Dec. 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios
even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence
and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.

Petitioner denied the accusations and said that Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was
dead and rotting. She presented 2 witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a
meeting and assigned who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting.

Trial Court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner
exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was an absence of evidence that would
require her to use a higher standard of care more than that required by the attendant circumstances. But the CA reversed such and
found the Petitioner liable. It ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaña.

Petitioner, before the SC, contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the
tree and did not inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to
anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other
teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her
duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner's explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her

HELD: NO. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. The fact that respondents’
daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious
danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where

(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead
and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the
school. The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents
established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts
to petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.

As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate
danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee. The
record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant. Clearly, she failed to
check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed.

Doctrine: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Case Name: Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court By: Del Rosario, Keren Michelle P.
GR No. L-73998 Topic: Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
Date: November 14, 1988

FACTS
 Layugan (plaintiff) filed an action for damages against Isidro (defendant) alleging the following:
o He was repairing his tire of the cargo truck parked alongside the National Highway, defendant’s truck driven by
Serrano bumped him
o As a result, he sustained injuries and was hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
o He spent P10,000 and will incur more expenses as he recovers from the injuries
o Due to the said injuries, he was deprived of a lifetime income of P70,000, and also prayed for P10,000 attorney’s
fees
 Defendant alleged the following:
o He was the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Serran. The truck which was allegedly repaired
occupied half of the lane, right after the curve. The proximate cause of the incident was failure of the plaintiff to
install an early warning device
o He contends that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving
vehicle which has the right to be on the highway, and it was incumbent to the plaintiff to exercise extreme care so
the motorist on the road will be extremely forewarned.
o The burden of proof to prove diligence was observed was shifted to plaintiff since he has the right of way on the
road. Absent such proof of care, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner
herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck
o Hence, plaintiff is liable for damages sustained by the truck in the amount of more than P20,000
 Trial Court: Defendant is liable to pay plaintiff P70,000 for actual and compensatory damages, P2,000 for attorney’s fees,
P5,000 for moral damages, and to pay for the costs of the suit
 IAC: reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint
 Hence, this petition
ISSUE/S:
1. Who between the plaintiff and defendant is negligent?
2. W/N the defendant rightfully invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in his favor
HELD
1. Defendant Isidro and driver Serano are negligent.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The test
by which to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

In the present case, the admission of driver Serano shows that about 3 to 4 meters from the rear of the parked truck, a kerosene
lamp was placed. He claims that he was blinded by the intense glare of the light that is why he did not notice the parked truck.
Despite warning, the truck driven by Serano, an employee of defendant Isidro still bumped the rear of plaintiff’s truck.
Consequently, plaintiff sustained injuries. Hence, defendant was negligent

2. The lower court erred in upholding defedant’s theory of res ipsa loquitur or “the thing speaks for itself”.
It is a rule of evidence peculiar to law of negligence which recognizes the prima facie negligence on the part of the
defendant. The rule is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of
the party charged. It merely determines the prima facie evidence of proving a breach of duty. It can only be invoked when
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been
used.

In this case, defendant Isidro was sued under Article 2176 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 2180(5), which the law gives
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer over the acts of the employee. He failed to prove the diligence of a
good father of the family over his supervision of his driver.
Doctrine Notes

Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an

inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury
was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

It is a rule of evidence peculiar to law of negligence which recognizes the prima

facie negligence on the part of the defendant. The rule is not intended to and does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the
party charged. It merely determines the prima facie evidence of proving a breach of
duty. It can only be invoked when direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
Case Name: Africa v. Caltex (Phil), Inc. By: Trisha Andrea Draper
GR No. L-12986 Topic: Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
Date: March 31, 1966
FACTS
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses.
The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged
owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages.

The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees.

ISSUE
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause or origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as
to presume negligence on the part of the appellees?
HELD
Yes. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."

The principle applies with equal force in the case at bar. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known the cause of the fire were the appellees and their employees, but
they failed to give any explanation. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care.

In a report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties, it was stated that the location of the gasoline
station was within a very business district where many people mill around throughout the day until late at night, and
that the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2.5 meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames
from leaping over it in case of fire. The descriptive facts contained in the report only strengthened the presumption of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of
caution.

Doctrine Notes

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is show to be For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is apply, the following requisites should
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have be present:
its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, (a) the accident is of a kind which
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose ordinarily does not occur in the
from want of care. absence of someone’s
negligence;
(b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of
the defendant or defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
Case Name: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. By: Janlo Fevidal
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN Topic: GROSS NEGLIGENCE
GR No.: G.R. No. 165969
Date: November 27, 2008
FACTS
 In the 1970s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts traversing the trail
leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Over time, the power lines sagged, and reduced their distance from the ground to only
about 8-10 ft.The lines were located on a trail frequented by people, thus it posed as a threat to passersby who were
exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written
requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users from their high-tension wires.

 19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were
at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and walked along the trail underneath the NPC lines on their way to their work
place. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the dangling wires.
Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound and saw Noble fall to the ground. (He died after)

 The authorities noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and that the trail
was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see any danger warning signs installed.
After the GM of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up warning signs
around the area.

 Noble’s parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the
lines, averring that signs were installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made to increase
the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area (by Noble). NPC witnesses
testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC
argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.

 RTC decided in favor of Noble’s parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were biased because all but one were
employees of NPC, and they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since the
company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE
1) Is there contributory negligence on the part of Noble? NO. (NPC not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.)
HELD
 NPC argues that it was Noble’s negligence that caused his death. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could
cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.

 The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the injured party’s contributory negligence.

 In the case at bar, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There
were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the
high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted
for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

Doctrine Notes
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.

 Gross negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of even slight
care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of
person or property.