Laurel v.

Abrogar
G.R. No. 155076. January 13, 2009.
En Banc

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Motion to Refer
the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. In the Amended
Information, Laurel was charged with the crime of theft for allegedly
taking, using and stealing the PLDT’s international calls and business
of providing telecommunication or telephone service on or about
September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by conducting ISR or
International Simple Resale, which is a method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is
destined.

PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of

providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal
properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.

However, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a

conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the
telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current or impulses.
Hence, it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of
appropriation. PLDT does not produce or generate phone calls. It
only provides the facilities or services for the transmission and
switching of the calls. He also insists that “business” is not personal
property. Since services of PLDT cannot be considered as “property,”
the same may not be subject of theft.

Issue:
Whether or not international phone calls are personal
properties.

Whether or not international phone calls are personal properties

belonging to PLDT hence, may be subjects of theft

Whether or not business or service of providing international

phone calls by PLDT is a personal property hence, may be subject of
theft.

Held:
(1) It was conceded that in making the international phone calls,
the human voice is converted into electrical energy impulses
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 or electric current which are transmitted to the party called. A
telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also
held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as
electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may
be taken and carried away. Electricity is therefore a personal
property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates the “forces of nature which are brought under
control by science.

(2) It may be conceded that taking “international long distance

calls,” the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case,
take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties
belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merelty encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using
its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
PLDT not being the owner of the said telephone calls, then it
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken
without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.

(3) The business of providing telecommunication or telephone

service is likewise a personal property which can be the object of
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dispositive Portion:
Motion for Reconsideration granted, assailed judgment
reconsidered and set aside.

2
 Bicerra v. Teneza
No. L-16218. November 29, 1962.

Ponente: MAKALINTAL, J.

Facts:
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance alleging that
the defendants Tomasa Teneza and Benjamin Barbosa forcibly
demolished the house of the plaintiffs worth ₱200.00; claiming to be
the owners thereof. As a result of defendants’ refusal to restore the
house or to deliver the materials to the plaintiffs, the latter asked for
damages and be declared the owners of the house in question and/or
the materials that resulted in its dismantling.

Issue:
Whether or not the demolished house is considered as real
property and is therefore cognizable by Court of First Instance.

Held:
No, the demolished house ceased to exist as a real property
and is therefore not cognizable by Court of First Instance. . A house
is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the
soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par.1, Civil Code). This classification
hold true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on
land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is
demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such hence its
character as an immovable likewise ceases.

Dispositive Portion:
The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having been
admitted in forma pauperis, no costs are adjudged.

3
 Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana
No. L-55729. March28, 1983
First Division

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

Facts:
It appears that the petitioner, Antonio Punsalan, Jr. was the
former registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Bamban,
Tarlac.the petitioner mortgaged the said land to respondent PNB
(Tarlac Branch), but since the petitioner failed to pay the stipulated
amount, the property was foreclosed. The respondent became the
highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings.

In the meantime, in 1947, while the petitioner was allegedly in

the possession of the said property, he secured a permit from the
Municipal Mayor and right then constructed a warehouse.

On July 26, 1978, a Deed of Sale was executed between the

respondent PNB (Tarlac Branch) and respondent Lacsamana over
the property. The amended contract particularly includes the
warehouse and improvement thereon. Respondent Lacsamana
secured title over the property in her name as well as separate tax
declarations.

Petitioner then commenced a suit for “Annulment of Deed of

Sale with Damages” against the respondents. The petitioner impugns
the validity of the sale of the building as embodied in the Amended
Deed of Sale.

Issue:
Whether or not the warehouse is an immovable or real property
hence, the action must be brought to the province where it is situated.

Held:
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property as provided in Article 415 (1) of the Civil
Code. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building
treated separately from the land on which it is stood is immovable
property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have
dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no
wise change its character as immovable property.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied without prejudice
to the refilling of the case by petitioner Antonio Punsalan, Jr. in the
proper forum. Costs against petitioner.

4
 Tsai v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120098 and G.R. No. 120109. October 2, 2001
Second Division

Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No.
32986 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Philippine
Bank of Communications and Ruby L. Tsai are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally Ever Textile Mills, Inc., the following: (1)
₱20,000.00 per month, as compensation for the use and possession
of the properties in question from November 1986 until subject
personal properties are restored to respondent corporation; (2)
₱100,00.00 by way of exemplary damages, and (3) ₱50,00.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.

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 Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
No. L-50466. May 31, 1982.
Second Division

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

Facts:
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station
operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt. The
machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated
tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing
pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air
compressors and tireflators.

The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas
station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. However, the city
board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. The assessor
appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

The Board held in its decision on June 3, 1974 that the definitions of
real property and personal property in articles 415 and 416 of the
Civil Code are not applicable to this case . Instead, the said machines
and equipment are real property within the meaning of Real Property
Tax Code and Presidential Decree No. 464.

Issue:
Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and
machinery installed by Caltex (Phil.) Inc. are real property subject to
realty tax.

Held:
Yes. The said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decisions and resolution of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals are affirmed. The p0etition for
certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

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 Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals
No. L-46245. May 31, 1982
Second Division

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

Facts:
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum
Act of 1049, R.A. No. 387, the Meralco Securities installed from
Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel
pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the
surface long the shoulder of public way.

The pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and solidly
welded together so as to preclude breakage or damage thereto and
prevent leakage or seepage of the oil. The valves are welded to the
pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property
from end to end.

In order to repair, replace, remove or transfer segments of the

pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by means of a rotary hard-
metal pipe-cutter after digging or excavating them out of the ground
where they are buried. In points where the pipeline traversed rivers or
creeks, the pipes were laid beneath the bed thereof. Hence, the
pipelines are permanently attached to the land.

The provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real

property and issued a Tax Declaration containing the assessed
values of portions of the pipeline.

Meralco Securities appealed the assessment to the Board of

Assessment Appeals of Laguna but they upheld the assessments.

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals confirmed the ruling

of the provincial assessor and the provincial board of assessment
appeals that Meralco Securities’ pipeline is subject to realty tax.

However, Meralco Securities insists that its pipeline is not

subject to realty tax because it is not real property within the meaning
of Article 415.

Issue:
Whether or not the pipelines of Meralco Securities are subject
to realty tax.

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Held:
Yes, the pipelines of Meralco Securities are real property
subject to realty tax.

Their contention that its pipeline is not subject to realty tax

because it is not a real property within the meaning of Article 415 of
the Civil Code is not sustainable. Section 2 of the Assessment Law
provides that the realty tax is due “on real property including land,
buildings, machinery, and other improvements.” It is incontestable
that the pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall within any of the
classes enumerated in Section 3 of the Assessment Law and Section
40 of the Real Property Tax Code.

Article 415 (1) and (3) provides that real property may consist of
constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached
to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deteration of the
object.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution are
affirmed. The petition is dismissed. No costs.

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 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Alejo
G.R. No. 141970. September 10, 2001
Third Division

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 4930-V-41319 is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.