The Role of British Influence on Canadian

International Relations at the end of the

558049839

History 330

Vancouver Island University

1867 the British Empire still remained in control of a few key aspects of Canada. It was thought

at the time that the newly fledged country would not be able to effectively govern its own affairs.

It was decided instead to leave things such as Canadian foreign policy to the might of the British

Empire. Prime Minister John A. Macdonald said in 1870 that “it would be a century before

Canada would be strong enough to walk alone.”1 While it might have appeared to have been a

good idea to allow the most powerful nation in the world to govern her affairs, Canadians

allowing the British to be in control of Canadian foreign policy would have more negative

effects than beneficial for Canada around the end of the 19th century. The British involvement in

Canadian affairs such as the Treaty of Washington in 1871, the Franco-Canadian treaty process

of the late 19th century, and the Alaskan Boundary Dispute that ran from 1899-1903 all showed

that the British were willing to further their own causes to the cost of those of the young

Dominion of Canada.

During the American Civil War the British Empire tried to stay neutral and thus enjoy

trading privileges with both the Union and the Confederacy. In order to have better relations with

the British the President of the Confederate States, Jefferson Davies, tasked an ambassador to go

over to Great Britain. James Mason was to be the Ambassador to Great Britain so he, along with

ambassador to France John Slidell, boarded the British steamer Trent. Not wanting the

Confederacy to gain any prestige by having ambassadors in Europe the USS ship San Jacinto

under Captain Wilkes boarded the Trent and took Mason and Slidell prisoner.2 The British

demanded their release and President Lincoln, realising fighting a war against both the British

1
Lawrence Martin, The Presidents and Prime Ministers: Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of
Bilateral Bliss 1867-1983 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1982): 22.
2
Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908 (Berkley: University of California
Press, 1967): 244.

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and the Confederacy would be next to impossible to win, relented. Although the ambassadors

were both released the Trent affair placed significant strain on the Anglo-American relationship.

This strain was further increased by the selling of British made ships of war to the Confederate

States. Although the British offered to provide ships for sale to both sides, the United States had

a very well established ability to manufacture their own ships of war and did not need the help of

the British. The agrarian based Confederate States had a much smaller manufacturing capability

and bought ships of war such as the Alabama from Great Britain. The Alabama caused a great

deal of damage to United States shipping which the Americans wanted compensation from the

British for.3 British involvement in the American Civil war is important to Canada because it set

the tone for the first major international treaty that was to take place between Canada, Great

Britain, and the United States following the confederation of Canada in 1867. This would come

to be known as the Treaty of Washington of 1871.

In 1870 the President of the United States was Ulysses S. Grant. A general in the

American Civil War and an adamant annexationist, Grant was angry at the British for the

damages caused by the Alabama. He was further upset when the Canadians decided to enforce an

1818 treaty that allowed Americans to fish in Canadian waters but not within three miles of the

shore where fish were the most bountiful. John A. Macdonald ordered the Canadian forces in the

area to begin seizing American vessels that were fishing within three miles of the Canadian

coastline. This was done largely in retaliation for the Americans cancelling the reciprocity treaty

of 1854 in 18664. Grant would have liked to have declared war on Canada but could not afford to

do so following the incredibly costly American Civil War. Instead, he gave into the wishes of his

Secretary of State, the rather appropriately named Hamilton Fish, and agreed to enter into

3
Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power: 252.
4
Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: 25.

2
negotiations with the British over the rights to the richest fisheries in the world. Each side would

send a five person panel to try and come to a compromise.5

While the fisheries was an issue concerning largely the Americans and Canadians, not the

British, the British still had control of the newly founded dominions foreign policy at the time

and only allowed one of the five members of the panel to be a Canadian. Although Prime

Minister John A. Macdonald was still suffering the after effects of gallstones that had nearly

killed him he was determined that if he sent anyone else to take part in the panel they would play

the devil with Canadian interests so he became the first Canadian Prime Minister to visit

Washington D.C. in an official capacity.6 Macdonald’s goal was to try and bring about a new

reciprocity treaty that covered a wide range of products like that which had existed in 1854. The

Americans had little interest in reciprocity at the time as they thought that weakening the

Canadian economy might drive Canada towards joining the United States and instead offered a

cash settlement with a few free trade items such as coal and firewood. The rest of the British

delegation were willing to accept this but the upset Macdonald went around them, contacted

British Prime Minister Gladstone directly, and convinced Gladstone to tell the other members of

the British delegation that the government of Ottawa would have to ratify any treaty that the

delegation proposed. This made Macdonald so demanding of the items that the United States

should offer in free trade for rights to the fisheries that the American delegations decided to

withdraw all offers of free trade and instead offer only a lump sum of money. Macdonald once

again contacted Gladstone but the other British delegates had already informed Gladstone of the

situation and Gladstone told Macdonald to accept the terms.7

5
Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: 26.
6
Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: 27.
7
Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: 30.

3
 Canada never really had a chance of accomplishing its goal of bringing about the revival

of the reciprocity treaty of 1854 at the treaty of Washington due in large part to the attitude of the

British at the time. The British ambassador to Washington, Sir Edward Thornton, had made it

quite clear to President Grant that the British had no real interest in keeping the Dominion in the

Empire at the time and that it was only due to the outcry that would be raised in Canada that

Canada was not traded to the United States to settle the issue of damages caused by the Alabama

in the Civil War.8 Clearly the British were not interested in further straining relations with the

United States for a recently former colony that they did not entirely want in their empire

anymore. Although some such as Messamore claim that the British did what they could to help

Canadians in light of their understanding that a reciprocity deal was not a viable option at the

time that seems to be a far reaching claim. Messamore says that Lord Lisgar, Governor General

of Canada at the time acted with Canada’s best interest at heart and that it was just because the

Canadians were after the impossible that they did not achieve anything close to free trade at the

Treaty of Washington in 1871.9 This is a questionable statement as the British had learned their

lesson about allowing too much political freedom following the American Revolution and were

determined that if Canada was going to part of the British Empire they would not be allowed to

do anything to the cost of Great Britain. The Governor General of Canada clearly would not have

wanted the Canadians to gain anything at the Treaty of Washington if those gains came at the

cost of the British.10 This is shown by Lisgar forwarding a letter that Macdonald had sent to his

government back in Canada which stated that he was toying with the idea of having the Canadian

government refuse to ratify a treaty unless the British gave them other considerations. This was

8
Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power: 257.
9
Barbara Messamore, “Diplomacy or Duplicity?: Lord Lisgar, John A. Macdonald, and the Treaty of Washington,
1871”, Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History, 32, 3 (May 2004): 48.
10
Edward McWhinney, The Governor General and the Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Governments
(Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, 2005): 27.

4
also around the time that Gladstone withdrew his support from Macdonald. It seems that if

Lisgar had not forwarded that particular letter, which he knew he was never meant to send to

others, then the Canadians would have been much more successful in their international dealings

with the United States.11 The Canadian approach taken in the treaty did not help but it was the

overall lack of caring about Canadian concerns on the part of the British that saw the Treaty of

Washington be such a failure for the Canadians.

The faith that Canadians had in their British protectors when it came to foreign policy

would again be shaken in 1903 in the Alaskan Boundary Dispute. The border up to this point had

never been well established as the language in both the 1825 treaty between Great Britain and

Russia and in the 1867 Alaska Purchase by the United States used language not conducive to

mapping actual borders. This did not really become an issue until 1899 when gold was

discovered in the part of the North West Territories that would soon become the Yukon

Territory. As there were no land routes that would allow the gold to quickly be taken out of the

area the Canadians needed for practical reasons to use the sea routes. Problems arose over

whether or not the Alaskan border should follow the contours of coast as the Americans claimed

or follow a straight line down the waterways of the Alaskan Panhandle as the Canadians claimed.

This became an issue as depending on where the border sat the Canadians may have been able to

take the gold out of the Yukon Territory without having to pass through territory owned by the

United States.12

When the issue could not be resolved between the two nations they agreed to an

international tribunal. The composition of the tribunal was to be three Americans, two Canadians

and one British. Although the sides were supposed to send people of diplomatic skill who would

11
Messamore, “Diplomacy or Duplicity”: 47.
12
Daniel Smith, The American Diplomatic Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972): 225.

5
be willing to negotiate Theodore Roosevelt had little interest in negotiating with a nation that he

thought was far too weak to be making demands of the United States. Instead of sending as

unbiased negotiators as possible Roosevelt choose as the three American delegates Secretary of

War Elihu Root, adamant annexationist George Turner, and Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the most

outspoken anti-Anglos in all of the United States. Clearly Canada was not going to be able to

convince the American delegation of anything and thus would need to stand together if they were

to have any chance of mitigating the disaster that was starting to brew over the Alaskan

Panhandle. Unfortunately for Canadians, when the time came to vote the final decision saw the

three Americans as well as the British delegate, Lord Alverstone, voting against the two

Canadians in favour of the United States.13 Canadians were understandably furious even though

there were reasons for the British delegate to break faith with the young dominion in such a way

that the rather minor incident would be remembered most unfavourably for a long time.

The United Kingdom was in a very delicate situation at the time. Mainland European

politics saw military alliances putting the world on the verge of a continental wide conflict and

the British were not a part of either the alliance with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy or the

Entente with France and Russia. The Royal Navy was in an arms race with the imperial fleet of

Germany and quarreling with France and Russia over their respective colonial spheres of

influence. In an attempt to solidify the relationships they could in case things did turn to war the

British had been continuing their conciliatory attitude towards the United States. This played a

large part in the final decision for Lord Alverstone to side with the Americans over the

Canadians.14 If it did come down to war in Europe then Canada as a dominion of the British

Empire would have to support the British to some extent regardless of what the British had

13
Phillip Buckner, Canada and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 93.
14
Smith, American diplomatic experience: 225.

6
decided at the Alaskan Boundary Dispute but the Americans were under no such obligation.

From a militaristic point of view the handling of the Alaskan Boundary Dispute by the British

made complete sense.

The British also had cause to side with the Americans for diplomatic reasons. Theodore

Roosevelt is often characterised as having bullied those whom he had diplomatic dealings with

but Haglund and Onea claim that as he saw the British as a political equal he offered the empire

a way to back out of the affair while not losing any face. By allowing the Canadians to have the

rights to the small islands of Wales and Pearse Roosevelt had offered some six hundred square

miles of soil claimed by America as something that would allow the British to say that they had

negotiated on behalf of Canada and had won the Canadians something instead of forcing an issue

that would most likely have led to military intervention on the part of the Americans. While

Canadians may be upset by this compromise as the land was insignificant in both location and

size in the overall dispute, the siding of Lord Alverstone with the Americans seems more

reasonable from the British point of view as it did allow the British to be done with the issue

while avoiding American animosity.15 The British may have been happy to have been done with

the Alaskan Boundary Dispute but the Canadians certainly were not. Prime Minister Wilfrid

Laurier was furious with both the British and the Americans for many years to come.

Although the loss of territory and revenue that could have been generated for Canada

had Lord Alverstone not sided with the Americans was not insignificant the real losses to Canada

were in relationship and prestige. Canada was a new country at the time, not even forty years old,

and had long been the desire of American expansionists and annexationists. The way that Great

Britain had clearly ignored the desires of the Canadian people showed American annexationists

15
David Haglund and Tudor Onea, ”Victory Without Triumph: Theodore Roosevelt, Honour, and the Alaska
Panhandle Boundary Dispute”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19, 1 (March 2008), 32.

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that the British did not really think much of Canadian independence and thus would not be

willing to resist too strongly an American attempt to convince Canada to join the United States

through non militaristic means. The treatment of Canada as little more than a colony by the

British also did nothing to help the American view that Canada was a pathetic excuse for a

country that had no right to exist on the American continent. British involvement in the Alaska

Boundary dispute served to set back any hopes that Canadians would be viewed as a legitimate

country by the United States for years to come.

The United States was not the only country where Canadian international relations were

in large part influenced by the British government. Canada dealt with many European nations but

perhaps the most important relationship that Canada had with a non-Anglo country was that

which existed with France. In order to further this relationship, Canada tried to create a trade

treaty that would have been to the benefit of both nations. The intervention of the British again

served to do more harm for Canada than good.

Work for a trade treaty between Canada and France began in 1878. Although the foreign

consuls in Canada were by no means full diplomats they were somewhat reluctantly granted the

power to help begin trade negotiations between Canada and their respective countries. 16 Under

this lose framework of quasi-diplomatic powers Finance Minister Alexander Galt made an

informal agreement with France’s consul Baron Boileau in 1862 that Canadian shipping would

receive a reduced tariff in France in exchange for Canada greatly reducing the tariff on French

wines and manufactured goods. This was included in a treaty between Great Britain and France

that went on for a decade. Over the course of that decade trade with France had become such a

major part of the economy for the Maritime Provinces and Quebec that the cancellation of

16
R. A. Shields, ”Imperial Policy and the Role of Foreign Consuls in Canada 1870-1911”, Dalhousie Review, 59, 4
(1979-1980): 716.

8
preferred tariff rates on Canadian shipping was devastating for their economies. Alexander Galt

went to Paris with the spoken support of London to try and renew a trade treaty with France.17

Galt stood little chance of being able to achieve the results he was after in Paris. Partly

this was due to the protectionist attitudes of the French towards their merchant marine at the time

but mostly it had to do with lack of support from the British. The British were at the time trying

to renew a trade treaty remarkably similar to that which Galt was after. Under pressure from the

merchants of England, British ambassador to France Lord Lyons was not about to let the upstart

requests of an unskilled politician like Galt damage the chances he might have to renew the

Anglo-Franco trade treaty of 1860 which was due to be terminated that year. Indeed, Lyons

seems to have been reluctant to offer any real support to Galt in his mission to find a trade treaty.

He was slow to meet with Galt, not offering the customary dinner invitation for some time, and

was not willing to talk to the French on Galt’s behave but told Galt that he should be doing the

majority of the negotiating himself. This did little to help Galt with the French as the French

were quick to notice the lack of respect afforded Canada by Great Britain. Sticklers for political

niceties such as these the French would of course treat the Canadians in a similar condescending

fashion. Negotiations thus never really began before they were aborted partially due to the fact

that Great Britain was not willing to risk any hurt to help Canada. This is clearly seen by the

British agreeing to renewing the Anglo-Franco treaty of 1860 with the change that colonies were

to be excluded from tariff reductions. Canada also was not able to offer enough to France for a

trade treaty to take place as providing similar tariff rates on French shipping in Canada as

17
R. A. Shields, “The Canadian treaty Negotiations with France: A Study in Imperial Relations, 1878-1883,”
Historical Research, 40, 102 (1967): 187.

9
Canada was after in France would have violated treaties imposed by the British concerning the

most favoured nations of Germany and Belgium.18

Completing a trade treaty with France was important to Canadians and was thus followed

up on after the failure of Galt by the High Commissioner to London Sir Charles Tupper. Sir

Tupper wanted a very similar treaty to that proposed by Galt and thus had a similar problem to

that of Galt; the French wanted preferential tariff reductions that Canada could not offer because

of British preferred nation agreements. Tupper managed to work his way around this and

convince the French to sign a treaty that saw Canada give a large reduction to the tariffs on

French wine in exchange for reduced French tariffs on Canadian shipping. This was a very

difficult task as Ottawa was not happy with an amendment Tupper agreed to that allowed the

French to have similar tariff rates for items in the treaty that Canada offered to any other nation.

This meant that if Canada was to offer tariff concessions to the United States or England they

would have to be offered to France as well. The issue was postponed by proroguing government

until 1884. The postponement saw the treaty become better for Canada with tariff reductions on

all Canadian shipping in France and a promise that the treaty was meant to increase trade.19

Canadians had cause to be happy with the treaty but the British did not. There was

concern that Canada was going to refuse to honour most favoured nations such as Austria-

Hungary by refusing them similar concessions as granted to France. There was also concern that

having a foreign power favour one part of the British Empire over another would be disastrous

for the empire, turning the various regions against each other and leading to the empire’s

ultimate destruction. The British were so worried about Canada not meeting British obligations

that they refused to ratify the treaty until the Canadian government passed legislation promising

18
Shields, “The Canadian Treaty Negotiations with France”: 197.
19
R. A. Shields, “Sir Charles Tupper and the Franco-Canadian treaty of 1895: A Study of Imperial Relations,”
Canadian Historical Review, 49, 1 (March, 1968): 16.

10
that the new treaty with France would not exclude most favoured nations and other parts of the

empire from experiencing similar benefits. The Canadian government reluctantly agreed over the

outcries of the opposition.20 This clearly showed that the ability of Canada to negotiate trade

treaties was heavily impacted by British demands and most favoured nation obligations. Sir

Charles Tupper had largely negotiated the deal with France so it seems that Canada could have

managed its own foreign affairs, at least where trade was concerned, more ably without the

intervention of the British government.

After confederation there was very real concern that Canada was not strong enough to

engage in its own external affairs and thus agreed to be secondary to the British if the British

agreed to help Canada deal with the rest of the world. While this may have seemed a good idea

immediately after confederation it should have been clear that Canada was not benefitting from

this relationship following the very first dealings with foreign powers. Instead, Canada remained

loyal to an empire that was doing little to help Canadian external affairs. It was not until Canada

had seen the weakness of British leaders in a crisis as large as the First World War that Prime

Minister Robert Borden for the first time started to consider the idea that Canada might be better

off without the influence of the British in her foreign affairs.

20
Shields, “Sir Charles Tupper and the Franco-Canadian Treaty of 1895”: 18.

11
 Bibliography

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University of California Press, 1967.

Buckner, Phillip. Canada and the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Haglund, David and Onea, Tudor. “Victory without Triumph: Theodore Roosevelt, Honour, and
the Alaska Panhandle Boundary Dispute”. Diplomacy and Statescraft, 19, 1 (March
2008): 20-41.

Martin, Lawrence. The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: Washington and Ottawa Face to
Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss 1867-1982. Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd, 1982.

McWhinney, Edward. The Governor General and the Prime Ministers: The Making and
Unmaking of Governments. Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, 2005.

Messamore, Barbara. “Diplomacy or Duplicity?: Lord Lisgar, John A. Macdonald, and the
Treaty of Washington, 1871.” Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History, 32, 3 (May
2004): 29-53. Stable DOI 10.1080/03086530410001700390.

Shields, R. A. “Imperial Policy and the Role of Foreign Consuls in Canada 1870-1911”.
Dalhousie Review, 59, 4 (1979-1980): 717-747.

Shields, R. A. “Sir Charles Tupper and the Franco-Canadian Treaty of 1895: A Study of Imperial
Relations”. A Canadian Historical Review, 49, 1 (March, 1968): 1-23. Stable DOI
10.3138/CHR-049-01-01.

Shields, R. A. “The Canadian Treaty Negotiations with France: A Study in Imperial Relations
1873-83”. Historical Research, 40, 102 (November 1967): 186-202. Stable DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2281.1967.tb02148.x.

Smith, Daniel. The American Diplomatic Experience. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1972.

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