ALCANTARA v. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR – Tayaban naturalization.

It impliedly held that being already a Philippine citizen

he did not have to be naturalized.

According to his testimony, he is a Filipino born of a Filipina mother.

IN RE ROBERT CU, CU v. REPUBLIC – Abueg But when his mother died when he was about 5 months old, he was
brought to China by his father. When he was 5 years old, he and his
DOCTRINE: As to a statute adopted from another country, A rational father left China and then was given to the care of Doña Mangahas.
rule of statutory construction is that a statute adopted from another state
or country will be presumed to be adopted with the construction placed The counsel for the Government opposed Cu’s claim that he is a
upon it by the courts of that state or country before its adoption. Such Filipino. Cu continued with this testimony: “I consider myself a Filipino
construction is regarded as of great weight, or at least persuasive, and citizen on account of the fact that my mother is (was) a Filipina and I
will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in harmony with was born in the Philippines. My only fault was that I failed to file my
justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am application
on the subject. to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am now asking this Court
to make a judgment on that."
As to the nationality (according to the law when this petition was
filed), Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act Consequently, he was asked by the court whether he knew if his
No. 473) provides that the petition for citizenship, must state the parents were legally married but he was unsure thereof.
following:

1. petitioner's qualifications as enumerated in the Act,

2. petition must be signed by the applicant in his own ISSUE: WON Cu is entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship
handwriting; and under the law at the time of his application?
3. be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons,
stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute HELD: No, he is not entitled to be admitted Philippine Citizenship.
and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
473) provides that the witnesses must be citizens of the Philippines and
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of the Act. "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by this Act. If petitioner is born in the
4. The petition shall also set forth the names and post office
Philippines, time required is 5 years and if not, 10 years.
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case."
The witness provided by Cu did not meet these qualifications.
FACTS: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization. During the hearing, Witness Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng admitted that his father was a Chinese
he stated that he was a citizen of the Philippines. The Court of First national and his mother a Filipina but he did not actually elect
Instance (CFI) of Rizal found him to be “a Filipino citizen, both by right Philippine citizenship.
of birth and by right of selection," and dismissed the petition for

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
The other witness, Dr. Pastor Gomez, he testified that "he had known were concerned, but denied the same with respect to Ng Siu
Mr. Cu since liberation, about August, 1945." Dr. Pastor Gomez was Luan on the ground that "she is not qualified to acquire
eventually withdrawn as witness upon the objection of the counsel for Philippine citizenship of her husband under the provision of
the Government. paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she
lacks the requirements provided for under paragraph 2 of the
In United States vs. Martorana, “a petition not so verified by at least two same Act." He therefore asked her to leave the country on
persons who are citizen is not merely voidable but void." January 26, 1961.
 The Immigration Commissioner denied a subsequent motion
In the case of In re Kornstain, A witness who is incompetent renders an for reconsideration, although he gave Ng Siu Luan a five-day
application void. The question of a witness' qualifications in extension within which to arrange for her departure.
naturalization proceedings is therefore a matter of more than usual  To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan appellees
importance. filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila and secured from it a writ of
The above decisions are not binding upon Philippine Courts, but it is a
preliminary injunction.
rational rule of statutory construction that a statute adopted from
 After trial, the court granted the petition, and held that the law
another state or country will be presumed to be adopted with the
construction placed upon it by the courts of that state or country before does not require that an alien wife should have the same
qualifications as those required of applicants for
its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight, or at
least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and naturalization, it being enough that she is not otherwise
in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the disqualified.
adopting jurisdiction on the subject. The Supreme Court finds the  From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals.
United States courts' reasoning to be sound and reasonable and we
make it our own.
ISSUE: Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of
Philippine citizenship, automatically follows the citizenship of her
husband if not otherwise disqualified under the Naturalization Law.
LAO CHAY v. GALANG – Bacani

FACTS:
HELD: YES.
 Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age,
came to the Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
visitors, having been allowed to stay in this country until 473, as amended) provides in part as.
January 26, 1961.
 Instead of departing on that date, however, appellees asked the Effect of the naturalization on wife and Any woman who is now or may
Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of their alien here-after be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
certificates of registration as well as those of their children on herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
the basis of Lao Chay's admission to Philippine citizenship on Philippines.
December 12, 1960.
 On January 20, 1961, appellant Commissioner of Immigration It is now settled that under this provision, an alien woman, who is
granted the petition as far as Lao Chay and the three children married to a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
husband only if he has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
none of the disqualifications provided in Section 4 of the law. citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Since Ng Siu Luan admittedly does not possess the qualifications for HELD: YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
naturalization, her marriage to Lao Chay be deemed as automatically woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
vesting in her Filipino citizenship. facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law which states.

SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. —

LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Baldonado Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
DOCTRINE: “An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen,
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not
possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.” Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of

FACTS: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport
the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. During the interview, Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the
she stated that she was a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong and
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
desired to have a pleasure trip in the Philippines to visit her great
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
grand uncle Lau Ching Pin for one month. Immigration allowed her to
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
stay from March 13, 1991 to April 13 of the same year. On the date of
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period provided. after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a
The date of visit was extended till February 13, 1962. On January 25, Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
Aguinaldo Lim a Filipino Citizen.
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction then resided in said Islands, and their children born
with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of
ninety-eight. cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration".1 She
avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage,
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she was
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao.
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether
the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage -
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the automatically become a Filipino citizen.
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings,
in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such Philippine Islands.
procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, of the Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the
for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and
by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. accordance to the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-
vis the Constitution of the Philippines?

NGO BURCA v. REPUBLIC – Carloman

HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in
FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca
— "as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for the Revised Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as, among others, petitioner's to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth
two supporting witnesses. the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino
who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It
filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the
Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in
preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other of this, the petition must fail.
than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or
declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
VELLILLA v. POSADAS – Custodio
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit,
Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it
course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
FACTS:
"present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all
places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where
 This case arose from the death of one Arthur Graydon Moody,
she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The
who died in Calacutta, India on February 18, 1931.
reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places
 He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed all
of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to
his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer (Palmer), who is a
his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
citizen and resident of New York, USA.
surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make
 On July 14, 1931, Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of
heiress of Moody.
residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a
former place of residence is fatal.  Moody’s estate consisted of bonds and shares of stock
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not deposits, and other personal properties shown in the
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that inventory.
they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner  BIR prepared an inheritance tax return and income tax return
to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by for the estate of Moody.
this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and  The estate of Moody paid under protest.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 Both parties introduced evidence which appears that Moody,  On November 26, 1930, the latter date when he wrote a letter
an American citizen came to the Philippines and engaged in to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the
business here up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India. Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which
 That he had no business elsewhere, and all of said property at Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares.
the time of his death was located and had its situs within the  He stated in the letter: “Certainly I'll never return there to live
Philippines. or enter business again…”
 Plaintiff now contends that that there is no valid law or  Defendant answered that Moody, was and prior to the date of
regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under his death, was a resident in the Manila, Philippines where he
or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, was engaged actively in business.
assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of
intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the
Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of ISSUE: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, on the day of his death?
credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted
and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without
due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic
law of the Philippine Islands… HELD: YES, Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands
 Plaintiff alleged that Moody, at the time of his death, was a non- on the day of his death.
resident of the Philippine Islands under the following
 As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after the letters
circumstances:
were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been
 Moody was never married and was in the Philippine Islands
immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he
from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated
returned to the Philippine Islands.
a fortune from his business here.
 Therefore, he was a fugitive from confinement in the Culion
 He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was
Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of
Islands, not from justice.
February, 1928.
 There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record
 Moody was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had
that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from
been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the
Manila.
Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony as required by the law.  Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta
prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
 He promised Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion.
claim that Moody had domicile there although it was precisely
from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell
 But distressed at the thought of being segregated, he left the
his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there
Philippines under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket,
again.
passport or tax clearance certificate.
 Thus, the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in
February 1929 is much less plausible.
 In March and April of 1929, he lived with a friend in Paris,
 The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris.
France where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the
Pasteur Institute.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed VILLAHERMOSA V. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Cristobal
abode that he intended to be his permanent home; no evidence
that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any DOCTRINE: Mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino
settled business on his own account there. mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus
 There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is the predominating factor on questions of
establishment of a legal domicile there; the negative evidence citizenship.
that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila
does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon
repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship
 His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent
with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose
of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
 The evidence indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence FACTS:
from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to evade
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew  Florentina Villahermosa married a Chinese National
that on his return he would be immediately confined, because named Co Suy. They had a child named Delfin who was
his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on born in Paniqui, Tarlac.
the day of his precipitous departure.  In 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board
 And also, he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where S/S Cushman as a Chinese repatriate, in company with
he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts. his relative.
 Our [then] Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural  Due to financial difficulties in China, Delfin took steps
persons as "the place of their usual residence". to return to the Philippines. He met a Chinese who
 The record leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of informed him of a plan to smuggle their compatriots
Moody, who was described as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in into this country, thus, he agreed to lead the party (69
Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter Chinese) to Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives
of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited who could render valuable assistance.
during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta.  The immigrants were discovered and apprehended
 To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a immediately after arrival.
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with  Delfin Co was examined by the Commissioner of
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or Immigration and recommended that said Delfin Co be
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent deported to China as a Chinese citizen. They rendered
place of abode, one's home. a decision ordering the deportation of Delfin Co.
 There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that  In 1947, Florentina Villahermosa after knowing the
Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country. apprehension of her son Delfin, filed in the civil
registry of Tarlac under Commonwealth Act No. 63 an
oath of allegiance for the purpose of resuming her
Philippine Citizenship which she had lost upon her
marriage to Co Suy.
 On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Florentina, it was contended before the

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 Immigration authorities that Delfin, being a minor, to elect Philippine citizenship, and therefore he is yet an alien, his
followed the citizenship of his mother, and was a father being a Chinese.
national NOT subject to deportation.
 These contentions were overruled. The Court therefore held that, after the Constitution, mere birth in the
Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto
confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is
ISSUEs: Whether the reacquisition of Villahermosa’s Philippine the predominating factor on questions of citizenship.
citizenship affects Delfin’s citizenship as a minor, therefore, not subject
for deportation? It is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina,
Delfin CO, should likewise be a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does
Will we consider Delfin as Filipino citizen because his mother not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire
reacquired Philippine Citizenship? Philippine citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as
repatriated like his mother, because he never was a Filipino citizen and
could not have reacquired such citizenship.

HELD: No. Delfin is not a Filipino citizen. Even granting that he is, at the While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His
time he entered this (Phils.) country from China he was a Chinese mother was not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After death of such father,
subject to deportation, and any subsequent change in his status cannot Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her
erase the taint of his unlawful, surreptitious entry. Filipino citizenship in April 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could
claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of Par. 4, Sec.1,
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those Art. IV of the Constitution; but according to the same organic act, he had
who are citizens of the Philippines, as follows: to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his age of majority. Until
he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
he was at the time his father’s demise. Hence, he is subject to
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
deportation.
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before adopstion of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine NOTTEBOHM – Castillo
Islands;
Doctrine: Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines; attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of
Philippine citizenship;
the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-
Delfin Co’s claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on Par. 4 à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of
of the above section. But, being a minor, he has not had the opportunity

8
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
the individual's connection with the State which has made him its there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The
national. change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the war
and as such, Guatemala was not forced to recognize it.
Facts. Nottebohm, a German by birth, lived in Guatemala for 34 years,
retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties with it. Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,
He however applied for Liechtenstein citizenship a month after the a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm had no ties with Liechtenstein with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to
but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
was approved by Liechtenstein after submitting all the requirements whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act
uder the law and impliedly waived its three-year residency of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population
requirement. After this approval, Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
and upon his return to Guatemala, he was refused entry because he was Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection
deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms
honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before the International of the individual's connection with the State which has made him its
Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national. national.
Guatemala challenged the validity of Nottebohm’s citizenship, the right
of Liechtenstein to bring the action and alleged its belief that International practice provides many examples of acts performed by
Nottebohm remained a German national. States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not
necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not
necessarily and automatically binding on other States or which are
binding on them only subject to certain conditions.
Issue: Whether Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of
Liechtenstein may compel other State (Guatemala) to recognize it?

NAZARETH CANDY CO, LTD v. SHERWOOD GROUP, INC. – Dino

Held: NO. DOCTRINE: The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present
in this case. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted by to foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to
Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its prevent entanglements with other sovereigns that might ensue from
protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level."
this reason, be held to be inadmissaible.

As general general rule, issues relating to citizenship are solely the

concern of the granting nation. FACTS: On November 4, 1987, Nazareth Candy Company, Ltd.
(Nazareth) filed this complaint against the defendants Sherwood
But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the Group, Inc. (Sherwood Group), Sherwood Foods, Inc. (Sherwood
conferring state’s designation unless it has acted in conformity with the Foods), and Uziel Frydman alleging that the defendants failed to pay for
general aim of forging a genuine bond between it and its national aim. chocolate and candies ordered from Nazareth. Defendants moved to
In this case, the naturalization of Nottelbohm was an act performed by
Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. Moreover,

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dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ISSUE: Whether or not a citizen with dual citizenship (Frydman), could
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1987). be sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)?

Nazareth is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of

Israel, with its principal place of business in Nazareth, Israel. Nazareth
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of "Elite" Israel Chocolate & Sweets HELD: In its discussion of dual citizenship, the Sadat court, like the
Manufacturing Company, Ltd., which is also a corporation organized Raphael court, determined that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
and existing under the laws of Israel. Defendants Sherwood Group and it would only recognize the American citizenship of the party claiming
Sherwood Foods are North Carolina corporations whose principal place dual citizenship. That court only recognized the American citizenship
of business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant Frydman is for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction since the rationale behind
president of Sherwood Group and Sherwood Foods. He resides in alienage jurisdiction was not present in Sadat.
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Frydman was born in Israel, and he
became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1977. He claims First, the Sadat court applied the dominant nationality theory where
both American and Israeli citizenship, and he travels to Israel on an courts analyze the citizen's conduct, residence, and his relationship in
Israeli passport. the countries in which he claims dual citizenship. Although, it found
that Egypt still recognized the plaintiff as an Egyptian citizen, it held
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the purchase of that his American citizenship defeated diversity jurisdiction since:
chocolates and candies that plaintiff sold defendants. On 1982, the
parties entered into an agreement giving the defendants the exclusive (1) He retained his American passport, and he manifested his intent to
right to market, sell, and distribute plaintiff's goods. Sherwood Foods return to the United States even though he worked in the Middle East.
assumed all liabilities of Sherwood Group on July 28, 1983. Plaintiff
(2) He registered at the United States embassy in Cairo as a United
claims that from February 1984 to the present, the defendants have
States citizen.
repeatedly ordered chocolate from the plaintiff and that the defendants
have repeatedly failed or refused to pay the plaintiff pursuant to the (3) He voted in the 1976 presidential election.
October agreement.
This court agrees with the reasoning in Sadat and Raphael. Under the
Courts and commentators refer to these sections of the statutes as dominant nationality theory, Frydman would be an American citizen
alienage jurisdiction.
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Although he travels to Israel
on an Israeli passport, he has purchased a home in Winston-Salem,
Plaintiff alleges that it falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because it is an
North Carolina where his family resides, and he operates his business
alien corporation suing Frydman, an American citizen. It contends that
in that city.
the cases indicate this court should ignore Frydman's dual citizenship
and find that complete diversity exists in this fact situation. Second, the court agrees with the Raphael court noting that he took an
oath renouncing his allegiance to foreign states or sovereignties when
Defendants filed this motion alleging that this court lacks subject
he became an American citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1987). Thus, his Israeli
matter jurisdiction since Frydman's dual citizenship defeats diversity.
citizenship is irrelevant for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction.

The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present in this

case. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to

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foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to
prevent entanglements with other sovereigns that might ensue from
failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level."
Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1182. Nazareth may face severe prejudice in state
court as a result of the violent events taking place on the West Bank
between the Palestinians and the Israeli government.

The court disfavors Frydman's argument to defeat jurisdiction since

that result would allow American citizens with dual citizenship to
control subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. Congress did
not intend for citizens with dual citizenship to have the power to defeat
or to gain access to the federal courts based upon their selection of
nationality.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.

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