A Nautical Institute project The case for a Designing to fit
H3
sponsored by Lloyd’s Register EMEA decent design the user
Page 3 Page 7
The Nautical
Institute
The International Maritime
Human Element
Bulletin
Issue No. 3 April 2004
T here are many factors that can
ultimately affect the ability of the
An ergonomic nightmare!
master and his crew to ensure the safe ‘An ergonomic nightmare’ is an The mariner is generally a trusting sort
expression often to be heard of person; he (or she) has implicit faith
conduct of the ship, and the safe and
emanating from the mariner, reflecting in those who have conceived, designed
timely delivery of its cargo. Poor ship
his opinion on the layout of the ship’s and built his ship. Alas, there is no
design, bad ergonomics, equipment such thing as ‘the perfect ship’, because
bridge, or the engineroom. The IMO
failure, fatigue, stress, boredom, the end product is inevitably a
definition of ergonomics is the study
commercial pressures, cultural and design of working environments compromise between what is needed
differences, differing equipment (e.g., workstation, cockpit, ship bridges) to satisfy the regulations, what is
designs, and a lack of proper training in absolutely necessary to fulfil the
and their components, work practices,
the operation of equipment, all affect operational role, and what is
and work procedures for the benefit of
affordable. But, it must be ‘fit for
the way in which a ship is operated. the worker’s productivity, health,
purpose’ to enable the master and his
comfort, and safety.
The human element is a critical feature crew to fulfil their obligations to
of all aspects of ship or system design A ship is unique in that it is not only a ensure the safe conduct of the ship
and operation. For any ship or system to place of work, within which there are a and the safe and timely delivery of its
number of workspaces - the bridge, the cargo. Put simply, for any ship or
operate safely and effectively, it must be
machinery control room, the system to operate safely and
designed to support the people who effectively, it must be designed to
work it, without detriment to their engineroom, the cargo control room,
support the people who operate it,
cargo holds, galley etc - each of which
health, safety and overall performance, without detriment to their health,
may have different operational criteria,
particularly in respect of: safety and overall performance.
but also it is a ‘home’ to those who
Ergonomic considerations do not just
• workability work onboard. Furthermore, it is a
floating platform which can be start at the design stage of a ship and
finish at build - they must be applied
• controllability affected by external and internal
environmental conditions such as throughout its lifecycle, especially
when updating its role or its manning
• safety and emergency response weather, temperature, humidity, noise,
vibration and ship motion (pitching, philosophies or when retro-fitting new
systems or equipment.
• maintainability rolling and slamming), any of which
can also be detrimental to the safety If you don’t get the ergonomics right,
• security and performance of those who work
and live onboard.
overall ship performance may be
compromised!
• manoeuvrability
• habitability
In this issue of Alert!, the focus is on
ergonomics - the science of fitting the
workplace to the worker. In our central
feature - The A to Z of Ergonomics - we
offer some ergonomic definitions that
are relevant to the design and operation
of a ship and its systems, together with
some pictorial examples of how the lack
of attention to ergonomics can affect
the mariner.
Comments on any of the articles or other
human element issues are always
welcome to: editor@he-alert.org
A is for ... Attention
Improving the awareness of the human element in the maritime industry
2 Inside this issue: Human error
Human error; a fragile chain
- a fragile chain of
2
of contributing elements
Harald Fotland
contributing elements
Shipboard Maintenance - Vice President,
a top management responsibility 2 Gard Services AS
t is commonly agreed in the shipping
Improving Ship Operational Design 3
I industry that close to 80% of accidents
are rooted in human error. The trend also
strong focus on design and optimal
technical solutions, and on ergonomic
solutions during the building phase, is
indicates that there are fewer accidents fundamental in the prevention of future
The Case for a Decent Design 3 caused by technical failure of a piece of accidents. Some ship owners out-source
equipment, and an increasing number construction management completely,
that can be explained by human error. The whilst others believe in in-house site
An A to Z of Ergonomics 4/5 problem is complex; human error may very teams, close cooperation with the
well be due to an error in design, improper shipbuilder, and a continuous improve-
The Human Element in Pilotage 6 follow-up of the building process, or lack of ment of the design. The latter approach is
proper routines on board. Some studies probably the natural follow-up to a
also indicate that a majority of the carefully organised design phase.
Prevention Through People: accidents due to human error may be
An Overview 6 traced back to factors where the ship’s Ships and ship operations are becoming
management has a strong influence, and more and more sophisticated. New and
in some cases direct control. advanced equipment is introduced on
Anthropometry - board, vessel speed and size is increasing,
Designing to fit the user 7 When establishing the cause of an and advanced methods of operation are
accident, any approach focusing solely on developed. In this context, selection of
the personnel on board will reduce the
Accident Investigation Reports 8 crew, familiarisation, advanced training,
possibility of identifying the underlying
and a continuous focus on the correct
cause. There must also be some focus on
implementation of procedures becomes
Reports and Studies 8 errors in design, poor ergonomics and
vital for the safe operation of the vessel, as
technical solutions, and routines and
well as for the company’s competitive
procedures incorrectly implemented.
edge. Gard has therefore supported a
It is at the design and build stages that number of projects where new and
future accidents can be prevented with advanced training methods have been
the least costs involved, and with the most developed, and will continue to do so in
long-lasting solutions. Gard believes that a the future.
The International Maritime SHIPBOARD One of the prime responsibilities of a
shipowner and ship management
Human Element Bulletin
MAINTENANCE company is that the ship’s hull structure,
Editor: David Squire, FNI machinery and equipment are maintained
The Nautical Institute, 202 Lambeth Road
- a top and operated in accordance with
London SE1 7LQ management applicable rules and regulations and any
relevant additional requirements,
T: +44(0) 20 7928 1351 responsibility Ugo Salerno
Chairman IACS
procedures and standards established by
F: +44(0) 20 7401 2817 the company. That responsibility starts
The International Association of from the top managers of the company,
E: nds@nautinst.org Classification Societies (IACS), comprising of who should be committed to direct efforts,
ten member societies and two Associates, resources and investments in order to
The opinions expressed herein are those of the editor
or contributors and do not necessarily represent the covers some 90% of the world’s cargo ensure that their ships are properly
views of The Nautical Institute or Lloyd’s Register EMEA. carrying tonnage. Here, the important issue maintained and operated by qualified and
The Nautical Institute and Lloyd’s Register EMEA,
of shipboard maintenance is discussed. competent crew. It is all too easy to lose
their affiliates and subsidiaries and their respective sight of the fact that the fundamental
officers, employees or agents are, individually and While concern over ship casualties tends
collectively, referred to as ‘The Nautical Institute and to focus largely on the age of a vessel, the responsibility for a ship’s condition rests
Lloyd’s Register EMEA’. The Nautical Institute and
quality and organization of maintenance squarely with the owner of the vessel.
Lloyd’s Register EMEA assume no responsibility and
shall not be liable to any person for any loss, damage remains a central issue. Shipboard Ugo Salerno, the Chairman of IACS
or expense caused by reliance on the information or maintenance is still the least-developed
advice in this Bulletin or howsoever provided, unless comments: ‘Poor maintenance increases the
that person has signed a contract with an entity from and weakest element in many of even the risk of casualty, pollution and damage to
The Nautical Institute and Lloyd’s Register EMEA for most well-intentioned companies. Indeed, property. Of all the Port State Control
the provision of this information or advice and in that
case any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the
maintenance tends to be regarded as the detentions attributed to failures in shipboard
terms and conditions set out in that contract. exclusive responsibility of technical staff, safety management systems, more have
rather than the rightful concern of safety referred to maintenance than to any other
managers and Designated Persons. clause of the ISM Code.’
The IACS Guide to Managing Maintenance may be downloaded from: www.iacs.org.uk/_pdf/Rec74.pdf
Improving Ship Operational Design
to inattention to detail at the design
3
Operational design is a collective
responsibility and should be shared stage. The Human element is addressed
between owners, mariners, designers and through expert advice on plan approval,
builders. The Nautical Institute publication design project management, through-life
Improving Ship Operational Design sets out costings, the application of ergonomics
to examine the problems found at sea due and conflict resolution.
Further information can be found at: www.nautinst.org/pubs/shipdesign.htm
The Case for a Decent Design
there will be less pressure on the designer with naval architects, especially in the eyes
to make political/economical decisions of the people onboard.
without compromising his/her integrity.
So, where can we go from here?
When it comes to the operational and
For future naval architects, the Royal
K S Tham, BSc(Hons), MRIN, CEng practical aspects of a design, decisions are
Institution of Naval Architects is actively
Technical Director very much driven by cost. What may be a
pushing for sponsorships from ship
Anglo Eastern Technical Services Ltd good idea or decent upgrade to a design is
owners and industry to provide young
frequently translated into ‘how-much-
designers with the opportunity to spend
does-it-cost?’ Perhaps this is one area in
G iven that ships in various forms have
been with us since the dawn of time,
the perennial lament from end-users,
which naval architects are often
misunderstood - incorporating what is
time at sea/ industry and increase their
awareness of good and bad designs, and
their implications to the people serving
namely the seafarers, about the good can sometimes mean pushing it too onboard the ships.
incongruity of ship designs with respect to far till the project is no longer viable. The
same is true for the shipbuilder, who takes For practicing naval architects, walking
safety, security, practicality, functionality
the opposite stance to the owner. Tucked the fine line remains an occupational
and operability, still goes on today.
in the middle is the end-user. hazard but it is left to the individual on
Most seafarers are aware and accept that how to decide and convince the owner
the underlying factor is ‘economics’ - the The difference in standards or and/or the builder which of the ‘wish-list’ is
builder, the shipowner, the legislators and expectations can be quite remarkable not only nice to have but also ‘good to
between owners, builders and seafarers. have’.
the designers are governed by it. However
For example, it is still common to find new
there is a fine line between commercial For all designers, owners and operators,
ships built in Japan today intended for
profitability and exploitation - the trick is in it is essential to maintain contact and
crews from developing countries to be
knowing where the compromise lies. encourage dialogue with the people at
equipped with shared or common
Thankfully, when it comes to safety and toilets/showers. This may be permitted for sea, as well ashore, as there is no substitute
security issues, Flag Administrations and signatory countries to the International for practical knowledge and feedback on
Classification Societies are continually Labour Organization (ILO) 1992 how well a design has performed. On this
introducing improvements for safer note, the Nautical Institute’s publication
Convention but it will not be deemed to
Improving Ship Operational Design contains
designs through regulations - often meet European standards. Another
practical tips that will not be found in any
otherwise known as ‘minimum popular justification for low standards of
college course work and is a good place
requirements or standards’. The term equipment or accommodation is the fact
to start.
‘standard’, though, is subjective and can that the owner may sell the ship within the
mean different things to different groups next 3 years - so why spend all that money For the seafarers, we know naval
outside the regulated regime. However, if on improving the design when it will only architects may not exactly feature high on
all stakeholders strive to achieve and agree benefit the future buyer? Such philosophy your top ten list of favourite personalities,
on ‘acceptable standards’, then maybe towards ship designs will not translate well but they do listen and they do try to fulfil
their professional obligation for safer and
better designs within the confines of the
project - so long as you don’t ask for
satellite TV in every cabin!
4
An A to Z of Ergonomics
TTENTION - the faculty or power of ODY MEASURES - the ranges in ONTEXT OF USE - the users, tasks,
A mental concentration. Divided ~
applying one’s mind to two or more
tasks at the same time; Selective ~
B size, shape and strength of the
human body as a function of
gender, race, and regional origin
C equipment (hardware, software and
materials) and the physical and social
environments in which a system is used.
monitoring several channels or sources of (Anthropometrics). The mechanics of
ISPLAY - a device or feature
information at the same time so as to
perform a single task; Focussed ~
concentrating on one channel or source of
information; Sustained ~ concentrating
human movement (Biomechanics).
D designed to provide status,
position, or condition information
to the operator through visual or
auditory feedback.
over a prolonged period of time so as to
detect infrequent signals.
IFECYCLE
L normal
co ext of use
nt
DE
knowledge
SIG
Bod
y
Inte meas E
SAF CT OF
N&
grate urem
Wor d sys ent
k te
Disp place m NDU IP
CO HE SH
BU I
Lay lays T
Use Ergon out
LD
Train r-cen omic
ing tred s
Main & Com design
tain pete
abil n
ity ce
USE
Attention, Risk
Quality of life
sign Performance shaping factors
ntred de
DEVEL
User ce n allocation OHS
Functio rformance Vim & vigour
pe
Human Training & Competence SAF
E
DEL & TIM
OP
E
THE IVERY LY
e
ign nc
es ma
b d for CAR OF
Jo per k
Pe
GO
Tra rma
Vim Ri om ing f
n is
rfo
ma R
in i n c e
Function Allocation
Hu
ng s
& v sk pete acto
Human Performance
& C hap
igo
NE
Integrated system
ur
S
OH
Workplace, Displays
ED
Layout
nc rs
Ergonomics
e
User-centered design RT
DI Training & Competence P O
SP DEVE Maintainability TE UP
OS
E LOP / DESIGN / UPDA S
MAINTAIN
If you don’t ORKPLACE DESIGN - the SER-CENTRED DESIGN - designing
get the W physical design
arrangement of the workplace
and accommodation - the whole ship -
and
U for users with users, in order to
achieve systems that are effective,
efficient, safe and satisfying to use.
ergonomics right, taking into consideration environmental
conditions such as weather, temperature,
overall ship humidity, air quality, lighting, noise, IM & VIGOUR - maintenance of
performance may
be compromised!
vibration, cleanliness, ship motion
(pitching & rolling), and its effect on the
safety and performance of personnel.
V strength and stamina through
appropriate diet, rest periods,
exercise, periodical medical review etc.
5
RGONOMICS - the study and UNCTION ALLOCATION - the UMAN PERFORMANCE - human
E design of working environments
(e.g., ship bridges, machinery
control rooms, galleys) and their
F process by which tasks or functions
are allocated between humans and
machines/systems, and/or amongst
H sensory capabilities (e.g., sharpness
of eye, hearing ability, sensitivity to
touch), and the impact of environmental
components, work practices, and work different operators/maintainers. factors (e.g., lighting, noise) on human
procedures for the benefit of the sensory systems, as well as mental
OOD PRACTICE - learning from
worker’s efficiency, effectiveness,
health, comfort, and safety.
G other organisations that have
developed successful projects or
approaches to problems.
capabilities for storing and processing
information and for making decisions.
NTEGRATED SYSTEM - a collection of
I applications on computer based
systems and equipment designed to
provide correct, sufficient, timely and
unambiguous information to, and support
control by, one or more users.
OB DESIGN - the specification and
J achievement of successful job
performance, typically focussing on
tasks, responsibilities, accountabilities,
knowledge and skill requirements.
NOWLEDGE - a theoretical and/or
K practical understanding of a
subject.
AYOUT - the integration of people
L with equipment, systems, and
interfaces, such as controls, displays,
alarms, video-display units, computer
workstations, labels, ladders, stairs, and
overall workspace arrangement.
AINTAINABILITY - designing
M operational maintenance tasks to
be rapid, safe and effective in
order to allow equipment and systems to
achieve a specified level of performance.
This includes consideration of access,
removal routes, tools, expertise, disposal,
and through life support.
ORMAL - conforming to a
N standard; regular, usual, typical.
CCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
O SAFETY (OHS) - the effect of work,
the working environment and
living conditions on the health, safety and
well-being of the person.
ERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS
P - the environmental, ergonomic and
job design factors that are
correlated with effective and safe task
RAINING & COMPETENCE - the ISK - the probable rate of performance by a human working within a
T development of skills or knowledge
through instruction or practice; R occurrence of a hazard causing
harm and the degree of severity
system. (See Alert! Issue No 2).
UALITY OF LIFE - the combination
and the levels of proficiency achieved
for the proper performance of
functions onboard ship in accordance
with internationally agreed criteria,
of the harm.
YSTEM - a combination of
Q of good occupational health and
safety, good workplace design,
good management and the impact on a
incorporating prescribed standards or
levels of knowledge, understanding and
demonstrated skill.
S interacting elements (human and/or
machine) organized to achieve one
or more stated purposes.
person’s physical and psychological fitness
to work at sea.
In the next issue:
PEOPLE
6
The Human Element in Pilotage
Captain Steve Pelecanos
Vice President
International Maritime Pilot’s Association
O f all the working environments in the
maritime industry, a ship’s bridge
during pilotage operations is perhaps
the one most likely to breed human
behavioural and performance induced
errors. A key role of the pilot therefore, is to environment intensifies, as in the case of easing the workload of the bridge team.
use such management techniques and reduced visibility, increased traffic density However, it is ironic that the more
skills that ensure appropriate controls and and narrow operating margins. advanced the control system, the more
defenses are in place to reduce the risk of crucial we find is the contribution of the
human error. Commercial pressures on the pilot and human operator. It is common to find
master as always are a source of stress. bridge teams that are not properly trained
The modern-day bridge is a complex These may be in the form of requests to in the use of these new technologies and it
mix of physical, psychological and use fewer tugs or to berth/unberth within is ultimately the pilot that has to properly
pathological variables that can impact on certain time-frames. It is not unusual to understand the limitations of such
human performance. find a fatigued master and crew, especially equipment in confined waters.
For example, it is common in today’s when a ship is making a number of port
calls within a short space of time (as in the Within this complex, highly operational
shipping environment for the pilot to
case of container ships and car carriers). and time critical environment there is a
arrive on a ship and be greeted by a
The pilot cannot depend on proper back- potentially volatile mix of the key
multi-national bridge team where
ingredients that lead to the classic human
language and culture can impair proper up from the bridge team in such
error type accidents. In order to improve
communications. It is also common to find circumstances. Fatigue induced stress
safety and efficiency, it is important for the
a bridge team of varying competencies can also be caused by adverse weather,
shipping industry to understand and
where a proper understanding and high workloads and poorly planned duty
acknowledge this critical aspect and
appreciation of the pilotage operation cycles that do not incorporate sufficient
implement strategies to address the issues
cannot always be assumed. rest periods.
arising from this recognition. The airline
Non-standardisation of bridge equipment, One would think that the plethora of new industry’s experience in this area can assist
symbology and bridge layout can also add technologies that find their way onto us enormously.
to confusion, especially as the operating ships’ bridges would go some way toward (See page 8, Reports and Studies - SPLASHER
Prevention through People: An Overview
Cdr Bryan R Emond Therefore, PTP promotes positive cultural makers make more informed management
Chief, Human Element and Ship Design Division changes within organizations. choices by providing methods to calculate
United States Coast Guard the possibility of unwanted outcomes.
An organization with a solid safety culture
PTP also made possible the development
can identify and manage current risks,
of the Crew Endurance Management
S ince 1994, the U.S. Coast Guard, in
cooperation with the maritime
industry, has been working to refocus
greatly reducing the risk of incidents that
may lead to severe losses, costly or
arduous reforms, or loss of public image.
(CEM) program. More than just fatigue
management, CEM provides a systematic
method for an organization to optimize
accident prevention efforts toward the Over the past decade, the PTP approach
crew productivity and take charge of its
human element. Prevention Through enabled the development of many non-
safety culture.
People (PTP) is the US Coast Guard’s regulatory programs, with the following
cornerstone strategy for guiding guiding principles: PTP is a systematic, people-focused
efforts in pursuit of safety, security, approach to reducing security threats,
and environmental protection. PTP • Honour the mariner
casualties, and pollution. Working
systematically addresses the root cause
of most accidents and incidents - the
• Take a Quality approach together, PTP is helping us make the seas
cleaner, safer, and more secure.
human element. PTP also recognizes that • Seek non-regulatory solutions
More information on PTP and
a major portion of mishaps comes from
organizational errors, and that a safe and
• Share commitment its programs can be found at:
profitable operation requires a balanced • Manage risks www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/ptp
interaction between management, the PTP has also enabled the development of www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/risk
work environment, the behaviour of our Risk-Based Decision-Making (RBDM)
people, and the technology available. resources. These resources help decision www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/cems/CrewEndurance.index.htm
Anthropometry - Designing to fit the user 7
Brian Sherwood Jones
(Process Contracting Limited)
Denise B McCafferty
(Safety Assessment & Human Factors Manager, American Bureau of Shipping)
nthropometrics is the branch of statistics. A percentile statistic defines the accommodated. In some cases, persons
A ergonomics which deals with body
measurements, particularly those of size,
anthropometric point at which a percent-
age of a population falls above or below
whose body size exceeds the designed
clearances are precluded from selection
strength and physical capacity. Good that value. For any body dimension, the for the system.
ergonomic design makes provision for the 5th percentile value indicates that 5% of
3. Design for the Average - applies to
range of variability to be expected in the the population will be equal to or smaller
workstations that are not adjustable (e.g.
user population. than that value, and 95% will be larger. On
fixed height tables, desks, or other work
the other hand, the 95th percentile value
Variation in user population can affect surfaces). In these situations, designing for
indicates that 95% of the population will
design for safety. For example, in the the average person better accommodates
be equal to or smaller than that value, and
Nautical Institute’s book Improving Ship the entire population.
5% will be larger.Therefore, use of a design
Operational Design (see page 3) the point is
made that Korean and Japanese ship range from the 5th to the 95th percentile 4. Design for the Range - applied to
designs assume that the height of (for either male or female populations, but determining the amount of adjustability
seafarers will be about 5’6” (1.68m) rather not both) values will theoretically provide that should be built into such things as
than 6’ (1.83m), and that extra length coverage for 90% of that (male or female) variable height work surfaces and
in bunks and settees may be required population using those limiting workstation seating (e.g. horizontal and
for European crews. Furthermore, the dimensions, and only those smaller than vertical adjustability). In general, the
International Life-Saving Appliance Code the 5%, and larger than the 95% will be dimension criteria used for designing
specifies a seat accommodation of 433 excluded by design. adjustability readily accommodates the
mm, but field anthropometric measure- middle 90% of the population.
However, the notion of the average person
ments of Gulf of Mexico offshore workers is misleading in that an individual will The Figure summarises some of the issues
have revealed an appropriately clothed vary among different anthropometric involved in headroom and related topics.
hip width of 533 mm - a potential dimensions. For example, individuals who
overestimate of maximum lifeboat The seafarer population is changing - not
are of average (50%) stature can be
occupancy for this population by about only in terms of nationality but also in that
comparatively smaller or larger on other
20%. A similar difference in average there are an increasing number of women
dimensions, such as arm length.
weight (75 kilos v 95 kilos) had the seafarers. This is a design issue as well
potential to affect buoyancy and stability. In general, there are four principles of as an employment one. Using limiting
applied anthropometrics in design: dimensions for males and females (5th
The application of anthropometry to
percentile female and 95th percentile
design establishes limits (or boundary 1. Design for the Smallest - applies
male) will accommodate approximately
conditions) for sizing equipment for primarily to application of physical force
94% of the entire design population (since
human use. In essence, it defines size limits and vertical and lateral reach distances,
over 99% of males are larger than the
in design based on the dimensions of the such as the forces required to pull, push, or
5th percentile female, and over 99% of
anticipated population of operating and turn a handle. Usually, the maximum force
females are smaller than the 95th percentile
maintenance personnel. By imposing size that can be readily applied by the 5th
male, so few small males, or large females,
limits in design (e.g., designing so the percentile person for that movement is
are excluded).
shortest expected operator or maintainer used as the criterion. Similarly, the reach of
can reach all controls), it follows that the 5th percentile person is often used as In summary, anthropometric data and
personnel who are less demanding in their the criterion. guidance exist to enable designers to
requirements will also be accommodated identify limiting dimensions to use, based
2. Design for the Largest - applies
(e.g., have greater reach than the limiting on an understanding of the context of use,
primarily to clearances, such as escape
personnel). i.e.the users, the tasks and the environment.
hatches, maintenance accesses, lifeboats,
Given the range of variability of human walkways, and overhead clearances. A free download of the ABS Guidance Notes for the
Application of Ergonomics to Marine Systems can be
bodily dimensions, anthropometric data Clearances generally are such that at obtained at:
are typically expressed as percentile least 95% of the expected population is http://www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/86-Ergo.pdf
2100mm - typical deckhead specification
This figure shows a typical headroom clearance and some related design factors. A1, A2, A3 are
H1
A1 A2 A3 H3 allowances that may need to be made. A1 - 25 mm for normal footwear; A2 - 50 mm for the dynamic
H2 characteristics of walking and starting; A3 - 75 mm for a hard hat. Adding a safety clearance factor is a
matter of assumption and judgment. H1, H2, H3 are the variations in height (stature) for three different
R2
populations (5th percentile to 95th percentile). H1 - N European males, compatible with the deck height
R1 (design for the maximum); H2 - male Philipinos; H3 represents a range from a small female to a large
male for a population up to 2015.
This is (just) compatible with the deck height but with no hard hat or safety factor allowances.
R1 (South Indian), R2 (UK) are 5th percentile vertical functional reach heights for the two different
populations.
For Europeans, controls over walkways are not quite possible, while for a wider population they are
definitely out of reach.
Deck
Accident
Investigation
8 Reports
Collision
between a Ro-Ro ferry and a moored vessel
This is a report of an incident, for which the allow one person to operate helm, engine helm orders given by the master and
immediate cause was human error but and thruster controls from a single repeated by the helmsman.
where there were a number of latent causes position, nor could he see the panoramic
The report concludes that the way that
associated with the environment, equipment Rudder Angle Indicator (RAI) without
failure, and system layout and bridge taking a step back. He was steering the the bridge team was deployed, and the
resource management. vessel with verbal helm orders which were ergonomics of the instrumentation on
repeated back to him by the helmsman. the ferry, meant that monitoring of the
s a high-sided RO-RO passenger ferry
A was in the final turn to starboard on
passage to her berth, in 35 to 40 knot
Control was therefore split (verbal and
direct) and the master became overloaded
master’s actions (by the chief officer and
the helmsman) and those of the
and gave an inappropriate verbal order. helmsman (by the chief officer and the
winds, and passing close to a moored master) was difficult and not effective,
He lost situational awareness, and was
vessel, an inappropriate helm order was because the master did not have easy
unaware of the rudder position in the
given by the master, which was not
time between giving the order and sight of an RAI from his conning position,
noticed by the other members of the
the collision. and the chief officer could neither hear
bridge team. Shortly before the collision
the orders easily nor easily see an RAI.
one of the two bow thrusters had tripped The chief officer was standing forward of
out and could not be brought back into the starboard bridge-wing manoeuvring The full report can be downloaded from
operation immediately, the lack of which console, from where he had a good view the UK MAIB website at:
reduced control authority. forward and aft down the vessel’s www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_maritimesa
fety/documents/page/dft_masafety_023365.pdf
At the time of the accident the master had starboard side, but where sight of the
the con and was stood at the central engine and thruster controls was
control console from where he had a good awkward, and sight of the RAI could only The lessons to be learned
view forward horizontally and down to the be achieved by changing position. He was from this accident should
bow, but did not have a clear view of the about 14 metres from the master, such be of interest to all
vessels moored to starboard. The engine that he was not in his direct line of sight. designers and operators
and thruster controls were within easy He could shout advice to the master and of large ferries
reach, but the layout of the console did not could, if he listened carefully, hear the
STARTING POINT TO LEARN ABOUT IMO GUIDELINES FOR ENGINE-ROOM
Reports
Studies & SAFETY AND HUMAN ERROR RISKS
The Joint Aviation Authorities Human
Factors Steering Group has produced a
very useful bulletin - SPLASHER - which
lists human element related reference
LAYOUT, DESIGN AND ARRANGEMENT
(MSC/Circ.834, January 1998)
The purpose of these guidelines is to
provide ship designers, ship owners,
ship operators, shipping companies,
shipmasters and engine-room staff with
material, some of which can be easily information to enhance engineroom
translated to the maritime environment. safety and efficiency through design,
An electronic version can be downloaded layout and arrangement. These guidelines
from: are intended to improve engine room
www.caa.co.uk/docs/109/hfstg_splasher.pdf. safety and efficiency and overall vessel
safety, through good decision-making
Other useful documents are:
with regard to engine room layout, design
Cockpit Resource Management and Line- and arrangement. They focus on the
Oriented Flight Training human-machine environment of the
(www.caa.co.uk/forums/forums_hfstg/default engine-room, with particular emphasis
.asp?page=1750) on familiarity, occupational health,
ergonomics, minimising risk through
Crew Resource Management Training
layout and design, and survivability.
(www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP737.pdf )
MSC/Circ.834 can be downloaded from:
Safety Health of Aviation Maintenance
Engineering Tool: User Guide www.imo.org/blastDataOnly.asp/dataid%3D
(www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAPAP2003_11.pdf) 8819/834.pdf