G.R. No.

207851 July 8, 2014

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

A politician thinks of the next election –

a statesman of the next generation.

- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author

The Case

A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive
terms. But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First.What
are the consequences to the provincial board member’s eligibility to run for the same elective
position if the legislative district, which brought him orher to office to serve the first two
consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies
are carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board member’s
election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation ofthe
renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariwith an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 1 filed under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court to assail the following resolutions of the public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC):

(a) Resolution2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5, 2013, in
SPA No. 13-166 (DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy3 (COC) as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Camarines
Sur (Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating the three-term limit
imposed upon elective local officials as provided for in Article X, Section 8 4 of the 1987
Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local Government Code (LGC); and

(b) En BancResolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, denying Naval’s
Motion for Reconsideration7 to the Resolution dated March 5, 2013.

Antecedents

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member
of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.

On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, 8 which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner:
[[reference -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/2078
51.pdf]]

District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716

1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,

Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao

Fernando, Del Gallego,

Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,

Cabusao

2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,

Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San

Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor

Calabanga,9 Gainza,

Milaor

3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,

Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman,

Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,

Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga

4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,

Presentacion, Sangay, San

Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,

Siruma

5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and
Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
District.

Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
and filed beforethe COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire
Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian,
irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application
is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with
an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for the
fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution
and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.12

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division

In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds stated below:

[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective posts
he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he
commits a false material misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of the [OEC].

xxxx

The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the important
components of[Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution]:

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.

Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has servedthree consecutive terms in an

elective local office[;] he must also have been electedto the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply. x x x

x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for public
office for three consecutive terms. The candidate must have been elected in the samelocal
government post. This connotes that the candidate must have been inthe same elective
position serving the same constituency who elected him to office for three consecutive
terms.

xxxx

The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to prevent the
monopoly of power centered only on a chosen few. The said disqualification was primarily
intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The framers
also considered the necessityof the enhancement of the freedom of choice of the electorate
by broadening the selection of would-be elective public officers. By rendering ineligible for
public office those who have been elected and served for three consecutive terms in the same
public elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse new blood in the political arena.

xxxx

x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed of the
same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns Gainza and
[Milaor]. The territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same
as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004,
2007 and 2010 isthe same electorate who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections.
They are the same group of voters who elected him into office for three consecutive terms.

The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA No. 10-
078)13 cannot be applied inthe case at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from Libmanan
belonged to the First District of Camarines Sur. With RepublicAct 9716, Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally belonging to the First District, were
merged with Gainza and Milaor to form the Second District. With the addition of the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it cannot be said that the previous First District became
the Second District only by name. The voters of Gainza and Milaoradded to the electorate of
the new Second District formed a different electorate, different from the one which voted for
Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections. In the case at bar, the municipalities
comprising the new Third District are the same municipalities that consisted of the previous
Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.

The Supreme Court, in Latasav. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the municipality into
a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different
from the office of the city mayor[.]

x x x x14 (Citations omitted)

The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en bancdenied Naval’s
Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed out thatabsent the
verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval’s
motion was instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, the COMELEC proceeded to discuss the
demerits of Naval’s motion, viz:

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case
as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same
government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss
the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of
whether or not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for three (3)
consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a
city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the
following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that
of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same
group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.

Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval] has filed
his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for which he had been
elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.

xxxx

x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the same:
First, the territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except for the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716; Second, the
inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is presently running as
member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected him for the past three (3)
consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd ] District are the same group of
voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the [Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District.

x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval’s] post [into one] different from
[w]hat he [previously had]. As correctly ruled by the Commission (Second Division), [Naval]
ha[d] already been elected and ha[d] already served inthe same government post for three
consecutive terms, x x x[.]

x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)

Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC
gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:

I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE
SAME GOVERNMENT POST;16

II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS;17 and

III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8, ARTICLE X OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC APPLIES TO NAVAL. 18

The Arguments of the Contending Parties

In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative
Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of
municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which
used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no
longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are
elected by districts. Thus, the right to choose representatives in the Sanggunianpertains to
each of the districts. Naval was elected as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by the
Second District. In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third District, which brought him to office.
Essentially then, Naval’s election in 2013 is merely his second term as Sanggunianmember
for the Third District.

Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification on the
ground of the three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, but it is also required that he or she had been
elected to the same position for the same number of times.21

Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC’s interpretations of the rulings in Latasa v.
COMELEC22 and Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court applied the three-term
prohibition only because notwithstanding the conversion of the Municipality of Digos into a
city, the mayor was to serve the same territorialjurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts
that the same does not hold true in his case. Naval further avers that in Bandillo, which finds
more application in the instant petition, the COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot
be invoked in a situation where the legislative districts have been altered. An extraction or
an addition both yields a change inthe composition of the voters.

Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his constituents,
whose will and mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julia’s counsel already withdrew his
appearance, indicating no less than his client’s lack of interest in still pursuing Naval’s ouster
from office.24

In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the instant
petition. The OSG contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local
elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violatedSection 78 of the OEC when he
filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility. Naval’s reliance on Bandillo is also
misplaced since in the said case, two towns were instead added to form a new district.
Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new set of voters. The OSG also alleges that Naval
is not entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by this Court. No clear and unmistakable
right pertains to Naval and it is his eligibility to be elected as Sanggunianmember for the
Third District which is the issue at hand.

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petition.

As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.

The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties cite Latasa,
Lonzanida v. COMELEC,26 Borja,Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,27 and Bandillo, which all involve the
application of the three-term limit rule, the factual and legal circumstances in those cases
are different and the doctrinal values therein do not directly address the issues now at hand.

In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then
municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule
by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he previously held.
The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there was no interruption of the
incumbent mayor’s continuity of service.

In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections.
While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the
expiration of the mayor’s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again for the same
post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his
eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court
ruled that the mayor could not beconsidered as having served a full third term. An
interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the
elected official’s continuity of service.

In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two
immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he
ran for the same position for the third time, his disqualification was sought for alleged
violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that whenhe assumed the position of
mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated as one full term. For the
disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served
the same post consecutively. In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an
elected municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the
elective official’s term. Although hewas barred from exercising the functions of the position
during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement tothe office remain
unaffected.

In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten
towns, which used to comprise Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second
District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule against the elected
Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively
created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.

In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term limit
rule upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the process
of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the nature of public office in
a democratic and republican state like ours.

The Role of Elections in our

Democratic and Republican State,

and the Restraints Imposed Upon

Those Who Hold Public Office

The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them.28

Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a
public office, viz: A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for
the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The
essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of
a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their
behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the
option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsiblegovernment
whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose
of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common
welfare according to the will of the people themselves.29 (Emphasis ours and italics in the
original)

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral
process in the following wise:

The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework
because it isthrough the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the
ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose
their leaders in accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that
the people should elect whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important
instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. It has
traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation. 31 (Citations omitted
and italics ours)

The importance of elections cannottherefore be over emphasized. Thus,

True, election is the expression ofthe sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation
of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. x x x.32 (Italics ours)

Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity
is to give effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations tobeing elected to
a public office.33 Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits,
the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal
access to public service.34 Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is
significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again
declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right.35

The Deliberations of the Members

of the Constitutional Commission

on the Three-Term Limit’s

Application to Local Elective

Officials

Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
exchanges of the members on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposed on local
elective officials: VOTING ON THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local
Governments had not decided on the term of office for local officials and suggested that the
Body decide on the matter.

xxxx

On Mr. Bacani’s inquiry regarding localofficials, Mr. Davide explained that local officials
would includethe governor, vice-governor and the members of the provincial board; the city
mayor, city vice-mayor and members of the city board; and the municipal mayor, municipal
vice mayor and members of the municipal council. He stated that barangay officials would
be governed by speciallaw, to which Mr. Nolledo agreed.

xxxx

MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3

In reply to Mr. Guingona’s query onwhether the Committee had decided on the interpretation
of "two reelections", Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be submitted to a vote.

Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as proposed by Mr.
Garcia, would allow a local official three terms, after which he would not be allowed to seek
any reelection; or whether, as interpreted by Mr. Davide, it would mean that after two
successive reelections or a consecutive periodof nine years, he could run for reelection after
the lapse of three years.

xxxx

RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS

Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which, they would
be barred from ever runningfor reelection.

On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf ofthe Committee, stated that local officials after
two reelections would be allowed to run for reelection after the lapse of three years.

xxxx

MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulomanifested that the Body would proceed to the
consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1)
Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2
(no immediate reelection after three successive terms).

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1

Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to prevent
monopoly of political power because the country’s history showed that prolonged stay in
public office could lead to the creation of entrenched preservesof political dynasties; 2) to
broaden the choiceso that more people could be enlisted to the cause of public service; 3) no
one is indispensable in running the affairs of the countryand that reliance on personalities
would be avoided; and 4) the disqualification from running for reelection after three terms
would create a reserve of statesmen both in the local and national levels.

He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the introduction of
new ideas and approaches. He stressed that public office would no longer be a preserve of
conservatism and tradition, and that public service would no longer be limited to those
directly holding public office, but would also include consultative bodiesorganized by the
people. INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO

In reply to Mr. Regalado’s query whether the three terms need not be served consecutively,
Mr. Garcia answered in the affirmative.

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2

Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power because
of a new awareness, a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the same time, it pre-
screens the candidates among whom the people would choose by barring those who would
have served for nine years from being reelected. He opined that this would actually require
an additional qualification for office to a certain number of people.

He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of statesmen, their
future participation is actually limited to some areas and only for a certain periodof time. He
added thatit is not for the Commission to decide on the future of our countrymen who may
have more years ahead of them to serve the country.

xxxx

INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE

xxxx

Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod’s manifestation, Mr. Ople expressed

apprehension over the Body’s exercise of some sort of omnipotent power in disqualifying
those who will have served their tasks. He opined that the Commission had already taken
steps to prevent the accumulation of powers and prequisites that would permit officials to
stay on indefinitely and to transfer them to members of their families. He opined, however,
that perpetual disqualification would deprive the people of their freedom of choice.He stated
that the Body had already succeeded in striking a balance onpolicies which could ensure a
redistribution of opportunities to the people both in terms of political and economic power.
He stated that Philippine politics had been unshackled from the two-party system, which he
said was the most critical support for the perpetuation of political dynasties. Considering
that such achievement is already a victory, Mr. Ople stated that the role of political parties
should not be despised because the strength of democracy depends on how strong political
parties are, that a splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of
democracy.

Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.

x x x x.

MR. GARCIA’S RESPONSE TOMR. OPLE’S STATEMENTS

Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1) the recognition
of the ambivalent nature of political power, and 2) the recognition of alternative forms of
public service. He stated that it is important to remember the lessons learned from the recent
past; that public service is service to the people and not an opportunity to accumulate
political power, and that a prolonged stay in public office brings about political dynasties or
vested interests. Regarding political parties, he stated that it will encourage the constant
renewal of blood in party leadership, approach, style and ideas. He opined that this is very
healthy for a pluralist and multi-party democracy.

On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that public
service could be limited to public office since many good leaders who were in the streets and
in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public service would also mean
belonging to consultative bodies or people’s councils which brought about new forms of
service and leadership.

REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR

Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of God.He
stated that if the people want to elect a representative to serve them continuously, the
Commission should not arrogate unto itself the right to decide what the people want. He
stated that in the United States, a Senator had served for 30 years.

xxxx

REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO

Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Tan,
although she stated that they spoke of the same premises. She stated that she agrees with
them that leaders need not be projected and developed publicly in an election as leaders are
better tempered and tested in the various forms of mass struggles and organized work. She
stated that if the people are to be encouraged to have their own sense of responsibility in
national leadership, what ultimately matters is the political determination of the citizenry to
chart their own national destiny. She opined that the Body should allow the people to exercise
their own sense of proportion and imbibe the salutary effects of their own strength to curtail
power when it overreaches itself. She stressed that in the final analysis,the Commission
cannot legislate into the Constitution the essence of new politics as it is a chastening
experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcia’s statement that politics is an
imperfect art, she stated that the Commission could correct politics with all its imperfections
and flaws by a constitutional provision. She opined that perpetual disqualification cannot
provide the cure. She maintained that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which
could also be counter-productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities
of realpublic service.

REMARKS OF MR. BACANI

Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and that
proposals were made to empower the people to engage in the legislative process,the Body
presupposed the political maturity of the people. He observed that in this instance, political
maturity is denied with the constitutional bar for reelection.He opined that the Body should
stick to the premise that the people are politically mature.

REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA

By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani’s statements,Mr. Garcia stated that the proposal was
basically premisedon the undue advantage of the incumbent in accumulating power, money,
party machine and patronage and not on lack of trust in the people.

Mr. Garcia stated that politics isnot won by ideals alone but by solid organized work by
organizations. He stated that with three terms, an official would have served the people long
enough.

xxxx

VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES

Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.

xxxx

RESULT OF THE VOTING

The result of the voting was as follows:

Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes

Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26 votes

With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the Chair
declared Alternative No. 2 approved by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)

The Constitution mandates the

strict implementation of the

three-term limit rule.

The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had not
discussed with specifity the subject of the three-term limit rule’s application on
reapportioned districts.

From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the general application of the three-term limit rule show. On
one side were those who espoused the stern view that perpetual disqualification to hold
public office after three consecutive terms would ensure that new blood would be infused
into our political system. More choices for the voters would give fuller meaning to our
democratic institutions. On the other side of the fence were those who believed that the
imposition of termlimits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned
public servants and a curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to
remain in office.

In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that no
immediate re-election after three successive terms shall be allowed. On the other hand, 17
members stood pat on their view that there should be no further reelection after three
successive terms.

Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils
if there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on
whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they
decided that only three consecutive elections tothe same position would be allowed.
Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap
of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the
consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the
people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called
statesmen.

The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive
deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the
rulecannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.

Ratio legis est anima.37

"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined
in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose."38 In Aldovino, the Court describes the three-term limit rule
as inflexible.

In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-
term limit on the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of
suspension was imposed upon him. Although not in all four withNaval’s case, there are
principles enunciated therein which undeniably hold true, viz:

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first
branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years– during which
an official has title to office and can serve. x x x[.]

xxxx

The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—"no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation—no more
than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule. x x x.

xxxx
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. x x
x.

xxxx

x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these
cases teach usto strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than
its exception.

xxxx

[In] Latasa v. Commission on Electionsx x x[,] [t]he Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception
to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. x x x.

xxxx

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by structure
and substance—fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary
renunciation as an example of a circumvention. x x x. 39 (Citations omitted, italics and
emphasis in the original and underscoring ours)

Reapportionment and its Basis

Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation."40 The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting
power among districts.41 The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a
city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.42

R.A. No. 9716 and the Reappor-

tioned Districts of Camarines Sur

Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:

Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in order to create an additional
legislative districtto commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.

Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the municipalities of

Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando of the current First (1st)
Legislative District are hereby consolidated with the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor of
the current Second (2nd) Legislative District, to comprise the new legislative district
authorized under this Act.

Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized as follows:

a) First District – The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st) Legislative District
shall continue to be designated as the First (1st) Legislative District, composed of the
following municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;

b) Second District – This new legislative districtshall be composed of the municipalities

enumerated in Section 2 hereof;

c) Third District – The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamedas the Third
(3rd) Legislative District, composed of the following: Naga City and the municipalities of Pili,
Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman, Magarao, Bombon and Calabanga;

d) Fourth District – The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any change in its
composition, shall be renamedas the Fourth (4th) Legislative District, composed of the
following municipalities: Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, San
Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and Siruma; and

e) Fifth District – The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any change inits
composition, shall be renamedas the Fifth (5th) Legislative District, composed of the
following: Iriga City and the municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and Nabua.
(Italics and emphasis ours)

As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of
Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third
District and now configured as follows:43

[[reference -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/2078
51.pdf]]

Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

RA 9716 RA 9716

2 3rd District

nd Population: 439,043

District Naga

Population: 474,899 Pili

Gainza Ocampo

Milaor Canaman
 Naga Camaligan

Pili Magarao

Ocampo Bombon

Canaman Calabanga

Camaligan

Magarao

Bombon

Calabanga

R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second

District, but it merely renamed the

other four.

The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current
Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856
less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the
wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second
District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As
to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word "rename." Although
the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in
Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive isthe clear intent to create a sole new district in
that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.

The following statutory construction rules surface:

First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common
usage meaning; the words should be read and considered intheir natural, ordinary,
commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are
presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and
acceptation. Second, a word of general significance ina statute is to be taken in its ordinary
and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different
or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general
words shall be understood in a general sense.44 (Citations omitted)

The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. 45

In Naval’s case, the words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be
created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms
used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptanceand negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say.46

The verb createmeans to "make or produce something new." 47 On the other hand, the verb
renamemeans to "give a new name to someone or something." 48 A complete reading of R.A.
No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second
District to be merely renamed as the current Third District.

It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District
from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the
latter. This numericalfact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally,
the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that
Sanggunianmembers are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which
elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004
and 2007.

The application upon Naval of the

three-term limit rule does not

undermine the constitutional

requirement to achieve equality of

representation among districts.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality

ofrepresentation among the districts.49 It is with this mindset that the Court should consider
Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and
2013.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not
undermine the right toequal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or
without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would
still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

The presumed competence of the

COMELEC to resolve matters

falling within its jurisdiction is

upheld.

"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent
in matters falling within its domain."50

"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not
merelyreversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or
resolution."51 "Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."52

In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s disquisitions to be amply supported by the
Constitution,law and jurisprudence.

Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the
Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the
drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest
after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the
Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be
allowed. Aldovinoaffirms this interpretation. Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would
practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the
Constitution explicitly intends to avert.

Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, soto speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as
citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our
privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled "What
Term Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot."53 In the article, Greek mythology was tapped
to make a tempting analogy. The gist of the story follows.

In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all men
approaching them with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens’ trap never returnedhome
to their wives and children. A clever strategy was thus hatched to secure safe passage for
Odysseus and his men. The men were to plug their ears with wax to muffle the songs of the
Sirens. Odysseus, on the other hand, was to be tied to the mast of the ship so he could still
listen to the songs, which may contain clues on how they can get home. When the wind died
down,Odysseus heard beautiful voices calling out to them. The voices were incomparable to
anything he had ever heard before. Even whenOdysseus knew that the irresistible voices were
coming from the Sirens, he struggled with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but
was unable to do so. The voices became fainter as the men continued to row. When the voices
can no longer be heard, Odysseus realized how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made
it through safely and Odysseus was untied. It was their clever plan which kept them all alive. 54

The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the Constitution
recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the
adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen's equal access to public service.
These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the
continued vitality of our republican institutions.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated
March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.