Case no.

41

COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners,

Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.

Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.

G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975

FACTS:

The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain
from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the
judgment in its favor. Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve
the writ, did so on January 17 and 18, 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or
the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. It was then that respondent
Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated February 2, 1973, on the further ground that petitioner
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. The Court of Industrial Relations in its
order dated February 23, 1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration, as shown in
its order dated March 23, 1973. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. It was
docketed as G.R. No. L-36636. 3 This Court, in its resolution dated July 17, 1973, denied the petition for certiorari
of private respondent. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First
Instance of Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari,
petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It was therein alleged that private
respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17,
1973. The lower court dismissed the complaint. That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals, and it is
precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of certiorari is granted.

HELD:

Yes. The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals
reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of
Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of dismissing it.

CASE NO. 42

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

FACTS:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3,
1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists
for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence
the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking
of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on
June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took
it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the candidates.

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the
Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang
up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar violated Section 14 of
the IBP By-Laws.

HELD:

Yes. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar
enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain
from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.

Case no. 43

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.

A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940

FACTS:

This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque
Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some
nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the
respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The
respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from
his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This
was done and the respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated,
among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry
again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so
marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses
to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent
marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and,
pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage
with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum
of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present
case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion
thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.

The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven
years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for that
reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made
a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his
office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice?

HELD:

Yes. The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by
him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of
a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege
conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by
recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared
terminated. Moreover, according to some members of the court, drastic action should lead to his disbarment.
However, the majority, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero
Rodas, stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes,
respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.

Case no. 45

G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970

VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO, plaintiffs-appellees,

FACTS:

On January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution
reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, now appellees, requiring
one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconvey one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso of the property in
litigation to appellees, and to pay the latter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There
was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was further set forth
therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February
13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ
of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during
the pendency of such appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention
to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case,
it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian, or their
legal representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above
provision. The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel
for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or the legal
representatives of the deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory
a decision, final and executory in character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo
C. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name and residence of the
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The aforesaid
counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956, and
that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid order. Considering the turn of events,
plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the above technicality, had no
choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo,
defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate
children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the
lower court, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and substituted
defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not delay in the litigant affects the enforcement of a final judgment.

HELD:

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes 7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and
executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."

Moreover, procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore,
any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. Thus: "Whenever a party
to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative." Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a
new counsel was appointed, then upon his death there could be compliance with the above provision. To cause
plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital to
remember that the judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be heard
to allege that it is much too late now to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the principle
consistently adhered to by this Court.

Case no. 47

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

FACTS:

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he
was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations
manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work
daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982.
In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983,
he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January,
1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent
ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well
as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against
private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment
of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and
consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. On
appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.

ISSUES:

(A.) Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed;

HELD:

A.)YES. After a careful review of the records of this case, it was found that the petitioner dismissal was carried
out without due process and without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a
justifiable excuse.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:

(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code,
by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by
law. Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by
law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided
he receives the prescribed separation pay. On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee
of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.

B.)Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years,
without qualification or deduction.

C.) Private respondent is also ORDERED to give separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

CASE NO. 48

G.R. No. 76549 December 10, 1987

CATALINA, ENRIQUE, ROSARIO, FLORDELIZA, RIZALAIDA AND SOCORRO, all surnamed ROXAS as heirs of the
late SEGUNDO ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES ROXAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners seek the review of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 2, 1986 and November 5,
1986 in CA-G.R. CV No. 08119 declaring appellants' Brief filed by herein petitioners to have been filed out of
time and denying their motion for reconsideration.

It appears that in Civil Case No. 3837-M, Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment
dismissing plaintiff Segundo Roxas' complaint for reconveyance of title against Andres Roxas and others.

On October 21, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. In the Resolution of October 25, 1985, the court a quo
directed the ventilation of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals as the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period. On January 29, 1986, petitioners were notified by the respondent Court of Appeals to pay
the docket fee and on March 7, 1986, petitioners were required to file appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof, copy of which was received by petitioners on March 18, 1986.

On April 28, 1986, petitioners filed their first motion for extension of time for thirty (30) days counted from May
2, 1986 within which to file their brief. Said motion was granted per Resolution of May 7, 1986, counted from
notice thereof copy of which was received by petitioners counsel on May 14, 1986. On May 29, 1987, petitioners
filed a second motion for extension of time for another period of thirty (30) days on the ground that petitioners'
counsel is suffering from asthma and hypertension and that their brief has not yet been completely finished in
draft form. Per Resolution of June 6, 1986, respondent court granted the motion counted from notice thereof
copy of which was received by petitioners, counsel on June 23, 1986. Then, on July 21, 1986, two (2) days
before the expiration of the 30-day period granted, petitioners filed their last motion for extension of time praying
for fifteen (15) days counted from notice.

On August 25, 1986, before said motion was resolved, petitioners filed their brief. On October 2, 1986,
respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for last extension in the resolution which reads as follows:

Before Us for resolution is a "Motion For Last Extension" to file Appellant's Brief, filed on July 21, 1986 praying
for a 15-day extension from July 23, 1986 within which to file appellant's brief.

It appears, however, that while the same remained unresolved, appellant filed his brief only on August 25, 1986,
or 18 days beyond the period of extension prayed for by appellant. No other motion for extension was filed
thereafter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's brief is hereby considered filed out of time.

HELD:

The appellant's brief is hereby considered filed out of time and is ordered expunged from the record. Pursuant
to Section 15, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, an "extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be
allowed except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration
of the time sought to be extended." Allowance or denial of motions for extension of time to file briefs is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. There is no question that the discretion vested in the courts whether to
grant or not motions for extensions must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view of
substantial justice.