Environmental Management (2016) 57:1009–1023

DOI 10.1007/s00267-016-0660-z

The Fortune of the Commons: Participatory Evaluation

of Small-Scale Fisheries in the Brazilian Amazon
Antonio F. P. Oviedo1 • Marcel Bursztyn1

Received: 19 January 2015 / Accepted: 8 January 2016 / Published online: 22 January 2016
Ó Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract This paper applies a participatory approach in Introduction

evaluating small-scale fisheries, focusing on the Arapaima
gigas fishery in the Brazilian Amazon. The evaluation uses In recent decades, one of the main scientific challenges in
the social-ecological system (SES) framework, adopted to addressing threats to sustainability has been the suit-
explain the conditions needed for sustainability and user able integration of disciplines that deal with biophysical
cooperation in natural resources management, as a more and human dimensions (Basset 2007; Moran 2010; Stern-
suitable alternative to the ‘blueprint’ or ‘panaceas’ lieb et al. 2013). Meanwhile, the traditional economic
approaches, based only on property rights or governmental approach to the study of the management of shared
intervention. However, managers and users often do not resources has predicted that all actors behaving in their
have the necessary information compiled and available for self-interest lead to the overuse or overharvesting of shared
a specific SES while some actions need to be taken resource (Hardin 1968). Even worse, there has been a
immediately. Thus, consensus and negotiation among tendency to oversimplify the complexity of human-envi-
stakeholders about SES variables may be useful to evaluate ronment interactions by suggesting ‘universal solutions’ for
system performance and indicate actions to promote sus- the management of natural resources that have very distinct
tainability. In the case study, using a consensus-building ecological traits and social contexts (Pritchett and Wool-
model, we found that arapaima SES leads to sustainability cock 2004; Wilson et al. 2013). However, Ostrom (1990)
and is far from being a case of ‘tragedy of the commons.’ showed that people are, in fact, capable of self-organizing
More investments in suitable monitoring and enforcement and successfully governing their shared resources. Those
for adaptive management are recommended. Adopting an findings fostered further conceptual development that led
SES framework based on stakeholders’ prospects may be to the social-ecological system (SES) approach (Ostrom
useful until complete interdisciplinary studies become 2009) with major implications for policy, helping to
available so as to seek of sustainability in the long term. explain the ineffectiveness of many governance regimes
(Anderies and Janssen 2013).
Keywords Participatory evaluation  Social-ecological SES research project and fieldwork has indicated that
system  Sustainability assessment  Arapaima gigas  there are multiple factors that account for success in
Amazon managing common-pool resources (Frey and Rusch 2013).
Institutional settings are very heterogeneous. The effec-
tiveness in applying models has shown limitations and
failures (Ostrom et al. 2007; Meinzen-Dick 2007); good
solutions are good because they have been tailor-made for
specific realities. Ostrom (1999) defined a set of success
& Antonio F. P. Oviedo factors that she called design principles: ‘‘an essential
antoniopoviedo@gmail.com
element or condition that helps to account for the success
1
Center for Sustainable Development, University of Brası́lia, of these institutions in sustaining common pool resources
Campus Darcy Ribeiro, Brası́lia, DF 70910-900, Brazil and gaining the compliance of generation after generation

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of appropriators to the rules in use.’’ Subsequently, that The SES approach to fishery management presents a
work has been further developed in the SES framework huge perspective towards achieving sustainability (Kit-
(Ostrom 2009). tinger et al. 2013; Gutiérrez et al. 2011). However, the
Since 1990, several studies have used or discussed these complex and place-specific nature of SES interactions
design principles and their contributions to the success of constrain the identification of the state and trends in SES
cooperation among common resource users (Cox et al. variables of interest to managers and policy-makers (Ols-
2010; Agrawal 2001). A study using 25 field projects on son et al. 2004; Asah 2008). Due to the perspective pre-
Asian fisheries evaluated Ostrom’s design principles, and sented by the SES approach, there is a demand for
proposed clear boundaries of resources and defined number simplified and easily interpretable indicators of the state
of users as a highly important principles (Pomeroy et al. and trends of relevant SES variables (Carpenter et al.
1998). Adding the policy dimension, Garretta et al. (2012) 2001). SES knowledge generation integrated with man-
examined the role of stakeholders’ fora in encouraging agement practices is increasingly proposed, evolving with
shared understanding among stakeholders. The perception the institutional framework and the learning-by-doing
of local users on natural resource use policies offers process (Walker et al. 2002; Olsson et al. 2004), as a mode
managers clues for policy design and improved system of reflexive governance (Beck 2006).
efficiency. For better policy performance, users and man- Sustainability assessment using indicators and SES
agers need to be involved in the decision-making process variables are being developed as a tool for policy design
(Nunan et al. 2012; Marshall 2007). and performance in fields such as environment, economic,
A step toward modeling SES is taken by arranging social, or technological improvement (Ostrom 2007; Bau-
variables into a multilevel framework. Using this frame- ler 2012; Singh et al. 2012). According to Ness et al.
work allows researchers to set up analysis of how attributes (2007), sustainability assessment gives managers an indi-
of the resource system, resource unit, users, and gover- cator of the nature-society system over time, in order to
nance system interact with one another, and the outcomes guide actions to ensure sustainability. Monitoring process
from this interaction (Ostrom 2007). Also, researchers can and reporting on environmental and social conditions
use this framework to evaluate the effect and interaction of should be integrated or extended to provide useful infor-
these attributes on the economic, political, and ecological mation to navigate a transition towards sustainability
settings (Ostrom et al. 2007). The framework is intended to (Bebbington et al. 2007). To move beyond panaceas and
allow for a high interaction between local and traditional build diagnostic methods, we need to identify combinations
knowledge and science. This interaction will enable diag- of variables that affect site-specific SES. Also, we should
nostics to match governance arrangements to specific examine variables of a resource system and the resource
problems in a social-ecological context (Ostrom 2007). unit which affect the performance of users and the gover-
SES needs quantitative and qualitative data. Multidis- nance system (Ostrom 2007). Growing knowledge about
ciplinary studies must be conducted in order to improve the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystems may
data sets and better evaluate the interaction between gov- help here (Pimm 1984; Schwartz et al. 2000; Loreau et al.
ernment and local users, and to improve policies (Ostrom 2001; Balvanera et al. 2006).
et al. 2007). SES can be used to evaluate the influence of SES variables as indicators of system performance can
social factors on land management and policy design. help build consensus among managers by easing knowl-
Qualitative data show that stakeholders’ attitudes and edge sharing (Bauler 2012). The process of knowledge
behavior are potential indicators to assess policy perfor- generation and specific SES variables might thus gain in
mance for land restoration (Petursdottir et al. 2013; Asah importance as governance tools when acknowledging their
2008). The study of Petursdottir et al. (2013) also suggests institutional embeddedness. This approach could continu-
that limitations on governance can impact the outcomes of ously adapt the institutional process of sustainability
policies related to resource management. Gutiérrez et al. assessment (Connor and Dovers 2004; Ostrom 2007), once
(2011) examined 130 co-managed fisheries in a wide range it keeps variables embedded within decision-making are-
of countries with different social, economic, and ecological nas. Participatory approaches have been used as effective
conditions. Their evaluation considered variables relating decision-making processes to address sustainable devel-
co-management attributes under categories suggested by opment issues (van den Hove 2000). However, considering
Ostrom (2009). Strong leadership was identified as a key the plurality of representation of a given system and pre-
variable contributing to co-management, as well as fishing dictive uncertainty (Prigogine 1997), the participatory
quotas, social cohesion, and protected areas. The authors approach should combine the consensus-oriented cooper-
concluded that enforcement mechanisms, long-term man- ation with the compromise-oriented negotiation process
agement policies, and resource information were less aiming at the collective agreement of a particular outcome
important variables. (van den Hove 2006).

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There is widespread recognition of the valuable role that dry season, part of the main river’s water is naturally
local and traditional ecological knowledge can play in the dammed in lakes. The area is inhabited by traditional
contemporary management of natural resources (Butler riverine communities (Moran 1984).
et al. 2012). This knowledge consists of the practical skills The Acre study case began in 2004, involving twelve
and wisdom acquired through livelihood activities and the communities controlling approximately 30 km2 of flood-
collective knowledge acquired by the community over plains, distributed in 14 lakes. Fishers from Purus and
generations (Berkes et al. 2000; Brook and McLachlan Envira rivers had demonstrated an interest in managing fish
2008). Local knowledge of species, their life histories, resources. Research work started with the mapping of the
distributions, climate, and environmental characteristics floodplain lakes resource system and community manage-
are nested within resource management systems, tools, and ment practices to learn how resource units were used and to
measures. In turn, these are embedded within the grassroots evaluate to what extent the management regime had an
institutions, codes, norms, rules, and decision-making impact on fisheries productivity (Oviedo 2006). That work
procedures required to implement management systems concluded that community management had a significant
(Weber 2003; Oteros-Rozas et al. 2013). In many cases, the effect on the productivity of lake fisheries (Martins 2010)
combination of traditional ecological knowledge and sci- but also that in order to do so, it would require a broad-
entific knowledge led to the creation of efficient manage- based approach. Fishery policy needed to be modified to
ment systems (Folke 2004; Drew 2005; Folke et al. 2005; provide an adequate legal basis for ecosystem and com-
Berkes 2009; Brondizio et al. 2009; De Freitas and munity management. Local institutions had to be created in
Tagliani 2009; Raymond et al. 2010; Vierros et al. 2010; order to implement these policies, while central govern-
Terer et al. 2012). Johannes (1998, 2002) and Johannes ment agencies had to adapt themselves to be able to work
et al. (2000) suggest that depletion of fishery stocks, lim- within a participatory management model. Finally, com-
ited scientific data, and limited governance capacity are munity members and government agents needed to learn
factors that leverage knowledge integration. According to their new roles within the evolving management system.
Garibaldi and Turner (2004) and Castello (2004), dealing Community groups have been working to develop
with ‘‘cultural keystone species’’ such as the arapaima may management systems for the Arapaima gigas, one of the
facilitate this kind of integration. largest freshwater fish species in the world. Arapaima is an
However, while the SES framework approach can important fishery in the Amazon basin and plays key
embrace multidimensional and interdisciplinary aspects ecosystem roles (Queiroz 2000). Public policies of harvest
related to sustainability from a conceptual point of view, an season and minimum size, and total moratoria have been
additional synthetic methodological step is needed so as to established in Acre state. However, monitoring and law
promote its application in most practical situations. This enforcement are limited. Castello et al. (2014) highlight
article aims at proposing a participatory approach to assign that with most of the catch being in violation of manage-
values for SES variables having in mind the empirical ment policies in the Amazon basin, fishing of arapaima is
analysis of the evolution of arapaima management system. now overexploited and declining. Arapaima is listed as
endangered species in the Convention on International
Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Case Study: Arapaima Fisheries in Acre State (CITES).
The arapaima has characteristics that make it a
As in many other regions in the world, fisheries managers promising species for community management: it surfaces
in the Brazilian Amazon have been experimenting since the regularly to gulp air, is primarily sedentary, spawns in
early 1990s with participatory management systems (Cas- floodplain lakes, and forms couples to care for offspring
tro and McGrath 2003). This shift is a response from (Castello 2004). A method for estimating arapaima popu-
grassroots in favor of local management schemes, as well lations based on wildlife census techniques (visual count-
as changes in national policies. Fishing agreements ing) was developed at the Mamirauá Sustainable
(IBAMA 2003) have been a form of the governance system Development Reserve, state of Amazonas (Castello 2004).
whereby resource users and local institutions work together This method takes advantage of biological characteristics
with government agencies to deal with some aspect of of arapaima and the fishers’s skill in distinguishing adults
resource management (Castello et al. 2011). from juveniles when they rise to the surface. A group of
The research took place in the Purus and Envira rivers in arapaima fishers from Acre traveled to the Varzea Project
the municipalities of Manoel Urbano and Feijó (Fig. 1), (a pilot initiative on arapaima management) in Santarem,
state of Acre, Brazil. The study area consists entirely of state of Para, to learn this technique. On returning, they
floodplains (Junk 1997). This type of ecosystem is char- formed a management team and improved arapaima man-
acterized by floods during part of the year, and during the agement schemes.

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Fig. 1 Case study at the Purus and Envira rivers

Whereas before fishers could only say whether a given work together. Successive annual estimates of arapaima
lake had more or less arapaima than another, now the populations enable the group to measure progress in
management team can make a reliable estimate of the achieving management objectives. The collective harvest-
number of adult and juvenile arapaima, the size of the ing system reinforces the fact that arapaima is a community
breeding population, and the size distribution of the ara- resource, and the size of total catch provides concrete
paima catch. Teams can now predict how many arapaima evidence of the value of the fishery to the community. The
can be caught each year without threatening system sus- contribution to the Fishers’s Union and communities
tainability, monitor progress in rebuilding arapaima popu- underscores the collective benefit provided by the fishery
lations and periodically revise management rules (Oviedo while dividing income among participants ensures that
and Crossa 2011). rewards are in proportion to each fisherman’s contribution
The most effective method, in terms of harvesting and to the management system.
benefit-sharing is a collective harvest using large nets and The practice of collective action has brought significant
harpoons. The management team organizes one or more changes at community and government levels. First the
collective harvests to catch the entire annual quota. Income users with some level of conflict were mobilized to take
from the sale of fish is divided among participants management actions together. After a while, fishers
according to how much they contributed to collective understood they had more capacity and power as a group
actions, with a proportion of the total amount going to the than as individuals. The management team can monitor the
municipal Fishers’s Union and to community members management rules and behavioral norms at community
who patrol the lakes. level rather than seeking outside assessment. The arapaima
This system also reinforces community organizational harvesting and marketing are supported by government
capacity. It is based on a participatory methodology in agencies, as well as the civil society organizations (Fisherśs
which results depend on the ability of group members to Union and NGOs). The creation of this multi-institutional

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arrangement strengthened the decision-making arena and resources sustainably (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 1990). These
fostered the prospect for a more formalized co-manage- are as follows: Principle 1 assumes the existence of clearly
ment system. established resource boundaries and of its users. Principle 2
At the same time, arapaima research efforts and tech- assumes that the resources are exploited sustainably.
nical assistance helped to improve community organization Principle 3 assumes functional collective action. Principle
and eliminate illegal practices. The planned arapaima sale 4 assumes that the resource and its users are monitored.
directly to buyers would increase fishing’ profits, thus Principle 5 assumes that rule offenders are sanctioned.
lowering illegal practices. Fishermen created local markets, Principle 6 assumes the existence of a conflict resolution
and the management team was formalized into the mechanism. Principle 7 assumes formal central govern-
municipal Fishers’s Union. These formal groups required ment regulation. And, principle 8 assumes there is insti-
that users commit formally to obeying fishing regulations. tutionally organized multi-level management scheme. Our
With the prospect that users could control the arapaima evaluation of the case study determined the presence or
stocks, the management team negotiated with the national absence of each of Ostrom’s (1990) eight principles for the
environmental authority (IBAMA) the possibility of legal periods before and after the management system was
harvesting. IBAMA had banned arapaima fishing in the implemented (Table 1).
state but had made an exception in management plan cases. An SES framework (Ostrom 2009) was used to assemble
The management team carried out annual arapaima multidisciplinary knowledge in order to facilitate evalua-
assessments. The harvest quota is about 30 % of the esti- tion and identify combinations of variables that affect
mated number of adult arapaima and is determined through interactions and outcomes of this specific management
negotiations between fishers and IBAMA. system. The aspects of decomposing complex systems are
The vigilance program was considered partly effective. essential for achieving a better understanding of complex
To some, the program was short of volunteers because of the SESs (Ostrom 2007) and crafting ways to improve their
risk involved in overseeing outside fishers. To others, the performance. The first aspect is the conceptual partition of
vigilance program was largely ineffective with respect to variables into classes and subclasses. The second aspect is
locals because local communities have high kinship network the existence of relatively separable subsystems that are
densities among families and family members. Vigilant independent of each other in the accomplishment of their
volunteers often faced the problem of having to sanction many functions and their development but eventually affect
relatives or close friends. Fishing agreements depend on the each other’s performance. This framework (Fig. 2) is based
irregular patrol of lakes, typically conducted by few volun- on the relationship among four SES subsystems:
teers, while the great majority evades this task. While this
i. Resource Systems (RS): a certain territory contain-
may work for dealing with the occasional incursions of
ing the natural resource;
outsiders, it is insufficient for dealing with ‘‘inside’’ viola-
ii. Resource Units (RU): the primary resource unit most
tors, members of the community itself. In this case, infor-
used for harvest;
mality and the lack of representative patrols and leadership
iii. Users (U): the sets of individuals who use the
leave those who identify violators vulnerable to charges of
territory (resource system) for different purposes;
partiality. Also, logistical and financial difficulties are
and
exacerbated by problems involving vigilance. Efficient
iv. Governance System (GS): government and other
mechanisms for punishing violators and solving conflicts are
organizations involved with resource system man-
thus another challenge for such a management scheme.
agement, its specifics norms and rules and how they
Community volunteers and IBAMA agents have not tackled
are made.
this challenge. This can partly be attributed to the lack of
resources to undertake patrols, but, more importantly, it Each of the subsystems mentioned above is made up of
reflects the fact that IBAMA agents do not easily accept second-tier variables as described by Ostrom et al. (2007)
sharing authority with community members. and Ostrom (2009). Some variables have been considered
by these authors as key-variables related to creating con-
ditions for cooperation among users (Table 2). Those
Methods subsystems are connected by a set of interactions (I) pro-
ducing a set of outcomes (O) that in turn provide feedback
We evaluated the extent to which fisherman participation to the subsystems, associated ecosystems (ECO) and social,
improved the management system by using the design economic, and political settings (S), as shown in Fig. 2.
principles proposed by Ostrom (1990). Previous works Obtaining measurements for SES variables is the first
have demonstrated that they are reliable indicators of the step in analyzing whether the users of the arapaima man-
conditions under which user groups can manage natural agement system would self-organize. The analysis must

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Table 1 Assessment of the arapaima management system compliance with Ostrom’s (1990) sustainable governance design principles
Ostrom’s design principle Arapaima SES before Arapaima SES after management system (2012)
management system (2004)

P1—Defined boundaries Present: zoning system Present: zoning system improved by collective fishing agreements and
user’s data base
P2—Resource be exploited Absent: overharvesting and Present: management measures, arapaima stocks increasing
sustainably arapaima stocks declining
P3—Collective action Absent: individual management Present: fishing agreements increased participation
P4—Monitoring Absent: no monitoring systems Present: counts of arapaima are made by the fishers themselves and
community monitoring of fish landing data
P5—Graduated sanctioning Absent: illegal fishing and free- Present but weak: sanctioning by fishing quota
rider
P6—Conflict resolution Absent: no conflict resolution Present but weak: conflict resolution mechanism exists but not all
occurs conflicts are resolved
P7—Formal recognition from Absent: total moratoria Present: legal permit to harvest arapaima based on management plan
central governments
P8—Nested enterprises Absent: activities are not Present: institutional arrangement with communities, state government
organized in multiple layers and IBAMA

from Feijó) and two local government agents to set and

assign values for a group of variables for the periods before
and after the arapaima management system. All the par-
ticipants composed a homogeneous group involved from
the beginning of the management system. A brainstorming
session conducted by the local government agents with the
help of the workshop moderator (a scientist involved in the
case study) identified a set 29 SES variables as most rel-
evant for arapaima management system: (i) 10 Key-vari-
ables suggested by Ostrom et al. (2007) and Ostrom
(2009); and (ii) 19 SES second-tier variables (Table 3).
Value assignment was performed by group members based
on empirical evidence about the management system. To
calibrate the range of values, the assumptions made by
Hardin (1968) were used as depicted by Ostrom et al.
(2007) in order to set the non-sustainability threshold. On
the other hand, the best scenario for SES variables was
taken to set the other extremity, i.e., the ideal conditions for
the sustainable co-management system. We used a set of
Fig. 2 Framework for social-ecological analysis adapted from 25 variables (S4, S5, RS1, RS3, RS5, RS7, RU1, RU4,
Ostrom (2009) RU6, GS4, GS6, U1, U5, U6, U7, U8, I1, I2, I4, I7, O1, O2,
O3, ECO2, and ECO3) to design Hardin’s and sustainable
acknowledge the interactions between variables. Further- scenarios, and 19 variables (S4, RS2, RS3, RS5, RS7, RU1,
more, these interactions occur mainly in a non-linear sys- RU6, GS4, GS6, GS8, U1, U4, U5, U6, U8, I4, I7, I8, and
tem (Janssen 2002; Levin 1992). Anderies and Janssen O2) to evaluate the arapaima management system
(2013) have developed a didactic approach to applying the (Table 3). In order to guarantee study replication of and
SES framework evaluation mechanistically. However, for comparison, rules were established to assign values to all
this paper, a complementary method was suggested to SES variables, attributing greater weight to those consid-
evaluate a given SES along a multidimensional spectrum of ered as key variables. The assigned value range varies from
sustainability, based on an empirical approach. -1 to ?1 for key-variables (including variables S5, RU6,
In 2010, a 3-day workshop was held involving fifteen GS4, I1, I2, I4, I7, O1, O2, O3, ECO2, and ECO3) and
fishers (seven fishers from Manuel Urbano and eight fishers from -0.5 to ?0.5 for the other variables.

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Table 2 Set of key variables and respective effects as indicated by Ostrom et al. (2007) and Ostrom (2009)
Variable Effect

RS3—Size of resource system Moderate territorial size is more conducive to cooperation

RS5—Productivity of resource An exhausted or very abundant resource will not incentive its management. Moderate productivity showing
system possible scarcity, with both risks and opportunities, will elicit interest among users
RS7—Predictability of system The system should be predictable enough in order to users may estimate the effects of particular rules
dynamic
RU1—Resource unity Resources with high mobility will demand high costs in monitoring great territories
mobility
U1—Number of users Rely mainly on RS3. To manage many users for a relatively small territory may not be cost-effective. On the
other hand in large territory a large number of users may be useful for monitoring activities
U5—Leadership/ When some user are respected as leaders and have entrepreneurial skills, the cooperation among users is more
entrepreneurship likely
U6—Norms/social capital Prior existence of ethical/moral standards which determine ethical/moral norms of reciprocity among users will
diminish the transaction costs in reaching agreements
U7—Knowledge of When users share common knowledge of relevant SES attributes, how their actions affect each other, and rules
SES/mental models used in other SESs, they will perceive lower costs of organizing
U8—Importance of resource The costs in organizing and cooperate is worth only if either the resource plays a major role for the users
livelihood or it has another social or cultural value which claims for its sustainability
GS6—Collective-choice rules If users have the legitimacy and the autonomy to create an to enforce their rules, they will be more motivated
into keep engaged in self-organization and protect the resource against outsiders

All qualitative information gathered between 2004 and After the consensus-oriented process, we calculated an
2012 has been analyzed as proposed by Dey (1993). In this average score value (Eq. 1) for the highest-tier variable of SES
regard, qualitative information depends on contexts, and framework, based on the associated second-tier variables, to
the analysis should be based on stakeholder objectives and produce a subsystem score or value (Table 3). We produced
perceptions. So, results reported in this article related to the scenarios for the periods before and after the management
arapaima management system are those shared among the system implementation, as well as for Hardin’s tragedy of the
stakeholders involved (fishers and government agents). The commons and sustainable co-management system. The ara-
group members built a formal procedure to reach consen- paima management system is described and presented in a web
sus for each variable assignment. Hence, communication diagram showing visually how each of the subsystems changed
becomes central. The procedure adopted the requirements over time. Also, the web diagram provides an estimate of where
of Habermas’ communicative rationality (Habermas 1996; the arapaima management system is on the continuum between
Enevoldsen 1998) for participatory approaches: (i) Free an unsustainable SES and a sustainable scenario.
speech situation, where the speech is devoid of external PTs
Gv
constraint and of strategic behavior, and in which only the SGAs ¼ v¼1 ð1Þ
Ts
best argument counts; (ii) Consistency between discourse,
beliefs and behavior, where each participant should be where SGA is the subsystem score, Gv is the value
rationally accountable by offering justifications and rea- assigned for variable v effect, and Ts is the total number of
sons; (iii) Transparency, where each participant’s refer- variables for the subsystem s.
ences and values should be explicit and open to other’s
criticism; (iv) Focus on common interest, where partici-
pants should strive beyond the mere adjustment of partic- Results and Discussion
ular interests. Habermas’ requirements highlight the
negotiation of a compromise in which participants strive to The arapaima management system implementation was
conciliate individual and diverging interests. As divergence based on the setting of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles.
occurs during the SES value assignment, the group applied Only one design principle (P1, defined boundaries) was
unlimited rounds of negotiation to reach consensus. Rep- present in the Acre case study before the arapaima man-
resentatives of divergent variable’s value argue their views agement system started. Nine years after the arapaima
of the management system and SES variable values were management system was implemented, practically all of
updated at each round of negotiation. the eight design principles were in place (Table 1).

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Table 3 Subsystem score (SGA) calculations using SES second-tier variables

Variable Values assignment Subsystem Aggregated Values by SES Susbsystem
Hardin’s Arapaima Arapaima Co-mgmt Hardin’s Arapaima Arapaima Sustainability
tragedy of SES before SES after and scenario SES before SES after threshold
the mgmt mgmt sustainable mgmt mgmt
commons (2004) (2012) (2004) initiative
(2012)

S4— 0 0 0.5 1
Government
resource
policies
S5—Market 0.5 – – 0 S 0.167 0 0.083 0.167
incentives
RS1—Sector 0.5 – – 0
RS2—Clarity – 0 0.5 –
of system
boundaries
RS3—Size of 1 1 1 1
resource
systema
RS5— 0.5 0.5 0.5 1
Productivity
of systema
RS7— 0 0 0.5 1 RS 0.222 0.166 0.277 0.333
Predictability
of system
dynamicsa
RU1— 1 1 1 1
Resource unit
mobilitya
RU4— 0.5 – – 0
Economic
value
RU6— 0 0 0.5 1 RU 0.214 0.142 0.214 0.286
Distinctive
markings
GS4— 0 0 0.5 1
Property-right
system
GS6— 0 0 0.5 1
Collective-
choice rulesa
GS8— – 0 0.5 – GS 0 0 0.187 0.25
Monitoring &
Sanctioning
processes
U1—Number -1 0 0.25 1
of usersa
U4—Location – 0.5 0.5 –
U5— 0 0 0.25 1
Leadershipa
U6— 0 0.5 1 1
Norms/social
capitala
U7— -1 – – 1
Knowledge of
SES/mental
modelsa

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Table 3 continued
Variable Values assignment Subsystem Aggregated Values by SES Susbsystem
Hardin’s Arapaima Arapaima Co-mgmt Hardin’s Arapaima Arapaima Sustainability
tragedy of SES before SES after and scenario SES before SES after threshold
the mgmt mgmt sustainable mgmt mgmt
commons (2004) (2012) (2004) initiative
(2012)

U8— 0 0 1 1 U -0.222 0.055 0.333 0.555

Importance of
resourcea
I1—Harvets -1 – – 0
levels of
diverse users
I2— 0 – – 1
Information
sharing
among users
I4—Conflict 0 0 0.5 1
among users
I7—Self- 0 0.5 1 1
organizing
activities
I8—Network – 0 0.5 – I -0.125 0.062 0.25 0.375
activities
O1—Social 0 – – 1
performance
O2— -1 0 1 1
Ecological
performance
O3— 0 – – 1 O -0.333 0 0.333 1
Externalities
to other SESs
ECO2— 0 – – 1
Pollution
Patterns
ECO3—Flows 0 – – 1 ECO 0 0 0 0.667
into and out
of focal SES
a
Key-variables as suggested by Ostrom et al. (2007) and Ostrom (2009)
– No value assigned

The arapaima management system progressed showing management with government agents (P8). Since 2005,
significant improvement in regard to Ostrom’s principles these teams have been monitoring arapaima stocks to
(Table 1). The collective action (P3) work began in 2004 establish annual fishing quotas and legal harvest permits
with the municipal assemblies, when fishers and govern- (P4). In Manoel Urbano, lake productivity had increased by
ment agencies agreed to a shared vision for achieving about 44 % since 2004. In Feijó, the arapaima population
sustainable fisheries (P6) and created rules for fishing had increased by about 23 % since 2008 (Oviedo and
agreements in target lakes (P1 and P3). Participatory work Crossa 2011).
began with the closure of the arapaima fishery for stock Three assumptions can explain why arapaima manage-
restoration (P5) and capacity building of community vol- ment system led to the establishment of the seven Ostrom’s
unteers, in 2005. The integrated ecosystem vision began principles not observed before it began : (1) shared knowl-
with the implementation of arapaima management plan edge implemented between fishers and government agents
(P2) and at the beginning of harvest, in 2007 (P7). The supported the decision-making process; (2) monitoring done
association began in 2009, when the local management by local users increased knowledge and management system
teams were created in Manoel Urbano and Feijó for co- empowerment; and (3) participatory approach for designing

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local rules promoted the adaptive management process. We applied a consensus-building model to evaluate the
Field surveys made by fishers and government agents arapaima management system. Consensus on the values of
improved understanding of the arapaima fishery and its SES variables was reached after a few rounds of iteration
related ecosystem, and also enabled the development of with group members. We also calculated SES subsystems
fishing agreements. There are five lakes managed under values resulting from arithmetic means based on the
fishing agreements in Manuel Urbano and nine lakes in Feijó associated second-tier variables. This procedure is sug-
with proposals IBAMA-approved fishing agreements. gested by Regan et al. (2006) as more appropriate. If fishers
Investing in the knowledge sharing helped to adjust design are open to communicate for conciliating individual and
principles 2, 3 and 8, related to sustainable fishing practices, diverging interests, and this process is iterated, the group
collective action, and institutional arrangements, respec- will reach the consensus. The model proposes a change of
tively. The monitoring process provided government agents assignment preferences at each round and formally reflects
with reliable data and facilitated the understanding of local the heart of the negotiation process. Group decision-mak-
users, who adhered more easily to fishing rules. This was key ing for SES evaluation involves different knowledge areas,
to setting design principles 4 and 7, which are related to and formal methods are unlikely to address all the chal-
monitoring the resource and the rights of fishers to legal lenges of group consensus. At some stage, the use of ad hoc
harvest permits. The participatory approach created deci- methods is recommended. For instance, the brainstorming
sion-making arena, involving local users and government session that resulted in the set of SES variables. There are
agents to share knowledge and understand how to adapt to interesting questions arising from this case study method-
environmental feedback. This approach was crucial to set- ology. We consider this method, based on the participatory
ting design principles 3, 5, 6 and 8, that are related to col- approach and communicative rationality is a useful tool to
lective action, rule offenders, conflict resolution and evaluate how group members affect consensus. Future
institutional arrangements. Also, the case study strongly questions are particularly important in assigning values and
aligns with Garibaldi and Turner’s (2004) approach, where composing groups. How does the divergence on values
the work with an endangered species promotes the rescue of across group members affect consensus? How does a
local knowledge and the development of further scientific heterogeneous group affect consensus? How does group
studies for the management scheme. size affect consensus? How do different stakeholders per-
Incomplete enforcement suggests the design principles form in a consensus-oriented process?
of graduated sanctioning (P5), and conflict resolution (P6) In using the SES framework, we estimated both Hard-
have not yet been fully reached. Cases of illegal fishing in’s and sustainable scenarios based on a particular set of
were recorded in 2011 and 2012 in Manoel Urbano and second-tier variables (Table 3). Generating Hardin’s sce-
Feijó, respectively, where violations and sanctions were nario requires nine assumptions: (i) The resource system is
not evident. Since 2011 the management teams and gov- a floodplain lake system (RS1); (ii) no collective action is
ernment agencies explore a collaborative approach to present (GS6); (iii) Small-scale fishery is unpre-
future management, followed by setting up low-cost arenas dictable (RS7); (iv) Mobile resource units harm self-orga-
for conflict resolution and a graduated sanctioning system. nization (RU1), and they are not the property of their
With the regulations of collective fishing agreements in owners (RU6); (v) There is economic value due to free-
2005 and 2008, the community livelihood and institutional rider behavior (S5 and RU4); (vi) Users do not contribute
settings were improved, thus promoting sustainable mea- to the management system (U1); (vii) The lack of leader-
sures for the arapaima management system. The challenge ship and local rules negatively affect the establishment of
faced by any decentralized governance system is clear in management systems (U5 and U6); (viii) Users which do
the arapaima SES, especially creating conditions for local not share common SES knowledge independently make
users to be integrated in design management measures. decisions to maximize their returns (U7); and (ix) Users are
Approaches used in this case study meet these challenge in dependent on the resource system for their livelihoods
three ways. First, participatory fora provide fishers with the (U8).
opportunity to generate place-specific measures and mini- These assumptions lead to an empirical prediction of
mize ad hoc methods based on expert knowledge. Discur- overharvesting (I1) and the destruction of the SES (O1 and
sive interactions with fishers enable collective learning O2). For the sustainable scenario, we maximized the
about SES (Berkes 2009). Second, the SES is a shared assumptions set out in Hardin’s scenario aiming at a self-
framework, as described is integrative, rooted in empirical organized system. Both scenarios allowed us to evaluate
reality and communicated with field examples (Holling the management system performance on a continuum
2001). Third, SES analysis should be applied and improved between an unsustainable SES and a sustainable one
in other periods of the case study, as well as supporting the (Fig. 3). SES subsystems and its variables can guide a road
adoption of rules and norms (De Vellis 2003). map for sustainable development. For instance, despite the

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IBAMA and the management teams to develop harvesting

rules and norms that have supported the recovery of the
stock. Given fishers’ ability to assess the arapaima popu-
lation and the formal association of the management teams,
resource users negotiated with IBAMA permission to leg-
ally harvest arapaima. These assumptions about second-tier
variables lead to an empirical prediction of institutional
performance supporting work on conflict among users (I4),
self-organizing activities (I7) and networking (I8). The
outcome of this interaction promoted improvements in
ecological performance (O2), enhanced by reduced over-
harvesting and a legal harvest permit.
The eventual improvement of the arapaima management
system is thus attributed to the congruence of multiple
factors. Changes in political settings (S) over time affected
the capability of resource users (U) and government agents
in a governance system (GS), while their interactions also
impacted the resource system (RS) and resource units
(RU). Knowledge sharing, collective action and the use of
norms grew over time. Simply engaging fishers to partici-
pate in the decision-making process enables them to
approach a sustainable harvesting level (O2), rather than
severely overharvesting the arapaima. Fishing agreements
use the artificial marking of arapaima (RU6) as a way to
Fig. 3 Subsystem score (SGA) for arapaima SES associated with identify collective property or resource units needing pro-
stages of management system tection. Conditions related to self-organization (I7) in
making norms were also present when arapaima were
advances made by the arapaima management system, sustainably exploited, as the number of users (U1) and
improvements must be made in resource users and the sharing norms related to harvest levels were known (U6). A
governance system, enhancing the use of resource system major factor in converting free-rider fishers into effectively
and resource units, and consequently the interactions and organized management teams was implementing ways to
outcomes for sustainable development. However, scenarios convert the harvest time scale from short-term to long-
for Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and the period before term. An established management plan (GS6 and U6) with
management were reversed in subsystems S, RS and RU. long-term interest in sustainability was more likely to
This may be due to the lack of information about the invest in norms related to technology and harvest level, and
resource system, resource unit and social economic set- in generating useful information about arapaima stocks.
tings, which impact consensus on SES variable values for A key factor in restoring arapaima stock has been
each scenario. increased resource control, where better user knowledge on
The performance of the arapaima SES using a particular abundance, distribution and production should be high-
set of second-tier variables (Table 3) were evaluated for lighted. Future case study prospects involve research pro-
the periods before and after the management system was grams to collect mark-recapture data, radio telemetry and
implemented. Figure 3 shows how the arapaima manage- economics aiming to enhance resource system and resource
ment system changed over time with impacts on most first- unit knowledge. Furthermore, local organizational
level core subsystems. The participatory approach for the strengthening enables greater adherence to collective
establishment of fishing agreements (S4) and adaptive agreements. Local group organization and arapaima man-
management improved the clarity of system boundaries agement work was stimulated by the operational-level
(RS2), collective action (GS6), local rules (U6), and have rights (GS4, access, withdrawal, and management)
acquired meaningful knowledge about the resource system devolved with the regulation of fishing agreements.
and resource units which fishers are using. The knowledge Obtaining at least the management right to the continued
sharing promoted the development of monitoring tools use of a resource may stimulate local users to seek long-
(GS8). Fishers make collective decisions to maximize the term goals (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).
recovery of arapaima stocks and sustainable production Those results indicate a promising future for the sus-
(U6). The total moratoria of arapaima have enabled tainability of the arapaima SES, but major monitoring

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efforts and institutional strengthening support for self-en- guarantee the replication of the technique in other studies
forcement are still needed. Along this line, it is necessary to for the sake of comparison in space and time. The arapaima
pay attention to the fact that long-term sustainability of SES framework proposed in this article will obviously need
rules depends on monitoring and enforcement as well as on further development. Cumulative use of the framework to
their not being overruled by central government (Sch- address variable analysis and policy design in the coming
weitzer et al. 2009). The long-term effectiveness of rules years will improve the ability for solving problems related
depends on users’ willingness to monitor one another’s to the arapaima management.
practices (Ostrom et al. 2007). Another factor may be the We have proposed that participatory approaches for SES
unbalanced power among local users and government measurement be implemented on a continuum process
agents, which may impact the degree of power-sharing. between consensus-oriented cooperation looking for com-
Power dynamics is recognized to be highly influential in mon interest and compromise-oriented negotiation aiming
the co-management process, and the balance among par- at the adjustment of individual interests. The use of the
ticipants can determine the extent of integration and social negotiation dimension can support measuring and evalu-
networking (Wilson et al. 2006; Doubleday 2007; Pinker- ating SES variables. Also, these approaches suggest the use
ton 2009). of divergence as a driver for decision-making through
collective communication and learning processes. This is
promising as a collective action mechanism.
Conclusion The case study presented here highlights the critical role
of multi-level institutional arrangements—from grassroots
Case study results can help develop alternative tools and to central governments—in creating the conditions that
approaches for small-scale fisheries in the tropics. The make sustainable arapaima management possible. Where
evaluation of Ostrom’s design principles indicates that governments have not implemented effective regulatory
small-scale fisheries present challenges on most principles. systems for managing arapaima within their jurisdictions,
Principles 1 and 3 usually are diminished by the open- the essential governance conditions required for sustain-
access fishing areas and the lack of knowledge sharing. able management are not likely to exist. The state of Acre
Principles 2, 4, and 7 usually are diminished by the lack of has implemented regulations and temporary monitoring
monitoring processes. Principles 5, 6, and 8 are usually and enforcement arrangements that have significantly
diminished by current top-down management models. We reduced the market for illegal arapaima and enabled
have proposed three ways of enhancing management sys- managed arapaima fishery to develop.
tem effectiveness. This article does not aim at confronting Hardin’s image
From the methodological viewpoint, we agree with the of the tragedy. The focus is rather exploring, from empir-
inadequacy of the blueprints and panaceas approach ical evidence, the possibilities of managing commons in a
(Ostrom et al. 2007). Nevertheless, an ‘‘expandable and participatory way. So that the process can be virtuous
adaptable blueprint’’ using participatory approaches for the instead of vicious. Despite the context of institutional fra-
evaluation of SES variables, as proposed in this paper, may gility, mainly of local institutions and government agen-
be useful for the managers and policy-makers, until more cies, the arapaima SES seems to be more prone to
complete academic interdisciplinary studies become sustainable use than to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’ The
available. The use of SES variables permits understanding main recommendation for the next steps is to focus more
of unmeasured interactions between users and natural objectively on Ostrom’s key-variables (Table 2), including
resources. This approach serves both SES monitoring and a suitable monitoring system, in order to tackle main gaps
assessment purposes in ways that are useful for natural and fragilities in an adaptive management fashion.
resource management and policy interventions. Combined Further application of SES to develop more effective co-
with of field practice observations, adequate interpretation management systems may depend upon the ability of users
of empirical measures makes this approach useful in and government system to modify the collaborative
understanding and managing SES. Also, SES’s complexity enforcement structure, in order to promote the active par-
induces the need to develop new forms of gathering ticipation of voluntary rangers and government managers.
information. SES variables—including the processes by This SES should include the establishment of new forums
which they are measured—are a powerful instrument for for conflict resolution and graduated sanctioning. Such
decision-making and policy-making, and can be seen as an forums should encourage communication and learning
attempt to implement reflexive governance. The systematic among all representatives. In addition, forums act as an
use of the SES framework, setting the ‘‘tragedy’’ and arena for decision-making and the analysis of rules for
‘‘sustainability’’ scenarios as references, as done here, can species and their ecosystems. Results indicate that even
help building a road map to sustainable development and when rules are being made and implemented on the basis of

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Environmental Management (2016) 57:1009–1023 1021

local knowledge and scientific studies, there are challenges Brook RK, McLachlan SM (2008) Trends and prospects for local
for knowledge sharing. knowledge in ecological and conservation research and moni-
toring. Biodivers Conserv 17:3501–3512
Such governance may become increasingly important to Butler JRA, Tawake A, Skewes T, Tawake L, McGrath V (2012)
manage the sustainability of tropical SESs in Brazil. Integrating traditional ecological knowledge and fisheries man-
Exogenous drivers, such as climate change, logging, and agement in the Torres Strait, Australia: the catalytic role of
illegal fishing (Oviedo 2011) have a growing impact on turtles and dugong as cultural keystone species. Ecol Soc
17(4):34
fisheries and ecosystems. The floodplain lakes in the state Carpenter SR, Walker B, Anderies MJ, Abel N (2001) From metaphor
of Acre can be severely impacted by climate in the future, to measurement: resilience of what to what? Ecosystems
and the SES approach can be applied for adaptive man- 4:765–781
agement to future change. Castello L (2004) A method to count Pirarucu Arapaima gigas:
fishers, assessment, and management. N Am J Fish Manag
24:379–389
Acknowledgments This article was sponsored by SKY Rainforest Castello L, McGrath DG, Beck PSA (2011) Resource sustainability in
Rescue (WWF-UK), and is based on a research program supported by small-scale fisheries in the Lower Amazon floodplains. Fish Res
Center for Sustainable Development (CDS) at the University of 110:356–364
Brası́lia. We thank the Feijó Fisher’s Union, Manuel Urbano Ara- Castello L, Arantes CC, Mcgrath DG, Stewart DJ, Sousa FS (2014)
paima Fishers Association, Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Understanding fishing-induced extinctions in the Amazon. Aquat
Amazônia (IPAM). We thank Mauro Armelin, Evandro Camara, Conser. doi:10.1002/aqc.2491
Edvilson Gomes, Carlos Leopoldo, Jose Augusto Drummond for Castro F, McGrath DG (2003) Moving toward sustainability in the
comments on a previous version of this article, and Joseph Weiss for local management of floodplain lake fisheries in the Brazilian
revising the final version. The two anonymous reviewers provided Amazon. Human Organ 62(2):123–133
valuable constructive comments. We would also like to thank the Connor R, Dovers S (2004) Instituional change for sustainable
fishers: Charles Santos, Antonio Soares, Geraldo Almeira, Paulo development. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Almeida, Francisco dos Santos, José de Souza, Vanderlei Nasci- Cox M, Arnold G, Tomás SV (2010) A review of design principles for
mento, Francisco G. da Silva, Antonio I. da Silva, Pedro Gadelha, community-based natural resource management. Ecol Soc
Raimundo N. de Souza, Francisco J. Silva, Carlos Gadelha, Antonio 15(4):38
Souza, and Francisco C. Moura for their contribution with data col- De Freitas DM, Tagliani PRA (2009) The use of GIS for the
lection and evaluation. integration of traditional and scientific knowledge in supporting
artisanal fisheries management in southern Brazil. J Environ
Manag 90(6):2071–2080
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