Festin v.
Zubiri
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Villarosa, filed an election
protest against him before the RTC. After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued
an Order (First Order) granting his motion for execution pending appeal.
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, seeking a
TRO against the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. COMELEC issued a
TRO (COMELEC TRO), directing the RTC judge, in her official capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the Order. Accordingly, the RTC
issued another Order (Second Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
o In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of
Execution in accordance with the [January 15, 2014] Order until further
notice. Despite the TRO and the RTC's Third Order, respondent, as counsel of
Villarosa, filed five (5) manifestations addressed to the COC insisting on the
writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these manifestations to the
other party.
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's First
Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended
on February 12, 2014. Since the COMELEC only issued the Second Order on February
13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO
was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not
bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could legally
issue the writ of execution pending appeal.
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff.
However, complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations when the
sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him. Soon thereafter, complainant filed the
disbarment complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when
he misled and induced the COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's
TRO and the RTC's Second Order. As a result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1,
10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.
In his answer, respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been
transmitted to the COMELEC, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case;
therefore, it had no more power to issue the Second Order. Respondent put forward
the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC
Judge. Second, the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual
deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-
day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no longer
had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of manifestations to highlight his
position did not violate any rule. Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations
pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence
and diligence.
Issue: W/N respondent should be held administratively liable? YES
Held:
After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that
respondent should be held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR.
However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower penalty.
Contrary to the CPR, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as
"manifestations" to sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect,
he violated his professional obligations to respect and observe procedural rules, not to
misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional
colleagues.
The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining
respondent's administrative liability.
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless
otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to
inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an
application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be accompanied
by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not
prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is the rule that a motion without
notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason
to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple:
to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the
court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process.
In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying
for affirmative reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were
in fact motions, since reliefs were prayed for from the court - particularly, the issuance
of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations,
respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived
the other party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. Moreover, the fact that he
submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly filing them before
the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping
the latter completely unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated
his professional obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with
competence and diligence. However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is
ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and
society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits, but must be "within
the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically
bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain their clients' objectives.
Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is justified
considering that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had
the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument fails to persuade. The
Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the
judge directs its issuance. In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second
explicitly directing the COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC
in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution.
