G.R. No.

88211, September 15, 1989 paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
Marcos, petitioner welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
VS. exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1) whether it must be granted or denied.
Facts: For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the
the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his Fernan, Concurring
family. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical
supervening events: time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger.
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave &
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a serious threat to its safety from arising.
Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic
Honasan’s failed coup gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give
Communist insurgency movements way to the other state interests.
secessionist movements in Mindanao Cruz, Dissenting
devastated economy because of As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own
accumulated foreign debt country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a
respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her
in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in powers & not expand.
the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision Paras, Dissenting
was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. right to return to the Philippines. .
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she
liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They should be buried w/in 10 days.
also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right
order. if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It
Issue: can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under control.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined Padilla, Dissenting
that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to Sarmiento, Dissenting
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national
Decision: security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear &
No to both issues. Petition dismissed. present.
Ratio: G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. Marcos, petitioner
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the VS.
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in Facts:
the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to
i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and
constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28,
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), the Philippines.
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the
President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of following arguments:
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the
depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed Constitution to all Filipinos.
to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to she had exercised it arbitrarily.
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be Marcos.
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual Issue:
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed I. ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VIN
to return in the Philippines be granted. JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECR
Decision: SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAF
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents.
denied because of lack of merit. G.R. No.
Ratio:
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NOR
Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not MAPANDI, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPA
changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOV
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown CHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF S
to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIO
that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive DECISION
power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in DEL CASTILLO, J.:
the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of h
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates
so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016
of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied account of lawless violence
powers.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of in
people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the p
acted arbitrarily the Philippines or any part thereof under

WHEREAS,
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2017 > July 2017 Decisions > G.R. No. 231658, Article
July 134 of- REPRESENTATIVES
04, 2017 the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provide
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJAÑO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, is committed
AND TEDDY by rising and taking
BRAWNER arms against
BAGUILAT, JR., the Government for the purpose of remo
Petitioners, v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN or itsN.laws, the territory
LORENZANA, of the Republic
SECRETARY OF THEof the Philippines or any part thereof, of any b
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN.depriving EDUARDOthe AÑO,Chief
CHIEFExecutive
OF STAFF OF or THE
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents.; G.R. No. 231771 - EUFEMIA CAMPOS
CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LINCUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY WHEREAS,D.part of the
OLALO, reasons
ROY for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the seri
JIM BALANGHIG,
terrorist groupANTONIO
RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTINA E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE such as the attackGABRIELA
L. TINIO, on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in F
WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE soldiers, and SARAHthe massJANEjailbreak
I. ELAGO,in MAE
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their
PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES,
Petitioners, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, WHEREAS, today 23 May
DEFENSE 2017, the same
SECRETARY DELFINMaute terrorist group has taken over a hospit
LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO severalAÑO,
checkpoints within
PHILIPPINE the City, POLICE
NATIONAL burned down certain government and private fac
DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 231774 - NORKAYAGovernment S. MOHAMAD, forces, and started
SITTIE flying theS.flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS
NUR DYHANNA
MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE to remove
SECRETARYfromSALVADOR
the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao an
C. MEDIALDEA,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT and prerogativesOF THE to enforce
INTERIORtheANDlawsLOCAL
of the land and to maintain public order and sa
GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES rebellion;
OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF
STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.: WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel
damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippin
the Constitution and by law, do hereby
G.R. No. 231658, July 04, 2017 - REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJAÑO, EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON.
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of is
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN.
effective as of the
EDUARDO AÑO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents.;
G.R. No. 231771 - EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LINCUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGHIG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTINA E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS'
of martial
REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. rd LIM,
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23 day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousa
VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President subm
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO
Report on the factual basis of
AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 231774 - NORKAYA S.
MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion an
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
worsened with the passing of time.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decad
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR
the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly c
GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato
others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Say
EN BANC
Group.1
G.R. No. 231658, July 04, 2017
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to c
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJAÑO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have be
BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violenc
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO AÑO, CHIEF
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their prop
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents.
Report:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
G.R. No. 231771
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader
leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance wh
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LINCUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY
government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed tow
JIM BALANGHIG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTINA E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO
institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, econom
L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE
which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork
have been
for the
hampered,
eventualpreventing
establishment
the government
of a from restoring peace and order in
DAESH wilayat or province government
in personnel Mindanao.
to and from the cit

Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted Theoftaking
around uptwoof arms
hundredby lawless
sixty-three
armed(263)groups in the area, with support being provide
members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group money,
chieflyand operates
their blatant
in the acts
provinceof defiance
of Lanao which embolden other armed groups in Min
del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groupspublic such order
as theand Jemaah
safety Islamiyah,
in Marawi Mujahidin
City; they have likewise compromised the security of t
Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as The evidenced
Reportby, highlighted
among others, the strategic
its publication
location of Marawi City and the crucial and sig
of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based Philippines
terroristas groups,
a whole. theInISISaddition,
(Islamicthe StateReportof pointed out the possible tragic repercussi
Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial andoflogistical the lawless support
groups.to the Maute Group.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terra
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention parts toof establish
Mindanao. anLawless
Islamic armedState and groupstheir have historically used provinces adjoining Ma
capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers
backdoor and prerogatives.2
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him
to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit: Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local cr
At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced Marawi Citytheir is a vital
attack cogoninvarious
attainingfacilities
their long-standing goal: absolute control over the
government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi. demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people
At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being managed ThebyPresident
the Bureau ended of his
JailReport
Managementin this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and
Penology (BJMP). While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-
The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted public
on-duty
safety personnel.
necessitates BJMPthe personnel
continued were implementation of martial law and the suspe
disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells. corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled
The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisonerInvans addition
and privateto thevehicles).
Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the militar
By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights with were the heard Senate and feltandeverywhere.
the House By of Representatives relative to
evening, the power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still cut off, plunging the city
into total black-out.) After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolut
From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the martial
Marawi lawPolice
proclamation
Station. and A patrol
findingcarProclamation
of the No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitut
Police Station was also taken. same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revok
A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group
facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the
The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate. Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with th
By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
Proclamation
and Sauiaran, No. 216 felland
under
findsthe nocontrol
compelling of reason to revoke the same.9
these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement. The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The Hous
As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi Resolution City,No. 105010 "EXPRESSING
including Naga Street, BangoloTHE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA
Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following barangays: Basak Malutlot, IT FINDS
Mapandi,NO REASONSaduc, TO LilodREVOKE
Maday, PROCLAMATION
Bangon, NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STA
Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar. PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN
These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.
Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, CathedralThe of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in
the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church.
About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed A)by the lawless groups. G.R. No. 231658
Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School. On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano
The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there,Baguilat, among other Jr. several a Petition11As
filed locations. Under
of 0600H the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of
of 24 May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the
employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat. First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial la has no sufficient fa
The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, whichinvasion
they later
in Marawi set ablaze.
City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in M
Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered there oneis noofproofits armored
that itsvehicles.
purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from a
13
Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City hasterritory. been infiltratedIt labelsby thelawless
flying of armedISIS flag
groups
by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other o
composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report,an eleven
open(11) attemptmembers to remove
of thesuch Armed areas
Forcesfrom the allegiance to the Philippine Governm
and the Philippine National Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others assertion
have beenand seriously
exercise wounded.
of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Ma
There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities basis thein Marawi
alleged interview
City to executeof VeraChristians.
Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly
They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male Muslims a "clan'sto join
private
theirmilitia
groups.latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived ca
Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a strategic
during the mass briefing,
action of representatives
lawless armedofgroups the military and defense authorities did not cate
in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of governmentISIS personnel,
threat inand thecommitting
country butarmed that they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there is IS
uprising
against and open defiance of the government.3 also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President
initiated
to conclude
by the government
that - in its bid to capture Hapilon.18 Based on said statement, i
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the
Group's
groups'armed seatresistance
of power in was Marawi
merelyCity to shield
for Hapilon and the Maute brothers from th
their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province Marawi covering City and theremove entire
its allegiance
Mindanao.to the Philippine Republic.19 It then posit that i
Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; Second,
the decimation
the LagmanofPetition a segment claims of that
the city
the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, contained and unmistakable "false,intent to remove inaccurate, contrived and
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President reports
of hison power,
the interview
authority, of and
Dr. Amer
prerogatives
Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman
within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in brought
an attempt
an injuredto undermine
memberhis to control
the hospital
over for treatment but did not overrun the hos
executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure Lagman
that all Petition
laws are alsofaithfully
refutes the executed;
claim inand the President's Report that a branch of the Lan
remove his supervisory powers over local governments.4 its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank employees themselves clar
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, the armored
broughtvehicleaboutwas undue ownedconstraints
by a third andparty and was empty at the time it was comm
difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the performanceonofthe their
burning
dutiesofand thefunctions,
Senator Ninoy and untold
Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Centr
hardships to the civilians, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that accord
Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending Marawi
their reports
Centralto Elementary
the Chief Executive
Pilot School duewas to not burned by the terrorists. 24 Lastly, it poi
the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing of the policetheir functions.
chief of Malabang,
Through the Lanao
attack del Sur, and the occupation of the Marawi
and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely University.
affected. 25 The bridge and road blockades

set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficientprerogatives;
factual basisand
since
thatthe
thePresident's
Marawi armedReport
hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander pla
mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February conclusions
2016, the mass jailbreak in Marawi City inbereft of
August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law.
TheItMohamad
contends that
Petition
theseposits
events
thateither
immediately
took after the declaration of martial law, and
place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the suit culprits
may already
having already
be brought
been arrested.
before the26 Court to assail the sufficiency of the

Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient Finally,
factual basis
in invoking
considering
this Court's
that thepower
President
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official 27 before
suspension of themaking
privilege
theof proclamation.
the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists
the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".54 Further, it assert
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks
thensufficient
the burdenfactual
to prove
basis owing
the sufficiency
to the fact of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on t
that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives,
compel the it [r]espondents
was shown that to divulge relevant information"56 in order for it to re
the military
was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao;
there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number
In closing,
of foreign
the Mohamad
fighters allied
Petition
withprays
ISIS for
wasthe Court to exercise its power to review, "c
"undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters factualwho
basiscan
[of]lend
the declaration
support to of themartial
Mautelaw and the suspension of the privilege of th
Group.29 declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack

Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exerciseThe its specific and special jurisdiction to Consolidated
review sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No.
216" for lack of sufficient The respondents'
factual
Consolidated Comment basis.5830was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by
with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the
In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the "defending
Lagman Petition
the constitutionality
and set the caseof Proclamation
for oral No. 216" should serve as "a rallying ca
argument on June 13, 14, flag and and defend
15, it against
2017. all threats from within

On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 The wereOSG filedacknowledges
and eventuallythat consolidated
Section 18,with Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
G.R. No. sufficiency of the factual basis of the 231658. 32
declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, po
the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision f
B) G.R. No. 231771 through (Cullamat
which the "appropriate proceeding" Petition) mentioned therein may be resorted to
proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, m
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII"33 of the Constitution, likewiseunder
seeksSection
the nullification
1 or 5, of of Article VIII.61 Corollarily,
Proclamation No. the OSG maintains that the review pow
216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion
on thein Mindanao part of and thethatCourt.
public 62 The
safetyCourt has the discretion not to
warrants its declaration.34
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factua
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates
reviewed
to events by happening
the Courtin Marawi"under City the onlylens of grave abuse of discretion"64 and
an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No. 216 "failed facts.
to show 65Arbitrariness,
any factual basis notfor correctness,
the impositionshould be the standard in review
of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that public
36
safety requires the imposition of martial law in The
the OSG maintainswhole that
of the burdenMindanao".lies not with the respondents but with the petitio
bereft of factual basis. It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burde
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other compel
rebel groups [the] to respondents
sow terror to andpresent
cause deathproof on the factual basis"66 of Proclamation N
and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial
prove" law67
and
in the wholethat of Mindanao.
governmental 38
It also actions are presumed to
posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed f
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups"President
in the lastand Whereas
based Clause
on the of facts available to him at the time the decision was made.6
Proclamation
No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts basisof should
rebellion be that
examined
they were not based
supposedlyon the facts discovered after the President had
waging.40 because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an im
President's decision should be guided only by the information and data avail
71
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities determination.
in the Report of The
the OSG
President
thus asserts
to Congress,
that facts that were established after the declara
particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi in the
PolicereviewStation,
of thethesufficiency
killing of five of teachers
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
of Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on after-proclamation-facts
various government lies with facilities.
the President 41 and Congress for the purpose of determ
the martial law. The OSG fears that the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional
for the proclamation,
or in the alternative,
it would in should
effect usurp
the the powers of the Congress to determin
of the writ72of habeas corpus in Marawi City,
Court find justification for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege extended.
to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao.42
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence re
73
C) G.R. No. 231774 Philippines;
(Mohamad and that he could not Petition) be expected to personally determine the veracity of
power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Ch
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the]Defense
Factual Basis Secretary,
of [the] orDeclaration
any officialoffor Martial
that matter, will not nullify the said declaratio
Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself assufficiency
"a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate of the
proceeding filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the fact
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort46 and should 216be and invoked
in his Report
by the to President
the Congress
only afterby merely citing news reports that supposedly
exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powerscriticizing of the in President
piecemealshould the happenings
be dispensed in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles a
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend
thus inadmissible
the privilegeand ofwithout
the writprobative
of habeas value, and could not overcome the "legal pres
corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate Finally, the to, OSG
the exigencies
points outof that
theitsituation.
has no duty 49 or burden to prove that Proclamation No

that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out t
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to "if requireonlythe imposition
to remove of martial anylaw.50doubtIt as to the constitutionalit
asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which
would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of theThe writfacts
of habeas
laid out corpus".
by the OSG 51 It in
proposes
its Consolidated
that Comment will be discussed in detail in t
"[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that
ISSUES[its] imposition x x x is compelled by the
needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress,
Whether to wit: or that
not the Maute
petitions Group
docketed
intended as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 ar
to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to deprive the duly constitutedParagraph authorities
3, Section 18, of their
Articlepowers
VII of and the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mod
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus of
is promulgated; Article
Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts; The Court
is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon the Secretary of National Defense;
is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, evena) if subsequent
Jurisdiction
events provemust the situation
be to specifically conferred by the
have not been accurately reported;
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitu
Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] beenthespecifically
proclamation
conferred
of martial
by thelaw
Constitution
or the or by some legislative act, no body or t
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual matteractionsbrought
that have before
beenit taken
for resolution.
by Congress
It is likewise settled that in the absence of a c
jointly or separately; implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly fr
Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically gra
What are the parameters for review? sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
Who has the burden of proof?
What is the threshold of evidence? b) "In an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a petition for certiorari fi

Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration It could not of have
graduated
been the powers
intention
grantedof thetheframers of the Constitution that the phrase "
President a Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege a Petition of for
theCertiorari
writ of habeas
pursuantcorpus,
to Sectionand1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of
declaration of martial law; the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exces
Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered vague and thusher nullfunctions.
and void:Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basi
with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the suff
since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
exercise of region;
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of revie
would emasculate its constitutional task under
Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are
sufficient [bases]: c) Purpose/significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marco
for the existence of actual rebellion; or Petition for Habeas Corpus
for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 198
Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion Marcos and martial
the requirements
law ruling of of this
public
Courtsafety
in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpu
sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; andof the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of h
Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will: precisely within the ambit of
have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless "In violence
determining
in Marawithe meaning,
and otherintent,
parts andof the purpose of a law or constitutional provision, t
Mindanao region. and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils in
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental accomplished
memoranda. are proper subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas),
OUR RULING that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Fe
I. Locus standi of on the Philippines from 1972 topetitioners. 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period u
made authoritarian rule part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence.The members o
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question aware
is brought
of these before
facts,[thewentCourt]
aboutby areformulating
party the Commander-in-Chief powers w
having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must constructed
have "a personal during and thesubstantial
authoritarian interest
years.inThe new formula included revised grounds
80
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
manner of Over
activating
the years,
them,there
the scope of thea powers, and review of presidential action.94
has been
trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found Toinrecall,
Section the18Court
of Article
held VII
in the
which 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castañeda95 that the auth
provides
that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual rebellion
basis ofrequiring
the declaration
the suspension
of martial of the
lawprivilege
or of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite foris final standingand conclusive
to challenge upon
thethe validity
courts. ofThis
the ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lan
81
suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need of thenot declaration
even ofbemartial a lawtaxpayer."
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of hab
within the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of m
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of Marcos,
the Republic;" 82 similarly,
the Court, in Garcia-Padilla
petitioners v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and
in the
Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and Supreme residents Court,
of Marawi City". 83 In the power
the constitutional Lagman of the President to suspend the privilege of
Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing as judicial
citizens but merely referred to themselves
as duly elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress could have elicited a
vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House Resolution
Thus, by inserting
No. 1050 Section
expressing18 full
in Article
supportVIIo which allows judicial review of the declar
President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, privilege ofthe theHouse
writ ofof habeas
Representatives
corpus, the isframers of the 1987 Constitution in effect co
declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the doctrine.martial law declaration, which is in direct
contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend
towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved
d) Purpose
in theofpresent
SectionPetitions,
18, Article theVIICourt
is to will
provide additional safeguard against possible a
exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the Courtextraordinary
is not entirely without discretion to accept
a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of
legal standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court canSection take judicial
18, Article
cognizance
VII is meantof the
to provide
fact that additional safeguard against possible abuse b
petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship
to declare is martial
a requirement
law or suspendfor them the privilege
to be of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling fro
elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them a suing in their own behalf the framers
as citizens
of the of Constitution
this country. deemedBesides,
it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Sec
respondents did not question petitioners'
records of the Constitutional
legal Commission
standing. when its members were deliberating on whet
even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II. Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph MR. 3, Section 18, SUAREZ.
Article VII of the Thank you,
Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph the rightof toSection
determine18, Article
the factors
VII (Executive
which may lead to the declaration of martial law and
Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular ph
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, substantial the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under during
the the
thirddiscussions
paragraphon of the
Section
Bill of
18,Rights,
Articleas I understand it, the interpretation is a situ
VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different situations,
from thosethe enumerated
President in hasSections
to act quickly.
1 and 5Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. I
the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire
expanded
into the sufficiency of the factualjurisdiction
basis of of
the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
g) Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to determine
these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factorThe of jurisdiction
determiningofwhether
this Court theis public
not restricted
safety to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5
requires it or not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during be thethesolepast
judge
administration.
of all contestsProclamation
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines thebylast
virtue
paragraph
of the powers
of Sectionvested
4, Article
upon him VII.102 The power of the Court to review on ce
purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein he made Commission
this predicate
on under Electionsthe "Whereas"
and Commission on Audit can be fou
provision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the h) Communists
Unique andfeatures
other armed of aggrupations
the third paragraph of Section 18, A
organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state
of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate tha
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated and different
by Ferdinand
fromE.those
Marcos,
enumerated
in his capacity
in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Sec
as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamationtherewith No.will
1081
follow
dated a different
September rule21,on1972
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provisio
wherein he said, among other things:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his eme
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and pleadings
properties,
in Petition
widespread
for Certiorari
lawlessness
is likewise
and not applicable under the third paragrap
anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which conditionlimited has been brought
periodabout by within
groups of men which this Court has t
who are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order to take over the
government by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportionAofproceeding an actual war
"[i]nagainst
its general
our people
acceptation,
and the [is] the form in which actions are to be broug
legitimate government . . . in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and appropriate
declare martial
proceeding"
law in ourappearing
country on without
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refe
justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, withpurpose
the concurrence
of questioning of atthe
least
sufficiency
a majority of of
the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
all the members of cases. Itthecould be denominated Congress'? as a complaint, a petition, or a m

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos, he is undoubtedly III. anThe
aberration
power ofinthe ourCourt
historyto review
and national
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclama
consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution privilege,now of the
haswrit
sufficient
of habeas safeguards.
corpus underAs I Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitu
said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right Congress.
to determine the factual basis because
the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspensionDuring theoforal argument,of105the
the privilege thewrit
OSG or urged
the the Court to give deference to the ac
extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same Government: within 30on days the partfrom of the its President
filing.as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in g
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance theand interests of the country. Andnot here we are revoking
trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are
enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned. 100
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary pow
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution notand onlythe
placed
reviewtheofPresident's
the said presidential
proclamation action.
of In particular, the President's extraordina
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit writ of judicial
of habeas
review, corpus
it also relaxed
and imposingthe rule on martial law are subject to the veto
standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.
Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a) aThe
demandable judicial
right to challenge
power theto review versus the con
sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to renderThe its decision
Court may thereon
strike within
down athe limited
presidential
period proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
of 30 days from datesufficient factual basis. of On the other hand, filing.Congress may revoke th proclamation or su
aside by the
e) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation o suspension, the Co
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the available
extent of to the
the powers
President of the
priorCommander-
to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed
in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the beyond
Judicial pleadings."106
theDepartment butOn remained
the other under
hand, Congress may take into consideration n
Article VII or the events
Executive
supervening the declaration. Department.
Unlike the Court which does not look into the absol
discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her
sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a p
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for citizen.
a six-year
On the term
other
withhand,
no reelection
Congress'for review
the mechanism is automatic in the sense that
duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the Presidenttime are granted, nonetheless
after for thethe first time, proclamation or s
there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusThus,
or the power
proclaim
to reviewmartial
by the Court law. and the power to revoke by Congress are not on
from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nu
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the Needless
imposition
to say,of martial
the power law of forthe
moreCourt
thanto review can be exercised independently
eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now
provides that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when b)public
The framers
safety demands
of the 1987 it, only
Constitution
for a period
intended the judicial power to review to be exe
not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension power or proclamation of martial law which to
congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial
review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political If only question
to show and thatbeyond
the intent the jurisdiction
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest
of the courts independently
to from each other, we adjudicate.
quote the following exchange:chanRoblesvirtualLaw
MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safegua
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the proclamation.
operation of the Constitution nor abolish
civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please
forgive me if, at this point, I state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissentingMR. opinions I have written during my RAMA.
tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases.101
f) To interpret "appropriate proceeding" as filed under Section 1 of Article VIII would beMS. contrary
QUESADA. to theButintent
now, ofif they
the Constitution.
cannot meet because they have been arrested or that th
going to declare that such a proclamation
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place x additional safeguards against possiblex
martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section I of Article VIII. In
other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph MR. REGALADO.
of Section 18, May Article
I alsoVIIinform
on topCommissioner
of the Quesada that the judiciary is not ex
of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the that. Supreme
A state
Court of shall
martial
alsolaw review
doesthe notfactual
suspend the operation of the Constitution; ther
basis. x x x107 separation of
c) Re-examination of the Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo.
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider,was: andDuring
set aside
martial
its pronouncement
law, the President in Fortun
may have the powers of a commanding general i
v. President Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to is
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review strictlythe
in asufficiency
theater ofofwar, thenot
factual
in thebasis
situation
of we had during the period of martial law
the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress
return totothe exercise
traditional
its own concept
reviewofpowers,
martial law as it was developed especially in Ame
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty reference
to defend the Constitutionto through such the theater
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands xof Congress before it becomes a justiciablex
one in the hands of the Court.109
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning
x x xlaw as it has existed in the jurisprudence inx international law, that it is a law for the th
are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable t
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation
authorized
or suspension
to give jurisdiction
within the evenshort
overtime
civilians to military courts precisely because th
expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action,
the general
and ascertain
area where if itthe
hascivil
a factual
courtsbasis.
are open then in no case can the military courts
x x x.110 reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to Congress as
well as, abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered itself just MR.on FOZ.
stand-by,
It iswaiting
a state and willing
of thingsto actbrought
as about by the realities of the s
a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this
proceeding.111 FR. BERNAS. That

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, MR. and FOZ.
independently
And it from, is not the something
power to that is brought about by a d
revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to FR. BERNAS. It is not brought aboutreview. by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilian
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial
Marcos lawregime
or thewhere
suspension
military
of courts
the privilege
were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here
of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision whereof civil
which courts
among are,his
in fact,
graduated
unablepowers
to function and it becomes necessary for some kind
he will avail of in aA state of martial givenlaw is peculiar because
situation. the President, at such a time, exercises police
Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military's assist
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling government
out the armed agencies
forces;
whichb) suspending
for the timethe being are unable to cope with the condition in
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powersofmay be resorted to only under specified the
conditions.
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendo
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief Senate Committee
by revising on the
Justice
"grounds
on March for13,the2006, stated that under a valid declaration o
113
activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, in-Chiefand
may review
orderof thepresidential
"(a) arrestsaction."
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on pub
and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
a) Extraordinary powers of the President distinguished.
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and on the
involves
rights ofordinary
civilianspolice
duringaction. 114law.
martial The This is because martial law does not suspen
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent does or
it supplant
suppressthe lawless
operation
violence,
of civil
invasion,
courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the g
or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations
place during
being its
that
pendency.
he acts within
And inpermissible
such instance where the privilege of the writ of habea
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.116 Inapplies
fact, "the actual
only use to to which
those the judicially
President charged with rebellion or of
puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review." 117
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or against
declaring martial
the lawPresident's
may be exercised prerogative to declare a
only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in
the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation
c) "Graduation"
by Congress;
of powers [and]refers
(3) review
to hierarchy
and based on scope and effect) it does not re
possible nullification by the which Supreme the Court." 118 Commander-in-Chief must

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent Indeed,danger
the 1987
thereof"
Constitution
as grounds
gives the
for "President,
the as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequenc
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. the119least
Theybenign,
perceived
these theare:
phrase
the calling
"imminent
out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power declare
of the President "is 131
martial law." sufficient
It must be forstressed,
handlinghowever, that the graduation refers only to
imminent not in any manner refer to a sequence, danger." 121
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in
of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the Presi
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of
civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning
These
to citizens
extraordinary
that thepowers
Executive areDepartment
conferred by the Constitution with the President as C
has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while follows
the emergency
that the remains,
power and theprerogative
citizens must,to determine whether the situation warrants a
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficultwhether
to restore theorder
situation
and enforce
demandsthe law.122 As of the privilege of the writ of habeas corp
suspension
such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, martial andlaw, also
review
lies, at byleast the
initially, with123
Court. the President. The power to choose, initially,
wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As
b) What really happens during
enough to include martial
his prerogative to address law? exigencies or threats that endanger the
State.132
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the imposition of martial law? What
powers could the President exercise during martial law that he could not exercise if there It is thus
is nobeyond
martialdoubt
law? thatInterestingly,
the powerthese of judicial review does not extend to calibrating
questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tan
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What domain precisely
of thedoes
Executive
martial andlaw addan toinfringement
the on the prerogative that solely,
power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant d) Thethe framers
functioning
of theof1987 the civil
Constitution
courts orintended the Congress not to interfere a p
legislative assemblies . . . President.
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where
the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative
The elimination
power. Sobythese
the framers
two clausesof thedenied
1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial
review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated
x powers will be availed of in a givenx
situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional concurrence in the first
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege.133 MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legi
MR. PADILLA. x Chief x Executive x acting a

We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should MR.
not require
MONSOD.
beforehand
I would
the concurrence
be less comfortable
of if we have a presidency th
the majority of the Members of the Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten
or even increase the period ofMR. SUAREZ. such But he suspension.
can act 134 with the concurrence of the

x x xMR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations x arise, it is very unlikely that the concur
secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no
need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in caseMR. of actualSUAREZ.
invasion or rebellion.'
So, weIf therewould
is be subordinating actual
actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there is an
attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads MR.
might
MONSOD.
be blocked
Idoornot
barricaded.
believe it is
x xexpediency
x So the when one is trying to protect the country
requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members of the Congress in Thecase
foregoing
of an invasion
exchange orclearly
rebellion
manifests
might bethe intent of the Constitution not to allow Co
impractical as I can choice see ofit. extraordina

Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke thedeclaration

e) The Court must or similarly
lift the and necessarily
suspension.refrain from calibrating the President's decisi
to avail given a certain sit
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to
judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence
It cannot as
beaoveremphasized
prerequisite to declare
that time martial
is paramount in situations necessitating the proc
135
law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
privilege
habeas of thecorpus.
writ of habeas
x corpus. x It xwas precisely this time element that prompted
the requirement of concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the Pre
x x xprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Considering x that the proclamation of martial la
of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety
MR. SUAREZ. Thank
in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity you. and urgency for the President to act qu
Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into t
The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase Constitution
'and, with the concurrence of attoleast a the E
majority of all the Members of the Congress . . .'
f) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ
the of habeas corpus or also the writdeclaration of
of martial law.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, o
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would becondition an exclusivefor prerogative
the President of to
thedeclare
President?
martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Ar
President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 daysand may that
bepublic
shortened
safetybyrequires
the Congress
it. Besides,
or theit would be contrary to common sense if the
Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or the Senate on maythe even
recommendation
revoke theof his mere alter 136
proclamation. ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and
the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
x x x x
g) In any event, the President initially employed the most benign action - the calling out
MR. SUAREZ. x suspended x the privilegex of the writ

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that At hethis
is vesting
juncture,
exclusively
it must unto
be stressed
the President
that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the decla
the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the President
suspension
had already
of the writ
issued
of habeas
Proclamation
corpus. No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a
I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. lawless Mayviolence
we beininformed
Mindanao. of his
This,
goodin fact,
and is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Pro
substantial presidential actions, it can be gleaned reasons?that although there is no obligation or requir
powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious an
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous benign interpellations
from amongregarding
his extraordinary
this phrase, powers.
even As the initial and preliminary step tow
during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation
hostilities
of actual
in Mindanao,
invasion ortherebellion.
President Indecided
these to use his calling out power first. Unfortu
situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. Itcontrary,
is only good
it only
for worsened.
a maximumThus, of 60exercising
days. At his sole and exclusive prerogative, the P
the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire
suspend
into thethesufficiency
privilege of the
the factual
writ of basis
habeasof corpus on the belief that the armed hostil
the proclamation always exists, even during rebellion
those first 60
and days. publip safety

x x xV. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 xmay be considered vague and thus void b
groups"; and (b) the absence of any guideline specifying its actual operational para
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national
consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution
Proclamation
now has No. sufficient
216 is being
safeguards.
facially As
challenged
I on the ground of "vagueness" by
said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right groups" 139 in its
to determine theWhereas
factual basis
Clausebecause
and forthelack of available guidelines specifying its actu
paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an appropriate
Mindanaoproceeding
region, filed
making
by anythecitizen,
proclamation
the susceptible to broad interpre
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within
This 30 days from argument
its filing. lacks

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance thea)interests of the country. And here we are Void-for-vagueness
trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. x x x
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of commo
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doingmeaning what andMr.differ Marcos
as to its application."
had done? 140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague

men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its a
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. repugnant
What we to the
are Constitution
looking for are
in two
safeguards
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to ac
that are reasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion
by it, fair
or notice
rebellion,
of the
evenconduct
during the
to avoid;
first 60and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled d
days when the intention here is to protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable
becomes to askanthat there should
arbitrary
be a flexing of the
concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
b) Vagueness doctrine applies only in
Neitherfree
could Proclamation
speech No. 216 be cases.
described as vague, and thus void, on the gro
actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operationa
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes
theinimplementation
free speech cases of or,
theasproclamation.
they are called In Part III, we declared that judicial review c
in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to data
a vague
available
statute
to orandknown
also toto one
the which
President
is prior to, or at the time of, the declarati
overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes
exhaustively
violating
in free
Part speech.
VII, theA person
review whowill be confined to the proclamation itself
does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague Clearly, law thustherefore,
chills there
him isintono need for 143
silence." the Court to determine the constitutionalit
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech
act committed
cases. They
underare thenotsaid
appropriate
orders in violation
for of the Constitution and the laws, such
testing the validity of penal statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wa
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad trespassing
because ofintopossible
the 'chilling
sphereeffect'thatuponis reserved exclusively for Congress i
protected speech. The theory is that '[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
VI. Whether
value toorallnotsociety
nullifying
of constitutionally
Proclamation No. 216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with acts
no requirement
of the President
that the
in calling
personout making
the armed
the forces to quell lawless violence in Mara
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the a) The
possibility
calling that
out power
the protected
is in a different
speech category
of from the power to declare martial la
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible the inhibitory
writ effects
of habeas
of overly corpus;
broad statutes.
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 w

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem Theeffect
Court's resulting
ruling from
in thesetheir
cases
verywill
existence,
not, in any way, affect the President's declaration
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be preventedof from
lawless
enacting
violence
lawsinagainst
Mindanao socially
through
harmful
Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016,
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances theasPhilippine in theNational area Policeof free(PNP) speech.
to undertake such measures to suppress any and a
region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and esc
x x x x
In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a differe
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
privilege offorthe testing
writ of 'onhabeas
their faces'
corpusstatutes
and the power to declare martial law:chanRoblesv
in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. Theyxcannot x x Congress
be made mayto do
revoke
service
such when
proclamation
what is or suspension and the Court may review
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that However,
'one to therewhomisapplication
no such equivalent
of a statuteprovision
is dealing with the revocation or revie
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might armed
also be forces.
takenTheas applying
distinction
to other
placespersons
the calling out power in a different category from
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed powerout, to suspend
'vagueness thechallenges
privilege ofinthe
thewrit
Firstof habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while together
statutesthe found
three powers
vague asand a matter
provided
of due
for their revocation and review without any qua
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x145 In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces i
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking
privilege
down statutes
of the writentirely
of habeas
on thecorpus
groundand thatto declare martial law, although, of course, i
they might be applied to Rarties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally exercise protected.146 "Such of invalidation the would latter powers, as
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
abstract context having no Even factual
so, the Court's review concreteness." 147
of the President's declaration of martial law and his
entails separate proceedings instituted for that
c) Proclamation No. 216 cannot be facially challenged using the vagueness doctrine.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. prevent
Proclamation
or suppress No. lawless
216 does violence,
not regulate
invasion or rebellion may only be examined by
148
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged.exercised What it seeks withinto penalize
permissible
is conduct,
constitutional
not limits or in a manner con
speech.
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation
requisitesNo. of locus
1017,standi,
issued asby itthen
wasPresident
not able to show any specific injury which it had su
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on ground of vagueness Joseph is uncalled
Estrada'sforordersince deploying
a plain reading
the of Philippine Marines to join the PNP in v
Proclamation No. 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. This
Likelocus
Proclamation
standi requirement,
No. 1017, Proclamation
however, need not be complied with in so far as the Co
No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is the manifestly
factual basissubjectof the
to state
President's
regulation.
declaration of martial law or suspension of th
concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citiz
d) Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make prove Proclamation
that he or she No.stands 216to sustain
vague.a direct and personal injury as a consequ

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 openBut,
to broad
even assuming
interpretation,
arguendo
misinterpretation,
that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration
and confusion, cannot not be affect the President's
sustained.
exercise of his calling out powe

In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary b) The operative

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution
Neither would in twotherespects:
nullification
(1) itofviolates
Proclamation
due No. 216 result in thcl nullification of the
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice ofUnder
the conduct
the "operative
to avoid; and fact (2)
doctrine,"
it leaves the
law unconstitutional statute is recognized as
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of 158
unconstitutional. the Government muscle.
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary t
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by eithernew
a saving
Civil Code
clauseputs
or byit:construction.
'When the courts Thus, in
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Co
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made latter it
shall
illegal
govern.
for 'three
Administrative
or more persons
or executive
to acts, orders and regulations shall be v
assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons laws or thepassing
Constitution.'
by.' Clearly, Thetheaboveordinance
provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox
imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance what annoys legislative some people or executive,
but does not is not
annoya law,
others.'
confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affo
qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence o
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is constitutionality],
evident on its face. is It
anisoperative
to be distinguished,
fact and may have consequences which cannot always
however, from legislation couched in imprecise language - but which nonetheless specifies effect
a standard
of the subsequent
though defectively
ruling asphrased
to the -invalidity may have to be considered in v
in which case, it may be 'saved' by proper construction.151 regulations, individual and corporate, and particular c
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany
it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation
The orthodox No.view
55, which
finds support
it cited by in the
way well-settled
of doctrine that the Constitution is
reference in its validity
Whereasof legislative or executive acts. clauses.
Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the exec
this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attem
e) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make provisions
Proclamation No.
is 216 to vague. that extent u
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which hasathe final say level
on whether or that
not a legislative
is hard, if not
or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have
legal consequences which the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of timeBesides, such a statute,
the framerstreaty, of executive
the 1987 order,
Constitution
or considered intelligencb reports of mil
ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate President
and logical
cah then appraise
than toand consider
to itwhich
as he can anchor his judgment,16
'an operative fact?'(Emphasis supplied)159
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proofAt shield
this that
point,
would
it isrepulse
wise anyto challenge
quote thetopertinent portions of the Dissenting Op
acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofinthe Fortun:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in
furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, President
when Arroyo
evidence
cannot showsbe blamed otherwise.
for relying upon the information given to her by t
Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising
VII. The Scope of the Powerthat a state of emergency
to has alsoReview.
been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent la
massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety
a) The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination
suspension of the sufficiency of the factual of t
basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring m
corpus.160The
To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, which
Constitution,
was decided as couched,
under thedoes1935not require precision in establishing the fact
Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has public been adherence to or168compliance with the
safety requires.
constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend Corollary, the privilegeas the President
of the iswrit expected
of habeas
to decide quickly on whether there is a need to p
corpus.162 "Lansanglimited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow intelligencd
test reports,
of arbitrariness." 163
it is irrelevant,Fr.for
Bernas
purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent e
described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary accurately reported
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court first gave the general answer that its power was
'merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has After gone beyond
all, the theCourt's
constitutional
review is limits
confined
of his
to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the info
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. suspension;
More specifically,
subsequent theevents
Court do
saidnot
that
have
its any bearing insofar as the Court's review i
power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases elevatedSection thereto18, byArticle
appealVII. .of. the
in which
Constitution
cases theare in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the
appellate court has all the powers of the court of origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicialCongress
administrative
may choose decisions
to revoke
whereittheeven
Court
immediately after the proclamation is made;
is limited to asking whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding.background
Instead, the Court accepted the Solicitor of the
General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending Hence, the themaxim
writ, thefalsus
President
in uno, did
falsus
notinactomnibus finds no application in this case. Fa
arbitrarily.'164 facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for th
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, bysuspension providing onlyas long
for asjudicial
therereview
are other
based
facts
onin the proclamation and the written Report
th determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the actual
test of arbitrariness
invasion asorprovided rebellion
in Lansang.
and that public safety requires

b) The "sufficiency of factual

In sum, the Court'sbasis
power to review is limited
test". to the determination of whether the Presi
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our revi
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 whether
Constitution
the President
are presumed
acted within
to know
the bounds
the set by the Constitution, i.e., whether th
prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase time
"sufficiency
of the declaration
of factual basis"
or suspension
in Sectionare
18,sufficient for him to declare martial law or
Article VII of th Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the
corpus.
President's power to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to
satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether
VIII. The
theparameters
President's for
decision
determining
had sufficient
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declar
factual of the privilege bases. of the writ

We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review bya)the introductionActual of the "sufficiency
invasion of the or rebellion, and
factual basis" test.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the fa
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or and/or to thesuspend
suspensionthe privilege
of the privilege
of the of writthe writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actua
of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. requires
Since the exercise of of such
thesepower."
powers 170isWithout
a the concurrence of the two condition
judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient
and/or factual suspension
basis for theof exercise theof such, privilege of the writ of habeas
must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written As a general
Report submitted
rule, a word byused
him in to aCongress.
statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is co
These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made ormeaning. past events.171 Since
As tothehowConstitution
far the past didevents
not define the term "rebellion," it must be unders
should be from the present depends on the President. Past events may be consideredofas justifications "rebellion"
for the declaration and/or in the Revised
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then C
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President. 165 As Commander-in-Chief,
actual rebellion as one defined under he Article
has 134 of the RPC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamationMR. andDE theLOS
written
REYES. Report
As I see
taking
it now,
intothe
account
Committee envisions actual rebellion and no lon
the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge mean thatintelligence
there should
reportsbe actual
and confidential
shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañ
information that may prejudice the operations and the
contemporary
safety event of - this the
Manila Hotelmilitary.
incident, everybody knows what happened. W
act of
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martialMR.lawREGALADO.
and/or the Ifsuspension
we consider of the definition
privilege of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of
of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued actual
theassemblage
proclamation. of men
If atinall,
anthey
armed may public
be uprising for the purposes mentioned in Ar
used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency ofArticle
factual135.
basis, x173not as part or component
x xbut
of the portfolio of the factual
Thus, rebellion as mentioned basis in the Constitution
itself. could only refer to rebellion as define
different definition would not only create confusion but would also give the Presiden
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension,
abused the Court - shoulda look intosituation the full that the Constitution
complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness
of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President couldArticle
not be134 expected
of the RPCto verify
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision
Art. 134.
in theRebellion
President's
or insurrection;
appreciation Howof facts
committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrecti
would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such armsa requirement
against the Government
will practically fornecessitate
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted Philippine
to him Islands
withinora any
periodpartthat
thereof,
only of theany body of land, naval or other armed f
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would notLegislature,
only place the wholly
President
or partially,
in peril
of any
but of
wouldtheir powers or prerogatives.
also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow Thus, thefor words
rebellion of Justice
to exist,Antonio
the following
T. Carpio elements must be present, to wit: "(1) there
in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by against
the time thetheGovernment;
President is and satisfied
(2) the
withpurpose
the of the uprising or movement is eithe
correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion Government
or rebellion could or its have
laws:already
(i) the territory
escalatedoftothe Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any
or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives." 175
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause deat
b) Probable cause is the allowable standard of del Sur
proof
but also for
in other parts
the of Mindanao;
President.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself andthat
thethere
Reportis184
probable
submittedcause
to Congress:
or evidence
showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. 176 To 1. require him to satisfy a higher standard of Zamboanga
proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as 2. the standard of proof in determining the Davao
existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most
practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the 3. existence or non-existence of rebellion Mamasapano
necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order
to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise 4. Cotabato
of emergency
bombings; 188
powers, the requirement
of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting
to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely]
5. relies on common sense [and] Sultan
xxx Kudarat
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused." 177
6. Sulu
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause 7. Basilan President 191
for thebombings; to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion.
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance, by combined force
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall now proceed to the core of the controversy - whether Proclamation No.
216, Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 9. Escalation
Corpus inofthearmed
wholehostility
of Mindanao,
against the government troops;193
lacks
sufficient factual basis.
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and establishment
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts
upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege
12. The ofobject
the writ
of the
of habeas
armedcorpus;
hostilities
rather,
was to lay the groundwork for the establishm
only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should 13.beMaute
accorded
Group thehas
President.
263 active such, he isarmed and combat ready;197
Asmembers,
not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas 14. Extensive networks linkages of thecorpus. Maute Group with foreign and local armed group

We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS;199
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declar
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed17.
forcesForeign-based
or (b) to deprive terrorist
the Chief Executive
groups provide financial and logistical
or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.178
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.179 However, they18. Events
insist on
thatMay
the23,
armed
2017hostilities
in MarawidoCity,
notparticularly:
constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof;
a) at
or 2:00
(ii) any
PM,body
members
of land,and
naval,
sympathizers
or other of the Maute Group and ASG attacked
of any 202
armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,facilities; of their powers and prerogatives.

The contention lacks

b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed merit.
criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jai
member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside
a) Facts, events and information upon which the President anchored his decision to declare
issued
martial
firearms,
law and
and suspend 203 privilege of
vehicles;the
the writ of habeas corpus.
c) by 4:30 PM, interruption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city wide power outage
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM,180 the Court will consider only those facts
and/or events which were known to or have transpired d) from
on 6:00orPM tobefore
7:00 PM, Maute
that Grouptime,ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Sta

consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were
e) deemed
BJMPto havepersonnel
been consideredevacuated
by the the Marawi City Jail
President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was
1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
Mindanao;181 g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi

2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including: h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns'
a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016,Moncado
killing and
Colony; 209
wounding several soldiers;

b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the Maute Group
i) taking
andofother
hostages from the church;210
detainees;

3. On May 23, 2017:183 j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation;211
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central Elementary
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;
l) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213
c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-L
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armoredinvehicle; 216
Fortun:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan incapacitate
to execute Christians;217
her from exercising

q) preventing Maranaos from leaving

Definitely, the President
their gather 218
need not homes; proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the
accused charged with a criminal o
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
x x
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and
private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing armedProofuprising
beyond
against
reasonable
and opendoubt
defiance
is the
of highest
the quantum of evidence, and to require
Government.220 rebellion or invasion with such amount of proof before declaring martial law or sus
restriction on 'the President's power to act as to practically tie her hands and disable
b) The President's against threats
Conclusion to

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the Neither
following
clear and
conclusions,
convincingasevidence,
mentioned which
in is employed in either criminal or civil case
Proclamation No. 216 and martial law orthe
suspension of the writ.Report:
This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains
powers, as it requires proof greater than preponderance of evidence al
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land
Not
and
even
to maintain
preponderance
public order
of evidence,
and safety
which
in is the degree of proof necessary in civil ca
Mindanao, constituting the crime martial of rebellion."221

2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against thex duly constituted government and againstx
the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance
to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives
Weighingtotheenforce
superiority
the laws
of the
of the
evidence
land and
on hand, from at least two opposing sides, b
to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, andsuspend
detriment of the people writtherein andunreasonably
the curtails the P
nation as a whole."222
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President'
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish
evidence
an Islamic
is theState
amount
andoftheir
proofcapability
requiredtoin administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or
deprive the duly constituted authorities the President, foremost - ofreasonable their powers mind and prerogatives."
might 223 accept as adequate

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish
I amthe
of groups'
the viewseat
thatofprobable
power incause
Marawi
of the
Cityexistence of either invasion or rebellion suff
224
for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province valid
covering the
declaration
entire Mindanao."
of martial law and sus

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Probable
Muslims to cause
further
is theexpand
same amount
their ranks
of proof
and required for the filing of a criminal inform
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City;
of anthe
arrest
decimation
warrantofbya asegment
judge. Probable
of the citycause has been defined as a 'set of facts an
population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced,
discreetand
andunmistakable
prudent manintent
to believe
to remove
that the offense charged in the Information
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its committed allegiance to theby Government." the225 person sought

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the In determining
President ofprobable
his power,
cause,
authority,
the average
and man weighs the facts and circumstances
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entirerules
Mindanao,
of evidence
in an of
attempt
which to
heundermine
has no technical
his knowledge. He relies on common sense
control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandaterest ontoevidence
ensure that
showing
all laws
that,
aremore
faithfully
likely than not, a crime has been committed a
226
executed; and remove his supervisory powers Probable
over cause
local demands governments."
more than suspicion; it requires less than ev

7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending
Probabletheir
cause,reports
basically
to the
premised
Chief Executive
on common sense, is the most reasonable, most prac
due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from the performing
President can their
fullyfunctions.
ascertainThrough
the existence
the or non-existence of rebellion, necessary fo
attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have beenc) adversely affected. Inaccuracies,
The bridge and road simulations, falsities,
blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peaceThe andallegation
order in thein thearea.
Lagman
Movement
Petition
bythat
boththe facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and
civilians and government personnel to and from the and/or
city hyperbolic,
is likewise
does not persuade. As 227
hindered." mentioned, the Court is not concerned about
of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the Presiden
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal
drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
Specifically,
have
it alleges
resulted thatinthe
thefollowing
deterioration
facts are not true as shown by its counter-eviden
of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao." 228
FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVID
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the
siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control(1)over
thatthe
theentirety
Maute ofgroup attacked
Mindanao. Amai Pakpak Hospital and
These Statements
hoisted people
circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino the DAESH flag there,
and preserve our among
nationalseveral locations. As of (a) Dr. Ame
integrity."229 0600H of 24 May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen (b) Health
guarding the entry gates of the Amai Pakpak Hospital and that (c) PNP Spoke
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public they held hostage
uprising, the employees
the culpable purpose of of the Hospital and took over
which (d) AFP Public A
was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory the
and PhilHealth
to deprive office located
the Chief thereat
Executive (Proclamation No. 216 and
of any (e) Marawi City
Report);
of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is hospital was at
being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas news articles o
corpus. Radyo.232

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
2. that Proclamation
the Maute No. 216,and
Group ambushed had
burned the Marawi Police Statements ma
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was
Station (Proclamation No.an armed
216 public
and the Report); Rosa and Maraw
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory line news re
and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the Philippines233de
facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. Marawi Police S

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for
3. athat
valid declaration
lawless armed of martial
groups law and
likewise ransacked the Landbank of Statement mad
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent
 the Philippines and commandeered one of its armored vehicles article of Philstar234 that the Marawi City branch was not
XI. Whole of
(Report); ransacked but sustained damages from the attacks.
a) The overriding and paramount concern of martial law is the protection of the security
4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was burned Statements in the on-line news article ofPhilstar235 made
public.
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); by the Marawi City Schools Division Assistant
Superintendent Considering
Ana Alonto denying that and
the nation's the school was traumatic experience of martial law under
its people's
burned and Department
framers ofof the
Education Assistant Secretary
1987 Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law.
Tonisito Umali stating
writers that they have
entertained not received
no doubt anynecessity and practicality of such specie of
about the
report of damage.
bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial

5. that the Maute Group attacked various government facilities Statement in theIndeed,
on-linemartial
news article ofthe
Inquirer 236 made
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report). by Marawi City ofMayor Majul Gandamra stating
the nation; suspension of the privilege that theof the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary,
ASG and the Maute Terror Groups
of individuals, [it] is have
for tlienot taken over
purpose of defending and protecting the security of the st
any governmentpeople".
facility in253Marawi City. Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Commissioner
or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "esp
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors
nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown Asidethatfromefforts were made
protecting to secure
the security such
of the country, martial law also guarantees and pro
affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled,that
news articlesalone
rebellion are hearsay
does not evidence,
justify thetwice
declaration of martial law or suspension of th
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other publicthan proving the truth of the matter
safety requirement must lik
asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles 238as
basis for their claim of insufficiency b) As Commander-in-Chief,
of factualthe President basis.
receives vital, relevant, classified, and live infor
decisions.
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in these cases. As long as there are
other facts in the proclamation and the written Report indubitably showing the presenqe In of an actual
Parts IX andinvasion or rebellion
X, the Court and that
laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed t
public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of President, sufficiency of factual
the totality of factsbasis, stands.
and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebell
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. O
d) Ruling in Bedol v. Commission on
thereElections not that actual
is probable cause applicable.
rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issu
Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and e
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance,
sufficient.
trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of
independent relevant statement, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, appliesToinbe cases
sure,"where onlymentioned
the facts the fact that
in thesuch
Proclamation and the Report are far from be
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial." 240 juncture, it may not be amiss to state such
Here, the question is not whether that as Commander-in-Chief, the President ha
statements were made by Saber, et al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary
classified to the view ofthe
as "confidential", petitioners,
contents the
of which cannot be included in the Proclamatio
exception in Bedol finds no Theseapplication
documents may contain information here. detailing the position of government
ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers
e) There are other independent facts which support the finding that, more likely than held not, by
rebellion existssome
the Court, and information
that public safety
came to light, although not mentioned in the P
requires discretion whether to include the same in it. the Proclamation or Report is the judgme
concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assert
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels ofis the Report; along with thethese alleged false call of
data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists, and public safety requires the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It isTobeyond
be precise,
cavil the
thatalleged false and/or
the President can rely on intelligence reports and classifie
inaccurate statements are only five out of the several statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the
[C]ommander-in-[C]hief interpellation
of the by to appraise these [classified evidence or d
Armed Forces
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagmanpublicadmitted
safety that he
demands was
thenot aware
suspensionor that
of the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-
he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question[the]
"when or challenge with respect
authors of to orthe witnesses to these documen
reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable
and that Proclamation No. 216 was without In fine,sufficient
not only does thefactual
President have basis.
a wide array of information before him, he also
access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as C
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated,c) The Court
false has noand/or
machinery orhyperbolic.
tool equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief to ably
X. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of thethe
In contrast, writ of habeas
Court does notcorpus
have inthethe
same resources available tp the President. H
whole of constitutional lapse. On the contrary, Mindanao.
this is in line with the function of the Court, pa
sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration
sufficiency of martial
of factual basislaw
mustor be
suspension
limited only to the facts and information mentioned
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 258 cautioned not to "undertake an indep
Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,
corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public
In thissafety
regard,requirement.
"the Court willIn his Report,
have the
to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecu
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group Department
were directedwill nothave
only against government
to open its findings to the Court,260 which it did during the
242
forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities,
bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools andd)churches
The 1987were burned;245grants
Constitution civiliantohostages
the President, as Commander-in-Chief the discreti
were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced
application to
of joinmartial 248 medical
their group;law or suspension of the privilege o
services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were
250
hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao Section Island was compromised. 251
18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebelli
President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philipp
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocititts had already escalated to athe
Clearly, level that risked grants
Constitution public safety
to theand President the discretion to determine the t
thus impelldd him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeassuspension
corpus. In the lastprivilege
of the paragraph of his
of the Report,
writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippin
the President declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going This isrebellion, if not the seeds ofand
both an acknowledgement invasion,
a recognition that it is the Executive Department,
public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension Chief, of
who theis privilege
the of theofwrit
repository ofclassified,
vital, habeas and live information necessary for and rel
252
corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial lawtactical
and suspension
and military of the privilegeand
support, of the
thuswrit
has a more informed understanding of wh
of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has Constitution
sufficient factual basis there being probable
imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unles
cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial larv declaration
not on theand the suspension
territorial scope orofarea
the of
privilege
coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any
of the writ of habeas corpus.
of the President.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS
e) The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against possible abuses of Commander-in-Chief's
no publicity in their powers;acts further
as, in fact,curtailment
they were merely lurking inside the compound of P
of Presidential powers should not only be discouraged
out that for thebut crime of also rebellion toavoided.
be consummated, it is not required that all armed
in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial lawsuffices
would engender
that a portion apprehensions
of the contingent
amonggathered
the and formed a mass or a crowd and eng
citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, government.the importance
Similarly, it ofcannot
martialbe lawvalidly
in the concluded that the grounds on which the arm
context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The be the
significance
measureofofmartialthe extent,law should
scope or notrange,
be of the actual rebellion. This is logical sinc
undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and or crucial
elsewhere, to the whose
promotionparticipation
of public didsafety,
not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may
the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country.ofIt is vital for the protection of the country
not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be
cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias Proceedingand from unsubstantiated
the same illustration,
assumptions. suppose we say that the President, after find
rebellion that public safety requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of h
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguardscould which effectively
we then
wateredsay down that the power the territorial coverage of the
to declate martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with
the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, To answer
but its duration
this question,was likewise
we revert fixed
backatto60the premise that the discretion to determine
days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the thevetoPresident.
powersThe of Constitution
the Court and grants
Congress.
him the prerogative whether to put the entire P
law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the part
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted actually transpired.
his colleagues Thisinis the
notConstitutional
only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent me
Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by elaboratingsovereignty on the and sufficiency
survival. of As such,
the proposed
the President has to respond quickly. After the rebe
safeguards:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose mar
MR. MONSOD. x President would x have to wait until every remote x corner in the country is infested with r
the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial law for a fixed period not exceeding 60
days, which is subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous violations ofhuman Going rights,
backthe to the
predominance
illustration above,
of the military
although the President is not required to impose m
forever and in untold sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion.
because itWe is where
may not thehave
armed anypublic
freedom uprising
to actually transpired, he may do so if he se
speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That might precluded
preventfrom the President
expanding fromtheacting
coverage at that
of martial law beyond the Court's compound
time in order to meet the problem. So I would like to suggest that, perhaps, we should look predetermined
at this in its proper perspective. We are
only looking at a very specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are looking at actual
invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in those cases.262 Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law,
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution hrs enough safeguards against from presidential
events that could abusesendanger
and commission
the safety ofof the general public from significant dange
268
human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination of the requirement pf prior disasters."
concurrence Public
of Congress,
safety is an Bishop
abstract Bacani
term; it does not take any physical form. Plai
stated, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary physically measured by metes
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote yes is that despite my concern for human rights, I believe that a good
President can also safeguard human rights and human lives as well. And I do not want Perhaps
to unduly anotheremasculate
reason why the the
powersterritorial
of thescope of martial law should not necessarily b
President. x x x263 armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of r
Commissioner De los Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues a
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my rebellion[,]
vote, thoughMadam crimes in themselves[,]
President.are deemed absorbed in one single crime o
committed in its pursuance".270 Direct assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbe
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and are delicate
absorbed
nature.in Athe freecrime
people of are
rebellion
naturally if committed in furtherance of rebelliop; "[
jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to277be
charge." Jurisprudence
one of no ordinary also teaches
magnitude.that not only common crimes may be absorbed
But as presented by the Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; laws
2) Congress
[such as Presidential
can revoke it; Decree
3) theNo. 1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of
Supreme
Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the punishable
operation under
of thea special
Constitution.
law orTo general
repeatlaw, which are mere components or ingred
what I have quoted when I interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power become to impose
absorbed martial in the
law iscrime
dangerous
of rebellion
to and cannot be isolated and charg
liberty and may be abused. All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out
any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same time equally Thus, effectual.
by the When theory
citizens
of absorption,
of the Statethe arecrime
in of murder committed n Makati City, if
arms against each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the laws, rebellion
the actionbeing of thehypothetically
President must staged
be prompt
in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its
or it is of little value. x x x264 (Emphasis supplied) crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of ma
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of public the framers
uprising isofactually
the 1987 takingConstitution
place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only
that sufficientsafeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chiefthe of his extraordinary
same powers timeare already rebellion
in is also happe
place and that no further emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution
recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential In fine, powers
it is difficult,
would not if notgenerate
impossible, any to good
fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a whole. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physiqal dim
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of defies these encumbrances
precise measurements; on the President
hence, the anddetermination of the territorial scope of mar
Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress not fixed,
that may variables.
be dominated
The Constitution
by opposition must have considered these limitations when
parties, we may be actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to flexibility
cut the Gordian in knot by just determining
declaring a the territorial sco
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x x265 (Emphasis supplied)
f) Rebellion and public safety; nature, Moreover, scope,
the President's andduty to maintain range.peace and public safety is not limited only to
extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is n
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising lawless
againstelements from Marawi266City,
the govemment;" andbut thatalso
by to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut t
nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action,ofthat Mindanao.
cannotThus, be confined
limiting the a priori,
proclamation
within and/or suspension to the place where th
predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the precise extent or rangethe of thepurpose
rebellion couldof declaring
not be measured martial by law, it will make the exercis
exact metes and bounds.
g) The Court must stay within the
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura, Ennita, Manila where the Court's
compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and The hoisted
Court can theonly
ISISactflag.
within
Their themotive
confines was of its power. For the Court to overreach is to
political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine governmentpower a parttoofdetermine
the territory the ofscope
the ofPhilippines,
territorial application belongs to the President. "The
particularly the Court's compound and establish without
it violating
as theanprincipleISIS-territory.
of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining th

Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion,Tocould
reiterate,
we validly
the Court
say that
is notthe
equipped
rebellionwith
is the competence and logistical machinery
confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility that thereplaces
are other
in the
rebels
military's
positioned
efforts in
to the
quell
nearby
the rebellion and restore peace. It would be eng
buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High
embark
School
on(MSHS)
a mission
couldofnot
deciphering
be discounted.
the territorial metes and bounds of martial l
There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went andproclamation stayed insideof martial
the Court's
law none compound.
of the members of this Court could have divined th
forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have
predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta i) Romato Maute Terrorism
would be apprehended neither
in negates nor
Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in
Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict that. It is In
also
theofsame
judicial
manner,
noticethethatCourt
the insurgency
lacks the in Mindanao has be n ongoing for decade
technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward operating
peaceful base
means, of the
others
military
haveinresorted
their present
to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion ma
endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether which thehas
60-day
a broader
lifespanscope
of Proclamation
covering a wide No. range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion
299
216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should
terrorism
give can
the President
be committed.sufficient However,
leeway towhile the scope of terrorism may be comp
address the peace and order problem
defined. The objective in of a "terrorist"Mindanao.
is to sow and create a condition of widespread fea
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded
kidnapping,
into using
mass"the
killing,
swordandof
beheading,
Alexanderamong
to others. In contrast, the purpose of rebe
cut the Gordian knot"282 by attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all, "the declaration
(a) to remove of from
martial thelaw
allegiance
or the suspension
to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territ
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially
any body of land,an naval, executive
or armed forces; 283 (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congre
act."or
and
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as
some sort of a reminder of the nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. In determining
However, it iswhat not crime
fair towas
judge committed,
President we have to look into the main objective of
Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial the law era.
purpose
At this
of point,
severingthethe
Courtallegiance
quotes theof Mindanao to the Philippine Government
insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a conditio
MR. OPLE. x panic amongx the populace in order to coerce x the government to give in to an unlawfu
have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is
x x xunder the x crime

Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive In anybranch
case,ofeven
the government
assuming that impotent,
the insurgency
as in Marawi City can also be character
though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service tomanner humanaffectwelfare.Proclamation
I think it is No. also216.important
Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwis
to understand that the extraordinary measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive expresslypertain
provides to that
a practical
"[n]othing stateinofthiswarAct shall be interpreted as a curtailment,
existing in this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism recognized
of all Filipinos,
powersespecially
of the executive
if it is an branch
actualof the government." Thus, as long as the Pre
invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum flexibilitySection 18, to Article
cope with VII, the
such existence
unprecedented
of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising hi
threats to the survival of a nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the samelaw time or has
suspending
not, in any themanner,
privilegeshunned
of the writ theof habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinar
task of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and balances, includinghim the possible
by therevocation Constitution.
at any time No of acta of Congress can, therefore,
proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to
another extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to Besides,
do sotherebecauseis nothing
the emergency
in Art. 134 persists.
of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion a
other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly rep
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it is is attuned
one ofto the freedom predicate andcrimes
the rights of ofterrorism, one cannot absorb the oth
the citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a vigorous representation of the
people through their Congress when an emergency measure is in force and effect.284 Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of
h) Several local armed groups have formed linkages aimed at committing rebellion andthe acts in furtherance thereof in the whole entireof Mindan
Mindanao.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South." causes285orOn principles
April 15,that 1980, weitespouse,
was conferredadvocate or champion, let us not forget that at t
the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was confronted
derived from withthea word
crisis of'dansal',
such magnitude
meaning aand proportion that we all need to summon
destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or coming." 287 Marawi nation,
lies in the heart if of we Mindanao. areIn fact,tothe overcome and prevail in
Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in
Mindanao. Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month
end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date,
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of therebels rebellion, bothasfor symbolic against
and strategic 71 government troops
reasons. , Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have
288
historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor
Can we passages;"
not sheathe thereour is also
swords
the plan
and topause for a while to bury our dead, i
establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already
dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and WHEREFORE,
Cagayan de Oro the forCourt
bombing FINDSoperations,
sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. as Indeed,
CONSTITUTIONAL.
there is some semblance Accordingly,
of truth the consolidated Peti
to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
SO
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:
On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Sereno,
Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. C. A civilian was J., See
killed while another was wounded.290 Carpio, J., See
On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak, Tawi-Tawi.291 Jr.,
Velasco, J., I concur. Please see
On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan resultingLeonardo-De in the death of Castro,two children andJ., the I concur in
wounding of three others.292 Peralta, J., See
From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions Bersamin, by the BIFF in Mindanao. J., TheseI resulted inconcur. Please see
the death and wounding of several personalities.293 Mendoza, J., I concur. See
On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu.294 Reyes, J., See Separate
On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebelsPerlas-Bernabe,
and government troops. J., 295 I concur in the result. Ple
On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde.296 Leonen, J., I dissent. See
297
On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji artd beheaded him three days later.Jardeleza, J., See
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by theCaguioa,
ASG and other local rebel groups.J.,All these See
suggest th t the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled overMartires to other parts of Mindanao. J., with
Tijam, J., with Separate Opinion.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and tbe linkages established U.S. among
Supreme rebel
Court groups, the armed uprising
that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court
Unitedtherefore
States v. Nixon,
will not418 simplyU.S.disregard
683 (1974)the
events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the United
Zamboanga
States v.City Nixonsiege, and the countless
bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court No. cannot73-1766
simply take the battle of Marawi in
isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis Arguedto believe
July 8,that
1974the declaration of martial
law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Decided
of Mindanao,
July 24,is1974*most necessary, effective,
and called for by 418 U.S. the683 circumstances.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing
COURT material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the
Syllabus Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the
Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain staff Constitution. Pp. 418 U. S. 703-707.
members of the White House and political supporters of the President, the 5. Although the courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts in
Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c) for a the performance of an Art. II function, United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187,
subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial of certain tapes and 190, 191-192 (No. 14,694), when a claim of Presidential privilege as to
documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on
between the President and others. The President, claiming executive the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on
privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The District Court, after the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's
treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged, concluded generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands
presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17(c) had been satisfied. The of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. Pp. 418 U.
court thereafter issued an order for an in camera examination of the S. 707-713.
subpoenaed material, having rejected the President's contentions (a) that 6. On the basis of this Court's examination of the record, it cannot be
the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was nonjusticiable as an concluded that the District Court erred in ordering in camera examination of
"intra-executive" conflict and (b) that the judiciary lacked authority to review the subpoenaed material, which shall now forthwith be transmitted to the
the President's assertion of executive privilege. The court stayed its order District Court. Pp. 418 U. S. 713-714.
pending appellate review, which the President then sought in the Court of 7. Since a president's communications encompass a vastly wider range of
Appeals. The Special Prosecutor then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of sensitive material than would be true of an ordinary individual, the public
certiorari before judgment (No. 73-1766), and the President filed a cross- interest requires that Presidential confidentiality be afforded the greatest
petition for such a writ challenging the grand jury action (No. 73-1834). The protection consistent with the fair administration of justice, and the District
Court granted both petitions. Court has a heavy responsibility to ensure that material involving Presidential
Held: conversations irrelevant to or inadmissible in the criminal prosecution be
1. The District Court's order was appealable as a "final" order under 28 U.S.C. accorded the high degree of respect due a President, and that such material
§ 1291, was therefore properly "in" the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1254, be returned under seal to its lawful custodian. Until released to the Special
when the petition for certiorari before judgment was filed in this Court, and Prosecutor, no in camera material is to be released to anyone. Pp. 418 U.
is now properly before this Court for review. Although such an order is S. 714-716.
normally not final and subject to appeal, an exception is made in a No. 73-1766, 377 F.Supp. 1326, affirmed; No. 73-1834, certiorari dismissed as
"limited class of improvidently granted.
Page 418 U. S. 684 BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined
cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review except REHNQUIST, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of
whatsoever of an individual's claims," the cases.
United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 402 U. S. 533. Such an exception Page 418 U. S. 686
is proper in the unique circumstances of this case, where it would be MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
inappropriate to subject the President to the procedure of securing review by This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the District
resisting the order and inappropriate to require that the District Court Court on behalf of the President of the United States, in the case of United
proceed by a traditional contempt citation in order to provide appellate States v. Mitchell (D.C.Crim. No. 7110), to quash a third-party
review. Pp. 418 U. S. 690-692. subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States District Court for the
2. The dispute between the Special Prosecutor and the President presents a District of Columbia, pursuant to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c). The subpoena
justiciable controversy. Pp. 418 U. S. 692-697. directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents
(a) The mere assertion of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, does not relating to his conversations with aides and advisers. The court rejected the
defeat federal jurisdiction. United States v. ICC,337 U. S. 426. P. 418 U. President's claims of absolute executive privilege, of lack of jurisdiction, and
S. 693. of failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 17(c). The President appealed to
(b) The Attorney General, by regulation, has conferred upon the Special the Court of Appeals. We granted both the United States' petition for
Prosecutor unique tenure and authority to represent the United States, and certiorari before judgment (No. 7 1766), [Footnote 1] and also the
has given the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of President's cross-petition for certiorari
executive privilege in seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance Page 418 U. S. 687
of his specially delegated duties. While the regulation remains in effect, the before judgment (No. 73-1834), [Footnote 2] because of the public
Executive Branch is bound by it. United States ex rel. Accardi v. importance of the issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution.
Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260. Pp. 418 U. S. 694-696. 417 U.S. 927 and 960 (1974).
(c) The action of the Special Prosecutor within the scope of his express On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the
authority seeking specified evidence preliminarily determined to be relevant District of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named
and admissible in the pending criminal case, and the President's assertion of individuals [Footnote 3] with various offenses, including conspiracy to
privilege in opposition thereto, present issues "of a type which are defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not
traditionally justiciable," United States v. ICC, supra, at 337 U. S. 430, designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President,
and the fact that both litigants are officers of the Executive Branch is not a among others, as an unindicted coconspirator. [Footnote 4] On April 18,
bar to justiciability. Pp. 418 U. S. 696-697. 1974, upon motion of the Special
3. From this Court's examination of the material submitted by the Special Page 418 U. S. 688
Prosecutor in support of his motion for the subpoena, much of which is Prosecutor, see n 8, infra, a subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant to
under seal, it is clear that the District Court's denial of the motion to quash Rule 17(c) to the President by the United States District Court and made
comported with Rule 17(c), and that the Special Prosecutor has made a returnable on May 2, 1974. This subpoena required the production, in
sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. Pp. 418 advance of the September 9 trial date, of certain tapes, memoranda, papers,
U. S. 697-702. transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings
4. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for between the President and others. [Footnote 5] The Special Prosecutor was
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an able to fix the time, place, and persons present at these discussions because
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process the White House daily logs and appointment records had been delivered to
under all circumstances. See, e.g., 5 U. S. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. him. On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43
177; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 211. Absent a claim of need conversations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the
to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a
confidentiality of "special appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c).
Page 418 U. S. 685 This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. At a subsequent
hearing, [Footnote 6] further motions to expunge the grand jury's action with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims
naming the President as an unindicted coconspirator and for protective are rejected on appeal."
orders against the disclosure of that information were filed or raised orally by United States v. Ryan, supra, at 402 U. S. 533.
counsel for the President. The requirement of submitting to contempt, however, is not without
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the exception, and in some instances the purposes underlying the finality rule
motions to expunge and for protective orders. 377 F.Supp. 1326. It further require a different result. For example, in Perlman v. United States, 247 U.
ordered "the President or any subordinate officer, official, or employee with S. 7 (1918), a subpoena had been directed to a third party requesting certain
custody or control of the documents or exhibits; the appellant, who owned the exhibits, sought to raise a claim of
Page 418 U. S. 689 privilege. The Court held an order compelling production was appealable
objects subpoenaed," id. at 1331, to deliver to the District Court, on or because it was unlikely that the third party would risk a contempt citation in
before May 31, 1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an order to allow immediate review of the appellant's claim of
index and analysis of those items, together with tape copies of those privilege. Id. at247 U. S. 12-13. That case fell within the "limited class of
portions of the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts had been cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review
released to the public by the President on April 30. The District Court whatsoever of an individual's claims." United States v. Ryan, supra, at 402
rejected jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was U. S. 533.
nonjusticiable because it was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Here too, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly
Executive and hence "intra-executive" in character; it also rejected the inappropriate due to the unique setting in which the question arises. To
contention that the Judiciary was without authority to review an assertion of require a President of the United States to place himself in the posture of
executive privilege by the President. The court's rejection of the first disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism
challenge was based on the authority and powers vested in the Special for review of the ruling would be
Prosecutor by the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General; the court Page 418 U. S. 692
concluded that a justiciable controversy was presented. The second unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occasion for constitutional
challenge was held to be foreclosed by the decision in Nixon v. Sirica, 159 confrontation between two branches of the Government. Similarly, a federal
U.S.App.D.C. 58, 487 F.2d 700 (1973). judge should not be placed in the posture of issuing a citation to a President
The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final simply in order to invoke review. The issue whether a President can be cited
arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the for contempt could itself engender protracted litigation, and would further
circumstances of this case, the presumptive privilege was overcome by the delay both review on the merits of his claim of privilege and the ultimate
Special Prosecutor's prima facie "demonstration of need sufficiently termination of the underlying criminal action for which his evidence is
compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers. . . ." 377 F.Supp. at sought. These considerations lead us to conclude that the order of the
1330. The court held, finally, that the Special Prosecutor had satisfied the District Court was an appealable order. The appeal from that order was
requirements of Rule 17(c). The District Court stayed its order pending therefore properly "in" the Court of Appeals, and the case is now properly
appellate review on condition that review was sought before 4 p.m., May 24. before this Court on the writ of certiorari before judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1254;
The court further provided that matters filed under seal remain under seal 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e).Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25, 292 U. S. 30 (1934).
when transmitted as part of the record. [Footnote 7]
On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the II
District Court order, and the certified record from the District Court was JUSTICIABILITY
docketed in the United In the District Court, the President's counsel argued that the court lacked
Page 418 U. S. 690 jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an intra-branch
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On the same day, dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch,
the President also filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of and hence not subject to judicial resolution. That argument has been
Appeals seeking review of the District Court order. renewed in this Court with emphasis on the contention that the dispute does
Later on May 24, the Special Prosecutor also filed, in this Court, a petition for not present a "case" or "controversy" which can be adjudicated in the federal
a writ of certiorari before judgment. On May 31, the petition was granted courts. The President's counsel argues that the federal courts should not
with an expedited briefing schedule. 417 U.S. 927. On June 6, the President intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Government.
filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. This Page 418 U. S. 693
cross-petition was granted June 1, 1974, 417 U.S. 960, and the case was set He views the present dispute as essentially a "jurisdictional" dispute within
for argument on July 8, 1974. the Executive Branch which he analogizes to a dispute between two
I congressional committees. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive
JURISDICTION authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
The threshold question presented is whether the May 20, 1974, order of the case, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869); United States v. Cox, 342
District Court was an appealable order and whether this case was properly F.2d 167, 171 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauber, 381 U.S. 935
"in" the Court of Appeals when the petition for certiorari was filed in this (1965), it is contended that a President's decision is final in determining what
Cort. 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The Court of Appeals' jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel
1291 encompasses only "final decisions of the district courts." Since the concedes that the President ha delegated certain specific powers to the
appeal as timely filed and all other procedural requirements were met, the Special Prosecutor, he has not
petition is properly before this Court for consideration if the District Court "waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President's duty to claim
order was final. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e). privilege as to all materials . . . which fall within the President's inherent
The finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 embodies a strong congressional authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer."
policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or impeding an Brief for the President 42. The Special Prosecutor's demand for the items
ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., Cobbledick therefore presents, in the view of the President's counsel, a political question
v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 309 U. S. 324-326 (1940). This under Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), since it involves a "textually
requirement ordinarily promotes judicial efficiency and hastens the ultimate demonstrable" grant of power under Art. II.
termination of litigation. In applying this principle to an order denying a The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more,
motion to quash and requiring the production of evidence pursuant has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not
Page 418 U. S. 691 depend on such a surface inquiry. In United States v. ICC, 337 U. S.
to a subpoena duces tecum, it has been repeatedly held that the order is 426 (1949), the Court observed, "courts must look behind names that
not final, and hence not appealable. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy
530, 402 U. S. 532 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, supra; is presented." Id. at 337 U. S. 430. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395
Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117 (1906). This Court has U. S. 486 (1969); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944); United States
"consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153 (1953); Secretary of Agriculture
the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of v. United States, 347 U. S. 645(1954); FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.
desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court's order S. 481, 356 U. S. 483 n. 2 (1958); United States v. Marine
to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order
Bancorporation, ante, p. 418 U. S. 602; and United States v. RULE 17(c)
Connecticut National Bank, ante, p. 418 U. S. 656. The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special
Page 418 U. S. 694 Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c),
Our starting point is the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is which governs
sought -- here, a pending criminal prosecution. It is a judicial proceeding in a Page 418 U. S. 698
federal court alleging violation of federal laws, and is brought in the name of the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings. If
the United States as sovereign. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 295 we sustained this challenge, there would be no occasion to reach the claim of
U. S. 88 (1935). Under the authority of Art. II, § 2, Congress has vested in privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material. Thus, we turn to
the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the the question whether the requirements of Rule 17(c) have been
United States Government. 28 U.S.C. § 516. It has also vested in him the satisfied. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public
power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his Utilities, 304 U. S. 61, 304 U. S. 64 (1938); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.
duties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533. Acting pursuant to those statutes, the S. 288, 297 U. S. 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent the United States Rule 17(c) provides:
in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
tenure. [Footnote 8] The regulation gives the produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein.
Page 418 U. S. 695 The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if
Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that
privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be
performance of these specially delegated duties. [Footnote 9] 38 Fed.Reg. produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time
30739, as amended by 38 Fed.Reg. 32805. when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production
So long as this regulation is extant, it has the force of law. In United States permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260(1954), regulations of the inspected by the parties and their attorneys."
Attorney General delegated certain of his discretionary powers to the Board A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be
Page 418 U. S. 696 "unreasonable or oppressive," but not otherwise. The leading case in this
of Immigration Appeals and required that Board to exercise its own Court interpreting this standard is Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
discretion on appeals in deportation cases. The Court held that, so long as States, 341 U. S. 214(1951). This case recognized certain fundamental
the Attorney General's regulations remained operative, he denied himself characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not
the authority to exercise the discretion delegated to the Board even though intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases, id. at 341 U. S.
the original authority was his and he could reassert it by amending the 220; (2) its chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time and
regulations. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363, 354 U. S. 388 (1957), place before trial for the inspection of
and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959), reaffirmed the basic holding Page 418 U. S. 699
of Accardi. subpoenaed materials, [Footnote 11] ibid. As both parties agree, cases
Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to decided in the wake of Bowman have generally followed Judge Weinfeld's
amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority. formulation in United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (SDNY 1952), as to
But he has not done so. [Footnote 10] So long as this regulation remains in the required showing. Under this test, in order to require production prior to
force, the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States, as trial, the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary
the sovereign composed of the three branches, is bound to respect and to [Footnote 12] and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable
enforce it. Moreover, the delegation of authority to the Special Prosecutor in reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party
this case is not an ordinary delegation by the Attorney General to a cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in
subordinate officer: with the authorization of the President, the Acting advance of trial, and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend
Attorney General provided in the regulation that the Special Prosecutor was unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that
not to be removed without the "consensus" of eight designated leaders of Page 418 U. S. 700
Congress. N 8, supra. the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an obvious expedition."
controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not sufficient to meet Against this background, the Special Prosecutor, in order to carry his burden,
constitutional standards. In the constitutional sense, controversy means must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity. Our
more than disagreement and conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy own review of the record necessarily affords a less comprehensive view of
courts traditionally resolve. Here the total situation than was available to the trial judge, and we are unwilling
Page 418 U. S. 697 to conclude that the District Court erred in the evaluation of the Special
at issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by Prosecutor's showing under Rule 17(c). Our conclusion is based on the record
the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal before us, much of which is under seal. Of course, the contents of the
case. It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special
his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes
duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President. contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the
Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type which indictment. United States v. Gross, 24 F.R.D. 138 (SDNY 1959). With
are traditionally justiciable." United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 337 U. S. respect to many of the tapes, the Special Prosecutor offered the sworn
430. The independent Special Prosecutor, with his asserted need for the testimony or statements of one or more of the participants in the
subpoenaed material in the underlying criminal prosecution, is opposed by conversations as to what was said at the time. As for the remainder of the
the President, with his steadfast assertion of privilege against disclosure of tapes, the identity of the participants and the time and place of the
the material. This setting assures there is conversations, taken in their total context, permit a rational inference that at
"that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon least part of the conversations relate to the offenses charged in the
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional indictment.
questions." We also conclude there was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 204. Moreover, since the matter is one subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with respect to the offenses
arising in the regular course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the charged in the indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility of
traditional scope of Art. III power. Id. at 369 U. S. 198. the taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out-of-
In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact court statements by declarants who will not be subject to cross-examination,
that both parties are officer of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a and that the statements are therefore inadmissible hearsay. Here, however,
barrier to justiciability. It would be inconsistent with the applicable law and most of the tapes apparently contain conversations
regulation, and the unique facts of this case, to conclude other than that the Page 418 U. S. 701
Special Prosecutor has standing to bring this action, and that a justiciable to which one or more of the defendant named in the indictment were party.
controversy is presented for decision. The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out-of-court statements by a
III defendant in a criminal case. [Footnote 13] Declarations by one defendant
may also be admissible against other defendant upon a sufficient showing, by construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow
independent evidence, [Footnote 14] of a conspiracy among one or more that the Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers
other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in alleged to derive from enumerated powers.
furtherance of that conspiracy. The same is true of declarations of Our system of government
coconspirators who are not defendants in the case on trial. Dutton v. "requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a
Evans,400 U. S. 74, 400 U. S. 81 (1970). Recorded conversations may manner at variance with the construction given the document by another
also be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of branch."
any defendant who testifies or any other coconspirator who testifies. Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 395 U. S. 549. And in Baker v.
Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 211, the Court stated:
require its production in advance of trial. See, e.g., United States v. "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
Page 418 U. S. 702 branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
371 (DC 1954). Here, however, there are other valid potential evidentiary exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
uses for the same material, and the analysis and possible transcription of the as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
tapes may take a significant period of time. Accordingly, we cannot conclude Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the
that the District Court erred in authorizing the issuance of the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, §
subpoena duces tecum. 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than
Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must necessarily be the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, since the necessity for power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
the subpoena most often turns upon a determination of factual issues. Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic
Without a determination of arbitrariness or that the trial court finding was concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from
without record support, an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb a the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S.
finding that the applicant for a subpoena complied with Rule 17(c). See, Mittell ed.
e.g., Sue v. Chicago Transit Authority, 279 F.2d 416, 419 (CA7 Page 418 U. S. 705
1960); Shotkin v. Nelson, 146 F.2d 402 (CA10 1944). 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to
In a case such as this, however, where a subpoena is directed to a President say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this
of the United States, appellate review, in deference to a coordinate branch of case. Marbury v. Madison, supra at 5 U. S. 177.
Government, should be particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards B
of Rule 17(c) have been correctly applied. United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel urges
30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). From our examination of the materials two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is
submitted by the Special Prosecutor to the District Court in support of his peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid
motion for the subpoena, we are persuaded that the District Court's denial of need for protection of communications between high Government officials
the President's motion to quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
17(c). We also conclude that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further
showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. The subpoenaed discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public
materials are not available from any other source, and their examination and dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
processing should not await trial in the circumstances shown. Bowman appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951); United States v. decisionmaking process. [Footnote 15] Whatever the nature of the privilege
Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 (SDNY 1952). of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II
Page 418 U. S. 703 powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each
IV branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers
THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE A and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; [Footnote 16]
Having determined that the requirements of Rule 17(c) were satisfied, we the protection of the confidentiality of
turn to the claim that the subpoena should be quashed because it demands Page 418 U. S. 706
"confidential conversations between a President and his close advisors that it Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings.
would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce." App. 48a. The The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the
first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers.
precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege. The second Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its
contention is that, if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, own sphere, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 295
the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege U. S. 629-630 (1935); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 103 U. S.
prevails over the subpoena duces tecum. 190-191 (1881), insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential
Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation communications.
of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the need for
President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process
Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the under all circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and
holding of Marbury v. Madison,1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However,
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of
the law is." Id.at 5 U. S. 177. No holding of the Court has defined the scope public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation
of judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military,
confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept
but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of
Branch have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such
McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). In a will be obliged to provide.
Page 418 U. S. 704 Page 418 U. S. 707
series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the
express provisions of the Constitution on Members of the House and Senate way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in
by the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S.Const. Art. I, § 6. Doe v. McMillan, 412 criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts
U. S. 306(1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); United under Art. III. In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and
States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson383 allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers
U. S. 169 (1966). Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to
of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. they are in derogation of the search for truth. [Footnote 18]
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also In this case, the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third
contemplate that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a party requiring the production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution;
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." confidential communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II
635 (Jackson, J., concurring). To read the Art. II powers of the President as duties, the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to
providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to Presidential responsibilities. In C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S.
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 333 U. S. 111 (1948), dealing with Presidential
public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic authority involving foreign policy considerations, the Court said:
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable "The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for
government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III. foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
C. ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing of the Executive taken on information properly held secret."
interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch. In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953), dealing
The right and indeed the duty to resolve that question does not free the Page 418 U. S. 711
Judiciary from according high respect to the representations made on behalf with a claimant's demand for evidence in a Tort Claims Act case against the
of the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 190, 191-192 (No. Government, the Court said:
14,694) (CC Va. 1807). "It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the
Page 418 U. S. 708 case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the
all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers."
Presidential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be Id. at 345 U. S. 10. No case of the Court, however, has extended this high
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making degree of deference to a President's generalized interest in confidentiality.
decisions, and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit
privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally
of Government, and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under based.
the Constitution. [Footnote 17] In Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 487 The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has
F.2d 700 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that such Presidential constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon
communications are "presumptively privileged," id. at 75, 487 F.2d at 717, every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the
and this position is accepted by both parties in the present litigation. We witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining
agree with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's observation, therefore, that "[i]n no witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that
case of his kind would a court be required to proceed against the president no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the
as against an ordinary individual." United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192. manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.
commitment to the rule of law. This In this case, we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of
Page 418 U. S. 709 confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the
is nowhere more profoundly manifest than, in our view, that "the twofold President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence Page 418 U. S. 712
suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 88. We have administration of criminal justice. [Footnote 19] The interest in preserving
elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the confidentiality is weighty indeed, and entitled to great respect. However, we
parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The prosecution. [Footnote 20]
very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence court. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. Page 418 U. S. 713
Only recently the Court restated the ancient proposition of law, albeit in the in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the
context of a grand jury inquiry, rather than a trial, constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal
"that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,' except for those proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular
persons protected by a constitutional, common law, or statutory criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts,
privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. [323, 339 U. S. a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad
331 (1950)]; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 284 U. S. interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by
438 (1932). . . ." disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 408 U. S. 688 (1972). The privileges some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
referred to by the Court are designed to protect weighty and legitimate We conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
competing interests. Thus, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
that no man "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of
himself." And, generally, an attorney or a priest may not be required to due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence. These and other generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
interests are recognized in law by privileges need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Page 418 U. S. 710 D
against forced disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in authorizing
common law. Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for the issuance of the subpoena. If a President concludes that compliance with
a subpoena would be injurious to the public interest, he may properly, as * Together with No. 73-1834, Nixon, President of the United States v.
was done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena. United States, also on certiorari before judgment to the same court.
Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the
further duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed material as
presumptively privileged and to require the Special Prosecutor to Republic of the Philippines
demonstrate that the Presidential material was "essential to the justice of Supreme Court
the [pending criminal] case." United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192. Here, Manila
the District Court treated the material as presumptively privileged, ---
proceeded to find that the Special
Page 418 U. S. 714
Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption, and EN BANC
ordered an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material. On the basis
of our examination of the record, we are unable to conclude that the District ROMULO L. NERI, G.R. No. 180643
Court erred in ordering the inspection. Accordingly, we affirm the order of Petitioner,
the District Court that subpoenaed materials be transmitted to that court. Present:
We now turn to the important question of the District Court's responsibilities
in conducting the in camera examination of Presidential materials or - versus - PUNO, C.J.,
communications delivered under the compulsion of the subpoena duces QUISUMBING,
tecum. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
E SENATE COMMITTEE ON CARPIO,
Enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum was stayed pending this Court's ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
resolution of the issues raised by the petitions for certiorari. Those issues AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE CORONA,
now having been disposed of, the matter of implementation will rest with COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND CARPIO MORALES,
the District Court. COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE AZCUNA,
"[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him from being harassed ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, TINGA,
by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct Respondents. CHICO-NAZARIO,
of a [district] court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any VELASCO, JR.,
circumstance which is to precede their being issued." NACHURA,
United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 34. Statements that meet the test of REYES,
admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other material must be LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
excised. At this stage, the District Court is not limited to representations of BRION, JJ.
the Special Prosecutor as to the evidence sought by the subpoena; the
material will be available to the District Court. It is elementary that in Promulgated:
camera inspection of evidence is always a procedure calling for scrupulous
protection against any release or publication of material not found by the March 25, 2008
court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and relevant to the x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
issues of the trial for which it is sought. That being true of an ordinary ---------------x
situation, it is obvious that the District Court has
Page 418 U. S. 715 DECISION
a very heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential conversations, which
are either not relevant or not admissible, are accorded that high degree of LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
respect due the President of the United States. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
sitting as a trial judge in the Burr case, supra, was extraordinarily careful to assailing the show cause Letter[1] dated November 22, 2007 and
point out that contempt Order[2] dated January 30, 2008concurrently issued by respondent
"[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
president as against an ordinary individual." Investigations,[3] Trade and Commerce,[4] and National Defense and
25 F.Cas. at 192. Marshall's statement cannot be read to mean in any sense Security[5] against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the
that a President is above the law, but relates to the singularly unique role National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
under Art. II of a President's communications and activities, related to the
performance of duties under that Article. Moreover, a President's The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:
communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive
material than would be true of any "ordinary individual." It is therefore On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
necessary [Footnote 21] in the public interest to afford Presidential (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
of justice. The need for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
associates in which casual reference might be made concerning political (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for Peoples Republic of China.
further treatment. We have no doubt that the District Judge will at all times
accord to Presidential records that high degree of deference suggested In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in
in United States v. Burr, supra, and will discharge his responsibility to see the Senate, as follows:
to (1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled
Page 418 U. S. 716 RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE
it that, until released to the Special Prosecutor, no in camera material is COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF
revealed to anyone. This burden applies with even greater force to excised LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
material; once the decision is made to excise, the material is restored to its BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE OFFICIALS
privileged status, and should be returned under seal to its lawful custodian. CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE
Since this matter came before the Court during the pendency of a criminal RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS
prosecution, and on representations that time is of the essence, the mandate RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO
shall issue forthwith. PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT
Affirmed. LEGISLATIONS.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo
SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE NATIONAL Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified
BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM ZHONG XING and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL
LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN)
PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate, to wit: being told about the alleged bribe?

1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under
SUBJECTING TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials
INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23
PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the
SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise
FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences,
like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the
2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
IMPOSING SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President,
NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her
PURPOSES; and conversations.

3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
entitled AN ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.Given the confidential
nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved
in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the
to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
out of town during the other dates.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on
that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the
Chinese Government. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections contempt. The Letter reads:
(COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show cause
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,[6] (b) whether or not she Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
directed him to prioritize it,[7] and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.[8] The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees,
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and
that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said
covered by executive privilege, thus: contempt Order.

It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining
cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as respondent Committees from implementing their contempt
shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to
2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees
me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and to file their comment.
which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November
2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion
claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations
dispensed with. with President Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the
Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the
during the 26 September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to countrys diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the
what else I need to clarify, so that as a resource person, I may adequately possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
prepare myself. the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is
upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. in Senate v. Ermita[10] and United States v. Reynolds.[11] Lastly, he argues that
Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non- he is precluded from disclosing communications made
appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation to him in official confidence under Section 7[12] of Republic Act No. 6713,
with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving Officials and Employees, and Section 24[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign Court.
investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration
of petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioners
needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing. testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive
present petition for certiorari assailing the show privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioners arrest;
cause Letter dated November 22, 2007. and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.

Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the ventilated:
matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his 1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such covered by the principle of executive privilege?
time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive
ORDER privilege, by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of
the President in the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making
For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, relations with the Peoples Republic of China?
2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and
Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby 1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying
delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and on his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his
obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure assertions that the said conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive
to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery
of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines x x x within
Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
and give his testimony.
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this following provisions of the Constitution:
Order and make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its
enforcement. Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest)
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern)
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above
Order.[9] He insisted that he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
of contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness to testify on new
matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he executed)
filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter through the issuance of and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
declaration of contempt and arrest.
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive
In view of respondent Committees issuance of the privilege?
contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary 3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering
the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
 cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court shall be conducted in executive session.
within twenty-four (24) hours if they are amenable to the Courts proposal of
allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the Senate Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and
Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining
to the decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that to the same power of Congress.Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
petitioner may invoke executive privilege in the course of the Senate inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used
Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees disagree for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to
thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject of a supplemental conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) questions pursuit of Congress oversight function.[19] Simply stated, while both powers
subject of the present petition.[14] At the same time, respondent Committees allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry,
were directed to submit several pertinent documents.[15] their objectives are different.
The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the
Manifestation dated March 5, 2008. As to the required documents, the This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of
Senate and respondent Committeesmanifested that they would not be able compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
to submit the latters Minutes of all meetings and the Minute Book because it appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts
has never been the historical and traditional legislative practice to keep pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[20] is clear:
them.[16] They instead submitted the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of
respondent Committees joint public hearings. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of
following arguments: duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
(1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation
by the principle of executive privilege. under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
(2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in
accordance with the law-making bodys power to conduct inquiries in aid of In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This
and Senate v. Ermita. is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission
(3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
non-compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007. officials under section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-
The Court granted the OSGs motion the next day, March 18, 2008. equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. (Emphasis
As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired. supplied.)

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151,

revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in
advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the this case has also been settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita[17] when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era,
of legislation. however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit: theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may
thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
covered by executive privilege?

And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in Hence, this decision.
issuing the contempt Order?
I
We grant the petition. The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by
Executive Privilege
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[18] becomes
imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between
the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons legislation is intended to affect or change.[21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has
limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the
the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.[22] This directs us
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled to the consideration of the question -- is there a recognized claim of
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
 functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the
A- There is a Recognized Claim Presidents pardon power, but concluded that an organizational test was
of Executive Privilege Despite the more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that would result
Revocation of E.O. 464 from the In Re: Sealed Cases functional test. The majority concluded that, the
lesser protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the
in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this 4,341 withheld documents.
concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which
has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive
the Freedom of Information Act[23] and the Federal Advisory Committee privilege are made in older cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a
Act,[24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is secrets,[34] identity of government informers in some
the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional circumstances,,[35] and information related to pending investigations.[36] An
substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. In United
Executive Ermitas Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[37] the U.S. Court, citing President
claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. George Washington, pronounced:
Vasquez,[25] and Chavez v. PEA.[26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[27] have comprehensively The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must
discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full
explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may
communications covered by executive privilege. have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this
might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
the presidential communications privilege.[28] In United powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for
States v. Nixon,[29] the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and
preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining
Presidents performance of his official duties. It thus considered presidential it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of
communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers
founded on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a
privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential dangerous precedent.
advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our
except privately. jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG[38], this Court held that there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
In In Re: Sealed Case,[30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v.
there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is PEA,[39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential
the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations privilege is fully discussed.
and that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter
includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to
formulated. a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, President is the repository of the commander-in-
the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making chief,[40] appointing,[41]pardoning,[42] and diplomatic[43] powers. Consistent
of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial
in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications
pre-deliberative ones[31] As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation privilege, to wit:
of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-
scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. delegable presidential power.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications
privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
that has operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as
quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power, such as commander-in- 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.[32] unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.[44]
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice[33] tested the In
Re: Sealed Case principles. There, while the presidential decision involved is In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
the exercise of the Presidents pardon power, a non-delegable, core- privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)
presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the
were deemed to be too remote from the President and his President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-
senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
relations. Activities v. Nixon,[49] it was held that since an impeachment proceeding had
been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select Committees
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by House Judiciary Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire
the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate into presidential impeachment. The Court expounded on this issue in this
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power wise:
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield
jurisprudence.[45] Second, the communications are received by a close advisor its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental
of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial branch, in a
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself in Nixon v.
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion. presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which
to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires
executive privilege is not absolutelyprotected by the Constitution. The U.S. and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning possible
Court held: presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the
sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an of the Committee's functions.
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this.
under all circumstances. It contended that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the
conflicts in the testimony before it would aid in a determination whether
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46] where it legislative involvement in political campaigns is necessary and could help
was held that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and engender the public support needed for basic reforms in our electoral
that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need system. Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee, power to
by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to oversee the operations of the executive branch, to investigate instances of
resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government possible corruption and malfeasance in office, and to expose the results of its
in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.[47] Here, investigations to public view. The Committee says that with respect to
the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Watergate-related matters, this power has been delegated to it by
Committees to show a compelling or citical the Senate, and that to exercise its power responsibly, it must have access to
need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a the subpoenaed tapes.
law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we
oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the need neither deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its
same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of legislative responsibilities, a general oversight power, nor explore what the
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that lawful reach of that power might be under the Committee's constituent
it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House Committee on the
draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The
exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend investigative authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to
on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted. presidential conduct has an express constitutional source. x x x We have
been shown no evidence indicating that Congress itself attaches any
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not particular value to this interest. In these circumstances, we think the need
guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no for the tapes premised solely on an asserted power to investigate and
dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon[48] that demonstrated, inform cannot justify enforcement of the Committee's subpoena.
specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend,
generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the
with the Nixon case is very performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear difference between
evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any
where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally
disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative
of its decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here with the balance actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
between the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting
congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the
here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable
this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific
executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury
the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for
made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their
need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative
the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive process, at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever
privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation force there might once have been in the Committee's argument that the
to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets. subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been
substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of
matters which may present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground
to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later on an impeachment Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim
proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.[50] We might have President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
privilege. information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v.
Ermita only requires that an allegation be made whether the information
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.[58] The following
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.Given the confidential
nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713,[51] Article 229[52] of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[53] of R.A. No. At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [59] the Congress must not
3019, and Section 24(e)[54] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential[55] and particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal
executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the department.
confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this
case belonging to such kind. II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its the Contempt Order
Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated
with the peoples right to public information.The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen or to act at all in contemplation of law.[60]
for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
Congress, not to an individual citizen. hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3)
questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that his non-appearance
it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his
of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both
correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again,
provided he be furnished in advance copies of the questions. Without
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent
their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt
This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear
must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for
constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed the
executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful present petition for certiorari.
review by numerous decided cases.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege contempt Order in view of five (5) reasons.
is Properly Invoked
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity.
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible
department which has control over the matter.[56] A formal and proper claim needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the
of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
their confidentiality.[57] furtherance thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both
under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to
ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the
the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated
expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised questions.
Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, strengthen the determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put
2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate down on what is happening in this country, Mr. Chairman, because it really
Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. [61] Section 18 of looks terrible if the primary Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue
the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that: Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction people who openly defy, you know,
the summons of this Committee. I know that the Chair is going through an
The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for agonizing moment here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think we have to
contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or uphold, you know, the institution that we are representing because the
refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So having said that,
Committee or any of its members. Id like to reiterate my point.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. the intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree
Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the deliberation with the legal requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are
were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to only two but both under Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under
the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the Section 6 of the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee, there is a need for a
pertinent portion of the transcript, thus: majority of all members if it is a case of contempt and arrest. So, I am
simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee, which will instead
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will of strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that we
call either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem. should push for this and show the executive branch that the well-decided the
Meaning, if we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a issue has been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case. And its very clear
sufficient number, we will just hold a caucus to be able to implement that that we are all allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey
right away becauseAgain, our Rules provide that any one held in contempt not only can we cite them in contempt and have them arrested. x x x [62]
and ordered arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of all members of
the said committee and we have three committees conducting this.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
So thank you very much to the members Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman. requiring that the inquiry be in accordancewith the duly published rules of
procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every
and give him the floor, Senator Pimentel. Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
the other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end
Committee is the lead committee, and therefore, it should have preference of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
in enforcing its own decisions. Meaning to say, it is not something that is deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings
subject to consultation with other committees. I am not sure that is the in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
right interpretation. I think that once we decide here, we enforce what we procedurally infirm.
decide, because otherwise, before we know it, our determination is
watered down by delay and, you know, the so-called consultation that
inevitably will have to take place if we follow the premise that has been And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is
explained. arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent
Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and
So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his
forget its the lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him
committee prevails over all the other, you, know reservations that other in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
committees might have who are only secondary or even tertiary committees,
Mr. Chairman. A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He
manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves
mentioning that under Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and
Section 6, The Committee by a vote of a majority of all its members may inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly,
Committee. respondent Committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same
So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion
responsibility. But we only have six members here today, I am the seventh for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this
as chair and so we have not met that number. So I am merely stating that, Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list of
sir, that when we will prepare the documentation, if a majority of all questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he
members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon rule wherein I do claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
believe, if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the documentation
and then either in caucus or in session asked the other members to sign. And Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt
once the signatures are obtained, solely for the purpose that Secretary Neri judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of
or Mr. Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as being utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
insufficient in accordance with law. not for retaliation or vindication.[63] Respondent Committees should have
exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government.
well-taken. But Id like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee
is only two as far as I remember. Any two-member senators attending a In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial
Senate committee hearing provide that quorum, and therefore there is more review could have been avoided if powers are discharged with
than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as we are concerned now, and circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation
acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed out. In any event, of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the
the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend to government.
One last word.

The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty WE CONCUR:
when it required the parties to consider a proposal that would lead to a
possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The Court did so,
only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling
similar cases, to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for
review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and REYNATO S. PUNO
legislative branches of government. Chief Justice

In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,[64] the court refrained from
deciding the case because of its desire to avoid a resolution that might
disturb the balance of power between the two branches and inaccurately LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court
Associate Justice Associate Justice
for further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a
settlement. In the subsequent case of United States v. American Tel. &Tel
Co.,[65] it was held that much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the
generality of language found in the Constitution. It proceeded to state: ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively
adversary relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises.
Rather each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional
mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluationRENATO of C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation. Associate Justice Associate Justice

It thereafter concluded that: The Separation of Powers often impairs

efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning ADOLFO
of S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
government. It is the long-term staying power of government thatAssociate
is Justice Associate Justice
enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of
powers.

In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that MINITA the V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
basic principles of constitutional law cannot be subordinated to the needsAssociate
of Justice Associate Justice
a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule
objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes
warning on the dangers inherent in cases of this nature, thus:

some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to ANTONIO the EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind
Associate Justice Associate Justice
of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful,
and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.[66]

In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the

fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of ARTURO D. BRION
government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary Associate Justice
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered
separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres
but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve
these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of CERTIFICATION
government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective
powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only
way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
uphold the Rule of Law. conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order
dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the
Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

Associate Justice
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and
GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the pertinent provision reads:
Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents. Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988 warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
vs.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents. of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
vs. examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
Manila, respondents. him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly

RESOLUTION laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts.
PER CURIAM:
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12,
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure
or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to
file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be
a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' time, also demands undivided attention.
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter- The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
affidavits if he is so minded. President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC
liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication, the M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT
INCIONG,
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would Petitioners,
produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this
stage to rule on the point. - versus -

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate
acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND
RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG,
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF,
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP,
to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to Respondents.
maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc x-------------------------------------------------x
dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
LIFTED. CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND
SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS �
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL,
EN BANC SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND
ROQUE M. TAN,
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TA�ADA G.R. No. 171396 Petitioners,
III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., G.R. No. 171483
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. Present:
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
*
Petitioners, PUNO, - versus -
QUISUMBING,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CORONA, MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, CARPIO MORALES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA,
HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF CALLEJO, SR., THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO AZCUNA, PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF TINGA, DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO,
THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GARCIA, and x-------------------------------------------------x
POLICE, VELASCO, JJ. ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),
Respondents. Petitioner,
x-------------------------------------------------x Promulgated: - versus -
NI�EZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE
PUBLISHING CO., INC., May 3, 2006
Petitioners, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR
G.R. No. 171409 GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
- versus - Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M.
AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C.
Respondents. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. G.R. No. 171400
x-------------------------------------------------x GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. PHILIPPINES (IBP),
SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. Petitioners,
AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO,
MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, - versus -
TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL G.R. No. 171485
JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R.
MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND
ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS
MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF,
G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS- Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
LOREN B. LEGARDA, Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
Petitioner, G.R. No. 171489 or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
- versus - direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER She cited the following facts as bases:

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have
AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists �
IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State � who are now in
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, in May 2004;
Respondents.
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the
President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by

certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State � by

G.R. No. 171424 obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people�s confidence in government and their faith in the
future of this country;
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left
DECISION and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring
down the democratic Philippine State;

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of
Government;
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength � the use of force � cannot WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications
make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and
safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s philosophy of liberty is thus most

relevant. He said: �In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017,
weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, thus:
the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.� Laws and actions that
restrict fundamental rights come to the courts �with a heavy presumption WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition
against their constitutional validity.�[2] have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists -
allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State � and who are
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal- now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend Government elected in May 2004;
and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such republican government;
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by
certain segments of the national media;
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern
problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by
of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and
without which, liberty becomes license?[3] sabotaging the people�s confidence in the government and their faith in the
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of future of this country;
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, thus: WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 the democratic Philippine State;
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: �The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,� and in my capacity as their
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of �Oplan Hackle I � which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during
Government; the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The
plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications President Arroyo herself.[6] Upon the advice of her security, President
and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the
the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA
parade ground.
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse
declaring a State of National Emergency; in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks
containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers Group and the National People�s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio
vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.[7] Prior
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the �Magdalo�s
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.�
upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information
Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to
in the country; defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino
Franco, Jr. to �disavow� any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, issued a public statement: �All SAF units are under the effective control of
as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and unquestionable loyalty.�
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco,
President Cory Aquino�s brother, businessmen and mid-level government
officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President critic, called a U.S. government official about his group�s plans if President
lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads: Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army�s elite Scout
Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued
Ranger. Lim said �it was all systems go for the planned movement against
declaring a state of national emergency;
Arroyo.�[8]
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February
Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the
(AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
(PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way
prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of
they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the
rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;
chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However,
Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed
of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col.
and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio �Ka
hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Roger� Rosal declared: �The Communist Party and revolutionary
movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming
year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime;
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances
to end it.�[9]
was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic
New People�s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in
Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: �Anti-Arroyo
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim
to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the
as a clear and present danger. economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.� He
specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-
5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners� counsels. Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President�s ouster
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers
has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual
it is not respondents� task to state the facts behind the questioned basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army
Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the
for the elucidation of the issues. directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, provinces in mass protests.[10]
members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security
their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting
peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to
vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon
account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains
the people to �show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let
solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible
us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but
trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended
also by wearing red bands on our left arms.� [5]
classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance Retired Major General Ramon Monta�o, former head of the Philippine
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all Golf and Country Club in Dasmari�as, Cavite.
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo,
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro
local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political Casi�o and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan
rallies, which to the President�s mind were organized for purposes of Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
announced that �warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including Representatives where the �Batasan 5� decided to stay indefinitely.
media, can already be implemented.�[11] Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these
not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] petitions.
and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state
marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging of national emergency has ceased to exist.
at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as
gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed respondent.
participants. The same police action was used against the protesters In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017
marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for
celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees
Makati City.[12] of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares
ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG�s act of raiding
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of �censorship� or �prior
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the restraint.� They also claimed that the term �emergency� refers only to
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. �absolutely no emergency� that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G.
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and Teodoro Casi�o, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017
mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon and G.O. No. 5 constitute �usurpation of legislative powers�; �violation of
City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the freedom of expression� and �a declaration of martial law.� They alleged
newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed that President Arroyo �gravely abused her discretion in calling out the
outside the building.[13] armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so.�
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members
and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
Defensor, is �meant to show a �strong presence,� to tell media outlets decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate
not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to
government.� The PNP warned that it would take over any media redress their grievances.
organization that would not follow �standards set by the government during In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged
the state of national emergency.� Director General Lomibao stated that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they
that �if they do not follow the standards � and the standards are - if they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article
would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the
to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 � we will recommend a Constitution.
�takeover.�� National Telecommunications� Commissioner Ronald Solis In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP
urged television and radio networks to �cooperate� with the government 1017 is an �arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial
for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked Law powers.� And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of
for �balanced reporting� from broadcasters when covering the events Martial Law, petitioners argued that �it amounts to an exercise by the
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his President of emergency powers without congressional approval.� In
agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 �goes beyond the nature and
that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative
threatened.[14] Code.�
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that
representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are �unconstitutional for being violative of the
Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran�s lawyer explained that the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.� In this
Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting
any of these petitions. her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they In respondents� Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for
5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424
by the police. (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners
went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has
his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody. constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the
people�s right to free expression and redress of grievances.
 On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the as they do the people�s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
follows: controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
A. PROCEDURAL: function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given
academic. by constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly, respondents� contested actions
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), judicial review.
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents
B. SUBSTANTIVE: cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v.
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. Justice�s very statement that an otherwise �moot� case may still be
a. Facial Challenge decided �provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
b. Constitutional Basis continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its
c. As Applied Challenge issuance.� The present case falls right within this exception to the
mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
A. PROCEDURAL II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks. deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing
I- Moot and Academic Principle or locus standi.
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this
country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Locus standi is defined as �a right of appearance in a court of justice on
Madison.[21] This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -- a given question.�[37] In private suits, standing is governed by the �real-
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the parties-in interest� rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that �every action must be
national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to
interest.� Accordingly, the �real-party-in interest� is �the party who
hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the
entitled to the avails of the suit.�[38] Succinctly put, the plaintiff�s standing
Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the
is based on his own right to the relief sought.
end of the theory of judicial review.[22]

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
�self-starting capacity.�[23] Courts may exercise such power only when the
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a �public right� in assailing an
following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the
person. He could be suing as a �stranger,� or in the category of a
earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question
�citizen,� or �taxpayer.� In either case, he has to adequately show that
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[24]
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence,
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of
we shall limit our discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite relief as a �citizen� or �taxpayer.
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is �definite and concrete, Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both �citizen� and
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;� a real �taxpayer� standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.[25] The Solicitor in Beauchamp v. Silk,[39] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer�s
General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen�s suit. In the
that the present petitions were rendered �moot and academic� by former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in
President Arroyo�s issuance of PP 1021. the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by
Such contention lacks merit. the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[40] �In matter
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable of mere public right, however�the people are the real parties�It is at
controversy by virtue of supervening events,[26] so that a declaration thereon least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
would be of no practical use or value.[27] Generally, courts decline public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
jurisdiction over such case[28] or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[29] grievance be remedied.� With respect to taxpayer�s suits, Terr v.
The Court holds that President Arroyo�s issuance of PP 1021 did not render Jordan[41] held that �the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed cannot be denied.�
illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and
that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that �an thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.�[30] �direct injury� test in Ex Parte Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
The �moot and academic� principle is not a magical formula that can Ullman.[43] The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue members of the public.
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the This Court adopted the �direct injury� test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet Vera,[44] it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
evading review.[34] have �a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court�s sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.� The Vera doctrine was
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no Senate,[45] Manila Race Horse Trainers� Association v. De la
question that the issues being raised affect the public�s interest, involving
Fuente,[46] Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[47] and Anti-Chinese League of Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
the Philippines v. Felix.[48] The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged �direct
done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[49] where injury� resulting from �illegal arrest� and �unlawful search� committed
the �transcendental importance� of the cases prompted the Court to act by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General
liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. does not question their legal standing.
Comelec,[50] this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was
�far-reaching implications� of the petition notwithstanding its categorical usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or
statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic
rulings.[51] rights.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule
failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
principle of �transcendental importance.� Pertinent are the following ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61]Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
cases: Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the Court ruled that the Gaming Corporation,[63] and Ta�ada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the issue
enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has
diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance an interest in the execution of the laws.
which clothe the petitioner with locus standi; In G.R. No. 171483, KMU�s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated
its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[53] wherein the Court held standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of
that �given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the their members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by the
Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review� of assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
the Visiting Forces Agreement; In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54] while the Court noted that the petitioners allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and
�Balikatan 02-01� involves the exercise of Congress� taxing or spending G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
Zamora,[55] that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public
are met: funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues; no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from
validity of the election law in question; pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court�s standing rules.
attitude toward legal standing. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,[56] the Court ruled that the status corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is
of Kilosbayan as a people�s organization does not give it the requisite the underlying legal tenet of the �liberality doctrine� on legal standing. It
personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now
Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter.
has suffered. The petitions thus call for the application of the �transcendental
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. importance� doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
v. Comelec,[57] the Court reiterated the �direct injury� test with respect to petitioners in the �PP 1017 cases.�
concerned citizens� cases involving constitutional issues. It held that
�there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.�
In Lacson v. Perez,[58] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. office or actual incumbency,[67] may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[59] the Court ruled that only the petitioners and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
President�s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore,
emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
in Lacson. constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him
by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo�s exercise of the calling-out
Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to Solicitor General�s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
the people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
by law and that is by impeachment.[69] supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
B. SUBSTANTIVE defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
I. Review of Factual Bases reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
�necessary� for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation. presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
President�s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its PP 1017 calling for military aid.
distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker[70] and Montenegro v. Castaneda[71] to the volatile era
of Lansang v. Garcia,[72] Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[73] and Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.[74] The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining �political Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not
questions,� particularly those questions �in regard to which full expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the
branch of the government.�[75] Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen
belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court
were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional on the Power of the President
sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus in Times of Emergency
to the system of checks and balances, �under which the President is
supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by
the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in
so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to
in turn, constitutionally supreme.�[76] In 1973, the this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.[77] There, the
Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the
validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the
justiciable question.[78] Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In
diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might
case, ratiocinating that �in times of war or national emergency, the be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative
the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable �power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the
only to his conscience, the People, and God.�[79] proscription of the law and sometimes even against it.�[84] But Locke
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora[80] -- a recent case most recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of
pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the
to Lansang. While the Court considered the President�s �calling-out� prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that admitted defeat, suggesting that �the people have no other remedy in this,
�this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was Heaven.�[85]
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.� This ruling
is mainly a result of the Court�s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political democratic processes of government in time of emergency. According to
departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are him:
authorized not only �to settle actual controversies involving rights which The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves
are legally demandable and enforceable,� but also �to determine whether to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State�
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.� The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the to lapse...
government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms
of power but also of duty.[82] If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle
to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who
As to how the Court may inquire into the President�s exercise of shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority.
In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the
power, Lansang adopted the test that �judicial inquiry can go no
people�s first intention is that the State shall not perish.[86]
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President�s decision
is correct,� but that �the President did not act arbitrarily.� Thus, the
standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.[83] In Integrated Bar
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or �supreme
of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that �it is incumbent upon the
magistracy� as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by
petitioner to show that the President�s decision is totally bereft of factual
�indiscreet use.� He was unwilling to rely upon an �appeal to
basis� and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then
heaven.� Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration
�this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.[87]
pleadings.�
 4) �all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
�I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption requirements�
of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.�[88]
5) � no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no
Nicollo Machiavelli�s view of emergency powers, as one element in the regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the
whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this
chasm in democratic political theory, thus: 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect�
to extra �constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once 7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every
established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional
that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she order. . .
has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every
emergency and fixed rules for applying it.[89] 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken
under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

Machiavelli � in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill � sought to 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision
incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency to institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who
powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national constitute the dictator. . .
danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a
capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of 10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of
emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.[90] the crisis for which it was instituted�

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of 11) �the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as
response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the
doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.[91] Frederick M. Watkins saw �no initiation of the constitutional dictatorship�[99]
reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of
liberal institutions,� provided it �serves to protect established
institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of
emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final
political life.�[92] He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency,
emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating
administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time �imposing committees.[100]
limitation upon that power.�[93] Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light
of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a of recent experience, were one in saying that, �the suggestion that
dictatorship: �The period of dictatorship must be relatively democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler
short�Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character�Final in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound
authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must constitutional theory.� To appraise emergency power in terms of
never rest with the dictator himself��[94] and the objective of such an constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder
emergency dictatorship should be �strict political conservatism.� realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term �dictator� is used in its
normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. [95] �It all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used,
is a problem of concentrating power � in a government where power has �constitutional dictatorship� cannot be divorced from the implication of
consciously been divided � to cope with� situations of unprecedented suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead
magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to the �concept of constitutionalism� articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for
how long, and to what end.�[96] Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of
the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: �The problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of
emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means � i.e., he this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by
must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the
of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural
time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need
defense of the constitutional order.�[97] to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of
constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping
emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the
United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of �constitutional enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of
powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that
dictatorship� as solution to the vexing problems presented by
the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening
emergency.[98] Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions
of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a
of success of the �constitutional dictatorship,� thus:
great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship
�limited� as distinguished from �weak� government, McIlwain meant
should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the
government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the
preservation of the State and its constitutional order�
processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal
2) �the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in
limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of
the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator�
government to the governed.[101]
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above
making specific provisions for its termination�
political theorists �- from Lock�s �theory of prerogative,� to Watkins�
doctrine of �constitutional dictatorship� and, eventually, to McIlwain�s
�principle of constitutionalism� --- ultimately aim to solve one real
problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as �manifestly strong
discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers medicine,� to be used �sparingly and only as a last resort,� and is
will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective �generally disfavored;�[107] The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in
limitations and checks. the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.[108] A writer and scholar
1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of in Constitutional Law explains further:
Justice Jackson�s �balanced power structure.�[102] Executive, legislative,
and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks
Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts
other. This system does not weaken the carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a
other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
carefully prescribed procedural limitations. invalidates the entire statute �on its face,� not merely �as applied for�
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
a. �Facial Challenge� authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
�chilling;� deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
�overbreadth.� They claim that its enforcement encroached on both law�s �very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the from constitutionally protected speech or expression.� An overbreadth
Constitution and sent a �chilling effect� to the citizens. ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
third parties.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the
for testing �on their faces� statutes in free speech cases, also known basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or
under the American Law as First Amendment cases.[103] prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v.
Harris,[109] it was held that:
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,
Supreme Court held that �we have not recognized an �overbreadth� is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment� (freedom of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative
speech). process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous
nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily
results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
a law that �reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.� Undoubtedly, And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered �harmful� and difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
�constitutionally unprotected conduct.� In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[105] it that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
was held: petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

It remains a �matter of no little difficulty� to determine when a law may Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
properly be held void on its face and when �such summary action� is vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of Related to the �overbreadth� doctrine is the �void for vagueness
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the doctrine� which holds that �a law is facially invalid if men of common
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
from �pure speech� toward conduct and that conduct �even if application.�[110] It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
expressive � falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing �on their
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls faces� statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017
is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only �spoken words� and 1017.
again, that �overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct.�[106] Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
provisions, thus: only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
First provision:
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
�by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII � do days, otherwise he shall be released.
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion� grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a �sequence� of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
Second provision: the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,[112] the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that �whenever it becomes necessary,� the President
may call the armed forces �to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
�and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and invasion or rebellion.� Are these conditions present in the instant
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;� cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing,
President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her
Office�s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine
the actual condition of the country.

Third provision: Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the President�s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra
vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his
�as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
a State of National Emergency.� lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the
power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the

First Provision: Calling-out Power President�s authority to declare a �state of rebellion� (in Sanlakas) and
the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President
Arroyo�s authority to declare a �state of rebellion� emanates from her
The first provision pertains to the President�s calling-out power. In powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[111] this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as which provides:
follows:
SEC. 4. � Proclamations. � Acts of the President fixing a date or
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, an executive order.
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpusor place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or President Arroyo�s declaration of a �state of rebellion� was merely
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. XII, a provision on the State�s extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
with its rules without need of a call. written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. her calling-out power.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the The declaration of Martial Law is a �warn[ing] to citizens that the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement
of law.�[113]
In his �Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice� on March 13, \
2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[114] an authority in constitutional law,
said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the Petitioners� contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative
power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil clause shows that it was lifted[120] from Former President Marcos�
liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in
the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the
people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines
freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides: by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph
(2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection
the privilege of the writ. or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial

Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative
acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use power. Its enabling clause states: �to enforce obedience to all the laws
for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
done contrary to its command is ultra vires. my direction.� Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued
by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news my direction.�
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander- Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate �decrees�?
in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. PP 1017 states in
part: �to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.�
Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo�s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of
violence. Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of
the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. � Acts of the President providing for rules of a

general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
Second Provision: �Take Care� Power constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. � Acts of the President which relate to
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
reads: Sec. 4. Proclamations. � Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. � Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,[115] the primary Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. � Acts of the President on matters relating
function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as memorandum circulars.
President of the Philippines, he will, among others, �execute its Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. � Acts and commands of the President in
laws.�[116] In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all shall be issued as general or special orders.
the armed forces of the country,[117] including the Philippine National
Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government.[119]
President Arroyo�s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances.
She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casi�o, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial
the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of Law under the 1973 Constitution.[121]
the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They
assail the clause �to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
direction.� �decrees.� Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that �[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.� To be sure, neither Martial manifold constitutional issues arise.
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo�s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
the military? session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
enforced. With respect to �laws,� she cannot call the military to enforce declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can
only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision
duty to suppress lawless violence. refers not only to war but also to �other national emergency.� If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a �state of national emergency�
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to
Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the
Third Provision: Power to Take Over Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a �state of
national emergency.� The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states: could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment.
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
state of national emergency. different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be
obedience �to all the laws and to all decrees x x x� but also to act pursuant construed together and considered in the light of each other.[123] Considering
to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
when she issued PP 1017? emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national

emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
the �martial law� thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.[122] In prescribe.
effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos� Letter of (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of policy declared by Congress.[124]
National Defense to take over �the management, control and operation of
the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with
contain, solve and end the present national emergency.� public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the �the State
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
claim that President Arroyo�s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
is an encroachment on the legislature�s emergency powers. utility or business affected with public interest,� it refers to Congress, not
the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power
This is an area that needs delineation. is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et
A distinction must be drawn between the President�s authority al. v. Sawyer,[125] held:
to declare �a state of national emergency�
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must
Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that
express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The
contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if �national emergency� refers
of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?�
provisions in Article II which say that �The executive Power shall be vested MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
in a President . . . .;� that �he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.[133]
executed;� and that he �shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States. It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may
not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President�s the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The with public interest.
Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad
powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of In Araneta v. Dinglasan,[134] this Court emphasized that legislative
war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though �theater of war� power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in
be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional Congress even in times of crisis.
system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the
ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to �x x x
keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the
nation�s lawmakers, not for its military authorities. After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of
the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
the framework of our Constitution, the President�s power to see that the group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time,
thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of
shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied
first article says that �All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws
in a Congress of the United States. . .�[126] been surrendered to another department � unless we regard as legislating
the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no,
not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was
engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term �emergency� under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils
under Section 17, Article XII refers to �tsunami,� more than in normal circumstances �the various branches, executive,
�typhoon,� �hurricane� and �similar occurrences.� This is a limited legislative, and judicial,� given the ability to act, are called upon �to
view of �emergency.� perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.�

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President
intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not
which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
intensity, variety, and perception.[127] Emergencies, as perceived by operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned public interest without authority from Congress.
by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a) economic,[128] b) natural disaster,[129] and c) national security.[130] Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
�Emergency,� as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
effect.[131] This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
thus: Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee�s definition of �national

emergency� which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads: c. �AS APPLIED CHALLENGE�

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual
with public interest. are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict,
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
example, calamities or natural disasters. unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of
about strikes and riots? assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term
�national emergency.� Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate �direct injury.�
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would
paralyze government service.[132] In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February
x x x x x x 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to
celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers
cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
 international
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:
Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives �raided and
ransacked without warrant� their office. Three policemen were assigned to In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the �fight against
guard their office as a possible �source of destabilization.� Again, the terrorism� has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the
basis was PP 1017. justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups
operating internationally. Lists of states �sponsoring terrorism� and of
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to
their members were �turned away and dispersed� when they went to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined
EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People by strategic interests.
Power I.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions � or threats of the
A perusal of the �direct injuries� allegedly suffered by the said use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq � consists
petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.
G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or
basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a by individuals.
law render it unconstitutional?
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying �One country�s terrorist is
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes another country�s freedom fighter.� The apparent contradiction or lack of
invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an consistency in the use of the term �terrorism� may further be
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity of a demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally
case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President�s calling-out labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but
power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of later became internationally respected statesmen.
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts � the differentia
PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national
search or violate the citizens� constitutional rights. resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been
trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The
organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the bridge the gap between those who associate �terrorism� with any violent
ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure
criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the
is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against
result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is
of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the concerned.
officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging
from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by
Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and
declared unconstitutional a long time ago. movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) � which is a
terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims
� the Kashmiri resistance groups � who are terrorists in the perception of
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan � the earlier Contras in
1017. General orders are �acts and commands of the President in his Nicaragua � freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.� Socialist camp � or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to
They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a
precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a
regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating
and the official who receives them.[139] They are based on and are the examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way
product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, � because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those
their object.[140] For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be perceptions.
valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In
�necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.� divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position
of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying
Unlike the term �lawless violence� which is unarguably extant in our power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will �fluctuate�
statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably associated with accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a
�invasion, insurrection or rebellion,� the phrase �acts of terrorism� is certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a
still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law �liberation struggle,� not of �terrorism� when acts of violence by this
defining and punishing acts of terrorism. group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the
definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of
In fact, this �definitional predicament� or the �absence of an agreed sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular
definition of terrorism� confronts not only our country, but the armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-
freedom fighter dichotomy. A �policy of double standards� on this vital by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence. fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
This �definitional predicament� of an organization consisting of sovereign power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[143]
states � and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the
United Nations Charter! � has become even more serious in the present
global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are
Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP
powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at
even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and
United States.[141] booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by
policemen who �held his head and tried to push him� inside an unmarked
The absence of a law defining �acts of terrorism� may result in abuse and car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No.
oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a 880[145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours;
group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest
them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on
their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a
crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the
corresponding penalty thereon.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

So far, the word �terrorism� appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled �Codifying The Various Laws
on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
Subversive Organizations.� The word �terrorism� is mentioned in the actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
following provision: �That one who conspires with any other person for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x.� believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist
Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5,
1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define �acts of
terrorism.� Since there is no law defining �acts of terrorism,� it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is
absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate David�s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the to sedition and violation of BP
media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the invective �Oust Gloria Now� and their erroneous assumption that
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the �acts of terrorism� portion Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence
for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[147]
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police
to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and
prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the
Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only
was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to
peaceably assemble.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

The Constitution provides that �the right of the people to be secured in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
government for redress of grievances.
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
�Assembly� means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for
be seized.�[142] The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that
consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our
searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized
republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for
freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o� clock in the
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance Tribune offices.
of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of
course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials.
the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such
required. raid was �meant to show a �strong presence,� to tell media outlets not
to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government.� Director General Lomibao further stated that �if they do
not follow the standards �and the standards are if they would contribute
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in
were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 � we will recommend
any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that a �takeover.�� National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from urged television and radio networks to �cooperate� with the government
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his
880were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit
argument, failed to justify the arresting officers� conduct. In De Jonge v. that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the
Oregon,[148] it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, national security is threatened.[151]
thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires
Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination
peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served
prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered
different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge. operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners� freedom of the press. The
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) enjoyed by its media. In theBurgos v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that --
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
Malaca�ang�s directive canceling all permits previously issued by local offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum� newspapers. As a
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that �freedom of assembly is sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and newspapers were discontinued.
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent.�[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent
upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
the State may deny the citizens� right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the
revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
assemblies was eliminated.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the
lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue �Metropolitan Mail� and �We Forum� newspapers in the above case,
permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement
determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.[150] The policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant
first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that
notice is a fatal defect. When a person�s right is restricted by government officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that
action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he
is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure. is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these
arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court
cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public
of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners� narration of facts, affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty
which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
following: first, the Daily Tribune�s offices were searched without
against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always
be obsta principiis.[154] Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were,
according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
the search of the Tribune�s offices and the seizure of its materials for
publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
�for any purpose,� thus:
I don�t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal
JUSTICE CALLEJO: or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be
condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their
policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering responsibility.[157]
evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the
clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that
were taken from the Tribune?
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO: in every aspect and �should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches
if applied according to their letter.�
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I
think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its
purpose.[155] ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to
reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the
xxx xxx xxx military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When
in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: police committed acts which violate the citizens� rights under the
Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all
you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there at In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban�s concurring
1 o�clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia.
become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or
what?
SUMMATION
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 � a
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my supervening event � would have normally rendered this case moot and
instructions. academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were
committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there
have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based reimposed �if the May 1 rallies� become �unruly and
on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017. violent.� Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties
should not be �evaded;� they must now be resolved to prevent future
SOLGEN BENIPAYO: constitutional aberration.

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper. violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: 1017�s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
Is it based on any law? laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
SOLGEN BENIPAYO: form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The
Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no. President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public interest.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the
President � acting as Commander-in-Chief � addressed to subalterns in the
AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a
valid standard � that the military and the police should take only the
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
�necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.� But the words �acts of terrorism�
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don�t know if
found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are
�terrorism� has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
remedies for this.[156]
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the
limits of the AFP�s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
 SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also Associate Justice
pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David
and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on WE CONCUR:
media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for
publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. Chief Justice
No. 5.

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, (On leave)
criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in Associate Justice Associate Justice
court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due
process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the Associate Justice Associate Justice
power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling
individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic
state. During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and
intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
restrain our people�s liberty. Associate Justice Associate Justice

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied
the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant
government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to Associate Justice Associate Justice
arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the
governed.[158]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Associate Justice Associate Justice
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article Associate Justice
VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation. CERTIFICATION

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is �necessary and that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
violence.� Considering that �acts of terrorism� have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, JR., respondent.
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure [G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
of its articles for publication and other materials, are JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
No costs. PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General
Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P.
personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker
constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty.
issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its
and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style. course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of
the office of the President. the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on
President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank
would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent on February 4, 2000.[15]
were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells
plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who
descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged
Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante
the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day
from jueteng lords.[1] of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence
2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest
the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous
the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur
Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker
headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2] Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a
Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati
down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in demanding
govern.[3] Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in
of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner. [4]Four Metro Manila to show their concordance.Speakers in the continuing rallies at
days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and
demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice of more people.[21]
resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At
or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
resignation.[7] However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap
refused to resign. election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando
members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the presence of former Presidents
Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators,
Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000
November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling withdrawing our support to this government.[23]A little later, PNP Chief,
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10] Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries,
November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned
Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the from their posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced
convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly
Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by controversial second envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide
Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened had become a tsunami.
the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round
oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at
presiding.[13] Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.Secretary Edgardo
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser
the impeachment trial started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez,
marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then head of the presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the
House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary
Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary
Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and of Justice Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter
Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in
stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer Act.[40] A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner as her Vice President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted
and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the following Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona,
press statement:[30] Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea
20 January 2001 voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge
STATEMENT FROM on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos presidency before the Supreme
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44] The
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts (2) days later.[46]
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.[47] Senator
our civil society. Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted against the
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk post.[48]
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public
country. acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey
MABUHAY! also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by
following letter:[31] majorities in all social classes:
Sir: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54%
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am among the Es or very poor class.[50]
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice- appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office
President shall be the Acting President. of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA 1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
January 20.[32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33] and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed
immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit: misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal- November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public
Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by
Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice- Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an plunder, graft and corruption.
administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty.
January 20, 2001. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
that maybe filed by a proper party. affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as to the aforementioned complaints against him.
ambassadors and special envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US President George W. 00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint
Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
US recognition of her government.[36] over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
of the House of Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
175 expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon
extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
Constitution.[39]
146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
February 15. decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless
hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should
Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political questions
former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of
Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they political cases.
have thrown their weight on one side but nonetheless inhibited In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with
themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a
days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous political question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58]where this
replies. Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved: which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the
Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution; 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
still pending decision by the Court, and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the any branch or instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the
pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and exercise of its jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision, however, courts are
subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with
academic.[53] this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article
were deemed submitted for decision. VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x x review, in an
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are: appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
I basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
II Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related
petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the
Acting President. legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a
III political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the
and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom
immune from criminal prosecution. Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a
IV direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that
ground of prejudicial publicity. the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits
I out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath,
political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of
the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that respondent the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People
taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of
the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition
political thicket which the Court cannot enter. the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review,
latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President
20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II
refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United States, the most involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance
spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz: which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution
a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work
discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or
opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is not governed by
are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the legal effect.
Philippines. In the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal
7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for Arroyo.Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20,
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
August 29, 1966.[66] circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz: petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated.The
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue
and petition the government for redress of grievances. Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given
democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained
freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting
discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision- him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President
making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary Secretary of Trade and Industry.
consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his
framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven
take place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second
Industrial Organization,[71] this function of free speech and assembly was envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of
echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for
American Bar Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially.Rallies and
assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all.[72] In the As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on
relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days
stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in morning
should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of
deaf to their grievances are ciphers. the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled
principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, [74] and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is
section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner
section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he
the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to
of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner
the law is . . . Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of political is but and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the
a foray in the dark. petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic
II shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but
as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m.,
factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful
to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner
suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
president. suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII the country.[84] At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed,
of the Constitution which provides: Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality
resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House called up Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para
of Representatives, shall then acts as President until President or Vice magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
President shall have been elected and qualified. transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara
x x x. readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath petitioner was implied.
as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police
period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the (PNP) shall function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national military
safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the and police authorities.
second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general
that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and
cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the
the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz: form and tenor provided for in Annex A heretofore attached to this
xxx agreement.[89]
I explain what happened during the first round of The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner
negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five- has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation,
day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
clear his name. unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. parties during and after the transition period.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by
dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel
bureaucracy, the intrigue.) to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88] party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The Diary narrates the fateful events, viz:[90]
intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang xxx
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation. 11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing
Angara Diary, the following happened: all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Oppositions deal Agreement
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001,
Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the
Macel. Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads: xxx
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January The rest of the agreement follows:
2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day 2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall
the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice
Philippines. President to various government positions shall start orientation activities
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the with incumbent officials.
assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons 3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall
designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
incumbent officials concerned. police authority Vice President.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police 4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the
shall function under the Vice President as national military and police Vice President as national military and police authorities.
effective immediately. 5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that
guarantee the security of the president and his family as approved by the the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
national military and police authority (Vice President). The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in provided for in Annex B heretofore attached to this agreement.
connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable xxx
PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request 11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our
to the Senate President. agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United
Our deal Opposition.
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads: And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at
agree and undertake as follows: 12 noon.
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt
which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to you wait? What about the agreement)? I asked.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?
safety of their person and property throughout their natural And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting
lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed that part).
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a
sector throughout their natural lifetimes. double cross.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation
(AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel
police authorities Vice President (Macapagal). erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for
impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provision on
to President Estrada. security, at least, should be respected.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief
January 2001 (the Transition Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of The president is too stunned for words.
the orientation program. Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the
compound. subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another
few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered. reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners letter
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he
police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President. also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
familys personal possessions as they can. Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
a final statement before leaving Malacaang. investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Penal Code on bribery.
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No.
proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did
restoration of unity and order in our civil society. not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the author of the bill, reserved to propose during the period of amendments the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the
country. period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
MABUHAY! provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
It was curtain time for the petitioner. The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his
was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his incumbency.[93]
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293,
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the
to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law
service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. right.[94] A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a or resign.Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is
temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or
said letter, viz: retirement to avoid prosecution.
Sir There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
President shall be the Acting President. these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically,
filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long immunity from suit of a sitting President.
crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We
people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is
he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be
against petitioner when he resigned. achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the
III House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert
in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole
to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties nation;
of the presidency. His significant submittal is that Congresshas the ultimate WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
11 of Article VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be
Acting President. it
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides: Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and the Nations goals under the Constitution.
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Adopted,
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Speaker
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24,
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the 2001.
powers and duties of the office as Acting President. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and Secretary General
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House
no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his Resolution No. 178[98] which states:
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
need of call. in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume
or, if not in session within twelve days after it is required to assemble, office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the voting separately;
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice- WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice
exercising the powers and duties of his office." President of the Republic of the Philippines;
That is the law. Now the operative facts: WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with
the Senate President and Speaker of the House; dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of
President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities,
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96] Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House the Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice
Resolution No. 176[97]which states: President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS Adopted,
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF (Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION Speaker
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7,
of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed 2001.
Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
cabinet had withdrawn support from him; Secretary General
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, (4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the (12) members of the Senate signed the following:
Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation
had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;
as President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused nation needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital
national unity and development; legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners
attain desired changes and overcome the nations challenges.[99] claim of inability.
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim
states: of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
voting separately; presidency. The question is political innature and addressed solely to
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
President of the Republic of the Phillippines; In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
integrity, competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino people with merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
dedicated responsibility and patriotism; Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on
Philippines. executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive
Adopted, immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a
President of the Senate Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for
Secretary of the Senate allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition,
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
No. 83[101] which states: The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he
OFFICIO may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise
Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated. of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
considered approved. executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-
second envelope be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature,
safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full
approval of the Senate President. power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and
Resolution. void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been
Adopted, deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or
President of the Senate property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
Secretary of the Senate any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may
up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as
election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges
term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of
respondent Arroyo as President. his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that
without any recognition from any sector of government, and without he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he
any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in
is only momentary. determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority
was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed,
honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the
such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
as such, must answer for the consequences of his act. demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
not granted immunity from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
highest officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the integrity of Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
government itself.[105] become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law xxx
years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the against the President, for example, and the President resigns before
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated: judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be
suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to necessarily dropped?
his specific orders during his tenure. Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President office, then his resignation would render the case moot and
referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution. academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, may continue in the ordinary courts.
Presidential Immunity And All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that
Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law beyond.Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment
on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition: process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to
enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs.
and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a
acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we different factual milieu.
broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as
persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome). stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-
Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
move was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism the king unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed. acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted trespasser.[114]Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive
from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by vindication of a right.In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President
delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108] Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain
Mr. Suarez. Thank you. recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges
proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon
from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to
not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
almost daily? that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here. process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the
made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official
things. acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US
Madam President. Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification. official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the
history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of
that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover discharged the burden.
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs.
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
laches or estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due
court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural
enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, xxx
improper, or inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot
fiscal autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can
suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency. match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
V preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
about the case continues unabated even today.Commentators still bombard
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed,
from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
violation of his right to due process. cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and xxx
trial of high profile cases.[125] The British approach the problem with (a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-
the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts American justice demonstrates conclusively that the time this Nations
readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long
suffers a threat.[126] The American approach is different. US courts assume been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,substantial probability of irreparable harm, significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized:
strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys
of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that: criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history,
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United
reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective (b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel- to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of
other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent
our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x xx x x x x x. Our of what takes place.
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and (c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms
on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
publications and publicity stunts does not per sefatally infect their fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
impartiality. indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual eviscerated.
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress
the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically some peoples prejudice.
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the
an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining Republic are DISMISSED.
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, SO ORDERED.
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not EN BANC
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their JR., respondents.
bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied) [G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of ARROYO, respondent.
the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer RESOLUTION
more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs to PUNO, J.:
show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos.
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of
cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by March 2, 2001.
a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:
No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI,
the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special THEREON.
panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING
guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION,
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT
Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the PROCEEDINGS.
respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE
reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE
respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.
petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT
petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED
is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:
light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice 1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;
official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of 2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE,
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to 3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by HEARSAY RULE;
their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to 4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS INABILITY TO
change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating 5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if FAIR TRIAL.
the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.
and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the I
result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court. Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

VI. Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he

Epilogue assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we
now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has
Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior,
justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as
will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot
Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible
right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of Governor
categorized as the most fundamental of all freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then
of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the
obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Committee on Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson expose by the
Lord Bryce calls the impatient vehemence of the majority. Rights in a House Committee on Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the
democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of
and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands
never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the for petitioners resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel
V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged
and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the resignation of the members of by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective
petitioners Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be
III from the Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of then resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation is
Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably
Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or facing disciplinary
petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of the Articles of charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress
Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of Senator or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only
Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the
House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination
Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation resulting from a
impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not
prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the
evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the
account under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with
resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has
proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the already determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such
issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under
its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what
support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized
then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the by law and the circumstances of the case.[2]
armed services; (21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other
Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He
commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet secretaries, transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability.He
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately before he left
agreement to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies
envelope. All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave.
this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is
the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness
make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully
only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and high-
petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false. powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the military officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall the
oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch, was
intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who
not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even able to
before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his
cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The
contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing
the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor
disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled
narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential
evidence. residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.
examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent II
Evidentiary Issues
Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the
petitioner containing his final statement which was issued after the oath- Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use
taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara
ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his
Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation.[1] These are overt acts which resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned. We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at
Janaury 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara
when respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was
same day has no leg to stand on. frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The three parts of
We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as
to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at all. Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents
x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third
voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the
resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12,
action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply
following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5,
terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) 2001,[4] and the third part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It was also
whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the
involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule.[6] Evidence is called
test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable it is sought to produce it.[7] There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor
the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.[8] Not at all hearsay evidence,
however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the
evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but
trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions and would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial
their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723
Abrams and Berger as follows: (1992).[10]
xxx A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
of other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will
sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary
admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act,
Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
support a verdict). Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to evidence against him.[11] It has long been settled that these admissions are
revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the
evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions
categories of highly probative statements from the definition of hearsay are not covered by the hearsay rule:[12]
(sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the
hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to probative value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special
their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission
Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that does not discredits the partys statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings
satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory
probative (section 12, infra). statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there
abolished altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the
Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804- opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross examine
1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted): himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048
of unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party
think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was
Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner.Prejudice refers to the jurys made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary
use of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to
legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when
ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimateinference to be drawn from the speaking under sanction of an oath.
evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because a witness A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are
was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to the admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
usurpation of the jurys function.Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po,
evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or 23 Phil. 578, 583).
from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential
by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only
information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives. wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
hearsay are either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang
altenative to a general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the assumptions dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the
necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We
event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
jury.Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished. resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the
Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
now available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the
discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to
the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, person.[13] Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made
Park, & Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of
Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary the statements which the other person had made.[14] To use the blunt
Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991). mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its
question whether the benefits outweigh the cost: support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner
justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not
this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and capital country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be
costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is taken as an admission by him.[16]
supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him
litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of
time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over half their time in by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous provided.
academic resources are expended on the rule.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 and best evidence were violated in our Decision, viz:
with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He evidence, such as the rule on authentication of private writings
was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act xxx
for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated
Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law
Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in
ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by
have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the
are.)[17] This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first xxx
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed
he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara
20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used
to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or
now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been
that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of
power after his relinquishment of the powers of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary than the original document itself.[23]
Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule,
in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:
her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or
declarations of Secretary Angara. any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
binding on the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject
for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and reasonable notice;
admissible in evidence against such principal.[20] (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) and
classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The recorded in a public office.
second class includes the following:[21] Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
the like; originals.
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
bad faith, etc. of the latter; likewise equally regarded as originals.
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not 6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence
covered by the prohibition against hearsay evidence:[22] rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts
comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such served by requiring production.[24]
cases, is as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in xxx
issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been
direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute
state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal
the acts or statements of such person.Where his acts or statements are adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used
against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect
announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not against it. (empahsis supplied)
interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:
issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary
admissible of necessity. evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner rule into application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been
which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent admitted, the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if
to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can proper and timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form
reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they or mode of objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set
are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our forth.Suffice it to say here that the objection should be made in proper
law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that
cannot receive our imprimatur. which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted. The
objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question constitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This
for the courts consideration.[25] political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only
He adds: to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the
Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles to state, the
if no objection is made to its reception.[26] doctrine of separation of power constitutes an inseparable bar against this
In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court courts interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment of
provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz: Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the President, albeit on
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress
proved either: has the ultimate authority to determine his inability to govern, and whose
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or determination is a political question by now arguing that whether one is a de
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the jure or de facto President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory,
maker. ill disguised as it is, does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is the general issue of whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de
claimed to be. facto President. Specific issues were raised to the Court for resolution
On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that: and we ruled on an issue by issue basis. On the issue of resignation under
A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary section 8, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the issue is legal and
evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be ruled that petitioner has resigned from office before respondent Arroyo took
reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 her oath as President. On the issue of inability to govern under section 11,
Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress has the ultimate
does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and
that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court
evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the
835).[27] generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a
Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on judicial question.
reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru
dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should
a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and
bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.
on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must
on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In
process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and the cases at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the
partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express
to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and
Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming
22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second inability to govern. To be sure, however, the petitioner cannot strictly
Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel,
denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable
given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the constitutional
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an successor to the presidency post facto.Petitioner himself states that his
Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a letter alleging his inability to govern was received by the Office of the
decision rendered partly on the basis thereof. Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the Senate at 9
III P.M. of the same day.[30] Respondent took her oath of office a few minutes
Temporary Inability
past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking, Senate
Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint
Article VII, of the Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of Statement which states:[31]
inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Joint Statement of Support
Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the and Recognition from the
Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the Senate President and the Speaker
President informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted Of the House of Representatives
by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the
thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that
the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review. the Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing
We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made this political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of
the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority leadership, we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus,
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of in line with our sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our
performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article goals for peace and prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the
VII.[29] We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress Speaker of the House of Representatives, hereby declare our support and
has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary recognition to the constitutional successor to the Presidency. We similarly
inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved call on all sectors to close ranks despite our political differences. May God
by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.
seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.
to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected (Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.
by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president Senate President
made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that (Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as Speaker of the House of Representatives
the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and the members of the international the House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional
community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria successor to the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. Thus,
Resolution No. 176 expressed x x x the support of the House of dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice-President Gloria purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.[42]
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject
its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a petitioners submission.
partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January
Constitution.[32] Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of 16, 2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the
the House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the
No. 83 declaring the impeachment court functus officio.[34] Both Houses sent name Jose Velarde. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors
bills to respondent Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the submitted a letter to the Speaker of the House tendering
Philippines.[35] These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately
President of the Republic. Petitioners insistence that respondent Arroyo is moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until
just a de facto President because said acts of Congress x x x are mere the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the
circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce people to submit to public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice
respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency[36] is a guesswork far Davide, Jr. Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its
divorced from reality to deserve further discussion. prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency
Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus,
made Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice- on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
presidential elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole impeachment court is functus officio.
judge in presidential and vice presidential contests.[37] He thus postulates Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double
that such constitutional provision[38] is indicative of the desire of the jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2)
sovereign people to keep out of the hands of Congress questions as to the before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has
legality of a persons claim to the presidential office.[39] Suffice to state that been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is no room to resort to inference. The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election the accused.[43] Assuming arguendo that the first four requisites of double
contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite
Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be
term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment
become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a
the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to
President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what
transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of happens when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the prosecution to prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a
powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the dismissal on the merits.[44]
body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:
case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the
President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the prosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order
issue.In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and,
the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis consequently fails to prove the defendants guilt, the court upon defendants
which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear provisions of the motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissall amounting to an acquittal of
Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make the defendant.
inferences that simply distort their meanings. In a more recent case, this Court held:
IV
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of
Impeachment and Absolute Immunity cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.It must be
the Constitution which provides: stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial
Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents
to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.[46]
Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against
impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not
reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys every invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the
two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment Court accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and
cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the speedy trial.[47] The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
party convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and Procedure are apropos:
punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal
petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his (h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing before Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial
the respondent Ombudsman. once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until
Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good
the impeachment proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on cause.
the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel,
case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal.[40] He explains failure to set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
prosecute as the failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case
on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[41] He then concludes that
shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus,
first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the
Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the Office of the Ombudsman.
V
impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an
unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

impeachment proceeding was suspended until the House of Representatives Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair
shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public trial have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that
prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment there is not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial
proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment publicity. Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events in
process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, our Decision itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He
petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the then posits the thesis that doubtless, the national fixation with the probable
impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were guilt of petitioner fueled by the hate campaign launched by some high
therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day circulation newspaper and by the bully pulpit of priests and bishops left
period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry and all regions, so harsh
day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure
of the right of the accused to speedy trial. petitioner a sporting chance.[51] To be sure, petitioner engages
Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or in exageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all regions
termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. We have been irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity. This
reiterate that the impeachment proceeding was closed only after the exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still enjoys the support
petitioner had resigned from the presidency, thereby rendering the of the majority of our people, especially the masses.
impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or
petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachmment the transaction speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa
case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and
double jeopardy.[48] present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.[52] It is
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute not a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation
immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove
prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of
exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on
the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[53]
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no
President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised court in the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to
new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still resolve the issue of prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue
President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers before us is whether the alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the
his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the members of the panel of
has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President. investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People v.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President Teehankee,[54] to resolve this issue, viz:
enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial
position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
Mr. Suarez. Thank you. gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a
proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does
not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
almost daily? trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-
Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here. impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of
made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other our communication system brings news as hey happen straight to our
things. breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair
madam President. and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49] world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our
tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and
the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term publications and publicity stunts does not per sefatally infect their
during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter impartiality.
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
incumbent.[50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation
the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this
and not his term. standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity administrative matter and emphasized that it was without prejudice to the
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party. In
trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another
discharged the burden. resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a
Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant
to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the
of the Ombudsman has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold alleged resolution. Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the
it again, petitioner has completely failed to adduce any proof of actual said twelve (12) justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to
prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact inhibit filed by a party after losing his case is suspect and is regarded with
must be established by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to general disfavor.
loose surmises and conjectures. In fact, petitioner did not even identify the Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
members of the Panel of Investigators. We cannot replace this test of actual majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its
prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as suggested by the jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.Disqualification of a judge
petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated
has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with
prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not affects the very heart of judicial independence.[57] The proposed mass
wanting where an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
publicity.[55] For this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice but must prove actual of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.[58]
prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea. It is IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos.
plain that petitioner has failed to do so. 146710-15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack
Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling of merit.
off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial SO ORDERED.
publicity against him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the
proposal. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period
will achieve its purpose. The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media
event. It is the first time in our history that a President will be investigated by
the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged commission of heinous crimes
while a sitting President. His investigation will even be monitored by the
foreign press all over the world in view of its legal and historic significance. In
other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. But what is
important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated SECOND DIVISION
in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the
respondent Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary [G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.]
investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by
brilliant legal minds who can protect his right as an accused. SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. THE HON. MAGNO S.
VI
GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL., Respondents. EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET
Recusation
AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET
Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went AL., Respondents-Appellants.
to EDSA put on record who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting
themselves, particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G.
pressure on this Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, for Petitioners.
2001, given the need for the cold neutrality of impartial judges.[56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for Respondents.
(12) members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the
respondent Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a SYLLABUS
historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of
the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her 1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF;
oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc resolution on January 22, 2001, the first CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTION. —
working day after respondent Arroyo took her oath as President, held in The constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a declaratory
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit: relief proceeding. (Hilado v. De la Costa, 83 Phil., 471).
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to Take Her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the 2. ID.; APPEALS; EFFECT ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION. — It is
Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice an elementary rule of procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the judgment. However in injunction, receivership and patent accounting cases,
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a a judgment shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is
letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an taken or during the pendency of an appeal unless otherwise ordered by the
administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the court. (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the
Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE RESTS IN SOUND DISCRETION OF
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of COURT; CASE AT BAR. — The State’s counsel contends that while judgment
January 20, 2001. could be stayed in injunction, receivership and patent accounting cases, the
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case present complaint, although styled "Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief with
that may be filed by a proper party. Preliminary Injunction," is one for declaratory relief, there being no
The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be
Court. It should be clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the one for injunction. But aside from the title of the complaint, plaintiffs pray
letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice for the declaration of the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and for such other relief as may extension of about 250 square miles and an average depth of approximately
be deemed just and equitable. This Court has already held that there are only 6 fathoms (Otter trawl explorations in Philippine waters — p. 21, Exh. B), is
two requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol
existence of the right sought to be protected, and that the acts against which region. Sometime in 1950, trawl 1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and
the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right (North Negros Sugar other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang,
Co., Inc. v. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question that in the Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of
case at bar, at least 11 of the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the
to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources
undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the
detrimental to their interests. And considering further that the granting or inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel
refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, rests in the sound Bay. This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953 (Exh.
discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the facts F), passed by the Municipal Mayors’ League condemning the operation of
of the particular case (Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439), the trial Court trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and
committed no abuse of discretion when it treated the complaint as one for resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San
injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment pursuant to the Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the
provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. year. In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same League of
Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish
4. ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS ONE AGAINST resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein (Exh.
GOVERNMENT; BOND REQUIREMENT. — An Action against Government 4). The Provincial Governor also made proper representations to this effect
officials sued in their official capacity, is essentially one against the and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl fishermen were likewise presented
Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly to the President by social and civic organizations as the NAMFREL (National
a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages Movement for Free Elections) and the COMPADRE (Committee for Philippine
that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of Action in Development, Reconstruction and Education), recommending the
the Philippines (L. S. Moom and Co. v. Harrison, 43 Phil., 39; Salgado v. cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if such
Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and others). The reason for this pronouncement is inquiry would substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing
understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent (Tolentino v. Carlos, method was detrimental to the welfare of the majority of the inhabitants
66 Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. v. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 (Exh. 2).
Phil., 157, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez Et. Al. v. Camus Et. Al., 96 Phil., 114).
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive
5. FISHERIES LAW; TRAWL FISHING; WHO MAY BAN OR RESTRICT TRAWL Order No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz., 1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
FISHING; POWER OF PRESIDENT THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDERS, TO BAN Bay, but said executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66,
TRAWL FISHING. — Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries Law, the issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037), apparently in answer to a
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the
within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2,
who, in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz., 5198) was issued
of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954.
fishing with trawls in Philippine waters. However, as the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a
general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Section complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction
75, Revised Administrative Code), the President can exercise the same power with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867,
and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the
proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned (Section Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries
79-A, Revised Administrative Code). Hence, Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and
80, series of 1954, restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Bay (Camarines) are valid and issued by authority of law.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT Fisheries, represented by the Legal Adviser of said Department and a Special
CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — For the Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, answered the complaint
protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress alleging, among other things, that of the 18 plaintiffs (Exequiel Soriano,
intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any Teodora Donato, Felipe Concepcion, Venancio Correa, Santo Gaviana,
fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the Alfredo General, Constancio Gutierrez, Arsenio de Guzman, Pedro Lazaro,
supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture Porfirio Lazaro, Deljie de Leon, Jose Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio
and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he Salgado, Porfirio San Juan, Luis Sioco, Casimiro Villar and Enrique Voluntad),
deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. In only 11 were issued licenses to operate fishing boats for the year 1954
so far as the protection of fish fry or fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act (Annex B, petition — L-8895); that the executive orders in question were
is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural issued in accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau of
Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the Fisheries of the use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the
legislative intent. Consequently, when the President, in response to the general welfare of the public could be disregarded, and set up the affirmative
clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive defenses that since plaintiffs question the validity of the executive orders
Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters issued by the President, then the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious Resources and the Director of Fisheries were not the real parties in interest;
regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose that said executive orders do not constitute a deprivation of property
of issues of general concern (Section 63, Revised Administrative Code) which without due process of law, and therefore prayed that the complaint be
were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. The exercise of such dismissed (Exh. B, petition, L-8895).
authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers of
Congress. During the trial of the case, the Governor of Camarines Sur appearing for the
municipalities of Siruma, Tinambac, Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said
DECISION province, called the attention of the Court that the Solicitor General had not
been notified of the proceeding. To this manifestation, the Court ruled that
FELIX, J.: in view of the circumstances of the case, and as the Solicitor General would
only be interested in maintaining the legality of the executive orders sought
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and to be impugned, Section 4 of Rule 66 could be interpreted to mean that the
Camarines Sur, a part of the National waters of the Philippines with an trial could go on and the Solicitor General could be notified before judgment
is entered. wherein respondents-appellants ascribed to the lower court the commission
of the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
After the evidence for both parties was submitted and the Solicitor General
was allowed to file his memorandum, the Court rendered decision on 1. In ruling that the President has no authority to issue Executive Orders Nos.
February 2, 1955, the last part of which reads as 22, 66 and 80 banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
2. In holding that the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes has
"The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact not been delegated to the President of the Philippines under the Fisheries
that Congress has seen fit to define under what conditions it may be done by Act;
the enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of Congress must be of
transcendental significance. It is primarily within the fields of legislation not 3. In not considering Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 as declaring a
of execution; for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in definite closed season pursuant to Section 7, Act 4003, as amended, otherwise
territorial waters. The court can not accept that Congress had intended to known as the Fisheries Act;
abdicate its inherent right to legislate on this matter of national importance.
To accept respondents’ view would be to sanction the exercise of legislative 4. In holding that to uphold the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 22 and 80
power by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel Bay now, it may be Davao Gulf would be to sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees;
tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by Congress. This being the
conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Until the trawler is 5. In its suggestion that the only remedy for respondents and the people of
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay the coastal towns of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the
by executive proclamation. The remedy for respondents and population of Legislature; and
the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the Legislature. The result will
be to issue the writ prayed for, even though this be to strike at public clamor 6. In declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid and in ordering
and to annul the orders of the President issued in response therefor. This is a the injunction prayed for to issue.
task unwelcome and unpleasant; unfortunately, courts of justice use only
one measure for both the rich and poor, and are not bound by the more As Our decision in the prohibition and certiorari case (G. R. No. L-8895) would
popular cause when they give judgments. depend, in the last analysis, on Our ruling in the appeal of the respondents in
case G. R. No. L-9191, We shall first proceed to dispose of the latter case.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are
declared invalid; the injunction prayed for is ordered to issue; no It is indisputable that the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and
pronouncement as to costs." 80 in response to the clamor of the inhabitants of the municipalities along
the coastline of San Miguel Bay. They read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Petitioners immediately filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of library
injunction which was opposed by the Solicitor General and after the parties
had filed their respective memoranda, the Court issued an order dated EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22
February 19, 1955, denying respondents’ motion to set aside judgment and
ordering them to file a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, "PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN
1955, as a condition for the non- issuance of the injunction prayed for by
petitioners pending appeal. The Solicitor General filed a motion for SAN MIGUEL BAY"
reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit, and the Court, acting
upon the motion for new trial filed by respondents, issued another order on "In order to effectively protect the municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay,
March 3, 1955, denying said motion and granting the injunction prayed for Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other aquatic
by petitioners upon the latter’s filing a bond for P30,000 unless respondents resources of the area, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines,
could secure a writ of preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court on or by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order
before March 15, 1955. Respondents, therefore, brought the matter to this that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Court in a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction,
docketed as G. R. No. L-8895, and on the same day filed a notice to appeal "1. Fishing by means of trawls (utase, otter and/or perenzella) of any kind, in
from the order of the lower court dated February 2, 1955, which appeal was the waters comprised within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited.
docketed in this Court as G. R. No. L-9191.
"2. Trawl shall mean, for the purpose of this Order, a fishing net made in the
In the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners (respondents form of a bag with the mouth kept open by a device, the whole affair being
therein) contended among other things, that the order of the respondent towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture
Judge requiring petitioners Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources demersal, ground or bottom species.
and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or
before March 1, 1955, had been issued without jurisdiction or in excess "3. Violation of the provisions of this Order shall subject the offender to the
thereof, or at the very least with grave abuse of discretion, because by penalty provided under Section 83 of Act 4993, or a fine of not more than
requiring the bond, the Republic of the Philippines was in effect made a party two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both,
defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one against the in the discretion of the Court.
Government which is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to
entertain; that the failure to give the Solicitor General the opportunity to "Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-
defend the validity of the challenged executive orders resulted in the receipt four and of the Independence of the Philippines, the eighth." (50 Off. Gaz.
of objectionable matters at the hearing; that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court 1421).
does not empower a court of law to pass upon the validity of an executive
order in a declaratory relief proceeding; that the respondent Judge did not "EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 66
have the power to grant the injunction as Section 4 of Rule 39 does not apply
to declaratory relief proceedings but only to injunction, receivership and "AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, ENTITLED
patent accounting proceedings; and prayed that a writ of preliminary ‘PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY’
injunction be issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing its order
of March 3, 1955, and for such other relief as may be deem just and "By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY,
equitable in the premises. This petition was given due course and the hearing President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 22, dated
on the merits was set by this Court for April 12, 1955, but no writ of April 5, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as defined in said
preliminary injunction was issued. Executive Order, within that portion of San Miguel Bay north of a straight line
drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of
Meanwhile, the appeal (G. R. No. L-9191) was heard on October 3, 1956, Camarines Sur. Fishing by means of trawls south of said line shall still be
absolutely prohibited. STAYED. — Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action
for injunction or in a receivership action, or a judgment or order directing an
"Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of September, in the year of our accounting in an action for infringement of letter patent, shall not be stayed
Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 4037). appeal. The trial court, however, in its discretion, when an appeal is taken
from a judgment granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, may make an
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 80 order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction during
the pendency of an appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it
"FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, AS may consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse
AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 66, DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 1954 party."cralaw virtua1aw library

"By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, This provision was the basis of the order of the lower court dated February
President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 66, dated 19, 1955, requiring the filing by the respondents of a bond for P30,000 as a
September 23, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as defined in condition for the non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by plaintiffs
Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, within that portion of San therein, and which the Solicitor General charged to have been issued in
Miguel Bay north of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the excess of jurisdiction. The State’s counsel, however, alleges that while
Municipality of Mercedes, Province of Camarines Norte to Balocbaloc Point judgment could be stayed in injunction, receivership and patent accounting
in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur, until December cases and although the complaint was styled "Injunction and/or Declaratory
31, 1954, only. Relief with Preliminary Injunction", the case is necessarily one for declaratory
relief, there being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the
Thereafter, the provisions of said Executive Order No. 22 absolutely plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction. But aside from the title of the
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all the waters comprised within the complaint, We find that plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the nullity of
San Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full force and effect as originally Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary
provided therein. injunction, and for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable.
This Court has already held that there are only two requisites to be satisfied
"Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of November, in the year of Our if an injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to be
Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the Independence of the protected, and that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 5198) violative of said right (North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil.,
664). There is no question that at least 11 of the complaining trawl operators
It is likewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity of said executive were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines,
orders in their petition for a writ of injunction and/or declaratory relief filed and it is undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that the lower court, upon detrimental to their interests. And considering further that the granting or
declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid, issued an order refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, rests in the sound
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the facts
of Fisheries to post a bond for P30,000 if the writ of injunction restraining of the particular case (Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil., 225, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439),
them from enforcing the executive orders in question must be stayed. We find no abuse of discretion when the trial Court treated the complaint as
one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment
The Solicitor General avers that the constitutionality of an executive order pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
cannot be ventilated in a declaratory relief proceeding. We find this
untenable, for this Court taking cognizance of an appeal from the decision of On the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party defendants in Civil
the lower court in the case of Hilado v. De la Costa Et. Al., 83 Phil., 471, which Case No. 24867 of the Court of First Instance of Manila are Salvador Araneta,
involves the constitutionality of another executive order presented in an as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Deogracias Villadolid,
action for declaratory relief, in effect accepted the propriety of such action. as Director of Fisheries, and were sued in such capacities because they were
the officers charged with duty of carrying out the statutes, orders and
This question being eliminated, the main issues left for Our determination regulations on fishing and fisheries. In its order of February 19, 1955, the trial
with respect to defendants’ appeal (G. R. No. L-9191), are:chanrob1es virtual court denied defendants’ motion to set aside judgment and they were
1aw library required to file a bond for P30,000 to answer for damages that plaintiffs
were allegedly suffering at the time, as otherwise the injunction prayed for
(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a by the latter would be issued.
Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully
be required to post a bond in an action against them; Because of these facts, We agree with the Solicitor General when he says
that the action, being one against herein petitioners as such Government
(2) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive officials, is essentially one against the Government, and to require these
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the
Bay, or, said in other words, whether said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any,
80 were issued in accordance with law; and the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines (L. S. Moon
and Co. v. Harrison, 43 Phil., 39; Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and
(3) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance others). The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State
thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the undoubtedly is always solvent (Tolentino v. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Government
President. of the P. I. v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil., 157, cited
in Joaquin Gutierrez Et. Al. v. Camus Et. Al. * G. R. No. L-6725, promulgated
Counsel for both parties presented commendable exhaustive defenses in October 30, 1954). However, as the records show that herein petitioners
support of their respective stands. Certainly, these cases deserve such failed to put up the bond required by the lower court, allegedly due to
efforts, not only because the constitutionality of an act of a coordinate difficulties encountered with the Auditor General’s Office (giving the
branch in our tripartite system of Government is in issue, but also because of impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for
the number of inhabitants, admittedly classified as "subsistence fishermen", reasons beyond their control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition
that may be affected by any ruling that We may promulgate herein. and certiorari proceedings in G. R. No. L-8895, were enforced, if at all, 1 in
accordance with section 4 of Rule 39, which We hold to be applicable to the
I. As to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of procedure that an case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein
appeal stays the execution of a judgment. An exception is offered by section petitioners to post a bond, becomes moot and academic.
4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
II. Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial
"SEC. 4. INJUNCTION, RECEIVERSHIP AND PATENT ACCOUNTING, NOT judge extending the controversy to the determination of which between the
Legislative and Executive Departments of the Government had "the power to restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device (which includes the net
close any definite area of the Philippine waters" instead of limiting the same used by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as to
to the real issue raised by the enactment of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to
80, specially the first and the last "absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of be administered in the manner prescribed by him, from which no person
trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay", ruled in favor could lawfully take, destroy or kill in any of the places aforementioned, or in
of Congress, and as the closing of any definite area of the Philippine waters any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom any small or immature
is, according to His Honor, primarily within the fields of legislation and fish, fry or fish eggs. It is true that said section 75 mentions certain streams,
Congress had not intended to abdicate its power to legislate on the matter, ponds and waters within the game refuges, . . . communal forests, etc., which
he maintained, as stated before, that "until the trawler is outlawed by the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries, but this enumeration of
legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive places does not curtail the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of
proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and population of the Agriculture and Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside
coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the Legislature," and thus declared and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which
said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid." naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel Bay in Camarines.

The Solicitor General, on the contrary, asserts that the President is From the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal Mayors held at
empowered by law to issue the executive enactments in question. Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), the following
manifestation is made:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003, known as the Fisheries Law, the latter
two sections as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 471, read "WHEREAS, the continuous operation of said trawls even during the close
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph season as specified in said Executive Order No. 20 caused the wanton
destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs
"SEC. 6. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED. — Words and terms used in this Act laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie; in order to save
shall be construed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library the shrimps specie from eventual extermination and in order to conserve the
x x x shrimps specie for posterity;"

In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL and addressed to the President of the
TAKE or TAKING, includes pursuing, shooting, killing, capturing, trapping, Philippines (Exh. 2), in support of the petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen
snaring, and netting fish and other aquatic animals, and all lesser acts, such (allegedly 6,175 in number), praying that trawlers be banned from operating
as disturbing, wounding, stupefying, or placing, setting, drawing, or using any in San Miguel Bay, it is also stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
net or other device commonly used to take or collect fish and other aquatic
animals, whether they result in taking or not, and includes every attempt to "The trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep
take and every act of assistance to every other person in taking or into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean
attempting to take or collect fish and other aquatic animals: PROVIDED, That floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the
whenever taking is allowed by law, reference is had to taking by lawful mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea: algea, shell fish and star
means and in lawful manner. fish . . .
x x x
"The absence of some species or the apparent decline in the catch of some
fishermen operating in the bay may be due to several factors, namely: the
"SEC. 13. PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS. — Except for scientific or indiscriminate catching of fry and immature sizes of fishes, the wide spread
educational purpose or for propagation, it shall be unlawful to take or catch use of explosives inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of the bay,
fry or fish eggs and the small fish, not more than three (3) centimeters long, and the extensive operation of the trawls." (p. 9, Report of Santos B. Rasalan,
known as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the Philippines. Towards this Exh. A).
end, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be authorized to
provide by regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be Extensive Operation of Trawls: — The strenuous effect of the operations of
imposed on THE USE OF ANY FISHING NET OR FISHING DEVICE FOR THE the 17 TRAWLS of the demersal fisheries of San Miguel Bay is better
PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS; Provided, however, That the Secretary of appreciated when we consider the fact that out of its about 850 square
Agriculture and Commerce shall permit the taking of young of certain species kilometers area, only about 350 square kilometers of 5 fathoms up could be
of fish known as hipon under such restrictions as may be deemed necessary. trawled. With their continuous operation, coupled with those of the
numerous fishing methods, the fisheries is greatly strained. This is shown by
"SEC. 75. FISH REFUGES AND SANCTUARIES. — Upon the recommendation of the fact that in view of the non- observance of the close season from May to
the officer or chief of the bureau, office or service concerned, the Secretary October, each year, majority of their catch are immature. If their operation
of Agriculture and Commerce may set aside and establish fishery reservation would continue unrestricted, the supply would be greatly depleted." (p. 11,
or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A).
prescribed by him. All streams, ponds, and waters within the game refuge,
birds sanctuaries, national parks, botanical gardens, communal forests and San Miguel Bay — can sustain 3 to 4 small trawlers (Otter Trawl Explorations
communal pastures are hereby declared fishing refuges and sanctuaries. It in Philippine Waters, Research Report 25 of the Fish and Wildlife Service,
shall be unlawful for any person, to take, destroy or kill in any of the places United States Department of the Interior, p. 9, Exhibit B).
aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom,
any fish fry or fish eggs."cralaw virtua1aw library According to Annex A of the complaint filed in the lower court in Civil Case
No. 24867 — G. R. No. L — 9191 (Exh. D, p. 53 of the folder of Exhibits), the
Act No. 4003 further provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph 18 plaintiffs-appellees operate 29 trawling boats, and their operation must
be in a big scale considering the investments plaintiffs have made therefor,
"SEC. 83. OTHER VIOLATIONS. — Any other violation of the provisions of this amounting to P387,000 (Record on Appeal, p. 16-17).
Act or any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the
offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for In virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the manifestations just
not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court."cralaw copied, We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the
virtua1aw library restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come,
under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
As may be seen from the just quoted provisions, the law declares unlawful Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal
and fixes the penalty for the taking (except for scientific or educational prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or
purposes or for propagation), destroying or killing of any fish fry or fish eggs, orders are caught fishing with trawls in Philippine waters.
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources) is authorized to promulgate regulations Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, is
obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs and frys which should be preserved, "THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative
can the President of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority? power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and within itself,
Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
prescribes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the
"SEC. 10(1). The President shall have control of all the executive act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some
departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is a delegation of legislative
faithfully executed."cralaw virtua1aw library power, is unconstitutional and void."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Commonwealth Act No. 471, which have been aforequoted, We find that
Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the
"SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. — territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the
Administrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations
touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the use of
rearranging or readjusting any of the districts, divisions, parts or ports of the any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or fish eggs (Sec.
Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of, Agriculture and Natural Resources to
of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to
be made in executive orders."cralaw virtua1aw library be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it
x x x unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places, or in any
manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (Sec.
75); and (d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in
Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated
Code also provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than P200, or
imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the
"All executive functions of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines court (Sec. 83).
shall be directly under the Executive Department subject to the supervision
and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry
The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of or fish egg is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the
the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and
them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the
chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall exhibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton
assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs
under his control and supervision. laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie" (Exh. F), and that
"the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep
For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean
considered the Department Head of the Executive Office.." . . . floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the
mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea" (Exh. 2).
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which by law is placed under the direction and control of the In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry
Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the
control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.) . Moreover, promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
"executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea
under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed
as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
respective Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.) , and there can be no doubt that Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people
the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely
proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San
Resources and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
enforce said executive Orders, was made a party defendant in one of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern
cases at bar (G. R. No. L-9191). (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the
law.
For the foregoing reasons We do not hesitate to declare that Executive
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations We render
issued by authority of law. judgment, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

III. But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute an (a) Declaring that the issues involved in case G. R. No. L-8895 have become
undue delegation of the powers of Congress? moot, as no writ of preliminary injunction has been issued by this Court
enjoining the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the Branch XIV, from enforcing his order of March 3, 1955; and
power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the
execution of the law consists in that the former necessarily involves a (b) Reversing the decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L- 9191; dissolving
discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or the writ of injunction prayed for in the lower court by plaintiffs, if any has
discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of been actually issued by the court a quo; and declaring Executive Orders Nos.
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority of the
made (Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234, 239. See also Rubi, Et. Al. v. The Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660).
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
In the case of U. S. v. Ang Tang Ho., 43 Phil. 1, We also
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which
Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur. constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at
Republic of the Philippines the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles
SUPREME COURT to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its
Manila regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO.
FIRST DIVISION 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to
vs. Filipino overseas workers."
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial
KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents. benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner. certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own
The Solicitor General for public respondent. previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco. contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
CRUZ, J.: employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles
her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the
not an overseas worker. analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for through the POEA.
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No.
was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a
have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and
death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco,
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done
administrative remedies. so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are
Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February
be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract
case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the
petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the
respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
case to her prejudice. as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the delegation.
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by ... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which,
disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2 as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as
an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
the Employees Compensation Commission. not whatthe law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate
fatal accident in Japan in 1985. Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order.
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to
by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.'
include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
while berthed in a foreign country. 6 beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may 1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. electrician
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient 2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient 3. ...
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for
delegation from running riot. 14 burial expenses.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No.
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. follows:
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment
the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social
frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
the exception. The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and promotion of its interest.
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and
experts in the particular fields assigned to them. the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an
legislation." arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights
laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The should have more in law.
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales
of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to
of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of
itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
equitable employment practices." WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED.
standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" It is so ordered.
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang Republic of the Philippines
v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor SUPREME COURT
General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and Manila
experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial EN BANC
Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20 G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as DIEGO, Petitioners,
already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the vs.
Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN
seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that— M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents. amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the
x-----------------------x Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate
G.R. No. 208493 and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the
ALCANTARA, Petitioner, 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the
vs. stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the
x-----------------------x legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang
G.R. No. 209251 Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under
Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner, the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on
vs. reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving
BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project
MANAGEMENT, Respondents. preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then,
DECISION the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1 treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that
-James Madison "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall
Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the C. Post-Martial Law Era:
particulars of the constitutional challenge. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
The Facts After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept. Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund"
usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240
with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the
bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the
from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding,
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which
budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to
made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In a Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the
more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
money to a representative's district.7Some scholars on the subject further activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8 amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump- participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while
later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or
Executive. qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines. infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects"
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972). such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of
the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time,
the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such,
distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators,
Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, "with the addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was
approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33
any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder." Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President,
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to
participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their
the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate
public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project
or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the
with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed
Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated for projects not included in the list herein required."
formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to
required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued
for the release of CDF Funds. Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007),
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the
that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the
"CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an
been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the 201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts
Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard
Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to
particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation
of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
spent.41 once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health,
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001). Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government,
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways
separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund," 43 the to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment
the release of the funds. is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual
2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used list.74
to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were
PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-
2000 GAA for the year 2001. President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010). deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
a single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests
consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
was re-enacted.53 case may be.79
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the
also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under
similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President
the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs. Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify,
the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to
funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in
DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been
Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation. currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12,
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of
the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described
allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of ● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
PAGCOR.88 appropriation law or ordinance.
IV. Controversies in the Philippines. ● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased ● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred
tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of
then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of law.
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the
funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of V. The Procedural Antecedents.
August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the
publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To
sparked public outrage."94 recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of
the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95 issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has been President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking
defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from
for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
"JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and
dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98 TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
three-year audit investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF from Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA
(VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have
of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to
during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the
Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-
were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103 budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The
legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations. Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno
sponsoring members of the Lower House. (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs. and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
having been turned over to the government. Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
latter‘s endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects. Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-
legislators to which the Funds were transferred. 14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
"financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
projects of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the important119and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013. A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking case or controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty
and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113 are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights,
petitioners to reply to the Comment. an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In
to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013. controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during hypothetical or moot questions."124
the Oral Arguments. Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, justiciable controversy in these cases.
the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
subsequently did. Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
The Issues Before the Court adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution: Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
I. Procedural Issues. – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated these public funds.
petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken
1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court
Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re- observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
the principles of res judicata and stare decisis. since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel." Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non- Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
(e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy. nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel." a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral
the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure Arguments:126
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are Appropriations Act, correct?
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case,
power. for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure
In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your
the present cases. Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
The Court’s Ruling Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the
The petitions are partly granted. project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
I. Procedural Issues. investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
implement it? connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation,
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out
specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly,
irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the
the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not
was just exercising precisely the duty …. just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but
xxxx more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition
does that mean that PDAF has been repealed? that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x. imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues
xxxx before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious
Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to
correct? petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable
(Emphases supplied) of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these
that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are
cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129 areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which,
of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there is found,
with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non- among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable
local autonomy. and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial
the interests involved discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms
public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been stage."140
lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present
numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution,
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
emphasized that: Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
balance system inherent in our form of government. be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the
of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied) legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
the CoA Report to be sufficient. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what
it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases
nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied) are concerned, cannot apply.
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created.
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same
firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people issue.153
that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To
society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power
judicial restraint. given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
C. Locus Standi. activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In
is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145 main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation,
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of
from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases. the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as including not only those related to the area of project identification but also
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues
society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
"not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of application of the stare decisis principle.
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the
cases. said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis. which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an
et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is
which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed
applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
LAMP. has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice
judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever
Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter,
a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies
direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is
them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation
the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional
inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To
ensuing section of this Decision. achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
fine, stare decisis would not apply. interest assertions of another or others.170
II. Substantive Issues. Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle
A. Definition of Terms. when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation
must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned
discourse. function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In
the Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump- other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible
sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s
determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the functions.
following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA,
allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget
the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and
funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the
System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the
PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159 implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and any other appropriation law.
legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more
of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid
collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law."
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details
collective power;160 and for implementation by the Executive."176
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any
manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
Presidential Social Fund. of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified,
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
substantive issues of these cases. implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel. oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
1. Separation of Powers. Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must
a. Statement of Principle. be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, must be confined to the following:
through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the
branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power to budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to b. Application.
make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or,
particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and
recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of
and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the
powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
implementation.181 thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement
control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the
Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘
Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and reliance on the same falters altogether.
identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to
in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is
framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184 only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through
The Court rules in favor of petitioners. the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby
in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior execution process:192
consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the
post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF by the individual legislator?
Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. xxxx
Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done
priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing and then there is no identification.
agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision xxxx
further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project
as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. was implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I
to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to
for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on xxxx
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in
legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of
projects. the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators
legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative
request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as
be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such
explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Chief Justice Sereno:
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2)
Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive
within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of
the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned." how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF
another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
whether through formal measures written into the law or informal practices separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained
institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an
deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own. elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power. workings of the various departments of the government.203
a. Statement of Principle. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or
be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process
the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in
that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent Sec. 27. x x x.
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and xxxx
referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This or items to which he does not object.
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President,
the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single,
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
or other national emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to publication."205
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
within the framework of the national development program of the The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make
Government.198 the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the will be a broader point of view.
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows: department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as
difficulty of administering the law." they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
xxxx Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as
(Emphases supplied) "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
b. Application. community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as inadvertence, or design."209
settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions"
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes which provide for parameters of appropriation.
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent
all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional. that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
3. Checks and Balances. formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power. Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a
specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature,
which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would
an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be
for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending,
proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s
President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary power of item veto.
funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme
for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a
bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and
by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be per implementing agency."217
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF
respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to
Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse
guidelines as may be prescribed by law." to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of commendable ends.218
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the c. Accountability.
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point
law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial
a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns
President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also
entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-
or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs
legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well,
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual The Court agrees in part.
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability. functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
b. Application. embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper
veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
useless."213 power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They legislation.224
argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214 forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has
The Court agrees with petitioners. an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed
the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post- Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with,
As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in
his office. (Emphasis supplied) their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v.
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would Intermediate Appellate Court:228
allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the
Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local
be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis. political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important,
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue
such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment. interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision
and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also
public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
4. Political Dynasties. goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of with petitioners.
the 1987 Constitution225 which states that: Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are
and underscoring supplied) likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this
not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that
this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the
or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-
must defer from ruling on this issue. projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties. is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the
5. Local Autonomy. LGU concerned cannot afford.233
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent
Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making
as follows: equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF
ARTICLE II and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
ARTICLE X legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as
organization and operation of the local units. well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows: given unto them on the sole account of their office.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs,
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
to the local government units. authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local
xxxx autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution.
Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
efforts of the government." All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application
local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work
deemed unconstitutional. obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on
turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel. service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel. exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used
1. Validity of Appropriation. to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
(now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent
release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if
specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside
and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. 237 In and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure
similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund
valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239 finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
The Court disagrees. projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting
apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the
amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
"appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x
particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines"
provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be
– be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment
Guingona, Jr.:241 measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat,
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only
as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-
annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of delegability principle as afore-discussed.
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for 2. Undue Delegation.
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such
from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242 be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the
applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource
the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a
supplied) particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test."
Constitution. Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP
to be implemented.248 from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report).
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be ARTICLE II
confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or involving public interest.
be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
projects of the government" states a singular and general class and hence, pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information
fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is Service Commission:256
limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose
passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records
clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such
should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the
government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910. mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been
moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the clarified that the right to information does not include the right to compel
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same
parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality. case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure matters of public concern.
project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that
definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no
commerce as well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases
phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be supplied)
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
effective and subsisting. Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert
any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO
duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that
that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the
release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as
a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary
parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this
the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is
petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus now permanently enjoined.
case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must,
petition. nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether
petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in
which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable DBM Circular 2013-8.
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the
documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself
requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
reasonable regulations,viz.:259 purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may approval or clearance by competent authority."263
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking,
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious. brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM
petitioners, i.e., representative during the Oral Arguments:265
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure SARO?
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the xxxx
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here. agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations. already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your
deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Executive‘s Social Funds."260 Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances
matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
prayer on this score. Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision. Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated
10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows: unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else
such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements source.
thereto effected by the agencies concerned. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued Funds which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to
September 10, 2013 TRO. finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by
of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted
release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
SARO, should remain enjoined. corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
"unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent
been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions,
(b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
the operative fact doctrine. phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993,
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of
As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San non-delegability of legislative power.
Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential
determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268 the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively. Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs),
Conclusion whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but
chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the
Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not
legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete
determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s
President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This
of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds
it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same
of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly
for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non- disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
delegability. This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious SO ORDERED
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out
should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or
form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. THIRD DIVISION
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has
monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN, G.R. No. 157643
of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Petitioner,
Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the Present:
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the
path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty Acting Chairperson,
and no other‘s. - versus - TINGA,*
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the CHICO-NAZARIO,
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares NACHURA, and
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal REYES, JJ.
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, Promulgated:
which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various Respondent. March 28, 2008
post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to
the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles
DECISION b) attorneys fees of P50,000.00.

NACHURA, J.: SO ORDERED.[9]

Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in
its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner,
Before us is a petition[1] for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the
Court, of the Decision[2] dated September 3, 2002 and the libelous article. The fallo of the Decision reads
Resolution[3] dated March 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20890 entitled People of the Philippines v. Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs
C. Tugas.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie)
Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel[4] were filed against 1. The appealed decision as against the accused-appellant BOGS C. TUGAS
Cristinelli[5] S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered ACQUITTING him of the
of Quezon City, Branch 218. Except for the name of the complainant,[6] the crime charged and ABSOLVING him from any civil liability; and
informations uniformly read 2. The same appealed decision as against accused-appellant CRISTENELLI
S. FERMIN is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the damages is REDUCED to P300,000.00 for EACH offended party, and the
above-named accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and BOGS C. award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A
Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City, and circulated in Quezon City Costs against the appellant FERMIN.
and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole country, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, publicly and acting with SO ORDERED.[10]
malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and
circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of
June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit: The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition, raising the following
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA arguments:
NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE
I.
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN
ANG ASUNTO NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA THE RULING IN U.S. VS. TAYLOR, PEOPLE VS. TOPACIO
HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN AND SANTIAGO, U.S. VS. MADRIGAL AND U.S. VS. SANTOS AND THE
NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, HOLDING IN U.S. VS. OCAMPO AS CLARIFIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA PEOPLE VS. BELTRAN AND SOLIVEN REQUIRING KNOWLEDGE,
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY BY THE PUBLISHER IN THE PREPARATION
NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA AND APPROVAL OF THE LIBELOUS ARTICLE TO SUSTAIN THE LATTERS
CONVICTION FOR LIBEL ARE APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are
entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than II.
to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as
it depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler, thereby causing ART. 360 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH MAKES A PUBLISHER LIABLE
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to FOR LIBEL TO THE SAME EXTENT AS IF HE WERE THE AUTHOR THEREOF
the damage and prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ. MERELY CREATES A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION WHICH MAY BE REBUTTED
BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
III.

Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas (Tugas) both THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS NOT LIBELOUS.
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint
Decision[8] dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of IV.
libel. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE OF THE FREEDOM
WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused, OF THE PRESS AND IS WITHIN THE REALM OF FAIR AND HONEST
judgment is hereby rendered finding CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN and BOGS C. COMMENT.[11]
TUGAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of libel, punishable under Art. 355
of the Revised Penal Code and sentences them to an indeterminate penalty
of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and the second issues jointly,
one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision then the third and the fourth issues together.
correccional, as maximum, for each case.
Petitioner posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the
Likewise, accused Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs Tugas are sentenced to pay Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly
jointly and solidarily: participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the
libelous article. This principle is, allegedly, based on our ruling
a) moral damages of: in U.S. v. Taylor,[12] People v. Topacio
1. P500,000.00 to Annabelle Rama in Criminal Case No. Q-95-62823; and and Santiago,[13] U.S. v. Madrigal,[14] U.S. v. Abad Santos,[15] and U.S. v.
Ocampo,[16] as purportedly clarified in People v. Beltran and Soliven.[17] She
2. P500,000.00 to Eddie Gutierrez in Criminal Case No. Q-95-62824; submits that these cases were applied by the CA in acquitting her co-accused
Tugas, and being similarly situated with him, she is also entitled to an
acquittal. She claims that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or
had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article, nor manager.
in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published
in Gossip Tabloid. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same
question was considered and the court held that in the criminal prosecution
The arguments are too simplistic and the cited jurisprudence are either of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima
misplaced or, in fact, damning. facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer
by the defendant to prove that he never saw the libel and was not aware of
Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v. Abad Santos are not applicable to the its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and
present case. U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal prosecution under retraction were afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground
Section 30 of Act No. 1519 for fraudulently representing the weight or for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
measure of anything to be greater or less than it is, whereas U.S. v. Abad
Santos refers to criminal responsibility under the Internal Revenue Law (Act. It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the
No. 2339). publication of improper communications, to use reasonable caution in the
conduct of his business that no libels be published. (Whartons Criminal Law,
The other cases are more in point, but they serve to reinforce the conviction secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishops Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson,
of, rather than absolve, petitioner. 64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)

In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In
which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was clearly of
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable criminally as
words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the
serial as fully as if he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced management of the paper.
during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication
without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in Foster.
the said libelous article.[18]
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar. Thus, An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a paper, although he
it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as
causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or he discovered it.
publishes it.
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in
the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper
been specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared
printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it.

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code[19] was enunciated in U.S. v. It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the publisher, as shown by
Ocampo,[20] to wit: the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid,[21] but also its president and chairperson
as she herself admitted on the witness stand.[22] She also testified that she
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the handled the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take
printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by charge of everything.[23] Obviously, petitioner had full control over the
reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge,
thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article fails to
the publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have persuade. Following our ruling in Ocampo, petitioners criminal guilt should
any connection with its publication are liable as publishers. be affirmed, whether or not she had actual knowledge and participation,
having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article
xxxx purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., were employees under her control and supervision.
629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783): Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by the CA in People v.
The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a Beltran and Soliven such that Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The
newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the Philippine Star, was acquitted by the appellate court in view of the lack of
libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a evidence that he knew and approved the article written by Luis D. Beltran
libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima about then President Corazon C. Aquino in the newspapers October 12, 1987
facie to charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication. issue. Petitioner submits that People v. Beltran and Soliven serves as a guide
The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held to this Court regarding the criminal liability of the publisher of the newspaper
prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no where a libelous article is published. Put differently, it appears that
defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x x petitioner wants this Court to follow the CA decision and adopt it as judicial
x precedent under the principle of stare decisis.
One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper
and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects and The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8[24] of the Civil Code, is
controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and enunciated, thus:
should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned
in the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
or servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of
of guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x. the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of
We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[25] (Emphasis supplied) Q: That means that his ailment is not life-threatening?
A: Correct.

Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained finality at the level of the CA. Q: In fact, visitors were allowed to see him?
Thus, if the CA seemingly made a new pronouncement regarding the criminal A: Yes, sir.
liability of a publisher under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, that ruling
cannot bind this Court unless we purposely adopt the same. Be that as it Q: He can also write?
may, we find no compelling reason to revisit U.S. v. Ocampo; to modify it A: Yes, sir.
would amount to judicial legislation. Article 360 is clear and unambiguous,
and to apply People v. Beltran and Soliven, which requires specific Q: He was allowed to [receive] friends?
knowledge, participation, and approval on the part of the publisher to be A: Yes, sir.
liable for the publication of a libelous article, would be reading into the law
an additional requirement that was not intended by it. Q: According to you, he was able to work also, he is not totally incapacitated
in performing certain chores in the hospital room?
In the same vein, we note that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas cannot A: No, sir.
feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was
evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit,[26] and as gleaned Q: Now, prior to 7:10 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1995, you did not see
from his testimony before the trial court, to wit: Mr. Bogs Tugas?
A: I saw him, he was admitted at 7:00 oclock but I saw him before.
WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation in the writing of the
questioned article and my only participation in the publication is the handling Q: How long before 7:10 were you able to see him?
of the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of type-size of the body A: That is about 2 hours.
of the article, before the same was printed and published in GOSSIP Tabloid.
Q: About 5:00 oclock in the morning?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: You do not deny the statements in this publication as executed by you in Q: Who was his companion when you saw him?
the counter-affidavit and sworn in before the City Prosecutor, is this correct? A: He was boarding in my place.
A: Yes, that is correct.
Q: So, you brought him to the hospital?
ATTY. ALENTAJAN: A: Both of us went to the hospital.

That is all for the witness, your Honor. Q: Which boarding house are you referring [to]? In Angeles City?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT: Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you were, you will
not allow the said publication of this same article or same stories? Q: Do you know that Mr. Bogs Tugas works here in Quezon City as editor-in-
chief of a newspaper tabloid?
A: If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will because if you can see A: Yes, sir.
the article, your Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a direct
comment. Q: And some of his work is done in your boarding house?
A: I do not know about it.
COURT: So whether you are there or not, [the] same article leading to them
(sic) will still find its way to come out? Q: How did you know that he is working on his paper works in Quezon
City? Did you see him do that?
A: Yes, your honor.[27] A: I only know he goes to Manila everyday.

Q: In your boarding house, you saw him read and write?

Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation A: Probably yes.[29]
and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was
written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA,
that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting
unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his
medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work, thus constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Q: How would you describe the condition of the patient on June 13, 1995? Anent the third and fourth issues, petitioner argues that the subject article in
A: He is in stable condition. the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the
mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest
Q: You said he was in severe pain, from your opinion, was that condition comment. We disagree.
sufficient to enable him to work?
A: Yes, in my opinion.[28] The banner headlines of the offending article read:

KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA

Q: You said your impression of the patient was urethral colic and this was STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!
caused by spasm?
A: Yes, sir. MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA
NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE!
Q: When you say spasm, it is not sustained, it comes every now and then and
[intermittently], it is not sustained?
A: Yes, sir. On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but
bold letters, are:
Q: Now you said he was in stable condition?
A: Yes, sir.
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG
ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E, Ang ikinakatwiran nilang mag-asawa noon, e gusto raw kasi nilang lumaking
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA Pilipinong-Pilipino ang kanilang mga anak, pero ang totoo, e, napakalaki ng
MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA problemang iniwan nila sa Amerika! mahabang simula ng source ng Gossip
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA Tabloid.
PA BA NINYO YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA
NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON ANG Masamang-masama diumano ang loob ng mga Pilipinong kinatalo roon nina
INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS NOON! Eddie at Annabelle, lalo na si Annabelle, na bukod sa mataray na ay may
kayabangan pa.

The rest of the article, which continued to the entire second page of the Dati nang ganyan si Annabelle! Mataray siya na wala sa lugar. Nung nasa
tabloid, follows Amerika pa silang mag-anak, e, yun din ang madalas nilang pag-awayan dun
ni Eddie!
Mainit na pinag-uusapan ngayon ang ibat ibang posibilidad na maaaring
gawin ni Annabelle Rama Gutierrez para lang hindi matuloy ang pag-aresto at Madalas silang magkagalit, kaya si Eddie, para lang makapagpalipas ng mga
pagkukulong sa kanya ng mga awtoridad kaugnay ng sintensiyang ipinapataw sama niya ng loob, e, dun nag-i-stay sa bahay ng mga kaibigan niyang Pinoy!
sa kanya ni Manila-RTC Judge Rodolfo Palattao.
Grabe ang naging problema nila dun, kaya wala silang choice that time kung
Mula noong June 8, nabatid ng Gossip Tabloid, ay wala pang sinumang di ang umuwi na lang sa Pilipinas!
nakapagtuturo kung saan talaga naroon ang ina ni Ruffa Gutierrez na hindi
pinayagang makapagpiyansa ng Branch 33 para sa pansamantala niyang Ang halagang involved sa pagbebenta nila ng kaldero, e, hindi basta-basta,
kalayaan. milyunan yon!

May mga nagpapalagay na sa pamamagitan ng tinatawag na back-door exit, Kaso yung pinagbebentahan nila, yung halagang dapat sana, e, ibigay nila sa
ang pag-alis ng bansa sa paraang hindi na kailangan pang dumaan sa NAIA, ay kompanya dahil porsiyentuhan lang naman sila dun, nagastos nila!
nakaalis na si Annabelle noon pang nakaraang Biyernes, June 9, patungong
Amerika. Nawala ang pera, at ang balita nga sa States, e, si Annabelle ang dahilan kung
bakit nalubog sila noon sa utang sa States!
Pero isang mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip Tabloid ang nagsabing
napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika nagtungo si Annabelle dahil doon man ay Nag-casino pala si Annabelle! Grabe raw kung magpatalo siya, kaya pati yung
may mga nakahanda nang awtoridad na handang magkulong kay Annabelle, kinita nila sa pagbebenta ng mamahaling kaldero, e, natunaw! sabi uli ng
sakaling mapatunayang naroon nga siya. source ng Gossip Tabloid.

Hindi siya makapupunta sa Amerika dahil napakarami rin niyang asuntong Maraming Pilipino ang sinabitan doon ng mag-asawa, ayon pa sa source
iniwan doon noon pa! ng Gossip Tabloid, kaya ngayong may asunto naman si Annabelle dito sa
Pilipinas ay napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika pa rin siya tatakbo.
Nag-abroad man siya, e pihadong hindi siya sa Amerika nagtuloy dahil
nakaabang na rin ang sangkatutak niyang maniningil dun ngayon! Paano siya magpupunta dun para tuluyan nang manirahan, e, ang dami-dami
ring Pinoy na naghihintay sa kanya dun para maningil sa kanya?
Sa Amerika pa kaya siya magtatago, samantalang ilang taon na rin siyang
inaabangan dun ng mga kababayan nating niloko niya, in one way or Alam nyo ba, bukod sa galit na galit na sa kanila ang mga Pinoy na nandun, e,
another? simula ng source ng Gossip Tabloid. may mga nakaabang na ring asunto para kay Annabelle.

Niliwanag ng naturang source na ang dahilan ng biglaang pag-uwi ng pamilya So, malabong sa Amerika pa siya tumuloy ngayong napapabalitang nasa
Gutierrez sa bansa ilang taon na ang nakararaan ay may kinalaman sa abroad siya dahil sa mga naghihintay na kaso sa kanya dun.
malaking halagang hindi nabayaran nina Eddie at Annabelle sa ilang
kababayan natin sa Amerika. Ang alam namin, e, sa Europe nagbabalak pumunta ang pamilya ni Eddie.

Naaalala pa ba ninyo yung mga kalderong ibinebenta noon nina Eddie at Di bat ilang beses nang nagpapabalik-balik dun sina Ruffa. Noon pa, e, pinag-
Annabelle sa States? aralan na nina Eddie at Annabelle ang posibilidad ng mga gagawin nila!

Mga mamahaling kaldero yun, hindi basta-basta kaldero ang ibinebenta nila Alam nila na hindi sila puwedeng mag-stay sa States dahil kalat din ang
dun, kaya talagang ang ganda-ganda na sana ng buhay nilang mag-anak dun asunto nila dun, bukod pa sa napakaraming Pinoy na huma-hunting sa kanila!
hanggang sa dumating yung point na sinisingil na sila nung mismong
kompanya ng kaldero! Kaya kung totoong nakalusot na nga si Annabelle ngayon para makatakas siya
sa pagkakulong, imposibleng sa States siya nagpunta!
Malaki ang halagang involved, milyon-milyon, kaya nung kinasuhan na sila, e
kinailangan nilang umalis sa Amerika para bumalik na dito. Mas malaking problema ang kailangan niyang harapin sa States dahil sa
perang nadispalko nila, bukod pa sa asuntong iniwan nilang nakatiwangwang
Isa si Bert Leroy, Jr. sa mga Pilipinong nagkaroon ng malaking problema kina dun!
Eddie at Annabelle, alam ba nyo yun?
Naghahanap ng sakit ng katawan si Annabelle kung sa States nga niya
Ang ganda-ganda ng samahan nila nung una sa Amerika, yumaman sila nang maisipang pumunta ngayon para lang malusutan si Ligaya Santos at ang
dahil sa mga mamahaling kaldero na ibinebenta nila, kaso, sumabit sina sintensiya sa kanya ni Judge Palattao! madiin pang pahayag ng
Eddie at Annabelle dun sa mismong company na pinagkukunan nila ng mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip Tabloid.[30]
produkto!

Bukod sa napakarami na nilang isinabit na Pinoy sa Amerika dahil sa mga A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
kalderong yun, e sumabit pa sila nang malaking halaga sa mismong or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or
manufacturer nung mga ibinebenta nilang mamahaling kaldero! circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
Yun ang dahilan kung bakit bigla-biglang umuwi sa Pilipinas ang pamilya ni dead.[31] In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
Eddie! are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another Q: As a hard campaigner, you wanted your team to win over the other, is this
sense.[32] correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones
sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident Q: Of course you understand what PRO work is, it includes propaganda, is
imputation of the crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for that correct?
their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in A: I am sorry I dont accept PR work, Sir.
their business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for
being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to Q: Do you understand PRO work?
the Philippines to evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that A: Yes, Sir, I know.
Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through
irresponsible gambling in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, Q: In propaganda, for your side, you promote it as against the other, right?
considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims A: Yes, Sir.[35]
were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of
malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
complainants. It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make
defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by
Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because, allegedly, the simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her
article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in
Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against
before then Judge Palattaos court. She even cited as proof of her lack of complainants during the electoral campaign.
malice the purported absence of any ill will against complainants, as shown
by the article she wrote about complainants daughter Sharmaine Ruffa Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom
Gutierrez in the June 15, 1995 issue of the same tabloid where she expressed of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical
her sympathy and admiration for the latter. utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official
duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
Notably, however, the complainants successfully refuted the imputations does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
during the trial. Complainants proved that they could return anytime to speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers
the United States of America after the publication of the article,[33] and that performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving
they remained on good terms with the manufacturing company of the public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.[36] While
cookware.[34] To the contrary, both petitioner and Tugas failed to adduce complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the
evidence to show the truth of the allegations in the article despite the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers
opportunity to do so. and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to
malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and
Further worthy of mention is the admission of petitioner before the trial malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their
court that she had very close association with then Congressman Golez and personal lives.[37]
mayoralty candidate Joey Marquez, and that she would use her skills as a
writer to campaign for them. Complainant Eddie Gutierrez ran against then We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media
incumbent Golez for the congressional seat in Paraaque City.Petitioner practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by
testified in this wise their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the
right of free speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of
Q: When you acted as writer during the campaign, as you said, for Joey others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it,
Marquez and Golez, of course you did not give your services for free to these is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human
candidates, were you paid? society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty
A: I was not paid, Sir. and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
unrestraint in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom in
Q: You just wanted to help them, am I correct? the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that
A: Yes, because they are my friends, Sir. which is limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press,
ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-
Q: And you wanted them to win the election, thru your being a writer, is that regulation as distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for,
correct? as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, [W]ithout x x x a lively sense of
A: Yes, Sir. responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of
injustice.
Q: You were campaigning hard for Golez and Marquez, right?
A: Right, Sir. Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in
which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly
Q: When you say hard, you wanted your candidates to win, is it not? maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is mans birthright
A: Yes, Sir. constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the
singular role of the press to act as its defensor fidei in a democratic society
Q: Who was the opponent of Joey Marquez at that time? such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the
A: The former Mayor Olivares, Sir. servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry
with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.[38]
Q: How about the opponent of Congressman Golez?
A: One of them is Eddie Gutierrez, Sir.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel
Q: And the tandem of Marquez and Golez versus the tandem of Olivares and should be upheld.
Eddie Gutierrez, am I correct?
A: Actually, that was the situation at that time, Sir. With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that
on January 25, 2008, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
Q: Of course, the tandem of Joey Marquez was working hard to win over entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
their opponent, is it not? Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The Circular expresses a preference for
A: Whatever their problems were, I am out. the imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances
attendant in the cases[39] cited therein in which only a fine was imposed by Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
this Court on those convicted of libel. It also states that, if the penalty Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated January 16, 2003 of the Court
imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the same, the of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 which dismissed outright petitioner's
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply. Petition for Review for failure to show proof of authority of the signatory to
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, and
However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound the CA Resolution[2] dated July 29, 2003 which denied petitioner's Motion for
discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the Reconsideration thereof.
imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the The antecedent facts of the petition are as follows:
imperatives of justice.
Remington Steel Corporation[3] (Remington) leased ground floor units 964
In the case at bench, the Court considers the publics speculations as to the and 966 and second floor unit 963 of a building owned by the Manila
whereabouts of Annabelle Rama Gutierrez with the issuance of the warrant Downtown YMCA (YMCA) in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. Remington used
of arrest after her initial conviction for estafa. Petitioner fueled these the combined areas of ground floor units 964 and 966 as hardware store,
speculations through her article. However, her article went overboard and offices, and display shops for its steel products, as well as a passageway to
exceeded the bounds of fair comment. This warrants her second floor unit 963 which was used as staff room for its Manila sales force.
conviction.Nonetheless, in light of the relatively wide latitude given to
utterances against public figures such as private complainants, and On February 27, 1997, YMCA formally terminated the lease over second floor
consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court deems it unit 963 and gave Remington until March 31, 1997 to vacate the premises.
proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to a fine in the amount On March 24, 1997, Remington filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each (MeTC) , Manila a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over unit 963, docketed
case. But the award of moral damages for each of the private complainants as Civil Case No. 154969-CV. On April 8, 1997, YMCA filed in the same court
in the amount of P500,000.00, as ordered by the trial court, should be an action for Unlawful Detainer involving the same unit 963 against
restored on account of the serious anxiety and the wounded feelings Remington, docketed as Civil Case No. 155083-CV. The two cases were
suffered by complainants from the libelous article, particularly taking into consolidated before Branch 26 of MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 26).
account the fact that petitioner and the private complainants were on
relatively good terms with each other, and complainants gave no cause or During the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV,
offense which could have provoked the malicious publication. Remington filed a Petition for Consignation of Rentals on the ground that
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals YMCA refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in lieu of docketed as Civil Case No. 155897 and assigned to Branch 24 of MeTC-Manila
imprisonment, petitioner Cristinelli S. Fermin is sentenced to pay a fine in the (MeTC-Branch 24). On June 23, 1998, Remington filed a Formal Surrender of
amount of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in the Leased Premises,[4] opting to surrender possession of units 964 and 966
each case. The award of moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 each effective July 1, 1998 and tendering two checks to cover all past rentals due
in favor of complainants Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo Gutierrez, is on the two units. On June 25, 1998, YMCA filed a No Objection to the Turn
increased to P500,000.00. Costs against petitioner. Over of the Leased Premises at #964 and 966 Benavidez
St., Binondo, Manila.[5] On July 9, 1998, MeTC- Branch 24 issued an
SO ORDERED. Order[6] declaring the consignation case closed.

Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as
passageway to second floor unit 963. It kept the premises padlocked and
failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court On August 11, 1998, MeTC-Branch 26 rendered a Decision in Civil Case Nos.
Manila 154969-CV and 155083-CV extending for three years from finality of the
decision the lease period on second floor unit 963 and dismissed YMCA's
complaint for ejectment.
THIRD DIVISION
On August 21, 1998, Remington filed in MeTC-Branch 26 a Motion to
Constitute Passageway alleging that it had no means of ingress or egress to
CHINESE YOUNG MENS G.R. NO. 159422 second floor unit 963. MeTC-Branch 26 assigned a Commissioner to conduct
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION an ocular inspection. He reported that Remington was still in possession of
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Present: the keys to ground floor units 964 and 966 because YMCA failed to provide
doing business under the name of an adequate passageway to second floor unit 963. The issue on the
MANILA DOWNTOWN YMCA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., passageway, however, was not resolved by MeTC-Branch 26, for it had to
Petitioner, Acting Chairperson, forward the records of the case to Branch 30, Regional Trial
TINGA,* Court, Manila (RTC-Branch 30) in connection with the appeals taken by the
CHICO-NAZARIO, parties from its decision, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837.
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. On March 15, 2000, RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate court, rendered a
- versus - Decision[7] in Civil Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837 granting Remington a
longer extension period of five years for second floor unit 963 and ordering
REMINGTON STEEL Promulgated: YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between units 964 and 966.
CORPORATION,
Respondent. March 28, 2008 Dissatisfied, YMCA filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 58957. On September 19, 2003, the CA held that the lower courts had
authority to fix an extension of the lease period. It found that although the
lease contract had expired, Remington's continued occupation of unit 963
DECISION resulted in a new lease on a month-to-month basis, which subsisted for over
a year; thus, while YMCA had the right to seek its termination, Remington
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: was entitled to a judicial lengthening of its period based on equity.
Nonetheless, the CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, as the
continuation of the lease was no longer tenable after the lapse of six years,
since the parties' formal contract had expired. It also noted that since
Remington had already transferred to its own building, there was no more authorization of the person signing the same; that Melo does not apply, since
reason to continue the lease. Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration, it involves the total failure to append to the petition a Verification and
which the CA considered as moot, for Remington had vacated the premises. Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; that recent cases of this Court, while
upholding the need to present the authority of the person signing the
In the meantime that CA-G.R. SP No. 58957 was pending, YMCA filed Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in case the party
in MeTC-Manila two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to evict litigant is not a natural person, emphasize that its late submission is not fatal.
Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966,[8] docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 168629-CV and 168628-CV, respectively. Civil Case No. 168629-CV was Remington, on the other hand, contends that YMCA is required at the time of
raffled to Branch 20, while Civil Case No. 168628-CV was raffled to Branch 17. the filing of its petition to show that the person signing the Verification and
Upon Remington's motion, the two cases were consolidated. However, when Certification of Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf had proper authority to do
YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration, the consolidation of cases was so; that subsequent compliance would encourage parties to make light of the
reversed and canceled.Thus, the cases were tried separately. requirements of petitions for review.

YMCA contended in both cases that Remington did not surrender the ground Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court require that a petition for
floor units but padlocked the doors, refused to surrender the keys, and failed review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a certificate of
to pay rent therefordemand. non-forum shopping, to wit:
SEC. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a
Remington countered that it vacated and surrendered ground floor units 964 decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
and 966 on July 1, 1998; that although it had the doors of the units locked, it jurisdiction may file a verified petitionfor review with the Court of Appeals
did so only as an act of self-preservation, since it had a valid lease on second x x x.
floor unit 963, and YMCA refused to heed the order of the court to provide a SEC. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
passageway to the second floor; that, if it were true that no turnover of copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such
ground floor units 964 and 966 was made, YMCA had the remedy of filing the by the petitioner, x x x.
appropriate motion in the consignation case, where the parties agreed on The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
such turnover; and that the fact that it did not complain shows completion of under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
such turnover.[9] involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
Both branches of MeTC-Manila separately ordered Remington to vacate the other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
premises and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees to YMCA.[10] should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Remington separately appealed both decisions to the Regional Trial divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
Court, Manila (RTC-Manila). Its appeal from MeTC-Manila, Branch 20 was inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-102435 and assigned to Branch 40, while the (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
appeal from MeTC-Manila Branch 17 was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
107655 and assigned to Branch 25. Branches 40 and 25 of RTC-Manila These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is
separately reversed the respective decisions of MeTC-Manila and dismissed sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[21] The requirement that
the two complaints for unlawful detainer.[11] YMCA filed separate motions for the petitioner should sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the mandatory
reconsideration[12] which were denied.[13] directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and
juridical persons.[22]
YMCA then filed separate petitions for review[14] in the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R SP Nos. 74292 and 88599. Except for the powers which are expressly conferred on it by the Corporation
On January 16, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[15] dismissing outright the Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence, a
petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 involving unit 964 on the ground corporation has no powers. It exercises its powers through its board of
that William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and Certification on directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents.[23] Thus, its power to
Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of authority to file the petition sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that
for review. exercises its corporate powers.[24] Physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for
On February 10, 2003, YMCA filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] therein, the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
appending thereto a Secretary's Certificate[17] dated December 26, 2002 directors.[25]
executed by YMCA's Corporate Secretary attesting to a December 13, 2002 The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William Golangco to prepare allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
and file the petition for review. correct, not merely speculative.[26]On the other hand, the rule against forum
shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
On July 29, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[18] denying YMCA's motion for pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
reconsideration. Citing Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the CA detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.[27]
underscored the mandatory nature of the requirement that the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping should be annexed to, or simultaneously filed with A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements
the petition and that subsequent compliance therewith cannot excuse a for Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification,
party's failure to comply in the first instance. non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective; hence, the court may order its correction if verification is lacking,
Hence, the present petition involving only unit 964 anchored on the or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
following ground: circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[28] On
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping
RAISED BEFORE IT WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
SUBMIT THE AUTHORITY OF THE AFFIANT WHO SIGNED FOR THE PETITIONER petition.[29] The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus
CORPORATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY'S deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.[30] However, jurisprudence
CERTIFICATE DID NOT CURE SAID DEFECT IN THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST instructs that the rule on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed
FORUM SHOPPING.[20] on grounds of substantial compliance or special circumstance or compelling
reasons.[31]
YMCA argues that the rules do not require that the filing of the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should include therewith the
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[32] the petitioner had not a Decision dated October 17, 2005 in CA-G.R SP No. 88599, involving ground
attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the floor unit 966 reversing the Decision of RTC-Branch 25 and reinstating the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as a consequence of Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 on YMCA's complaint for
which, the petition was dismissed by the CA. Subsequent to the dismissal, unlawful detainer. When Remington's motion for reconsideration was
however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which was denied, it filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
attached a Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that, prior to Court, entitiled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Chinese Young
the filing of the petition, the resident manager had been authorized by the Mens Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, doing business under the
board of directors to file the petition.The Court recognized therein the name Manila Downtown YMCA, docketed as G.R. No. 171858.[45] On January
abundance of cases excusing non-compliance with the requirement of a 22, 2007, the Court rendered a Decision[46] granting the petition and
certification of non-forum shopping and held that with more reason should a dismissing the unlawful detainer case involving ground floor unit 966.
petition be given due course when it incorporates a certification of non- However, upon YMCA's motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a
forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certification Resolution dated August 31, 2007 setting aside its January 22, 2007 Decision
was an authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits and reinstating the Decision of MeTC-Branch 17 with the modification that
a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority in its motion for Remington was ordered to pay YMCA P11,000.00 a month from July 1, 1998
reconsideration. until March 12, 2004 as reasonable compensation for the use of the
premises.[47] The Court held therein:
Similarly, in Havtor Management Philippines Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[33] the Court acknowledged substantial compliance when the The filing of the Formal Surrender of Leased Premises and the actual
lacking secretarys certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an emptying of the premises constitute constructive delivery of possession.
attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the original Hence, the contract of lease was terminated on July 1, 1998and it is
decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such incumbent upon petitioner, as lessee, to comply with its obligation to return
requirement. the thing leased to the lessor and vacate the premises.
However, [Remington] failed to comply with its obligation to return the
Likewise, in General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations premises to [YMCA]. In order to return the thing leased to the lessor, it is not
Commission,[34] the CA dismissed the petition, which was not accompanied by enough that the lessee vacates it. It is necessary that he places the thing at
any board resolution or certification by the corporate secretary that the the disposal of the lessor, so that the latter can receive it without any
person who signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly obstacle. He must return the keys and leave no sub-lessees or other persons
authorized to represent the petitioner corporation. In the Motion for in the property; otherwise he shall continue to be liable for rents.
Reconsideration, however, the petitioner attached a board resolution stating
that the signatory of the Certification had been duly authorized to do so. The [Remingtons] constructive delivery of the premises did not produce the
Court deemed as substantial compliance the belated attachment to the effect of actual delivery to the [YMCA]. To be effective, it is necessary that
motion for reconsideration the board resolution or the secretarys certificate, the person to whom the delivery is made must be able to take control of it
stating that there was no attempt on the part of the petitioner to ignore the without impediment especially from the person who supposedly made such
prescribed procedural requirements. delivery. In the case at bar, records show that despite the termination of the
lease, [YMCA] was never in possession of the premises because it was
The ruling in these cases has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent padlocked. [YMCA] was not given the key to the premises hence it was
cases: Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of deprived to use the same as it pleases.
the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association,[35] WackWack Golf and Country
Club v. National Labor Relations Commission,[36] Vicar International Although the use of the premises as passageway was justified, [Remington]
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance cannot deprive [YMCA] the use of the said premises by having it
Corporation,[37] Ateneo De NagaUniversity v. Manalo,[38] China Banking padlocked. Other than simply repudiating the demand for back rentals,
Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc.,[39] LDP Marketing, [Remington] should have given [YMCA] a set of keys so it can enter the
Inc. v. Monter,[40] Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations premises without exposing the property to security risks. Prudence dictates
Commission,[41] and most recently in Cana v. Evangelical Free Church of the the delivery of the keys to [YMCA] to dispel any doubt that [Remington] is
Philippines,[42] and continues to be the controlling doctrine. using the premises other than as a mere passageway and that it has never
withheld possession of the same to the [YMCA]. [Remington] had several
As in the aforementioned cases, YMCA rectified its failure to submit proof opportunities to give [YMCA] access to the premises starting from the time it
of Golangco's authority to sign the Verification and Certification on Non- sent its first demand to pay back rentals until the complaint
Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its Motion for for ejectment was filed but it never availed of these opportunities.
Reconsideration a Secretary's Certificate issued by its Corporate Secretary
stating that on December 13, 2002, or prior to the filing of the petition on From the foregoing, it is apparent that [Remingtons] constructive delivery
December 27, 2002, Golangco had been authorized by YMCA's Board of did not effectively transfer possession of the leased premises to [YMCA].
Directors to file the petition before the CA. From the time the lease was terminated, [Remington] unlawfully withheld
possession of the leased premises from [YMCA]. However, it appears that
Thus, the CA's reliance on Melo was misplaced. That case involved a total [Remington] had moved out from [YMCAs] building on March 12, 2004, as
failure to append to the petition a verification and certification of non-forum stated in its Manifestation before Branch 25 of the RTC-Manila. [YMCA] is
shopping, unlike the present case in which YMCA timely filed a Verification entitled to a reasonable compensation for [Remingtons] continued
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, but merely failed to submit proof occupancy of the premises despite termination of the lease from July 1,
of authority of the signatory to sign the same. 1998 to March 12, 2004.

While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may award
mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased premises
literally as to defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of after the same is duly proved. In Asian Transmission Corporation
forum shopping.[43] v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, the Court ruled that the reasonable
compensation contemplated under said Rule partakes of the nature of actual
Accordingly, the CA committed an error in dismissing outright YMCA's damages based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The Court also ruled
petition for review for failure to attach a proof of authority of the signatory that fair rental value is defined as the amount at which a willing lessee would
to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. pay and a willing lessor would receive for the use of a certain property,
neither being under compulsion and both parties having a reasonable
Ordinarily, the Court would remand the case to the CA for proper disposition knowledge of all facts, such as the extent, character and utility of the
of the petition on the merits.[44] The particular surrounding facts and property, sales and holding prices of similar land and the highest and best
circumstances in the present case, however, prevent the Court from doing use of the property.
so. In the meantime that the present petition was pending, the CA rendered
The reasonable compensation for the leased premises fixed by the trial court SO ORDERED.
based on the stipulated rent under the lease contract which is P22,531.00,
must be equitably reduced in view of the circumstances attendant in the case
at bar. First, it should be noted that the premises was used only as a means FIRST DIVISION
of passageway caused by [YMCAs] failure to provide sufficient passageway
towards the second floor unit it also occupies. Second, [YMCA] was negligent PEPSI-COLA G. R. No. 167866
because it waited for more than a year before it actually demanded payment PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES,
for back rentals as reflected in its Statement of Accounts dated September 7, INCORPORATED, and PEPSICO,
1999. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the INCORPORATED, Present:
performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of Petitioners,
the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment. From the foregoing, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
we find the amount of P11,000.00 a month equitable and reasonable AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
compensation for petitioners continued use of the premises.[48] (Emphasis - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
supplied) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Remington filed a Motion for Reconsideration therein but it was denied with
finality in a Resolution dated November 12, 2007. Remington subsequently PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, and Promulgated:
filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration but it was PEPITO A. LUMAJAN,
denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated February 6, 2008, ordering Respondents. October 12, 2006
entry of judgment. Thus, the resolution in that case has become final x--------------------------------------------------x
and executory.
DECISION
The final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 is binding and
applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere which means to adhere to precedents, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
and not to unsettle things which are established.[49] Under the doctrine, The Case
when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 13
future cases, where facts are substantially the same.[50] The doctrine February 2004 Decision[1] and 26 June 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of
of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68290, reversing and setting aside the 3 August
upon judgment which results therefrom. In this particular 2000[3] Decision and 23 August 2000[4] Order of the Regional Trial Court of
sense stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based upon the Pasig City, Branch 163,[5] in Civil Case No. 62726.
judgment.[51]
The Facts
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: This case stemmed from a Complaint[6] filed by herein respondents Pepe B.
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) and Pepito A. Lumahan (Lumahan) against
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary herein petitioners Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Incorporated (PCPPI) and
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as PEPSICO, Incorporated (PEPSICO) on 22 December 1992, before the Regional
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, for Sum of Money and Damages.
it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb The facts are beyond dispute. As culled from the records of the case, they are
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, as follows:
a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the
facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade and Industry
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful (DTI) approved and supervised under-the-crown promotional campaign
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, entitled Number Fever sometime in 1992. With said marketing strategy, it
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward undertook to give away cash prizes to holders of specially marked crowns
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by and resealable caps of PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e., Pepsi, 7-Up,
a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt Mirinda and Mountain Dew. Specially marked crowns and resealable caps
to relitigate the same issue.[52] were said to contain a) a three-digit number, b) a seven-digit alpha-numeric
security code, and c) the amount of the cash prize in any of the following
It bears stressing that the facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. denominations P1,000.00; P10,000.00; P50,000.00; P100,000.00;
171858 are substantially the same. The only difference is the unit involved; and P1,000,000.00.
G.R. No. 171858 involves unit 966 while the present case involves unit
964. The opposing parties are likewise the same. Clearly, in the light of the Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO engaged the services of D.G. Consultores, a
final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858, which the Court Mexican consultancy firm with experience in handling similar promotion in
follows as precedent, Remington unlawfully withheld possession of the other countries, to randomly pre-select 60 winning three-digit numbers with
leased premises because its constructive delivery did not amount to an their matching security codes out of 1000 three-digit numbers seeded in the
effective transfer of possession to YMCA. It is the Courts duty to apply the market, as well as the corresponding artworks appearing on a winning crown
previous ruling in the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. and/or resealable cap.
171858 to the instant case. Once a case has been decided one way, any other
case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should The mechanics of the Number Fever promo was simple From Monday to
be decided in the same manner.[53] Friday, starting 17 February 1992 to 8 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS herein petition insofar as the outright PEPSICO will announce, on national and local broadcast and print media, a
dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 is concerned. The Resolutions randomly pre-selected[7] winning three-digit number. All holders of specially
dated January 16, 2003 and July 29, 2003 of the Court of Appeals marked crowns bearing the winning three-digit number will win the
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 of corresponding amount printed on said crowns and/or resealable caps.
the Court in G.R. No. 171858 shall likewise govern the rights of the parties
insofar as unit 964 is concerned. On account of the success of the promotional campaign, petitioners PCPPI
and PEPSICO extended or stretched out the duration of the Number Fever for
another five weeks or until 12 June 1992.
For the extended period, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO again sought the Without costs.
services of D.G. Consultores to pre-select 25 winning three-digit numbers
with their matching security codes as well as the corresponding artworks to SO ORDERED.
appear on a winning crown and/or resealable cap.

On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the notorious In dismissing the complaint, the RTC ratiocinated that:
three-digit combination 349 as the winning number for the next day, 26 May
1992. On the same night of the announcement, however, petitioners PCPPI The preponderance of evidence now on record does not appear to support
and PEPSICO learned of reports that numerous people were trying to redeem the assertion of the plaintiffs that number 349 with security code number L-
349 bearing crowns and/or resealable caps with incorrect security codes L- 2560-FQ won the Pepsicos sales promotion game for May 26, 1992. While it
2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. Upon verification from the list of the 25 pre- is true that number 349 was used both as a winning and non-winning
selected[8] winning three-digit numbers, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and number, still the winning 349 must tally with the corresponding security code
the DTI learned that the three-digit combination 349 was indeed the winning contained in the master list of winning crowns.
combination for 26 May 1992 but the security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-
FQ do not correspond to that assigned to the winning number 349. xxxx

Subsequently, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO issued a statement stating in x x x [a]mong the 349s enumerated in the list of winning crowns (citation
part that: omitted) as winning numbers were 349 V-2421-JC; 349 A-7963-IS; 349 B-
4860-IG; 349 C-3984-RP; 349 D-5863-CO; 349 E-3800-EL; 349 U-3501-MN
DEAR VALUED CUSTOMERS (sic) and 349 U-3246-NP. Nowhere to be found were nos. 349 L-2560-FQ and
L-3560-FQ. This means that it was not possible for both defendants to have
xxxx won during the entire extended period of the sales promotion of Pepsi Cola
because the number did not appear in the master list. It was made clear in
Some 349 crowns have winning security codes as per the list held in a bank the advertisements and posters put up by defendants that to win, the 3-digit
vault by the Department of Trade and Industry and will be redeemed at full number must be matched with the proper security code. The Department of
value like all other authenticated winning crowns. Trade and Industry had been duly informed of the mechanics of the Pepsi
Cola sales promotion for the protection of the interest of the public.
Some other 349 crowns which have security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ
are not winning crowns. Anent the award of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00 to respondents Pagdanganan
and Lumahan, respectively, the RTC justified such grant, by stating to wit:
However, as an act of goodwill to our customers, we will redeem the non-
winning 349 crowns for P500.00 each until June 12, 1992 at all Pepsi plants & x x x since the defendants have voluntarily announced their desire to pay
warehouses. holders of caps or crowns of their products bearing non-winning number 349
as a sign of goodwill, the Court feels that this privilege should also be
xxxx extended to the plaintiffs despite the institution of the instant case.

Their Partial Motion for Reconsideration[13] having been denied in

Sincerely, an Order[14] dated 23 August 2000, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan
appealed their case to the Court of Appeals.
ROD SALAZAR
President In a Decision[15] promulgated on 13 February 2004, the Court of Appeals
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional

Despite the foregoing announcement, on 9 July 1992, respondent Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, in Civil Case No. 62726 is REVERSED.
Pagdanganan demanded from petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI the Defendants-appellants are hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiffs-appellants Pepe
payment of the corresponding cash prize of each of his 349 bearing crown, Pagdanganan the sum of P5 million and Pepito Lumahan the sum of P1.2
specifically, four 7-Up[9] crowns and two Mirinda[10] crowns, each displaying million.
the cash prize of P1,000,000.00 in addition to one 7-Up[11] crown showing the
cash prize of P100,000.00. Notably, all seven crowns bore the security code
L-2560-FQ. In a Resolution dated 26 April 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners
PCPPI and PEPSICOs Motion for Reconsideration.
For his part, respondent Lumahan similarly insisted that petitioners PCPPI
and PEPSICO pay him the cash value of his two winning crowns, that is, two The Issues
7-Up crowns with one exhibiting the cash value of P1,000,000.00 and the
other the amount of P100,000.00. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, predicated on the following issues:[16]
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO refused to take heed of the aforementioned
demands. I.

Affronted by the seeming injustice, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING STARE
filed a collective complaint[12] for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC DECISIS;
of Pasig City, Branch 163, against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.
II.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on 3 August 2000, the
dispositive part of which states that: WHETHER OR NOT RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN AND DE MESA ARE BINDING
ALTHOUGH RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PARTIES THEREIN;
WHEREFORE, for failure of the plaintiffs to establish a cause of action against
defendants, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. III.

The defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs Pagdanganan and WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS RAISE ANY ISSUE THAT HAS NOT BEEN
Lumahan the amounts of P3,500.00 and P1,000.00, respectively. PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED IN RODRIGO, MENDOZA, PATAN OR DE MESA;
 the Rodrigo and Mendoza cases involved complaints for Specific
IV. Performance.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE AND DTI TASK FORCE REPORTS ARE EVEN The petition is meritorious.
RELEVANT, OR CONTROLLING; and
There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa,
V. including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the
Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. Mendoza,
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS MAY SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those
HAVING APPEALED. holding supposedly winning 349 Pepsi/7-Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft
drink crowns and/or resealable caps. Said crowns and/or resealable caps
were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by petitioners PCPPI and
In essence, the present petition raises as fundamental issue for resolution by PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct security code assigned to such
the Court the question of whether or not the instant case is already barred winning combination. As a result, the rejected crown and/or resealable cap
by our rulings in the cases of Rodrigo,[17] Mendoza,[18] Patan[19] and, the most holders filed separate complaints for specific performance/ sum of money/
recent, De Mesa. [20] breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.

The Courts Ruling A survey of said cases is imperative in order to determine whether or not the
principle of stare decisis will, indeed, bar the relitigation of the instant case.
In ordering petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO to pay respondents Pagdanganan
and Lumahan the amounts of P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00, the In 2001, in the case of Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and
appellate court articulated that: Pepsico, Inc.,[23] the RTC dismissed the complaint for specific performance
and damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. On
x x x [w]e fully agree with the contention of plaintiffs-appellants that such appeal[24] with the Court of Appeals, the latter dismissed the appeal for lack
deviation or additional requirement, that is the winning crown must have a of merit and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. It rationalized that:
corresponding winning security code, imposed by PEPSI was a deviation from
the rules approved by DTI. The mechanics for the Number Fever promo, both in the original period and
for the extension period, was duly approved by the DTI. Television, radio and
xxxx print advertisements for the promo passed through and were by the DTI.
Posters explaining the promo mechanics were posted all over the country
x x x [i]t appeared that the matching winning security with code is not an and warning ads in newspapers highlighted the importance of the security
express requirement in order to win. Taken together with printed promo code. Plaintiff-appellant admitted to have read and understood the
mechanics, this means that one is a winner as long as he has in his possession mechanics of the promo. His different interpretation of the security codes
the crown with the winning number. The matching winning security code is function should not mean that PEPSI was grossly negligent. The mechanics
not required. were clear. A winning number had its own unique, matching security code
which must be authenticated by PEPSI against its official list. The importance
With the promo mechanics as the guide, it is undisputable that plaintiffs- of a matching security code had been adequately emphasized in the Warning
appellants are very well entitled to the cash prizes indicated on their crowns. Ads (citation omitted) and in the new campaign posters (citation omitted)
To deny their claim despite their compliance with the unequivocal during the extension period both of which were duly approved by DTI.
requirements of the promotion is contrary to the principle of good faith.
xxxx
xxxx
The function of the security code is not limited to the determination of
It is highly inequitable for PEPSI to impose an additional requirement in order whether or not a crown is tampered with or fake. It also serves to
to win as a way to evade the unusually large number of 349 winner- authenticate the winning number combination whether it had the correct
claimants. x x x. alpha-numeric security code uniquely assigned to each crown as appearing in
PEPSIs official list. The campaign posters for the promo period February 17,
1992 to May 10, 1992 as well as for the extension period from May 11, 1992
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO fault the appellate court for disregarding this to June 12, 1992 uniformly enumerated three (3) essential elements of a
Courts pronouncements in four other Pepsi/349 participating winning crown, to wit: (1) 3-digit winning number; (2) prize
cases i.e., Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa that the 349 bearing denomination; and (3) 7-digit alpha-numeric security code. x x x The promo
crowns and/or resealable caps with security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ, mechanics stressed that the 3-digit winning number combination must have
like those held by respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan, are non-winning an authenticated security code, which security code was unique to every
crowns under the terms of the Number Fever promo. They reckon that, by crown. Thus, plaintiff-appellants 349 crown must also be measured against
virtue of the principle of stare decisis, the aforementioned cases have the essential elements of a winning participating crown pursuant to the
already settled the issue of whether or not petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO promos mechanics.
are liable to holders of non-winning 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable
caps. Simply put, the principle of stare decisis should have been xxxx
determinative of the outcome of the case at
bar. Rodrigo, Mendoza, Patan and De Mesa cases having ruled on the very Thus, PEPSIs obligation to redeem plaintiff-appellants 349 crown did not
same issues raised in the case at bar, they constitute binding judicial arise as his crown did not bear the correct security code, a condition
precedents on how Pepsi/"349" litigations must be disposed of. precedent to winning the proffered prize.

On the other hand, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan justify the non- A Petition for Review on Certiorari was then filed with this Court. In a
application of the principle of stare decisis by stating that it is required that Resolution dated 24 July 2002, we denied Mendozas petition for review for
the legal rights and relations of the parties, and the facts, and the applicable failing to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error.[25]
laws, the issue and evidence are exactly the same, (sic) as those decided in
the cases of Rodrigo, Mendoza and later the de Mesa x x x.[21]They contend, Similarly, in 2002, in Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico,
however, that a comparison of the subject cases show that they are not the Inc., the RTC therein dismissed the complaint for Specific Performance and
same nor identical x x x as evident in the different questions of law, the Damages filed against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO. The Court of
findings of facts and evidence and issues involved in said cases x x x.[22] In Appeals then affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, stating that:
fact, respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan particularly argue that the
basis of their action is Breach of Contract while that of
To resolve the pivotal issue of whether the appellants are the real winners of
the promo, the various advertisements must be read together to give effect The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
to all. From the start of the promotion, Pepsi had highlighted the security and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article
code as a major component of each and every crown. In subsequent posters, 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:[26]
the companies clarified its role as a measure against tampering or faking
crowns. (sic), and emphasized the important role of the security code in ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
identifying and verifying the real winning crown. In its Warning Cheaters shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
posters, the third paragraph succinctly provides that:

Thus if a supposed winning crown is presented to us where the security code With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial
does not match the real security code of the winning number as verified with pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed
our master list (known only to authorized personnel of Pepsi and DTI), then reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions
we know that the Crown is either fake or tampered with. (Citation omitted.) those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents
in so far as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the better practice
Also (sic) the companies published that: that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
Every crown/cap with a winning number and Authenticated security wins the where the facts are substantially the same.[27] In the case at bar, therefore,
amount printed on the crown/cap. (Citation omitted.) we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that the correct security code
is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to become entitled to the
Given said advertisements, the impression an ordinary consumer gets is that amount printed on a 349 bearing crown and/or resealable cap.
the security code distinguishes the real or genuine from the fake winning
crown, especially considering the conditions surrounding their issuance i.e., Likewise, the same principle of judicial precedent will prevent respondents
that as early as March 1992, various complaints of tampered crowns had Pagdanganan and Lumahan from receiving the amounts of P3,500.00 and
reached the DTI. This construction is bolstered by the subsequent release of P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill compensation. As we have stated on the
the NUMBER FEVER MORE CHANCES TO WIN posters during the extension case of Patan:
period wherein the security code is defined as a measure against tampering
or faking of crowns (citation omitted) and in the subsequent advertisements Neither is the award of P500 to respondent Patan, Jr. in the interest of justice
which warned the consuming public that the appellee companies would not and equity warranted. Respondent Patan, jr. had consistently refused the
honor under any circumstances any fake or tampered crown. (Citation petitioners offer of P500 for his non-winning 349 crown. Unlike the other
omitted.) holders of the non-winning 349 crowns, x x x who availed themselves of the
goodwill money offered by the petitioner, respondent Patan, Jr. rejected the
The inescapable conclusion is that the crowns held by the appellants are not same.
winning crowns. x x x .
xxxx
Undaunted, Rodrigo went to this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari but we subsequently denied his petition, in a Resolution dated 1 In this case, the petitioners offer of P500 for every non-winning 349 crown
October 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by had long expired on June 12, 1992. The petitioner cannot now be compelled
the Court of Appeals, hence the aforequoted disquisition was affirmed. to pay respondent Patan, Jr. P500 as a goodwill gesture, since he had already
rejected the same.
Promulgated in 2003, in Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) vs. Patan, Jr., the RTC
therein dismissed two consolidated complaints for specific performance and The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
damages against herein petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for lack of cause of rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
action. The Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the findings of the trial controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
court that therein respondents did not win in the petitioners Number Fever situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in
promotional campaign as their crowns were not the winning crowns. The the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.[28] This is
appellate court, however, awarded therein respondents P500 each in the unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said
interest of justice. When the case came to the Court by means of a Petition that such decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
for Review on Certiorari, the finding that the correct security code is an authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
indispensable requirement to be entitled to the cash prize is concerned, was applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
affirmed. The award of P500 though was deleted as it was our stance that called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
the offer of P500 for every non-winning 349 crown had long expired on 12 obedience thereto.[29] Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
June 1992. and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
And, in the 2005 case of De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., the RTC publics confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
dismissed the case under the principle of stare decisis. It elucidated that the diminished.
instant case, as well as the 2001 Mendoza case, not only are the legal rights
and relations of the parties substantially the same as those passed upon in To reiterate, there is naught that is left to be brought to court. Those things
the 2002 Rodrigo case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace.[30]
action, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are
identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. Subsequently, De Mesa et assailed 13 February 2004 Decision and 26 April 2005 Resolution both of the
al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenging the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68290, are hereby REVERSED and SET
application of the principle of stare decisis to said case. In ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in
a Decisionpromulgated 19 August 2005, we denied their recourse to this Civil Case No. 62726 dismissing the complaint for Sum of Money and
court and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. We held that: Damages is REINSTATED. Further, respondents Pepe B. Pagdanganan and
Pepito A. Lumahan, are not entitled to the award of P3,500.00
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the and P1,000.00, respectively, as goodwill compensation.
applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly
the same as those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. SO ORDERED.
Hence, nothing is left to be argued. The issue has been settled and this
Courts final decision in the said cases must be respected. This Courts hands
are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but
to deny the instant petition.
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Aggrieved, Macedonio Monje filed on 12 October 1967 before the CFI of
Associate Justice Baganga, Davao Oriental, a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale
between the heirs of Catalino Manguiob and Carolina Balanay/Nicanor
Manguiob, as well as the subsequent deed of absolute sale by the latter in
favor [of] Avelyn Antonio and the cancellation of TCT No. T-9643, docketed
as Civil Case No. 007-125.

Republic of the Philippines On 27 August 1981, the aforesaid court rendered a decision the decretal
Supreme Court portion thereof reads as follows:
Manila
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the 2nd and 3rd deeds of
SECOND DIVISION sale of the property in question null and void and transfer certificate of title
No. 9643 likewise null and void; ordering the defendants jointly and solidarily
SPOUSES CONRADO ANTONIO G.R. No. 149624 to pay the plaintiff moral damages of P30,000.00 and actual damages
and AVELYN ANTONIO, of P20,000.00, with legal interest until the amount is fully paid; and to pay
Petitioners, the costs.
Present:
- versus Let a copy of this decision be served on the Register of Deeds at Mati, Davao
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Oriental, for appropriate action.
JULITA SAYMAN VDA. DE MONJE, NACHURA,
substituted by her heirs, namely: PERALTA, SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA MONJE-VILLAMOR, ABAD, and
LUZVISMINDA MONJE-CORTEL, MENDOZA, JJ. Plaintiff-appellants, Spouses Antonio appealed the above-mentioned
MARRIETA MONJE-ORTICO, decision all the way to the Supreme Court. On 07 December 1992, the
LEOPOLDO MONJE, CONCEPCION Supreme Court in G.R. No. 69696, rendered a decision, the pertinent portion
SAYMAN-MONJE, and ROLINDA Promulgated: of which states as follows:
MONJE-CALO,
Respondents. We find that while the principle of res judicata is better disregarded if its
September 29, 2010 application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality; to so
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x disregard it now and reopen the case would further delay its disposition.
However, the lower court should take note of its erroneous order to deliver
to Monje an area larger than what he bought from the heirs of Manguiob
DECISION and claimed in the action he had filed, in the eventual execution of its
decision. In the same way that the power of the court in the execution of its
judgment extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor,
PERALTA, J.: the court below may not, in the execution of its decision of August 27, 1981,
deliver to Monje the entire area covered by TCT No. T-9643 as it is more than
double that of the property he had bought. (pp. 15-16, rollo).
Assailed in the present petition are the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 4, 2001 and August 3, 2001, respectively. Prescinding from the decision of the Supreme Court, plaintiff-appellants
[herein petitioners] filed a case for a sum of money, accounting of the
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: proceeds of the copra, damages and attorneys fees against herein
Spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon were the original owners of defendant-appellees, docketed as Civil Case No. 506 before the Regional Trial
the subject parcel of coconut land, consisting of 15,903 square meters, Court of Baganga, Davao Oriental, Branch 7.
particularly known as Lot No. 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
1020 of the Register of Deeds of Davao. In the aforesaid complaint, plaintiffs-appellants alleged, among others that:

On 02 September 1962, Andrea Pansaon who survived her husband Catalino 8. That the late Macedonio Monje has been in possession of this 15,903
Manguiob, together with some other heirs, sold to Macedonio Monje Seven square meters coconut land covered by TCT No. T-9643 since 1967 which
Thousand Five Hundred (7,500) square meters only of the aforesaid property. possession and enjoyment thereof has been continued by the herein
The said deed of absolute sale was duly notarized by Notary Public Ricardo defendants when Monje died;
Reyes and entered in his notarial book as Doc. No. 48; page 10; Book No. 5;
Series of 1962. 9. That as earlier pointed out, Monje is only entitled to 7,500 square meters
of this subject property, hence, plaintiffs were deprived of the possession
Macedonio Monje immediately took possession thereof and constructed a and proceeds of the copra of their property consisting of 8,403 square
house worth P30,000.00. meters since 1967 (the year plaintiffs became the owner of this property)
continuously up to the present.
On 16 January 1967, the heirs of spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea
Pansaon who also died, sold the subject property which was already sold to 10. That the possession by Macedonio Monje and the defendants of the
Macedonio Monje in 1962, in favor of Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. whole 15,903 square meters of the aforesaid land and their appropriation of
Manguiob. the proceeds of the copra was made in bad faith for they know very well that
they are only entitled to 7,500 square meters portion of the land which is the
Immediately thereafter, spouses Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. only area they bought from the heirs of Catalino Manguiob. (Please refer to
Manguiob had executed an absolute deed of sale in favor of the formers Annex 'B')
sister-in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, the entire Lot No. [1] consisting of 15,903 xxxx
square meters. The sale was entered in the notarial book of Notary Public
Juanito T. Hernandez as Doc. No. 645; Page 31; Book 5, Series of 1967. 12. That since 1967 up to the present or a period of 27 years, Monje and the
defendants appropriated unto themselves the proceeds of the copra of the
Macedonio Monje knew it only on 11 August 1967 when he received a letter land belonging to the plaintiffs (8,403 square meters area) in the estimated
from Avelyn B. Antonio, informing him that she is now the registered owner net amount of P420,714.00);
of the subject property under a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. TCT No.
T-9643. xxxx
Defendants-appellees [herein respondents], instead of filing an answer to the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or
aforesaid complaint had opted to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-
of res judicata and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non- interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either
forum shopping. x x x[3] for the same or for a different cause of action.[11] Thus, only the identities of
parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.[12]
On December 16, 1994, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order
dismissing herein petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata.[4] In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in
Civil Case No. 007-125 and Civil Case No. 506.
Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, petitioners filed an appeal with the
CA. Despite due notice, respondents failed to file their appellees' brief. However, as to identity of issues, a perusal of the records and other
Consequently, the CA deemed the case submitted for decision without the pleadings would show that the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is
said brief. whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No.
1 being contested by respondents is valid. On the other hand, in Civil Case
On May 4, 2001, the CA rendered its presently assailed Decision affirming the No. 506, the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of
judgment of the RTC and dismissing the appeal of herein petitioners. the remaining 8,403 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly sold
to them and whether they are entitled to an accounting of the proceeds of
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was dismissed the copra harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated
by the CA in its Resolution dated August 3, 2001. by respondents. The Court finds that there is no identity of issues as the issue
raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is different from, and does not overlap with,
Hence, the instant petition raising the lone issue of whether or not the CA the issue raised in Civil Case No. 506.
erred in applying the principle of res judicata with respect to Civil Case No.
007-125 and Civil Case No. 506.[5] Respondents insist in their Motion to Dismiss filed with the RTC that the
cause of action in Civil Case No. 506 is barred by the prior judgment rendered
At the outset, the Court notes that respondents failed to file their comment in Civil Case No. 007-125.
on the present petition. As borne by the records, several Court resolutions
addressed to the respondents were returned either unserved or unheeded. The Court agrees, however, with the CA that the causes of action in these
Thus, the Court dispensed with the filing of respondents' comment. cases are not identical.

Going to the merits of the case, res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; The Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or
a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of the
judgment.[6] According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final principle of res judicata. One test of identity is the absence of inconsistency
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, test where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, with the prior judgment.[13] If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.[14] In the instant case, the
suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 506 are the payment of a sum
the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[7] To state simply, a final representing the proceeds of the copra supposedly harvested from
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is petitioners' property and purportedly misappropriated by respondents.
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all Petitioners also pray for the award of moral and exemplary damages,
points and matters determined in the former suit.[8] as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In the event that a
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment judgment is rendered in favor of herein petitioners, who are the
and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the complainants in Civil Case No. 506, the Court finds no possible
inconsistency in the judgment sought in Civil Case No. 506 with the
difference between these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 007-125.
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
The more common approach in ascertaining identity of causes of action is
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
the same evidence test, whereby the following question serves as a sufficient
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
criterion: would the same evidence support and establish both the present
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
and former causes of action? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the prior
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
judgment is a bar to the subsequent action; conversely, it is not.[15] In the
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
instant case, it is unmistakable that the pieces of evidence that would
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit back up the cause of action in Civil Case No. 007-125 are different
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. from the set of evidence that would prove the cause of action in Civil
Case No. 506.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no Aside from the absence of inconsistency test and same evidence test, we
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those have also ruled that a previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to one when it had touched on [a] matter already decided, or if the parties are
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known in effect litigating for the same thing.[16] A reading of the decisions of the
as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 007-125 would show that
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an there were neither discussions nor disposition of the issues raised in
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the Civil Case No. 506.
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, The Court, nevertheless, does not agree with the conclusion of the RTC and
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[9] the CA that Civil Case No. 007-125 and Civil Case No. 506 involve the same
subject matter.
The final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 007-125 cannot bar the
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact filing of Civil Case No. 506, since these cases involve entirely different subject
or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and matters. The bone of contention in Civil Case No. 007-125 is confined to the
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.[10] The fact or 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 bought by the predecessor-in-
question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action interest of respondents, while the subject matter in Civil Case No. 506 is the
(and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and remaining 8,403 square meter parcel of the same lot. Since there is no
continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and identity of subject matter between the two cases, it is but logical to conclude
unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the that there is likewise no identity of causes of action.[17]
 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision states:
Both the questioned rulings of the RTC and the CA may have arisen from an WHEREFORE, in the view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
apparent confusion that the whole of Lot No. 1, consisting of 15,903 square hereby REVERSED. A new one is entered dismissing the complaint. The land
meters, is owned by respondents. It is clear, however, from the December 7, in question is owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
1992 ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 69696[18] that respondents' predecessor- SO ORDERED.[6]
in-interest acquired only a 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 and not
the entirety thereof and that the remaining 8,403 square meters are still On October 1, 1992, herein respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the
owned by petitioners. expropriated property. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, denied
respondents right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground
In sum, the Court finds that there is no res judicata in the present case. of res judicata, lack of cause of action and forum-shopping.[7]

Lastly, petitioners' claims for accounting and recovery of the proceeds of the On November 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed the complaint as follows:
sale of copra, as well as for damages, do not take the nature of a compulsory WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the
counterclaim that should have been barred if not set up in the action. These Court hereby DISMISSES the complaint filed in this case on the ground of res
claims do not arise out of, or are necessarily connected with, the transaction judicata or bar by prior or final judgment.
or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the respondents' claim. SO ORDERED.[8]
Thus, petitioners' claims may be filed in a separate action, which they did. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and
remanded the case to the trial court, thus,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated November 16,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City is hereby REVERSED
Appeals dated May 4, 2001 and its Resolution dated August 3, 2001 in CA- and SET ASIDE. This case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further
G.R. CV No. 49356 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED for proceedings and final determination of the issues on the merit.
appropriate proceedings to the court of origin, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, SO ORDERED.[9]
of Baganga, Davao Oriental, which is DIRECTED to decide on the merits WITH The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us in this petition for
REASONABLE DISPATCH. review. It raises the following issues, to wit: Whether
I.
SO ORDERED. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
OF RES JUDICATA.
II.
THE ABANDONMENT OF LAHUG AIRPORT AND RETURN OF OTHER
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES DID NOT GIVE RESPONDENTS A NEW CAUSE OF
ACTION.
THIRD DIVISION III.
ASSUMING A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION, RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES(CIVIL G.R. No. 157557 ASSERT OWNERSHIP IN THE FIRST PLACE.[10]
AERONAUTICSADMINISTRATION), Simply stated, the threshold issues are: Is the action barred by res judicata?
Petitioner, Present: Are respondents entitled to reversion of the expropriated property?

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Petitioner asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on the
CARPIO, ground of res judicata and maintains that respondents are bereft of any right
CARPIO MORALES, and to assert ownership as the sale in their favor was invalidated in Yu v.
TINGA, JJ. Republic. Petitioner further asserts that the expropriation of Lot No. 939 was
absolute and unconditional. Thus, no reversion could be legally claimed
RAMON YU, TEOFISTA Promulgated: despite the subsequent sale or reversion of the other nearby lots.
VILLAMALA,LOURDES YU and YU SE
PENG, March 10, 2006 Respondents counter that the action is not barred by res judicata because the
Respondents. abandonment of the government of the public purpose constitutes a new cause
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x of action. Further, respondents contend that the determination of their right to
reacquire or repossess the lot necessitates a full blown trial.
DECISION Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
QUISUMBING, J.: or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.[11] Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 2, 2002 of the Court without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53712 which set aside the dismissal by the matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, of Civil Case No. CEB-12968 and privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings. of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first
suit.[12]
This petition relates to this Courts decision in Valdehueza v. Republic[2] and The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v. Republic.[3] action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition
In Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), we affirmed the judgment of expropriation of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City, and ruled that therein petitioners, between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
Francisca Valdehueza, et al., were not entitled to recover possession of the causes of action.[13]
lot but only to demand its fair market value. In the present case, the first three elements are present. Only the presence
The dispositive portion of the Courts decision reads: of the identity of causes of action is at issue.
Wherefore, finding no reversible error therein, the judgment appealed from At this juncture, we need to stress that res judicata has two concepts:[14] (1)
is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance. So ordered.[4] bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b)[15] of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47
In Yu v. Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals annulled the subsequent sale of (c)[16].
the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, et al., to herein respondents, Ramon Yu, et
al., and held that the latter were not purchasers in good faith. The parties did There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
not appeal the decision and so, judgment became final and executory.[5] judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where
there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, by fraud and/or clever machination. On the other hand, private respondents
but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to maintained that their title is valid and legal.
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT
to matters merely involved therein. This is conclusiveness of T-16375.
judgment.[17] Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by private respondents on
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in the grounds that said notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is not
any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve necessary to protect petitioners rights. The same was opposed by petitioner
a different claim or cause of action.[18] The identity of causes of action is not insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to protect his
required but merely identity of issues. [19] right over the property covered by TCT No. T-16375 and to avoid sale of
property pending the execution of the judgment in the case.
Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice
respondents again seek to enforce a right based on a sale which has been of lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-16375 upon the posting by
nullified by a final and executory judgment. Recall that the question of private respondents of an indemnity bond in the amount of
validity of the sale had long been settled. The same question, therefore, P2,000,000.00. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an order
cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same dated October 7, 1998.
parties. The issue before this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits the notice of lis pendens.
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of Petitioners contend that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens by the
the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent trial court is justified because respondent had it registered for the sole
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.[20] Considering purpose of molesting them and that it is not necessary to protect his
that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long rights. According to petitioners, the trial court correctly ratiocinated as
been nullified, they have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have follows:
no legal personality to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated A very thin line exists and separates the protection afforded by the notice to
property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the respondents are not the plaintiff and the restriction it imposes on the right of the defendants
the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case, dominion over the property. Indubitably, the 200 square meter portion
related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no cause of claimed by the plaintiff is grossly disproportional to the entire 5,432 square
action.[21] meter property which the notice virtually hold hostage. More so, the
annotation proceeds from a still to be proven claim. Thus, based on the
Consequently, the second issue is now mooted and made academic by our allegations in the pleadings, as between a bare assertion of ownership over
determination of res judicata in this case. the claimed portion anchored on an unregistered deed of sale as against the
indefeasible title possessed by the defendants over the entire subject
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2, property, the presumption under our rules favor the latter, unless rebutted
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 53712 is SET ASIDE and the by evidence on the contrary. As it stands, plaintiffs unregistered deed of sale,
Decision dated November 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, cannot, therefore, be accorded more weight than the certificate of title in
Branch 11 in Civil Case No. CEB-12968 is AFFIRMED. defendants name which is proof of ownership over the entire 5,432 square
SO ORDERED. meter property.
THIRD DIVISION While afflictive consequences will be suffered by plaintiff if the notice is
[G.R. No. 143646. April 4, 2001] cancelled in case he is adjudged the lawful owner of the claim 200 square
SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM and ROSARIO T. LIM, petitioners, vs. PEPITO M. meter property, defendants will likewise suffer a grave injustice if denied the
VERA CRUZ, respondent. remedy of cancelling the notice, resort to which is allowed by law and
DECISION discretionary on the courts upon proper showing. The injustice will take the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: form of an unlawful dispossession though what is claimed only is 200 square
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit. Notice of lis meters, yet the entire 5,432 square meter property is affected. Instead of
pendens is filed for the purpose of warning all persons that the title to serving its real purpose as laid by law pursuant to public policy, the
certain property is in litigation and that if they purchase the same, they are in continued retention of the notice fosters inequity as clearly established
danger of being bound by an adverse judgment.[1] The notice is, therefore, based on the claimed portion vis a vis the unclaimed of free portion of the
intended to be a warning to the whole world that one who buys the property 5,432 square meter property. To the mind of the Court, this inequity
does so at his own risk. This is necessary in order to save innocent third translates to an unwanted and unjustified burden that utterly molest the
persons from any involvement in any future litigation concerning the tranquil possession and enjoyment by the defendants of the subject part.
property.[2] Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice and equity, the Court
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of deems it wise under the prevailing circumstances to direct the defendants to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision dated January 25, post an indemnity bond in an amount commensurate and reasonable
2000 and Resolution dated June 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals[3] which set proportionate to the per square value of the claimed area of 200 square
aside the order of the trial court cancelling the notice of lis pendens. meter property. To the mind of the Court, thru the posting of a bond, the
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are: claim of the plaintiff (respondent herein) would still remain protected and
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by safeguarded even though the notice is eventually cancelled. Equity and fair
petitioner[4] against private respondents[5] before the Regional Trial Court, play dictate the same be resorted to by the Court relative to the peculiar
Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 195-M-94, alleging circumstances of the case.
that he has been in possession since 1960 of a 200 square meter portion of Petitioners contention lacks merit.
Lot 4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan covered by TCT No. Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
191498 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in the names of Turandut, Sec. 14 Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the right of
Traviata, Marcelita, Pacita, Marlene, Mathews, Victoria and Rosary, all possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative
surnamed Aldaba; that on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of
200 square meter portion, which is included in the formers one-eight share deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the
in Lot 4204, consisting of 1,732 square meters; that a complaint for pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties
ejectment was filed against him in 1993 by private respondent Henry Lim, and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in
who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by him, being a portion that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing of such notice for
of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-16375 registered in his name; that record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected
judgment was rendered against him in the ejectment case, which he elevated thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendencyof the
to the appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered that TCT action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real
No. T-16375 in the name of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only SO ORDERED.
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for THIRD DIVISION
the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to [G.R. No. 148568. March 20, 2003]
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis ours) ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. HERBAL COVE REALTY
Sec. 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states: CORPORATION, respondent.
Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens Before final judgment, a notice of lis DECISION
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing PANGANIBAN, J.:
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is The pendency of a simple collection suit arising from the alleged
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be nonpayment of construction services, materials, unrealized income and
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified damages does not justify the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title
petition of the party who caused registration thereof. to a property where construction has been done.
Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens practically covers his entire Statement of the Case
land covered by TCT No. T-16375 and thus molests his right as an owner. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing Rules of Court, challenging the May 30, 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of
the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 56432. The dispositive portion of the Decision
secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For such notice is reproduced as follows:
serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed November 4, 1998 and
the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off October 22, 1999 orders annulled and set aside. The July 30, 1998 order of
the same unless of course, he intends to gamble on the results of the respondent judge is reinstated granting the cancellation of the notices of lis
litigation.[6] Based on this principle as well as the express provisions of Sec. pendens subject of this petition.[3]
14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the In its July 21, 2001 Resolution,[4] the CA denied petitioners Motion for
particular property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis Reconsideration.
pendens. In this case, only the 200 square meter portion of the entire area is The Facts
embraced by the notice of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
such notice, respondents aim is to protect his right as an owner of this On June 20, 1996, [respondent] and [petitioner] entered into a Construction
specific area. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the notice of lis Contract whereby the former agreed to construct four (4) units of
pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and restriction of [townhouses] designated as 16-A, 16-B, 17-A and 17-B and one (1) single
petitioners right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered detached unit for an original contract price of P15,726,745.19 which was
by TCT 16375 in their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion. late[r] adjusted to P16,726,745.19 as a result of additional works. The
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as contract period is 180 days commencing [on] July 7, 1996 and to terminate
amended, earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on on January 7, 1997. [Petitioner] claimed that the said period was not
two grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of followed due to reasons attributable to [respondent], namely: suspension
molesting the adverse party; or b) it is not necessary to protect the interest orders, additional works, force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or
of the party who caused it to be recorded delay on the part of said [respondent]. [Respondent], however, denied such
In justifying the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the trial court held claim and instead pointed to [petitioner] as having exceeded the 180 day
that respondents unregistered deed of sale can not be accorded more weight contract period aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization of
than petitioners certificate of title. materials which are not in compliance with specifications.
For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the xxxxxxxxx
rules which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land On November 21, 1997, [petitioner] filed a complaint for sum of money with
belongs to him. In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for damages (Civil Case No. 97-2707) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
the annotation of the notice must prove his right or interest over the entitled Atlantic Erectors, Incorporated vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp. and
property sought to be annotated.[7] Hence, even on the basis of an Ernest C. Escal[e]r. This case was raffled to Branch 137, x x x Judge Santiago J.
unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the Ranada presiding. In said initiatory pleading, [petitioner] AEI asked for the
title.And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack against following reliefs:
the certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING, to order x x x defendant to:
notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does 1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P4,854,229.94 for the unpaid construction services
not create a right or lien. It only means that a person purchases or contracts already rendered;
on the property in dispute subject to the result of the pending litigation.[8] 2. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P1,595,551.00 for the construction
We observe that the trial judge was convinced that the cancellation of the lis materials, equipment and tools of plaintiff held by defendant;
pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have required petitioners 3. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P2,250,000.00 for the [loss] x x x of
to post a bond of P2,000,000.00 expected income from the construction project;
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and 4. [T]o x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P800,000.00 for the cost of income by
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within way of rental from the equipment of plaintiff held by defendants;
the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the 5. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for moral damages;
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose 6. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for exemplary damages;
would be rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file a bond, 7. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum equivalent of 25% of the total money claim
regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice. In Tan vs. Lantin[9], plus P200,000.00 acceptance fee and P2,500.00 per court appearance;
this Court held that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice 8. To x x x pay the cost of suit.
of lis pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient bond by On the same day of November 21, 1997, [petitioner] filed a notice of lis
the party on whose title said notice is annotated. pendens for annotation of the pendency of Civil Case No. 97-707 on titles
Petitioners likewise insist that since respondent lost in the ejectment suit TCTs nos. T-30228, 30229, 30230, 30231 and 30232. When the lots covered
they filed against him, it follows that he also lost whatever right he has in the by said titles were subsequently subdivided into 50 lots, the notices of lis
200 square meter portion and that, therefore, he has no more right to be pendens were carried over to the titles of the subdivided lots, i.e., Transfer
protected by the notice of lis pendens. It bears emphasis that respondent Certificate of Title Nos. T-36179 to T-36226 and T-36245 to T-36246 of the
caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 195-M- Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City.
94 for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment On January 30, 1998, [respondent] and x x x Ernest L. Escaler, filed a Motion
case. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-16375 to Dismiss [petitioners] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to
must stay. state a cause of action. They claimed [that] the Makati RTC has no
Indeed, there is nothing in the records indicating that the notice of lis jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the parties
pendens is for the purpose of molesting herein petitioners or that it is not Construction Contract contained a clause requiring them to submit their
necessary to protect the rights of respondent. dispute to arbitration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of xxxxxxxxx
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
On March 17, 1998, [RTC Judge Ranada] dismissed the Complaint as against mentioned petitioners admission that there was already a pending case
[respondent] for [petitioners] failure to comply with a condition precedent to before the CIAC, which in fact rendered a decision on March 11, 1999.
the filing of a court action which is the prior resort to arbitration and as against x The appellate court further explained that the re-annotation of the Notice
x x Escaler for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action x x x. of Lis Pendens was no longer warranted after the court a quo had ruled that
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the March 17, 1998 the latter had no jurisdiction over the case.The former held that the rationale
dismissal order. [Respondent] filed its Opposition thereto. behind the principle of lis pendens -- to keep the subject matter of the
On April 24, 1998, [respondent] filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis litigation within the power of the court until the entry of final judgment --
Pendens. It argued that the notices of lis pendens are without basis because was no longer applicable. The reason for such inapplicability was that the
[petitioners] action is a purely personal action to collect a sum of money and Makati RTC already declared that it had no jurisdiction or power over the
recover damages and x x x does not directly affect title to, use or possession subject matter of the case.
of real property. Finally, the CA opined that petitioners Complaint had not alleged or claimed,
In his July 30, 1998 Order, [Judge Ranada] granted [respondents] Motion to as basis for the continued annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, the lien of
Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens x x x: contractors and laborers under Article 2242 of the New Civil Code. Moreover,
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid July 30, 1998 petitioner had not even referred to any lien of whatever nature. Verily, the
Order to which [respondent] filed an Opposition. CA ruled that the failure to allege and claim the contractors lien did not
In a November 4, 1998 Order, [Judge Ranada,] while finding no merit in the warrant the continued annotation on the property titles of Respondent
grounds raised by [petitioner] in its Motion for Reconsideration, reversed his Herbal Cove.
July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated the notices of lis pendens, as follows: Hence, this Petition.[7]
1. The Court finds no merit in plaintiffs contention that in dismissing the The Issues
above-entitled case for lack of jurisdiction, and at the same time granting Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
defendant Herbal Coves motion to cancel notice of lis pendens, the Court I. Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials [for] and labor
[took] an inconsistent posture. The Rules provide that prior to the transmittal [on] the houses constructed on a property [are] a proper lien for annotation
of the original record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the of lis pendens on the property title[.]
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve II. Whether or not the trial court[,] after having declared itself without
any matter litigated by the appeal (3rd par., Sec. 10, Rule 41). Even as it jurisdiction to try the case[,] may still decide on [the] substantial issue of the
declared itself without jurisdiction, this Court still has power to act on case.[8]
incidents in this case, such as acting on motions for reconsideration, for This Courts Ruling
correction, for lifting of lis pendens, or approving appeals, etc. The Petition has no merit.
As correctly argued by defendant Herbal Cove, a notice of lis pendens serves First Issue:
only as a precautionary measure or warning to prospective buyers of a Proper Basis for a
property that there is a pending litigation involving the same. Notice of Lis Pendens
The Court notes that when it issued the Order of 30 July 1998 lifting the Petitioner avers that its money claim on the cost of labor and materials for
notice of lis pendens, there was as yet no appeal filed by the townhouses it constructed on the respondents land is a proper lien that
plaintiff. Subsequently, on 10 September 1998, after a notice of appeal was justifies the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land titles. According
filed by plaintiff on 4 September 1998, the Branch Clerk of Court was ordered to petitioner, the money claim constitutes a lien that can be enforced to
by the Court to elevate the entire records of the above-entitled case to the secure payment for the said obligations. It argues that, to preserve the
Court of Appeals. It therefore results that the above-entitled case is still alleged improvement it had made on the subject land, such annotation on
pending. After a careful consideration of all matters relevant to the lis the property titles of respondent is necessary.
pendens, the Court believes that justice will be better served by setting aside On the other hand, Respondent Herbal Cove argues that the annotation is
the Order of 30 July 1998. bereft of any factual or legal basis, because petitioners Complaint[9] does not
On November 27, 1998, [respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of directly affect the title to the property, or the use or the possession thereof. It
the November 4, 1998 Order arguing that allowing the notice of lis pendens also claims that petitioners Complaint did not assert ownership of the property
to remain annotated on the titles would defeat, not serve, the ends of justice or any right to possess it. Moreover, respondent attacks as baseless
and that equitable considerations cannot be resorted to when there is an the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens through the enforcement of a
applicable provision of law. contractors lien under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. It points out that the
xxxxxxxxx said provision applies only to cases in which there are several creditors
On October 22, 1999, [Judge Ranada] issued an order denying [respondents] carrying on a legal action against an insolvent debtor.
Motion for Reconsideration of the November 4, 1998 Order for lack of As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be
sufficient merit.[5] availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
Thereafter, Respondent Herbal Cove filed with the CA a Petition for (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that directly
Certiorari. affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals occupation thereof.[10] Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis
Setting aside the Orders of the RTC dated November 4, 1998 and October 22, pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or
1999, the CA reinstated the formers July 30, 1998 Order[6] granting Herbal possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to
Coves Motion to Cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens. According to the appellate establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real
court, the re-annotation of those notices was improper for want of any legal property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.[11]
basis. It specifically cited Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Apparently, petitioner proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves
Property Registration Decree). The decree provides that the registration of the enforcement of a lien. Since the money claim is for the nonpayment of
such notices is allowed only when court proceedings directly affect the title materials and labor used in the construction of townhouses, the lien referred
to, or the use or the occupation of, the land or any building thereon. to would have to be that provided under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. This
The CA opined that the Complaint filed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 97- provision describes a contractors lien over an immovable property as follows:
2707 was intended purely to collect a sum of money and to recover Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of
damages. The appellate court ruled that the Complaint did not aver any the debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred,
ownership claim to the subject land or any right of possession over the and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:
buildings constructed thereon. It further declared that absent any claim on xxxxxxxxx
the title to the buildings or on the possession thereof, the notices of lis (3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of
pendens had no leg to stand on. architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction,
Likewise, the CA held that Judge Ranada should have maintained the notice reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said
cancellations, which he had directed in his July 30, 1998 Order. Those notices buildings, canals or other works;
were no longer necessary to protect the rights of petitioner, inasmuch as it (4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction,
could have procured protective relief from the Construction Industry Arbitral or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or
Commission (CIAC), where provisional remedies were available. The CA also other works[.] (Emphasis supplied)
However, a careful examination of petitioners Complaint, as well as the It may be possible also that the case when commenced may justify a resort
reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was to lis pendens, but during the progress thereof, it develops to be purely a
ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction personal action for damages or otherwise. In such event, the notice of lis
services and materials plus damages, without mentioning -- much less pendens has become functus officio.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
asserting -- a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a Thus, when a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in
purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any personam, the rationale for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to
material averment of any enforceable right, interest or lien in connection exist. To be sure, this Court has expressly and categorically declared that the
with the subject property. annotation of a notice of lis pendens on titles to properties is not proper in
As it is, petitioners money claim cannot be characterized as an action that cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in personam.[19]
involves the enforcement of a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus Second Issue:
warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint.[12] Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the Order
Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens as well as the Order reinstating
encumbrance in its Complaint, the annotation of the Notice of Lis it. Supposedly, since both Orders were issued by the trial court without
Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection and jurisdiction, the annotation made by the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City
damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a contractors lien. must remain in force.
In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals,[13] the Court explained Petitioner avers that the trial court finally declared that the latter had no
the concept of a contractors lien under Article 2242 of the Civil Code and the jurisdiction over the case on July 27, 1998, in an Order denying the formers
proper mode for its enforcement as follows: Motion for Reconsideration of the March 17, 1998 Order dismissing the
Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code enumerates certain credits which Complaint. Petitioner insists that the subsequent July 30, 1998 Order
enjoy preference with respect to specific personal or real property of the cancelling the subject Notice of Lis Pendens is void, because it was issued by
debtor. Specifically, the contractors lien claimed by the petitioners is a court that had no more jurisdiction over the case.
granted under the third paragraph of Article 2242 which provides that the Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which governs appeals from
claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair regional trial courts, expressly provides that RTCs lose jurisdiction over a case
of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific when an appeal is filed. The rule reads thus:
building or other immovable property constructed. SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. -- A partys appeal by notice of
However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal
credits, i.e., when the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to in due time.
the claims of several creditors and the value of such property of the debtor xxxxxxxxx
is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
of preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of
the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due the time to appeal of the other parties. (Emphasis supplied)
process will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be enforced in On the basis of the foregoing rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the case only on August 31, 1998, when petitioner filed its Notice of
preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency Appeal.[20] Thus, any order issued by the RTC prior to that date should be
proceedings.[14] (Emphasis supplied) considered valid, because the court still had jurisdiction over the
Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of case. Accordingly, it still had the authority or jurisdiction to issue the July 30,
the lien thereunder is applicable here, because petitioners Complaint failed 1998 Order canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens. On the other hand,
to satisfy the foregoing requirements.Nowhere does it show that the November 4, 1998 Order that set aside the July 30, 1998 Order and
respondents property was subject to the claims of other creditors or was reinstated that Notice should be considered without force and effect,
insufficient to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did not because it was issued by the trial court after it had already lost jurisdiction.
pertain to insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the In any case, even if we were to adopt petitioners theory that both the July
adjudication of claims of preferred creditors could be ascertained. 30, 1998 and the November 4, 1998 Orders were void for having been issued
Another factor negates the argument of petitioner that its money claim without jurisdiction, the annotation is still improper for lack of factual and
involves the enforcement of a lien or the assertion of title to or possession of legal bases.
the subject property: the fact that it filed its action with the RTC of Makati, As discussed previously, erroneously misplaced is the reliance of petitioner
which is undisputedly bereft of any jurisdiction over respondents property in on the premise that its money claim is an action for the enforcement of a
Tagaytay City. Certainly, actions affecting title to or possession of real contractors lien. Verily, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the
property or the assertion of any interest therein should be commenced and subject property titles should not have been made in the first place. The
tried in the proper court that has jurisdiction over the area, where the real Complaint filed before the Makati RTC -- for the collection of a sum of money
property involved or a portion thereof is situated.[15] If petitioner really and for damages -- did not provide sufficient legal basis for such annotation.
intended to assert its claim or enforce its supposed lien, interest or right over Finally, petitioner vehemently insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
respondents subject properties, it would have instituted the proper cancel the Notice. Yet, the former filed before the CA an appeal, docketed as
proceedings or filed a real action with the RTC of Tagaytay City, which clearly CA-GR CV No. 65647,[21] questioning the RTCs dismissal of the Complaint for
had jurisdiction over those properties.[16] lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, it must be remembered that it was petitioner
Narciso Pea, a leading authority on the subject of land titles and registration, which had initially invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court when the former
gives an explicit exposition on the inapplicability of the doctrine of lis sought a judgment for the recovery of money and damages against
pendens to certain actions and proceedings that specifically include money respondent. Yet again, it was also petitioner which assailed that same
claims. He explains in this wise: jurisdiction for issuing an order unfavorable to the formers cause.Indeed,
By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to parties cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,
attachments, levies of execution, or to proceedings for the probate of wills, then repudiate or question that same jurisdiction after obtaining or failing to
or for administration of the estate of deceased persons in the Court of First obtain such relief.[22]
Instance. Also, it is held generally that the doctrine of lis pendens has no WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be SO ORDERED.
incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected, as
where the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of
possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between Republic of the Philippines
conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific SUPREME COURT
property, or requiring its transfer or sale[17] (Emphasis supplied) Manila
Pea adds that even if a party initially avails itself of a notice of lis EN BANC
pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if
the case turns out to be a purely personal action.We quote him as follows: G.R. No. 87186 April 24, 1992
CAMILO VILLA, petitioner Casimiro David, who had already been convicted in the Criminal Circuit Court
vs. of Cebu in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-1457-Cebu, entitled "People v. Casimiro
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. David, et al.," confederating together and mutually helping one another or
G.R. No. 87281 April 24, 1992 otherwise, acting in concert, with intent to defraud and gain, did then and
RODOLFO E. MONTAYRE, petitioner, there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to influence other public
vs. officials, or allow to be influenced, to violate rules and regulations duly
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. promulgated by competent authority relative to their respective duties, and
G.R. No. 87466 April 24, 1992 for financial and pecuniary interest, by then and there permitting, promoting
JOSEFINA SUCALIT, petitioner, and approving the negotiation, perfection and consummation of the
vs. purchase and payments of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Mactan International Airport, of which the accused are by law called upon to
G.R. No. 87524 April 24, 1992 officially intervene and take part, the following items or articles, to wit:
ARTURO JIMENEZ, petitioner, 1 set three phase primary metering 13.8 KV 400 KVA, 60 cycles complete
vs. with demand metering, voltage and current transformers valued at
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. P30,000.00;
3 pieces 15O KVA Distribution Transformers, single phase, 60 cycles 2400
CRUZ, J.: volts-240 V/120V oil cooled valued at P69,000.00;
The herein petitioners' basic contention is that as their alleged co- 3 pieces 150 KVA Power transformers, single phase, 60 cycles, 138 KV/2400
conspirators have been acquitted by the Court of Appeals, they too should volts oil cooled valued at P90,000.00;
have been absolved by the Sandiganbayan under the doctrine of "the law of 4 sets high voltage change over switch 3 poles double throw KV valued at
the case." They also submit that, in any event, the evidence against them was P12,050.00;
insufficient to prove their guilt and, on that ground, they should have also 6 sets high voltage fuse cut-outs valued at P33,000.00; and cost of
been presumed innocent and acquitted. installation — P9,000.00
These are the relevant facts. costing all in all P299,175.00, Philippine Currency, from "Rocen Enterprises"
Investigation of alleged anomalous transactions at the Civil Aeronautics knowing fully well that the said entity is not a reputable manufacturer and/or
Administration (CAA), Mactan International Airport, led to the filing in 1975 supplier of the above-enumerated articles, thus, giving said "Rocen
of criminal charges in the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City against Casimiro Enterprises" unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, in violation of
David, administrative assistant at CAA, Mactan, and chairman of the Bidding prohibitions of the Presidential Memorandum, dated April 22, 1971, Sec. 2,
Committee; Estanislao Centeno, cash aide; Fernando Dario, airport Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations and of Sec. 1(x), of
attendant; and Serafin Robles, janitor, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs Presidential Decree No. 6. dated September 27, 1972, to the damage and
(a) 1 and (b) 2 of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential prejudice of the Philippine Government.
Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, 3 as well as Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil CONTRARY TO LAW.
Service Rules 4 and Section 1(x) of Presidential Decree No. 6 dated September Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The case against
27, 1972. 5 Manuel Bustamante was, on motion of the prosecution, dismissed without
The case involved questionable payments made by the CAA Mactan to Rocen prejudice for lack of prima facie case. Jimenez, Montayre, Villa and Sucalit
Enterprises and Sprayway Corp., dealers in paper products and printed were later suspended from public office during the pendency of the case.
matter, for the purchase of electrical items and the cost of their installation, Through the testimonial and documentary evidence it presented at the trial,
in the total amount of P299,175.00. the prosecution sought to establish the following facts:
Dario, Centeno and Robles represented these firms in the transaction. Dario, Centeno and Robles negotiated with Jimenez for the purchase of
Another accused, Mactan Airport General Manager Arturo Jimenez, was transformers and electrical supplies for the Mactan International Airport. The
dropped from the amended information after a reinvestigation. three were on leave during that time. On June 1, 1975, Montayre issued
On October 20, 1978, the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City then presided by Requisition and Issue Voucher 6-513-75 for the following articles:
Judge Romeo Escareal (now Associate Justice and Chairman of the Second 1 set three phase primary metering 13.8 KV 400 KVA, 60 cycles complete
Division of the Sandiganbayan) rendered a decision finding all the accused with demand metering, voltage and current transformers;
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a), 3 piece 150 KVA Distribution Transformers, single phase, 60 cycle 2400 volts-
(e), 6 (h), and (i) 7 of R.A. 3019. All the accused appealed the judgment of 240 V/120V oil cooled;
conviction the Court of Appeals. 3 pieces 150 KVA Power transformers, single phase, 60 cycles, 138 KV/2400
The decision of the trial court included findings that Arturo Jimenez; Rodolfo Volts oil cooled;
Montayre, assistant airport general manager for operations; Camilo Villa, 4 sets high voltage Changeover Switch, 3 poles double throw 15 KV;
chief, logistics section; Josefina Sucalit, technical inspector, COA, assigned at 6 sets-High Voltage fused cut outs, 15 KV;
CAA Mactan; Hereto Leonor, acting chief accountant; and Manuel 750 feet of 750 MCKTHW 600 Volts Copper conductor.
Bustamante, regional auditor of Region 7, COA, conspired and were equally Purpose: For installation of commercial power at Mactan Centralized
liable with the convicted accused. Emergency Power STM.
Accordingly, Judge Escareal directed Chief State Prosecutor Juan A. Sison of Jimenez approved the requisition and Leonor certified to the availability of
the Ministry of Justice to assign a State Prosecutor to conduct an funds. Jimenez signed Advertisement No. 16-75, and in due time the required
investigation for possible violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices invitations to bid calling for sealed proposals for the furnishing and delivery
Act, falsification of public documents, malversation of public funds, of the supplies were issued.
overpricing, unexplained wealth, and violation of accounting and auditing On June 15, 1975, Jimenez sent Sucalit to Manila to canvass the subject
rules and regulations, and to file the corresponding charges if warranted. supplies at various reputable dealers or manufacturers in Manila. Sucalit
The investigation was conducted as directed and led to the filing of an delivered Advertisement Forms to Rocen Enterprises in Pasay City, Utilities
information with the Sandiganbayan, where it was docketed as Criminal Case Equipment and Supply Corporation (UTESCO) in Quezon City, and Intrade
No 5915, against Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Bustamante, Leonor and Sucalit Corporation in Makati.
for violation of Section 3, R.A. 3019. The information read as follows: On June 25, 1975, the sealed bids were opened by the Bidding Committee.
That during the period from June 9 to 30, 1975, or thereabout, at Lapu-Lapu The Committee prepared an Abstract of Bids signed by David, Villa, Sucalit,
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Sandiganbayan, Wigberto Fuentebella, Leonardo Mahinay, and Fermin Beltran, approving the
the accused Arturo Somosa Jimenez, then Airport General Manager, Mactan lowest bid, which was that of Rocen Enterprises. On the same day, a
International Airport; Rodolfo Evangelista Montayre, Assistant Airport Purchase Order addressed to Rocen Enterprises was prepared and signed by
General Manager; Camilo Gido Villa, Chief of the Logistics Section, CAA David and approved by Jimenez, with Leonor certifying to the availability of
Mactan; Josefina Sanchez Sucalit, Technical Inspector of the COA, Cebu City; funds.
Manuel Raneses Bustamante, Regional Auditor, Cebu City; and Hereto From June 25-30, 1975, four reports of inspection were prepared and signed
Cabrera Leonor, Chief Accountant, CAA, Manila, taking advantage of their by Sucalit, Villa and Montayre; four certificates of delivery were signed by
public positions and while in the performance of the duties of their office, Montayre and Villa; and four general vouchers for P70,180, P75,900, P99,000
together with Fernando Dario, Estanislao Centeno, Serafin Robles and
and P53,020 respectively were prepared and signed by Villa, Montayre, Memorandum of the President dated April 22, 1971, Section 12, Rule XVIII of
Leonor and Jimenez. the Civil Service Rules and Section 1(x) of P.D. No. 6.
On June 30, 1975, four treasury warrants in the amounts respectively of Each of the accused was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
P70,180, P57,980, P99,000, P53,020, all payable to Rocen Enterprises and/or ranging from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of 6 years imprisonment
Fernando Dario, were issued in payment for the articles requisitioned. The and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Warrant Register at the airport shows that five checks in the separate The Sandiganbayan said:
amounts of P70,180, P99,000, P53,020, P57,980, P17,920, were delivered to Carefully evaluating the evidence on record, it has became abundantly clear
Centeno. to Us that accused Arturo S. Jimenez, Rodolfo E. Montayre, Camilo G. Villa,
It turned out that the requisitioned articles were delivered at Cebu City only Josefina S. Sucalit, and Hereto C. Leonor had conspired with Fernando Dario,
on July 6, 1975, and were shipped by UTESCO, a losing bidder, to Rocen Estanislao Centeno, Serafin Robles and Casimiro David in the commission of
Enterprises, c/o Mrs. Remedios Centeno via the vessel Sweet Faith. The the crime for which the last four were convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court
freight and handling charges of P5,500.00 incurred in connection with the in Case No. CCC-XIV-1457, namely, "Violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c),
delivery were reimbursed under a General Voucher signed by Jimenez, (h), and (i), of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Montayre and Leonor to Rocen Enterprises. Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to the Unnumbered Memorandum of the
Rocen Enterprises, the winning bidder, was ostensibly owned by Remedios President of the Philippines dated April 22, 1971, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Centeno, wife of Estanislao Centeno. Its line of business, as registered with Civil Service Rules, and Section 1(x) of Presidential Decree No. 6.
the Bureau of Domestic Trade on August 9, 1974, was "paper products and We are not disposed to disregard the finding of the court in that case that "a
printed matter." On August 11, 1975, the firm was incorporated and massive and gigantic conspiracy existed between and among the four
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as "Rocen Trading accused herein, namely, David, Centeno, Dario, and Robles, as well as
Incorporated" with an authorized capital stock of P100,000, P20,000 of which practically all of the high-ranking officials of CAA Mactan" (namely, Airport
had been subscribed and P5,000 paid up. The incorporators were Remedios General Manager Arturo S. Jimenez, Asst. Airport General ,Manager Rodolfo
Centeno, Priscilla Robles, Glicerio Efren, Rogelio Santos, Estanislao Centeno E. Montayre, Camilo G. Villa as Chief of the Logistics Section, Mrs. Josefina S.
and Serafin Robles. Sucalit, Technical Property Inspector of the COA detail, and Chief Accountant
The common defense of all the accused was as follows: Hereto C. Leonor), the purpose of which was to corner and monopolize all
The acquisition of the electrical items was an emergency measure requisitions and purchases of supplies and equipment at CAA Mactan,
necessitated by the brownout at Mactan Airport on the night of June 1, 1975. regardless of the source or the reputability of the suppliers.
Incoming flights had to be diverted as the runway and taxiway lights The Sandiganbayan observed that there was an overcharge in the four
necessary for a proper landing were all out. Jesus Singson, CAA Director, vouchers between the prices quoted by Rocen as reflected in the Abstract of
directed Mactan officials to implement a plan to install commercial power at Bids and the amounts actually paid. The overcharge, totaling P27,100, was
Mactan Airport which at that time depended on the Mactan Electric meant to represent the cost of installation, but there was no justification for
Company and the Philippine Air Force for its power source. For this purpose, including this item in the vouchers and no proof either that Rocen undertook
Cash Disbursement Ceilings (CDC) in the total amount of P310,000.00 were the installation. On the contrary, this work appeared to have been
released. undertaken by Montayre and personnel from the Bureau of Air
As the CDCs would expire on June 30, 1975, it was necessary to make it Transportation.
appear in the vouchers, supporting documents, reports of inspection, and The Sandiganbayan held:
certificates of delivery that the items requisitioned were delivered and From all facts and circumstances, admitted or undisputed, as well as those
inspected on or before June 30, 1975. The CDCs had to be utilized before the inferences, deductions, and conclusions logically and reasonably proceeding
end of the fiscal year as otherwise they would revert to the general fund. In therefrom, We are drawn into the conclusion that accused Arturo S. Jimenez,
view of the emergency nature of the purchase, there was no time to Rodolfo E. Montayre Camilo G. Villa, Josefina S. Sucalit and Hereto C. Leonor,
advertise and the Bidding Committee had to adopt the more expeditious indeed, had conspired with Casimiro David, Estanislao Centeno, Fernando
mode of procurement. Anyway, the prices paid by the government were Dario and Serafin Robles in a dastardly scheme to defraud the government.
reasonable. When accused Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit and Leonor signed, approved
Jimenez testified that he approved the vouchers after verifying that all the and/or executed the documents that facilitated the consummation of the
supporting documents were in order and duly certified by the proper transaction in question, in conspiracy with David, Centeno, Dario and Robles,
officers. He disclaimed responsibility in determining the reputability of the in direct violation of existing rules and regulations promulgated by
supplier. He admitted he knew Dario, Centeno and Robles but denied that competent authority, they have become criminally liable under Section 3.
they were in his office at Mactan Airport to follow up the transaction. paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. They not only
Montayre contended that his participation in the transaction was limited to persuaded, induced, or influenced each other as public officers to commit
requisitioning the electrical items. He was not a member of the Bidding such flagrant violations, but also allowed themselves to be so persuaded,
Committee and so had nothing to do with the canvassing of the prices, the induced or influenced to railroad the transaction in question. They had
determination of the winning bidder, and the verification of reputability of wittingly allowed the questioned purchase from Rocen Enterprises, an entity
the supplier. which is not a reputable manufacturer or a duly registered and licensed
Villa, a member of the Bidding Committee, argued that he did not participate distributor of the equipment purchased, the same being engaged in the
in the canvass of the requisitioned items. As chief of the logistics section, it business only of "paper products and printed matters."
was his duty to determine the items needed for the airport but not the By the questioned transaction, Rocen Enterprises was also given
availability of funds for their acquisition. He processed the vouchers before unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, to the exclusion of more
June 30, 1975, because the funds needed for the items requisitioned would established and/or reputable establishments manufacturing or dealing in the
not be available if not disbursed before that date. He did this upon kind of equipment purchased. There was manifest partiality, evident bad
Montayre's direction. faith, and inexcusable negligence in accepting the bid of Rocen Enterprises
Sucalit testified that she made a canvass of the items requisitioned and approving the same within a period of only one day, in accomplishing the
independent of the Bidding Committee, to use as a basis for determining the purchase order and general vouchers in payment of the requisitioned
reasonableness of the prices quoted by suppliers. She acted pursuant to the equipment within a period of one week, and delivering the corresponding
National Accounting and Auditing Rules. She added that she went to Manila warrants or checks in payment of the same, through a CAA employee even
to make the canvass because there was no supplier in Cebu City that could before delivery of said equipment. Section 3, paragraph (3) of Republic Act
furnish the needed items. She had no responsibility to determine who were No. 3019, as amended, was thereby violated.
qualified to participate in the bidding as she was not a member of the By combining, confederating, and conspiring with Centeno, Dario, and Robles
Bidding Committee. She pre-audited and initialed the vouchers after to promote or facilitate efforts that led to the violation of Section 3,
verifying all supporting documents and certifications. She also said she paragraph (h) of Republic Act No. 3019, for which Centeno, Dario, and Robles
signed the inspection reports ahead of the actual delivery of the items were convicted, accused Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit and Leonor
because the CDCs would expire on June 30, 1975. rendered themselves equally liable.
In its decision dated July 28, 1988, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan Finally, there can be no doubt at all that Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit and
found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3, Leonor are liable under Section 3, paragraph (i) since they participated in or
paragraphs(a), (c) 8 (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019, in relation to the Unnumbered were responsible for the approval of a manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or
irregular transaction, by which actuations interest for personal gain shall be operative as the "law of the case," the same would be confined in its
presumed against them. operations solely to the case and to those accused therein.
While the Sandiganbayan case was pending, the Court of Appeals, in a The petitioners also invoke res judicata, pointing out that in Criminal Case
decision promulgated on January 29, 1988, reversed the judgment of No. CCC-XIV-1457 and the case at bar, there was identity of the transaction
conviction rendered by the Circuit Criminal Court, on the ground of involved, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented, and the
insufficient evidence. This decision was subsequently, and quite offenses charged.
understandably, invoked by the herein petitioners in their separate motions The judgment of acquittal in CA G.R. No. 24142 does not constitute res
for reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. judicata so as to bar a judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 5915. One
In a resolution dated February 17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan denied all these of the requisites of res judicata is that there must be substantial identity of
motions for reconsideration. Hence, four separate petitions for review were parties, 10 which is not present in the instant case.
filed with this Court, by Villa, in G.R. No. 87186; Montayre, in G.R. No. 87281; The petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan "relied very heavily, if not
Sucalit, in G.R. No. 87466; and Jimenez, in G.R. No. 87524. Leonor did not mainly" on and has merely adopted the findings of facts of the Circuit
appeal, Criminal Court in arriving at its judgment of conviction. With the reversal of
On May 4, 1989, G.R. No. 87466 was dismissed for non-compliance with the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, the Sandiganbayan decision has
Circular No. 1-88. Sucalit filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also lost its basis.
denied with finality. On October 3, 1989, however, this Court resolved to This argument is also unacceptable.
hold in abeyance enforcement of final judgment on the petition pending While the Sandiganbayan did consider the decision of the Circuit Criminal
resolution of the other petitions. On August 22, 1989, we resolved to Court in finding the petitioners guilty, this was not the sole reason for their
consolidate these cases upon motion of the Solicitor General, who was conviction. Apart from the conclusions of that court, the Sandiganbayan
directed to file a Consolidated Comment on all the cases. made its own findings of fact based on the testimony of witnesses and
The common issues raised in these petitions are: documentary evidence submitted to it during the trial. In fact, the major part
1. Whether or not the decision of acquittal of the Court of Appeals of its decision dwelt its own analysis of such evidence.
promulgated 6 months before the decision of the Sandiganbayan bars their The petitioners also invoke the decision of the Court of Appeals rejecting the
conviction pursuant to the doctrine of "the law of the case." charge of conspiracy and contend that its finding that David, Centeno, Dario
2. Whether or not the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, which were and Robles did not conspire among themselves or with the herein petitioners
discredited by the Court of Appeals as biased, merit belief by the precluded the Sandiganbayan from arriving at a contrary conclusion.
Sandiganbayan. This defense is also untenable. In United States v. Remigio, 11 the Court held
3. Whether or not there was conspiracy among the petitioners. that although "a conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense . . . it does not
The petitioners contend that since their cases in the Sandiganbayan were follow that one person only cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the
merely an offshoot of Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-1457 in the Circuit Criminal acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases for a charge
Court of Cebu City, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense."
No. 24142, the decision of the Court of Appeals has become the "law of the Notably, the judgment of acquittal of the Court of Appeals invoked by the
case" which cannot now be overturned by any court and should be applied in herein petitioners was based on the insufficiency of the evidence of guilt of
the case at bar. Accordingly, they should also be acquitted. the accused therein and not on a finding that no offense had been
This contention is erroneous. committed.
The doctrine has been defined as "that principle under which determinations The petitioners complain that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving credence to
of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which had earlier been
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a disbelieved by the Court of Appeals as biased. The answer to this is that the
prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of procedure and does findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in the cases before us are binding on
not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its this Court in the absence of a showing that they come under the established
application will result in an unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of exception. It is also worth noting that the Sandiganbayan, being a trial court,
law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same was in a position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, unlike the Court
case." of Appeals which had to rely only, in the words of the Solicitor General, "on a
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, 9 we held: mute transcript of stenographic notes."
Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former It is asserted that the omission to ascertain the reputability of the supplier
appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably would result only in administrative and not criminal liability, as held by the
established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same Court of Appeals. We do not think so. Not only administrative but also
parties in the same case continue to be law of the case, whether correct on criminal liability under the aforementioned paragraphs (a) and (e) Section 3,
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was of R.A. 3019 was incurred. The failure to ascertain the reputability of Rocen
predicted continues to the fact of the before case before the court (21 C.J.S. Enterprises constituted a violation of the rules and regulations promulgated
330) (Italic supplied). It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the by competent authority and comes under paragraph (a). The manifest
court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal question properly brought partiality that resulted in unwarranted benefits to Rocen was in
before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that contravention of paragraph (e).
particular case. . . (Emphasis supplied). It is a rule of general application that Also invoked is our ruling in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan. 12 to wit:
the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the Petitioner herein, Reynaldo R. Bayot, together with, his co-accused Lorenzo
points presented throught all the subsequent proceeding in the case in both Ga. Cesar, was one of the those charged and convicted in a joint decision by
the trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and the Sandiganbayan, of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error documents. Both were sentenced to a total of 577 years imprisonment by
in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as the Sandiganbayan on exactly the same evidence which this Court had
those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities, pronounced as "woefully inadequate" and "too conjectural and presumptive
provided the decision is on the merits. to establish personal culpability," (Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105).
In light of these definitions, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in The petition for review filed by Lorenzo Ga. Cesar was granted by this Court
holding as follows: and in the decision rendered on January 17, 1985 in G.R. Nos. L-54719-50,
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Circuit 134 SCRA 105, the Court en banc, reversed the decision of the
Criminal Court in Case NO. CCC-XIV-1457, was not, however, a determination Sandiganbayan and acquitted Lorenzo Ga. Cesar. The charge and the
of a question of law. The present case is not merely a stage or subsequent evidence submitted against Lorenzo Ga. Cesar being one and the same
proceedings of that case. Although related, they are entirely distinct and against the herein petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot, the Court should do no less
separate cases. While in both cases, the transaction involved, the charges with respect to the latter.
laid, and the persons alluded to as co-conspirators are one and the same, In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 13 it was this Court en banc that reversed the
there is definitely no identity of parties between the two cases. The persons decision convicting the accused of estafa through falsification of public
accused in one differ from those in the other. There is, therefore, no way documents because it had not been proved that Cesar signed the questioned
whereby the doctrine of the law of the case would apply. If ever the findings vouchers. This served as the basis for acquitting Bayot in his own petition for
of the Court of Appeals in the case decided by it would be considered
review as they were charged under identical informations and convicted in a Sept. 8-10, 1986 Garchitarena Jabson Joson
joint decision based on the same evidence presented before Sandiganbayan. Nov. 4-6, 1986 Garchitorena Jabson Joson
In the case at bar, the first three accused were convicted by the Circuit Moreover, the decision of conviction was signed by Justices Joson,
Criminal Court and later acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The second batch Garchitorena and Chua while the resolution on the motion for
of accused, the petitioners herein, were convicted directly by the reconsideration was signed by Justices Joson, Garchitorena and
Sandiganbayan. Hermosisima.
Obviously, we cannot rule on the decision of the Court of Appeals because it Invoked is the case of Cabigao vs. Saidiganbayan, 17 where this Court held:
is not before us. What is the decision of the Sandiganbayan, which, is the At the same time, the too frequent rotation of Justices hearing this particular
case we can review. In so doing, we are not bound by the findings of the case borders on unfairness. The Sandiganbayan should devise a better
Court of Appeals, which have not been appealed to this Court. We are system whereby, as much as possible, the same Justices who hear a case
confined only to the examination of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be the ones to decide it. The procedure in the Court of Appeals cannot
because it is its decision that has been elevated to us. From the records of be used as a precedent. Except in some isolated instances provided in Batas
that case, to repeat, we are satisfied that there was a conspiracy among Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals reviews and decides cases on the
some of the petitioners. basis of the records and does not conduct trials. In reducing temporary
The failure to show that the petitioners profited from the transaction would changes in its divisions to the barest minimum, the Sandiganbayan also
not necessarily result in acquittal. In Luciano v Estrella, 14 Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reduces the possibility of one Justice who hears all the witnesses, influencing
in interpreting paragraph (g), Section 3 of R.A. 3019, said: the findings of the Justices who did not have the same opportunity.
. . . the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; In that case, we set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan and ordered a
it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or new trial not solely on the basis of the "too frequent rotation of justices" but
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been also because "in addition to the newly-discovered evidence, there (were)
violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced serious allegations which call(ed) for a more thorough examination."
purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of Furthermore, temporary vacancies in a division of a collegiate court are to be
certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or expected and unavoidable. The "frequent rotation of Justices" decried by the
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not petitioners was not deliberately done to prejudice them. It must also be
merely contemplates repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, noted that there was no categorical statement in Cabigao that "frequent
but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption . . . rotation of justices" would result in the nullity of the proceedings.
The petitioners stress that the investigating fiscal who conducted the We now proceed to the liabilities of the petitioners.
preliminary investigation cleared them of liability (while Tanodbayan The petitioners submit that their act of requisitioning the items approving
Fernandez maintained there was conspiracy) and argue that the findings of and signing documents relative to the transaction and issuing the checks in
the former should prevail pursuant to Quizo v. Sandiganbayan. 15 That case, payment of the items requisitioned were made in good faith to beat the
in fact, argues against them. In Quizo, it was the Tanodbayan himself who expiry date in the CDCs on June 30, 1975, and allow their utilization before
moved for the dismissal of the information with the Sandiganbayan which their reversion to the general fund.
denied the same and which denial we set aside. The investigating fiscal being We agree that the issuance of and signatures on the reports of inspection,
the subordinate of the Tanodbayan, the letter's decision should prevail. certificates of delivery and general vouchers, all before June 30, 1975, prior
Also cited is the case of Pajaro v. Sandiganbayan, 16 where it was held: to the actual delivery of the requisitioned item, were innocent and justified
In view of the findings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.. No, SP-07493, April by the emergency nature of the purchase and the need to beat the expiry
30, 1987, the prosecution of petitioner in the Sandiganbayan should be dates of the CDCs. What we cannot come to terms with, however, is the
discontinued for the Sandiganbayan may not review, revise or reverse the glaring fact that the winning bidder, Rocen Enterprises, which was
findings of the Court of Appeals in relation to which the Sandiganbayan, a represented by Centeno, Robles and Dario, deals only in paper products and
special court with special and limited jurisdiction. is inferior. printed matter and merely procured the electrical items it supplied to CAA
In that case, Pajaro, as officer-in-charge of the Office of the City Treasurer of Mactan from UTESCO, one of the losing bidders. This transaction reveals that
Dagupan City, was charged before the Tanodbayan with violation of R.A. unwarranted advantage through manifest partiality were accorded Rocen
3019 for having given undue advantage and benefits to a delinquent notwithstanding its lack of reputability as a supplier of electrical equipment.
taxpayer by allowing it to pay in installment instead of collecting the taxes Who and what made this possible?
due within the period fixed in the Local Tax Code. While the case was A close scrutiny of the circumstances of this case clearly indicates that
pending, Llamas filed a petition for mandamus to compel Pajaro to collect Jimenez and Sucalit were indeed involved in a scheme violative of the Anti-
the delinquent's tax liabilities. The trial court dismissed the suit and on Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
appeal was upheld by the Court of Appeals on the ground that no prejudice Dario, Centeno and Robles were CAA Manila employees and were on leave
had cause to the city, which in fact stood to gain more from the promissory during the period of the questioned transaction. They were seen by
note than the amount awarded by the trial court. prosecution witnesses at Mactan Airport in the company of Jimenez, who
The Tanodbayan filed the information against Pajaro but later recommended admitted he knew the three. Robles and Centeno are incorporators of Rocen
its dismissal, which the Sandiganbayan denied. Citing the Court of Appeals Trading, Inc., which was the Rocen Enterprises at the time the transaction
decision, Pajaro moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan also was consummated. This was a sole proprietorship registered in the name of
denied. This prompted the petition for certiorari and prohibition where we Remedios Centeno, wife of Estanislao Centeno, and engaged only in the
ruled in favor of Pajaro. business of dealing in "paper products and printed matter."
The Pajaro Case is not applicable because, as correctly observed by the When the requisition of the items was made, Sucalit went to Manila
Solicitor General, one and the same act of the same party was the subject of pursuant to a travel order issued by Jimenez to canvass prices of the articles.
separate cases before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. In the It is not explained why she delivered an advertisement form to Rocen
cases before us, the parties absolved by the Court of Appeals are different Enterprises, which was a supplier only of paper products and printed matter
from the parties in the Sandiganbayan case and the acts committed by the but not of the needed electrical items. Curiously, Rocen submitted the lowest
accused in this case are different from the acts committed by the accused in quotation for the items requisitioned. When the contract was awarded to it,
Criminal Case No. 7CC-XII-1457. Rocen merely procured the items requisitioned from UTESCO, a losing
Lastly, it is contended that there was denial of due process because the case bidder.
against them was heard by several sets of justices as follows Arturo Jimenez, Airport General Manager, had the responsibility, as head of
Nov. 8, 1983 Pamaran Molina Purisima office, to see to it that the purchases mole were from reputable suppliers
Jun. 30, 1984 Pamaran Consolacion Jabson pursuant to the Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum dated April 22,
Jan. 31, 1984 Pamaran Consolacion Quimbo 1971. Instead of discharging this responsibility, Jimenez approved the award
Mar. 26, 1984 Pamaran Molina Consoldcion to Rocen Enterprises, which was represented by Centeno, Robles and Dario.
Sept. 25, 1984 Pamaran Escareal Molina Josefina Sucalit, who was sent by Jimenez to Manila to make a canvass,
Mar. 11, 1985 Pamaran Molina Amores inexplicably delivered an advertisement for Rocen Enterprises, which was not
May 28, 1985 Pamaran Jabson Amores a reputable supplier of' the needed items. In her Travel Report, she certified
Sept. 23, 1985 Pamaran Amores VeraCruz that she made a canvass from reputable suppliers.
July 1-2, 1986 Garchitorena Jabson Joson
These acts and omissions of Jimenez and Sucalit violated paragraph (a) of Avenue, Lucena City, Quezon Province, covered and described in Transfer
Section 3 of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9863, which she purchased from Marina M. de
Memorandum. They were persuaded, induced or influenced, and persuaded, Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera. Petitioner ascribed fault upon Averia
induced or influenced each other, to award the purchase of electrical items and Casilang with unlawful refusal to turn over the property in her favor; and
to an entity which was not even a supplier of electrical items in disregard of that respondent Averia even instituted Civil Case No. 1690-G,[5] a suit for
the Presidential Memorandum directing that procurement of supplies by rescission of two (2) deeds solely for harassment and dilatory purposes
government offices should be from reputable suppliers. Rocen was not a although the suit actually established petitioners right of ownership over the
"reputable supplier" as it was dealing only in paper products and printed subject property.
matter at the time of the transaction in question. Petitioner Padillo prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ to place her in
Paragraph (e) was likewise violated by Jimenez and Sucalit because, with the possession and use of her said property, and prohibiting respondents
manifest partiality in the discharge of their official and administrative from disturbing the same; and ultimately, that judgment be rendered
functions, they gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to ordering respondent Averia and Casilang to pay jointly and severally to
Rocen Enterprises. petitioner Padillo: (a) One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
The circumstances of the case are sufficient to establish conspiracy between annual unrealized income for the use of her said property from January 4,
Jimenez and Sucalit in violating the pertinent provisions of R.A. 3019 1982, (b) moral and exemplary damages the amount of which she leaves to
adverted to above. Direct evidence is not necessary to prove such the court for proper evaluation and (c) attorneys fees of Eighty Thousand
conspiracy, for as we held in People vs. Roa: 18 Pesos (P80,000.00) plus Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) per appearance in
A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity. court.
Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where In his Answer,[6] Casilang specifically denied the material allegations of the
concealment is highly probable; and to require direct testimony would in petition. He alleged that as early as June 1, 1982, he vacated the subject
many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny proper protection to property and, thus, the case against him should be dismissed.
society. (20 Am. Jur, 261). On March 2, 1984, respondent Averia filed his Answer with Counterclaim and
We believe, however that Montayre and Villa are not criminally liable. Motion to Dismiss[7] wherein he invoked the decision rendered in Civil Case
Montayre was convicted as a conspirator for having signed the reports of No. 1620-G, a suit for specific performance against Marina M. de Vera-
inspection, certificates of delivery, and general vouchers before delivery of Quicho. He further raised the defenses of litis pendencia, laches,
the items requisitioned. As already stated, these were innocent act in view of estoppel, res judicata and lack of cause of action, and prayed for the
the emergency nature of the purchase and the need to beat the expiry date dismissal of the petition as well as the grant of his counterclaims for
of the CDCs. No criminal intent can be imputed to his having made the damages.
requisition because the same was necessary. He had no responsibility in It appears that prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 9114, there were
determining the reputability of the supplier and did not take part in making already three (3) actions which involved the said property, namely, Civil Case
the canvass and awarding the purchase to Rocen. No. 1620-G, M.C. No. 374-82, and Civil Case No. 1690-G.
Villa was likewise convicted as involved in the conspiracy for having signed Civil Case No. 1620-G was instituted by respondent Averia against Marina M.
invoices, reports of inspection, certificates of delivery and general vouchers de Vera-Quicho and the Register of Deeds of Lucena City for specific
before delivery of the items requisitioned. He is absolved of this charge like performance and/or damages which involved the lot subject of the sale. A
Montayre, for the same reasons. Villa, moreover, did not take part in the subsequent decision dated June 2, 1983 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
canvassing of supplies. It is true that he was a member of the Bidding of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 in said Civil Case No. 1620-G ordered Marina
Committed and he signed the Abstract of Bids and the approval of the lowest M. de Vera-Quicho to execute the necessary documents over the property
bid to Rocen Enterprises. However, this act cannot be considered criminal as covered by said Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9863 and enjoined
he relied in fact on the canvass made and sealed bids procured by Sucalit in the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to desist from entering any
Manila. Such reliance may have constituted negligence but certainly not the encumbrance or transaction on said certificate of title and/or cancel the
gross inexcusable negligence punishable by law. same except in favor of respondent Averia.[8] The said decision became final
Regarding the offenses involved, the Court finds that only paragraphs (a) and and executory as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed
(e) of Section 3, R.A. 3019, in relation to this Unnumbered Presidential therefrom.[9]
Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, were violated. M.C. No. 374-82,[10] was instituted by petitioner Padillo on July 6, 1982 to
There was no violation of paragraph (h) of R.A. 3019 as proof of financial or compel the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to register the deed of sale
pecuniary interest in the transaction on the petitioners' part did not follow dated February 10, 1982 wherein Margarita de Vera[11]sold to petitioner
from the Sandiganbayan finding that there was overpricing. Padillo her one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the lot and the building
Paragraph (i) was also not violated because the Bidding Committee did not erected thereon, covered by TCT No. T-9863, considering the refusal of the
exercise discretion in the award of the contract for purchase of the Register of Deeds to register said deed of sale in view of a restraining order
equipment, which had to be given to the lowest bidder. issued in Civil Case No. 1620-G. The petition to register the deed was
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED opposed by respondent Averia.
insofar as petitioners Jimenez and Sucalit are concerned. Petitioners Villa and On July 7, 1983, during the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82, Civil Case No. 1690-
Montayre are hereby ACQUITTED. G was instituted by respondent Averia against spouses Edilberto de Mesa
SO ORDERED. and petitioner Padillo.[12] The said case is a complaint for rescission of two (2)
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Guttierrez, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, deeds of sale, namely: (a) the Kasulatan ng Bilihan na may Pasubali dated
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, JJ., concur. January 5, 1982 wherein Marina M. de Vera-Quicho sold to petitioner Padillo
her one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share over lot together with the house
SECOND DIVISION thereon, subject of TCT No. T-9863, which was registered and annotated at
[G.R. No. 119707. November 29, 2001] the back of said TCT on January 11, 1982 per Entry No. 54967, and (b) the
VERONICA PADILLO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS AVERIA, deed of sale dated February 10, 1982 subject of M.C. No. 374-
JR., respondents. 82. Respondent Averia claimed ownership of the same lot subject of TCT No.
DECISION T-9863 by virtue of an unregistered contract to sell dated January 5, 1982
DE LEON, JR., J.: executed in his favor by Marina M. de Vera-Quicho.[13] Petitioner Padillo
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court sought the dismissal of the amended complaint.[14] In an Order dated
of Appeals dated November 22, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40142 reversing the September 30, 1983, Civil Case No. 1690-G was dismissed by Branch 61 of
Decision[2] dated March 31, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon Province for improper venue.[15] Respondent
Branch 54 in Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of res judicata. Averia interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.[16]
Civil Case No. 9114, which found its way to this Court via the instant petition, In the meantime, a decision dated September 23, 1983 was rendered in M.C.
is a petition[3] for declaratory relief and damages initiated by petitioner No. 374-82 wherein Branch 57 of the RTC, Lucena City ordered the Register
Veronica Padillo[4] on December 14, 1983. In the petition filed against of Deeds to register the deed of sale dated February 10, 1982.[17] Respondent
respondent Tomas Averia, Jr. and one Beato Casilang, petitioner Padillo Averia assailed the decision in M.C. No. 374-82 via a petition for certiorari
alleged that she is the absolute owner of a Two Hundred Fifty-One (251) and prohibition in G.R. No. 65129[18]with the Supreme Court contending that
square meter parcel of land with improvements thereon located in Quezon the trial court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale
which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. In a jurisdiction of the court a quo, the appellee is correctly perceived by the
Decision dated December 29, 1986, the Supreme Court declared that the trial appellant to have already lost her right to recover the same in the instant
court has jurisdiction since Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 suit. In finding the decision in the former case a bar to the latter, the Court is
(Property Registration Decree) eliminated the distinction between the guided by the long-standing rule that a final judgment or order on the merits
general jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
acting as a cadastral court under Section112 of Act 496 (Land Registration parties is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and
Act).[19] The Supreme Court set aside the September 23, 1983 decision of the their successors-in-interest litigating upon the same thing and issue (Vencilao
trial court and ordered a new trial where all parties interested in the case vs. Varo, 182 SCRA 492, citing Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302;
may appear and be given opportunity to be heard. Carandang vs. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344; Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the
Pursuant to the Supreme Courts decision, a new trial was conducted in M.C. Mountain Province vs. Court, 165 SCRA 515). It matters little that the instant
No. 374-82. Following notice and hearing in the new trial, the trial court case is supposedly one for declaratory relief and damages, while the former
rendered a Decision dated May 5, 1988, which declared petitioner Padillo as case is one originally for registration of the appellees documents of title. A
sole and exclusive owner of the property in question and ordered the party cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
Register of Deeds of Lucena City to register the questioned deed of sale in presenting his case escape the operation of the principle that one and the
favor of petitioner Padillo. same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the parties and
The decision of the RTC in M.C. No. 374-82 was appealed to the Court of their privies (Filipinas Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Intermediate
Appeals[20]which rendered judgment on December 28, 1990 sustaining the Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 506; Bugnay Construction and Development Corp.
decision of the trial court. Dissatisfied, respondent Averia appealed to the vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 804). On the principle, moreover, that res judicata bars
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari which was denied in a not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues raised, passed
Resolution dated June 17, 1991 for failure to show that the Court of Appeals upon and adjudicated, but also the ventilation in said subsequent suit of any
had committed any reversible error in the questioned other issue which could have been raised in the first but was not (Africa vs.
judgment.[21] Respondent Averia sought reconsideration but the same was NLRC, 170 SCRA 776), the court a quo clearly erred in not holding the instant
denied in a Resolution dated August 26, 1991.[22] A subsequent motion for action to be barred by prior judgment.[34]
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on Disagreeing with the foregoing disquisition, petitioner sought
October 21, 1991.[23] reconsideration of the same but it proved unavailing inasmuch as petitioners
While the foregoing proceedings ensued in M.C. No. 374-82, the trial court in motion for reconsideration[35] was denied in a Resolution[36]dated April 7,
Civil Case No. 9114, issued an Order dated March 20, 1984 wherein it 1995. The Court of Appeals, in resolving petitioners motion for
deferred the resolution of respondent Averias motion to dismiss and ordered reconsideration in the negative, rendered the following pronouncements:
the case temporarily archived in view of the pendency in the Court of Contrary, however, to [Padillos] position, the Courts application of the
Appeals of the appeal of respondent Averia in Civil Case No. 1690-G.[24] principle of res judicata was neither based nor in any way dependent on the
When the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed, in a decision dated inaccuracies emphasized in the motion and incidents she filed. While it is
September 16, 1987, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1690-G for improper readily conceded that the Court was obviously referring to Civil Case No.
venue,[25] the hearing in Civil Case No. 9114 was resumed on November 19, 1690-G as that which the Gumaca Court dismissed on account of improper
1987[26]but resolution of respondent Averias November 18, 1987 Motion to venue, the passage which states that the self-same was filed ahead of MC
Dismiss[27]was deferred in view of the pendency of M.C. No. 374-82.[28] No. 374-82 is one actually quoted from the trial courts March 31, 1992
When M.C. No. 374-82 was finally resolved in the decision dated May 5, decision which [Padillo] did not and still does not contest. Corrected though
1988, the trial court in an Order dated June 1, 1988 proceeded to deny the Court may stand on these particulars, however, it bears emphasis that
respondent Averias Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suspend Further the instant case was determined to be barred by res judicata not so much on
Proceeding in Civil Case No. 9114.[29] account of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 1690-G but by that
Thereafter, respondent Averia assailed the denial of his motion to dismiss in rendered in MC No. 374-82. It consequently matters little that the latter case
a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, was originally filed ahead of the former as [Padillo] had been wont to
before the Court of Appeals, which on December 21, 1989 rendered a stress. The fact that its new trial was only ordered on December 29, 1986
decision therein ordering the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. together with a clarification of the land registration courts expanded
9114 to await the final termination of M.C. No. 374-82 then pending appeal jurisdiction under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1592 effectively
with the Court of Appeals.[30] No appeal was filed therefrom, hence, the rendered the decision promulgated therein a bar to the claim for damages
decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 became final.[31] [Padillo] pursued in the instant case. It is, moreover, repugnant to the
With the Supreme Court denying the petition to challenge the Court of prohibition against multiplicity of suits to allow [Padillo] or any party-litigant
Appeals affirmance of the decision in M.C. No. 374-82,[32] the trial court for that matter to claim in a separate action the damages she supposedly
rendered the assailed March 31, 1992 Decision[33]in Civil Case No. 9114, suffered as a consequence to the filing of another.
which reads: Considering that the December 21, 1989 decision rendered in CA-G.R. SP No.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered 15356 granted the petition then filed by [Averia] (p. 200, rec.), the Court,
ordering Tomas Averia, Jr. or any persons claiming any right from him, to finally, fails to appreciate the sapience of [Padillos] invocation thereof as a
vacate and surrender the possession of the lot covered by TCT No. T-9863 of bar to the appeal herein perfected by [Averia]. xxx[37]
the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City and the building erected thereon, to Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition for review anchored on
Veronica Padillo and to pay the latter the following amounts: seven (7) assigned errors, to wit:
1) Unrealized income from the lot and building in the sum of P150,000.00 A. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
every year from January 5, 1982 until Tomas Averia vacates the same; AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ITS INCORRECT CITATIONS
2) Attorneys fees in the sum of P107,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance AND PERCEPTIONS OF FACTS UPON WHICH IT PREDICATED ITS DECISION.
in the hearing of the case and litigation expenses of P10,000.00; B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
3) Moral damages of P50,000.00; DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE
4) Exemplary damages of P20,000.00; and EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENTS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT IN CA-G.R. CV NO.
5) Costs of suit. 18802 AND THAT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 96662 DECLARING
SO ORDERED. PETITIONER THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY UNDER
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. TCT NO. T-9863.
40142 rendered its subject decision on November 22, 1994 reversing the trial C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUST
court based on the ground of res judicata. The appellate court ratiocinated: AND EQUITABLE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 9114.
The Court finds that res judicata bars the appellees claims. MC No. 374-82 D. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE
resolved the case on the merits. Civil Case No. 1620-G, dismissed on account JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 15356 BETWEEN THE
of improper venue, may not strictly speaking be considered an adjudication SAME PARTIES ON THE SAME CAUSE AND ISSUES.
of the case on the merits. xxx E. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AMOUNTING TO GRAVE
xxx xxx xxx ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO NOTE THE BAD FAITH OF PRIVATE
Not having claimed the damages she supposedly suffered despite the new RESPONDENT IN MOST OF HIS ACTS TO POSSESS A PROPERTY NOT HIS OWN.
trial ordered for MC No. 374-82, and the clarification of the expanded
F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO NOTE AND OBSERVE THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT objections.[44] Finally, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
INTENTIONALLY PROLONG THE UNDUE EXPLOITATION OF PETITIONERS action. M.C. No. 374-82 and Civil Case No. 9114 both involved the petitioner
REALTY EVEN AFTER THE SUPREME COURTS DECISION IN G.R. NO. 96662. and respondent Averia. The subject matter of both actions is the parcel of
G. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY land and building erected thereon covered by TCT No. T-9863. The causes of
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE action are also identical since the same evidence would support and
ON CONSULATION AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 13, ARTICLE VIII OF THE establish M.C. No. 374-82 and Civil Case No. 9114.[45]
FUNDAMENTAL LAW.[38] However, a different conclusion is warranted under the principle of law of
Petitioner attacks the appellate courts posture that petitioner should have the case. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
set up her claim for unrealized income, litigation expenses and/or attorneys former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages, as a distinct cause of action in established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties
M.C. No. 374-82 for she contends that it was not anticipated that respondent in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
Averia would oppose M.C. No. 374-82. Neither could she invoke any general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
counterclaim for damages in Civil Case No. 1690-G for the Regional Trial predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.[46] As a
Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61 promptly dismissed it. Furthermore, res general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the
judicata as a ground for the dismissal of the instant case was already rejected law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the
by the Court of Appeals in the December 21, 1989 decision promulgated in party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.[47]
CA-G.R. SP No. 15356. Lastly, petitioner cites anew the alleged inaccuracies in The concept of Law of the Case was further elucidated in the 1919 case
the finding that Civil Case No. 1690-G was filed ahead of M.C. No. 374-82 and of Zarate v. Director of Lands,[48] thus:
that Civil Case No. 1620-G was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once
Gumaca, Quezon on the ground of improper venue. declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that
The doctrine of res judicata is embodied in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court,
Rules of Court,[39] which states: while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final subsequent proceedings in the same case. The Law of the Case, as applied to
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the
the judgment or final order, may be as follows: courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is necessary
xxx xxx xxx to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in subsequent appeal. Again, the rule is necessary as a matter of policy to end
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or
same capacity; speculate of chances from changes in its members. xxx
(c ) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in The phrase Law of the Case is described in a decision coming from the
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or Supreme Court of Missouri in the following graphical language:
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which The general rule, nakedly and badly put, is that legal conclusions announced
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the
Section 49 (b) refers to bar by prior judgment while Section 49 (c) concrete facts, not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial
enunciates conclusiveness of judgment. court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and
Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the remain the law of the case in all after steps below or above on subsequent
judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of reason.Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation,
action. When the three (3) identities are present, the judgment on the merits reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless
rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigant were allowed to speculate
is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting
those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other the law of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But appeal, would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up
where between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like
case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is no identity of cause of ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a practical
action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to xxx[49]
matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed conclusiveness of The appellate court apparently overlooked the significance of this principle
judgment.[40] called the law of the case which is totally different from the concept of res
Under ordinary circumstances, this Court would have subscribed to the judicata. Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res
appellate courts conclusion that M.C. No. 374-82 barred petitioners claim for judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereas res judicata forecloses
damages in Civil Case No. 9114 since all four (4) essential requisites in order parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case.[50] In
for res judicata as a bar by prior judgment to attach are present in the instant the 1975 case of Comilang v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division.),[51] a further
case, to wit: distinction was made in this manner:
1. The former judgment must be final; The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is
2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject more limited in its application. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is
matter and the parties; confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The
3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the
4. There must be between the first and second action identity of parties, conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions
identity of subject matter, and identity of cause of action.[41] of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action
M.C. No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an
is a final judgment.[42] Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, in adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.
the new trial it conducted in M.C. No. 374-82, following clarification by the Significantly in the instant case, the law of the case on the matter of the
Supreme Court of its expanded jurisdiction,[43] had obtained jurisdiction over pendency of M.C. No. 374-82 to bar Civil Case No. 9114 has been settled in
the subject matter as well as the parties thereto. The judgment of Branch 57 CA-G.R. SP No. 15356.
of Lucena City in M.C. No. 374-82, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and It is worthwhile to consider that at the time this Court in G.R. No. 65129
the Supreme Court, is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits ordered the new trial of M.C. No. 374-82, after clarifying the expanded
when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the jurisdiction of the trial court with authority to decide non-contentious and
contentious issues, Civil Case No. 9114 was already existent. When the issue charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. One may have erred, but
of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114 on the ground of pendency of M.C. No. error alone is not a ground for moral damages.[62]
374-82 was raised before the trial court wherein the said Civil Case No. 9114 In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a
was docketed, the trial court chose to merely defer resolution thereof. And person for having been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety
when the said issue of litis pendentia was raised before the Court of Appeals which would warrant the award of moral damages.[63] The emotional
via a special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, the Court of distress, worries and anxieties suffered by her and her husband[64] are only
Appeals, while agreeing with respondent Averias arguments on the existence such as are usually caused to a party hauled into Court as a party in a
of litis pendentia, which would ultimately result in res judicata, incorrectly litigation. Therefore, there is no sufficient justification for the award of moral
ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No. 9114 to await the final damages, more so, exemplary damages, and must therefore be deleted.
termination of M.C. No. 374-82, instead of dismissing the case and/or With respect to attorneys fees, the award thereof is the exception rather
ordering that the claim for damages be filed in M.C. No. 374-82. than the general rule; counsels fees are not awarded every time a party
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on December 21, 1989 prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on
and by then, M.C. No. 374-82 had long been resolved by the trial court and the right to litigate.[65] Attorneys fees as part of damages are not the same as
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals. Since no appeal was filed from the attorneys fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In the ordinary
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356, the resolution sense, attorneys fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a
therein of the appellate court which ordered the suspension instead of lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter, while
dismissal of Civil Case No. 9114, became final. Thus, even if erroneous, the in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity
ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 has become the law of for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.[66]
the case as between herein petitioner Padillo and respondent Averia, and Attorneys fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified
may no longer be disturbed or modified.[52]It is not subject to review or in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.[67] As such, it is necessary for the court to
reversal in any court. make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception
Petitioner, therefore, should not be faulted for yielding in good faith to the and justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be
ruling of the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 reasonable. Thereunder, the trial court may award attorneys fees where it
and continuing to pursue her claim for damages in Civil Case No. 9114. The deems just and equitable that it be so granted. While we respect the trial
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15356 on the matter of the courts exercise of its discretion in this case, we find the award of the trial
issue of existence of M.C. No. 374-82 as a bar to Civil Case No. 9114 should court of attorneys fees in the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos
dictate all further proceedings. (P107,000.00) plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per appearance in the
Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, this Court is not inclined to hearing of the case and litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos
sustain the monetary award for damages granted by the trial court. (P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive. Attorneys fees as part of
Concerning the alleged forgone income of One Hundred Fifty Thousand damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the
Pesos (P150,000.00) per year since 1982 as testified on by petitioner as the losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably reduced to Twenty-Five
income she could have realized had possession of the property not been Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
withheld from her by respondent Averia,[53] we consider such amount of Because of the conclusions we have thus reached, there is no need to delve
expected profit highly conjectural and speculative. With an allegation that any further on the other assigned errors.
respondent made millions for the improper use and exploitation of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
property, petitioners testimony regarding the matter of unrealized income is of Appeals dated November 22, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40142 is
sadly lacking of the requisite details on how such huge amount of income REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another in its stead is hereby rendered
could be made possible. Petitioner did not detail out how such huge amount ORDERING respondent Tomas Averia, Jr., to pay petitioner Veronica Padillo
of income could have been derived from the use of the disputed lot and the amounts of (a) Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P97,600.00)
building. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and as unrealized rentals which shall earn interest at the legal rate from the
consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be presumed. If the finality of the this decision until fully paid, and (b) Twenty-Five Thousand
proof adduced thereon is flimsy and insufficient, as in this case, no damages Pesos (P25,000.00) as attorneys fees.
will be allowed.[54] Verily, the testimonial evidence on alleged unrealized SO ORDERED.
income earlier referred to is not enough to warrant the award of damages. It Republic of the Philippines
is too vague and unspecified to induce faith and reliance. SUPREME COURT
The only amount of unrealized income petitioner should be entitled to is the Baguio City
unrealized monthly rentals which respondent Averia admits to be in the EN BANC
amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) a month or Nine Thousand Six
Hundred Pesos (P9,600.00) a year during the sixth (6th) to tenth (10th) year of G.R. No. 117818 April 18, 1997
the Contract of Lease between Marina de Vera-Quicho, as Lessor, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
respondent Averia, as Lessee, which fell on 1982 to 1986.[55] Inasmuch as vs.
respondent Averia had been in possession of the property from January 1982 ROMAN DERILO, ISIDRO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias "Sido", LUCAS DOÑOS,
to February 1992 when he vacated the property,[56] it is but just for him to ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE, accused
pay petitioner the unrealized rentals of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred ISIDORO BALDIMINO y QUILLO, alias, "Sido", accused-appellants.
Pesos (P97,600.00) for that period of time. Furthermore, said amount
of Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P97,600.00) shall earn REGALADO, J.:
interest[57]at the legal rate[58] computed from the finality of this decision.[59] Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes
On the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of Fifty and one John Doe were charged with the so-called crime of murder
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), committed by a band before the First Branch of the former Court of First
respectively, we find that there is no sound basis for the award. It cannot be Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar. 1 The information filed therefor alleges
logically inferred that just because respondent Averia instituted Civil Case —
No. 1690-G while M.C. No. 374-82 was pending, malice or bad faith is That on January 1, 1982 at about 6:00 o'clock P.M. at sitio Palaspas, Taft,
immediately ascribable against the said respondent to warrant such an Eastern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
award. Court, the above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation,
The issue of whether the trial court in M.C. No. 374-82 could adjudicate with intent to kill, with the use of firearm and bolos, confederating and
contentious issues was only resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 65129 on mutually helping one another did then and there shot (sic) and stabbed (sic)
December 29, 1986[60]long after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1690-G which one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which caused her death.
was instituted by respondent Averia.[61] That respondent Averia instituted a CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
separate suit which was subsequently dismissed and all actions or appeals Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was
taken by respondent Averia relative to M.C. No. 374-82 does not per se make apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his
such actions or appeals wrongful and subject respondent Averia to payment arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was translated in
of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not
right to litigate. Such right is so precious that moral damages may not be guilty. 3 Trial on the merits was conducted thereafter.
However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting its circumstance, the trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the supreme
evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte, penalty of death and to indemnify and pay damages to the heirs of the
manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of victim.
not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re- It will be observed from a reading of the lower court's decision 13 that its
arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant judgment was obviously based not only on the evidence presented by the
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.4 prosecution but also on appellant's belated admission of guilt, together with
A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test some inconclusive pronouncements of this Court on conspiracy. The former
appellant's voluntariness and comprehension of the consequences in making apparently proved the circumstances of treachery, superior strength
his new plea of guilty. Satisfied with the answers of appellant, the trial court and cuadrilla, while the latter supposedly supplied the ground for the finding
convicted him of the crime of murder defined and punished under Article of evident premeditation.
248 of the Revised Penal Code.5 We agree with the finding of the court below that appellant participated in
A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness the treacherous killing of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appellant's presence in
Cresencio Lupido. 6 According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house the locus criminis and his identification were positively supplied by the
at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening prosecution's eyewitness. The unwavering and unequivocal testimony of
of January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring to work in her Lupido, corroborated by that of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted
ricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one of the postmortem examination on the corpse of the victim 14 and submitted his
the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed corresponding autopsy report, 15 indubitably show the deliberate
Lupido's wife to get food from her house in the poblacion as she had decided employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means to ensure the
to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas. killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend herself.
While Perpetua was waiting and standing in the yard of the house, five However, we cannot give the same stamp of approval to the finding
armed men arrived and confronted Perpetua. Lupido recognized two of the on premeditacion conocida declared by the trial court. The disturbing
men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro Baldimo, as these two frequently conclusions of said court thereon need to be clarified to obviate
passed by his house at Sitio Palaspas. He did not know the other three men misconceptions that may affect the stability of our present rules on evidence
but he claimed that he could identity them if brought before him. and criminal procedure. Said the lower court on this aspect:
Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without any warning, The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is likewise present in
Derilo shot Perpetua three times with the pistol he was carrying. After she the commission of the offense of murder as the existence of the conspiracy
fell to the ground, appellant, who was standing at the right side of Derilo, among the accused Baldimo and his co-accused having been duly proven also
approached Perpetua and stabbed her several times with a knife that looked beyond peradventure of doubt, presupposes evident premeditation (People
like either a Batangas knife or a bolo know locally as "depang." A third vs. Belen, L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39) which the said accused himself
member of the group, with a short and stout physique, followed suit in supplied the evidence on this score by virtue of his plea of guilty, which
stabbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the circumstance is not the least disproven by the evidence on record. Thus, its
yard for some time and left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of appreciation as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
them carried long firearms. A plea of guilty constitute(s) an admission of all material facts alleged in the
As soon as the group had left the scene of the crime, Lupido hurriedly went information, including the aggravating circumstances alleged, although the
to Perpetua's house in the poblacion of Taft where he informed the family of offense charged be capital. (People vs. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11
the deceased about the incident.7 SCRA 88; People vs. Mongado, L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People
I vs. Tilos, L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).
Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. A plea of guilty is mitigating and at the same time it constitutes an admission
Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
modification of the death penalty imposed by the lower court to life circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital. Because of the
imprisonment. 8Although appellant is aware that he has made his plea of aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon
guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence, thus foreclosing the the trial court to receive his evidence, much less require his presence in
application of paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, 9 he court. (People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Estebia, 40 SCRA 90). 16
contends that his untimely acknowledgment of culpability may still be The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation
treated by analogy as a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 10 of the attended the commission of the crime of murder on the bases of its findings
same article, invoking therefor the aforesaid case of Coronel. 10 regarding the admission of guilt by appellant and the existence of conspiracy
Unfortunately, that decision relied upon by appellant is inapplicable to his with his co-accused. As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea of guilty
case. The death penalty in People vs. Coronel, et al. 11 was modified to "life after the prosecution had presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further
imprisonment" not in consideration of paragraph 10, Article 13 of the code evidence whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident
but because the number of votes of then required to affirm a sentence of premeditation. The records and the transcripts of stenographic notes are
death imposed by a lower court 12 was not secured by this Court in its barren of any proof tending to show any prior reflection on, followed after
automatic review of the judgment. Apparently, the required number for some time by persistence in, the criminal resolution of the five accused.
concurrence was not obtained because some members of the Court treated It is elementary law that to establish evident premeditation, these must be
the belated confession of the accused therein as an indication on his part to proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2)
reform, and they felt that he should only suffer the same penalty imposed on an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination,
some of his co-conspirators. and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution
The late plea of guilty entered by herein appellant cannot be considered to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his
mitigating because the plea made is not "of a similar nature and analogous" conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken
to the plea of guilty contemplated in paragraph 7 of Article 13. A plea of to its warnings. 17
guilty is considered mitigating on the rationale that an accused The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was
spontaneously and willingly admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
of repentance. An accused should not be allowed to speculate on the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
outcome of the proceedings by pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to judgment. 18When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was
later substitute the same with a plea of guilty after discovering that the hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
People has a strong case against him. Withal, all is not lost for appellant. premeditation cannot be considered. Evident premeditation must be based
The killing of the victim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the lower court to on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating
have been qualified to murder by treachery. Although not alleged in the deliberate planning. Otherwise stated, there must be a demonstration by
information, the circumstances of superior strength hand cuadrilla were outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. 19
taken note of by the court a quo based on the evidence presented by the As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to
prosecution, but the same were correctly regarded by said court as absorbed show when appellant and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their
in alevosia. However, it found that the generic aggravating circumstance of decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that elapsed before this
evident premeditation likewise attended the commission of the crime. plan was carried out, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be
Hence, with no mitigating circumstance to offset this aggravating presumed against appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that the
circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. 28
presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence. No matter how We expounded on this in People vs. Camay 29 with this explanation:
truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court
cannot produce the effect of aggravating the liability of the accused. 20 after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1.
It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
circumstance before being taken into consideration for the purpose of comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require
increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he
the act charged as the criminal offense. 21 It is not only the central fact of a desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and
aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that
such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof. 22 even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
II knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the
The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of reconciling them introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree
with the old rule that a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but also its of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not
attendant circumstances which is relied upon and invoked by the lower court only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining
in this case to justify its conclusion of evident premeditation to aggravate the whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full
liability of appellant. significance and consequences of his plea.
Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for
exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on
presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an information or review, as to the possibility that there might have been some
complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge
regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise: to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to
Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater
were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty. 30
covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot 31 that the
and/or aggravating the crime. 23 rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any
We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of discretion.
more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to
vs. Rapirap, 24 it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty
following effects: to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in the earlier Rules of
A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or Court 32 sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted
information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the
alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the
the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.
evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its III
merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but There is another reason why we have to reject the aforesaid conclusion
to impose the penalty prescribed by law. reached by the lower court in this case. Under settled jurisprudence, the
Then, in People vs. Lambino, 25 we prevented the accused in criminal actions consequences of aggravating circumstances alleged in the information must
from contradicting the outcome of his admission, with our holding that by be explained to the accused when he pleads guilty to a crime imputed
the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information against him.
and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has not committed A reading of the questions directed at appellant during his re-arraignment
them. reveals a shortcoming on the part of the trial court to fully explain to
People vs. Yamson, et al. 26 thereafter expanded the application of the appellant the consequences of his plea. 33
doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases: COURT:
A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the All right, please come forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your lawyer, Atty. Camilo
complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in Libanan manifested to the court that you intimated to him your desire to
arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in withdraw your plea of not guilty when arraigned in this case and to
the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since substitute the same with a plea of not guilty after the prosecution has
by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It already presented evidence and in fact closed its evidence this morning.
matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) What have you to say about the manifestation of your lawyer, Atty. Libanan?
covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances. ACCUSED: Yes, your honor.
Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. 27 cited by some of the cases relied upon by COURT:
the lower court, declared that — All right, re-arraign the accused. Did you understand the information
While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time charging, you with the crime of murder along with some other persons?
constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, A Yes, your honor.
including the aggravating circumstance therein recited, . . . The prosecution Q All right, what will your plea be?
does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in ACCUSED:
the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has Guilty.
supplied the requisite proof. COURT:
With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it When you withdraw your plea of not guilty to the information when
had acted correctly in presuming the existence of evident premeditation arraigned the first time and substitute the same with a plea of guilty this
based on appellant's plea of guilty without any proof being presented to morning, did you do so of your free and voluntary will?
establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental A Yes, sir.
growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the Q Were you not forced, threatened, coerced or intimidated to change your
revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty?
specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in capital A I was not.
cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law Q Were you not under influence by any person or persons who exercises
with this provision: legal authority over you which may have been the consideration why you are
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the now pleading guilty to the offense charged?
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching A None.
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of Q Do you realize the consequences of a plea, of your plea of guilty?
A Yes, your honor. It is neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated person
Q You are therefore aware that by your plea of guilty you will be penalized by understands the allegation that "the aggravating circumstances of treachery
the court and ordered to indemnify your victim as well as other accessory and premeditation were present in the commission of the crime," inasmuch
penalties provided for by law? as "treachery" and "premeditation" are highly technical terms the juridical
A Yes, your honor. meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but
Q And this notwithstanding your realization of what a plea of guilty entail, even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers. 38
will you still insist on your plea of guilty to the information charging you with If many members of the Bar are unable to call to mind the technical
the crime of murder committed by a band? requisites of "treachery" and "evident premeditation" as qualifying and
A Yes, your honor. aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for supposing that the
Q Was it your realization that you actually committed the crime charged and accused, who is a farmer by occupation, understood such elements and
the prodding of your conscience that you now enter the plea of guilty? requisites after a few minutes of whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in
A Yes, your honor. open court. 39
Q Are you now repentant? Another reason why we cannot agree with the lower court's posture on this
A I am not repentant. issue is the consistent holding in several cases that a plea of guilty to an
Q You are not repentant for what you have done? information alleging aggravating circumstances will not be considered an
A Yes, sir, I am repentant. admission of such circumstances if the evidence presented by the
Q In other words, you regret having committed the acts, having committed prosecution fails to establish them.
the crime charged? Even the case of People vs. Boyles 40 cited by the trial court disallowed the
A Yes, your honor. appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime when the
COURT: Supreme Court found out that other than the time of the commission of the
All right, promulgation is set on August 18. All right, September 1. crime, nothing else suggested the circumstance of nocturnidad as
A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to understood in criminal law, to wit:
explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital Not one of the prosecution evidence, oral or documentary, makes the
offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the slightest indication that the protection of the night's darkness was
imposition of the death penalty. 34 We cannot declare with reasonable deliberately availed of by the appellants. In view of this deficiency in the case
certainty that when appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the for the Government, we are constrained to disallow the said circumstance
information he knew that he was at the same time admitting the presence even as, technically, it may have been accepted by them when they pleaded
and serious effects of the aggravating circumstances alleged therein. We are guilty on arraignment.
more inclined to believe, as a matter of judicial experience, that when he On the same ratiocination, although herein appellant pleaded guilty to the
admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only intended to limit such charge as alleged in the information, evident premeditation may not be
admission to the crime charged and not to the aggravating circumstances. taken against him since the evidence presented by the People does not
The trial judge did not himself try to inform or advise appellant regarding the adequately disclose the existence of the same. 41 Where the aggravating
consequences of pleading guilty to having killed the victim with both circumstances listed in the information were not supported by the evidence
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. More particularly, the adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital offense cannot constitute an admission
trial judge did not himself try to convey to appellant, in ordinary language of the aggravating circumstances set forth in the information. 42
that appellant would be assumed to understand, the meaning of evident The above rulings drew from People vs. Corachea 43 which, in turn, reiterated
premeditation and treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing the dictum in People vs. Galapia 44that even under the old rule on judicial
to murder and to aggravate the penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of confession of guilt, to be appreciated the aggravating circumstances must
death. 35 further be duly proved.
We quote from the old but instructive and still authoritative case The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts
of U.S. vs. Jamad. 36 alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances listed
If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense therein. But, where such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it
charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical should be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil.
language so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying 779), the Court ruled "that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads
the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the guilty to the crime of parricide described in the information as having been
consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form premeditation and his testimony given under oath before the trial court,
in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be held to be sufficient to upon his petition fails to show the existence of such aggravating
sustain a conviction. circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the
Our experience has taught us that it not infrequently happens that, upon admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not having done so
arraignment, accused persons plead "guilty" to the commission of the with treachery and evident premeditation.
gravest offenses, qualified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in In view of the present requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the
truth and in fact they intend merely to admit that they committed the act or presentation of evidence but with due explanation to appellant of the
acts charged in the complaint, and have no thought of admitting the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged in an information, and
technical charges of aggravating circumstances. It not infrequently happens considering the insufficiency of the People's evidence showing evident
that after a formal plea of "guilty" it develops under the probe of the trial premeditation in this case, we cannot consider appellant's plea of guilty as an
judge, or in the course of the statement of the accused made at the time of admission of the existence of that aggravating circumstance.
the entry of his plea, or upon the witness stand, that the accused, while As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the plea of guilty of
admitting the commission of the acts charged in the information, believes or an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and
pretends to believe that these acts were committed under such is called for by said Section 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer
circumstances as to exempt him in whole or in part from criminal liability. assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending
Clearly, a formal plea of guilty entered under such circumstances is not circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to
sufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the demand that the prosecution should prove the exact liability of the accused.
information. The requirements of Section 3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to
In People vs. Alamada, 37 this Court found the trial court to have failed in allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the
observing that quantum of care which it had prescribed for the valid dubious strength of a presumptive rule.
admission of a plea of guilty by an accused, especially in capital cases, when While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty
it did not explain to the accused the nature of the charges against him, when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand the case to the
particularly the allegations regarding conspiracy, treachery, evident lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which are terms so technical aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of
that the layman, especially an unschooled one like the accused in the said improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
case, cannot possibly understand without proper elucidation. condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence
to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his
guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) earlier two Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights)
loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on thereof the imposition of the death penalty, as follows:
the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
. 45 inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
conviction. 46 As already observed, the prosecution had already rested when to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied).
appellant decided to change his plea. The prosecution then had all the xxx xxx xxx
opportunity to verify the material allegations in the information. Despite Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in
such opportunity, it only successfully established treachery but failed to the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain
present any evidence tending to prove evident premeditation. heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal
We also doubt the applicability to the case at bar of People vs. Belen, 47 cited Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic
by the lower court, to the effect that conspiracy presupposes evident Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now the
premeditation. A reading of People vs. Timbang, et al. 48 upon which Belen is governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.
based, does not state, either categorically or impliedly, that evident Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder
premeditation exists where conspiracy is proven. were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by
There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the imposing a heavier penalty for murder than that originally prescribed, the
concerted actions of the accused. The existence of this mode in the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory statute being reclusion
commission of a felony can be inferred from the sudden shooting of the perpetua to death.
victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her person by appellant and Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be
his unidentified companion. applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the
However, to claim that evident premeditation can be inferred from principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is that laws
conspiracy violates the fundamental principle that aggravating circumstances operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly
should also be proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime alleged to have and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. 52 In every case of doubt,
been committed. While the court below did not equate conspiracy with the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. 53Nor
evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced from the former as the can the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just
elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely different. because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement, the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise
agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and the execution of the provide.
felony is decided upon. However, unlike evident premeditation, where a The interpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to draw up the
sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation present Constitution is enlightening in our determination of the non-
and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on retroactivity of said law, thus:
his intended deed, conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, MR. BENGZON. And then, supposing Congress passes a law imposing the
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue death penalty on those very same crimes committed by those that were
it. Once this assent is established, each and everyone of the conspirators is convicted of the death penalty which penalty has been commuted
made criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of them. 49 to reclusion perpetua, will they go back?
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the MR. MONSOD. No.
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that MR. BENGZON. Not anymore?
the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same MR. MONSOD. Any new law passed by the National Assembly would be
objective. 50 To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our ruling in People prospective in character. 54
vs. Rizal: 51 One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity.
There is no proof, aside from conspiracy, that the accused and his This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised
companions had sufficient time to plan the killing, reflect on it and after Penal Code which provides that "no felony shall be punishable by any penalty
reflection decided to commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances not prescribed by law prior to its commission," and was applied by the
where conspiracy is present with proof of attendant deliberation and Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall be
selection of the method, times and means of executing the crime, the held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force
existence of evident premeditation is taken for granted. But when conspiracy at the time the act was committed. 55
is merely inferred from the acts of the accused and his companions in the Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act
perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that characterizes evident No. 7659 would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post
premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be taken for granted facto laws. 56 Among others, an ex post facto law has been defined as one
but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis supplied). which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
It can thus be said that evident premeditation can only be deduced from law annexed to the crime when it was committed. 57
conspiracy if in the course of directly proving conspiracy, the elements of It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is
evident premeditation were likewise presented and proven. But then, in such favorable to the accused. 58 Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than
a case, evident premeditation would not merely be presumed but actually that provided by the Revised Penal Code for murder, the pertinent
established. Hence, it follows that there is really a need for the presentation amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within the
of evidence indicating the existence of premeditacion conocida, which was exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws.
not done in this case. Lastly, observance of juridical uniformity in the decisions of this Court
IV requires that we refrain from applying Republic Act No. 7659 to the case at
We could stop at this juncture, with the vital points against the death penalty bar. The present case is not the first and only instance where the Court has
having been made, but there are certain facets of this case which necessitate had to review a sentence for death after this amendatory law came into
elucidation. Indeed, the peculiar antecedents and chronological milieu of the force. To give retroactive effect to said law in this case will disturb the
instant case confront us now with what appear to be the problematical numerous decisions of the Court imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused
application of two penal laws. who committed capital offenses prior to the effectivity of the 1987
At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the Constitution and were convicted after its effectivity but before that of
conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force Republic Act No. 7659, even though the penalty imposable would have been
dealing with the crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code death.
which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that Having eliminated the possibility of applying the death penalty under
any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its Republic Act No. 7659 in the present case, we now examine the applicability
maximum period to death. of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its aforesaid amendment.
Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force after its On May 20, 1987, this Court issued Circular No. 9 regarding the imposition of
ratification on that date by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by the death penalty, under the circumstances therein defined. In the said
some as progressive since it contains new provisions not covered by our circular, all courts were enjoined to impose only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, even in those cases wherein our penal laws provide for the MR. REGALADO. May I ask Commissioner Monsod about this second
imposition of the death penalty, until Congress shall have provided by law for sentence. "Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
the definition of the heinous crimes contemplated in the 1987 Constitution. perpetua."
Prior thereto, in an en banc resolution dated April 30, 1987 issued in When we say commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to the power
Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, the Court took cognizance of the of the President to effect commutations because only the President can
Cabinet Meeting held on April 8, 1987 wherein, among others, the President commute sentences already final and imposed by the courts. Is that correct?
agreed to issue a statement officially commuting to life imprisonment the MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I am not the proponent of that sentence.
death sentence theretofore imposed on some convicts, in accordance with Perhaps the Committee should answer that.
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with MR. REGALADO. That was the answer of the Gentleman in response to the
the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, reveals that inquiry of Commissioner Bengzon.
the projected presidential commutation never materialized. MR. MONSOD. My answer is reflective of what the Committee had answered
It will further be noted that said circular referred only to those cases then before. And since that has not been changed, I suppose the answer would be
"under automatic review by the Court," and the aforestated resolution the same. But if the Committee would like to answer it in more detail,
quoted therein likewise contemplated "pending cases before the Court," that perhaps it should be the one to answer that.
is, as of May 20, 1987. Those issuances could not therefore apply to the FR. BERNAS. The intention of the provision here is, upon ratification of this
present case since, as hereinafter explained, the case at bar was brought on Constitution, the death penalty already imposed is automatically — without
appeal to this Court only on July 20, 1994. need for any action by the President — commuted.
Be that as it may, however, whether or not evident premeditation was MR. REGALADO. Yes, because the wording here is: "Death penalty already
present in this case and regardless of the inapplicability thereto of the imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua." The power of
aforementioned circular and resolution, the Court is reasonably convinced commutation is a presidential prerogative.
that it cannot validly impose the capital punishment on appellant. The words FR. BERNAS. Or we can say "ARE HEREBY commuted," if that is clearer. But
of the Constitution are clear: Any death penalty already imposed shall be that is the intention.
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was sentenced in MR. REGALADO. Does the Commission mean "are hereby reduced"?
1986 to suffer the death penalty as then provided under the Revised Penal FR. BERNAS. Commuted to the death penalty.
Code. With the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, that sentence should MR. REGALADO. It "shall be REDUCED to reclusion perpetua"?
have been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such constitutional fiat. FR. BERNAS. To reclusion perpetua, yes.
The fact that this Court will have the opportunity to review appellant's case MR. REGALADO. Maybe the Commissioner should eliminate the word
only now does not detract from the force of such directive of the "commute" because we are invading the presidential prerogative.
Constitution. Neither will the fact that Circular No. 9 was not yet issued when THE PRESIDENT. Is the Gentleman proposing an amendment to the
appellant was tried and convicted prevent the application to him of that amendment? 61
Constitutional provision. It is not the action of the courts which, under the Although Commissioner Regalado was not able to formally propose an
circumstances, convert his sentence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such amendment because of an intervening question by another commissioner,
reduction is directed and effected by the explicit words of the fundamental his observation was correspondingly accepted by the Commission as shown
charter; the courts merely apply this express and self-executing provision of by the use of the word "reduced" in the present provision of the
the Constitution when they impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua rather Constitution, instead of "commute" as originally proposed. The fact is that he
than the imposable penalty of death in appropriate cases. did not have to propose an amendment as Commissioner Bernas, who was
Again, the following proceedings in the Constitutional Commission yield light representing the committee concerned, had already taken note thereof and
on the foregoing proposition: acceded thereto.
MR. DE CASTRO. The proponent's amendment is a comma (,) after "inflicted" Thus, in his work on the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner Bernas had this to
on line 29 to be followed by the clause "UNLESS FOR COMPELLING REASONS say on the matter:
INVOLVING HEINOUS CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE . . . . But since "commutation" is technically an executive prerogative, the
DEATH PENALTY." In this proposed amendment, there will still be a need for Commission, in order to make the effect automatic without having to wait
the National Assembly to pass a law providing for the death penalty. Is this for presidential action, deliberately avoided the use of the word "commuted"
correct? and, on the suggestion of Commissioner Regalado, used instead "reduced".
MR. MONSOD. Yes. Thus the provision reads: "Any death penalty already imposed shall be
MR. DE CASTRO. What happens to those awaiting execution, having already reduced to reclusion perpetua." The phrase "shall be reduced" is not a
the death penalty on their heads, but there is no law yet passed by the description of some future act but a command that is immediately effective.
National Assembly? (Nevertheless, President Aquino issued an Executive Order, perhaps ad
MR. MONSOD. Then the next sentence will apply: "Death penalty already cautelam, commuting death sentences already imposed.) 62
imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua. 59 From the foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in
It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not order that any accused sentenced to the death penalty under the same
made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before the circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Section 19. The
aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. As the
inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its language should be
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be understood in the sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be
brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fundamental principle of employed. 63 While "to commute" necessitates presidential initiative, "to
constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the reduce" does not.
organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation,
be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
provisions themselves. 60 Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even
pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after
destroying it. Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have
The fact that no proclamation or grant of commutation was officially issued revived the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier.
by the President will not prevent the implementation and operation of By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced
Section 19 to appellant. To argue otherwise would be subordinating the to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but
command of the Constitution to the will of the President. The framers of the by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.
Constitution never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the Before we end, we note the extremely protracted delay in bringing
death sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent appellant's conviction to the attention of this Court. Although the judgment
on the act or omission of the Chief Executive. of the lower court was promulgated on October 12, 1986, the records of this
Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission will justify this case were elevated to this Court only on July 20, 1994. 64 Even by this date,
conclusion: the records were not yet complete as some of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial were not included in the records forwarded to "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
this Court. considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
We can only blame the court of origin for this improbable and unexplained Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15,
delay of almost eight years. It is the express and specific duty of the clerk 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
thereof to transmit to this Court, within the periods allowed therefor, the 2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of
complete records of the case where the death penalty is imposed for B.P. Blg. 22.
automatic review. Paragraph 5, Section L (Appeal), Chapter VI (Duties in Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure
Criminal Cases) of the Manual for Clerks of Court, which is the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not
a verbatim reproduction of Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s.
provides: 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s.
5. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. — In all cases where the 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981,
death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589,
the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on
judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino
The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
thereof by the stenographic reporter. 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of
The Office of the Court Administrator is accordingly directed to investigate December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
this matter and submit the corresponding evaluation, report and deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the
recommendation to this Court within ninety (90) days from notice hereof. original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check
All clerks of court are hereby ordered to scrupulously comply with their duty to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows:4
and responsibility of seasonably transmitting to this Court the complete Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having
records of cases where the death penalty was imposed, especially now that interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a
the trial courts have imposed the death penalty in many cases involving statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively
heinous crimes. (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in
With respect to the case at bar, in justice to appellant this appellate all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in
proceeding shall be treated as an automatic review because there is no question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
showing in the records that he was advised that the death penalty imposed guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will
upon him has been reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the pertinent no longer be considered a valid defense.
provisions of the 1987 Constitution; and that his case is no longer subject to Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his
automatic review, as provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court, conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate
hence a notice of appeal should have been filed. Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one,
circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the command of the i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to
Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment
death indemnity. thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
SO ORDERED. comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of
Republic of the Philippines Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him
SUPREME COURT in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated
Manila February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
EN BANC contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino
Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993 Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of
vs. the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner. by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive
The Solicitor General for the people. effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . .5
NARVASA, C.J.: The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30,
and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA
deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely- 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts
stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect
the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD
City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil.
being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of
indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00. the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants
as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of
1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 — i.e., that a check tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a
check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in
the judgment in Que v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419). doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior
taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90- to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall absolute retroactive invalidity.
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24,
168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 1985 — which declared "that presidential issuances of general application,
cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite
before the Circular was issued. apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . .
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what ." — the Court said:
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New . . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court,
Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'" Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for
commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I.
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . . declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct,
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among
that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects
obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation,
court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been
question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, . . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
515, 527-528:8 paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was survive.
mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may
highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to
petitioners on September 29, 1979. the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the
as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to
petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or
legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a
that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]). quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to transpired prior to such adjudication.
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 SO ORDERED.
[1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 Republic of the Philippines
[1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar SUPREME COURT
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, Manila
1967, 21 SCRA 1095). EN BANC
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer
v. Military Commission No 34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs.
vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in SANTOS, respondents.
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing
or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be VITUG, J.:
no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
xxx xxx xxx Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971- ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant
in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an
be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with
promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the
government abolished. 13 young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — parents.
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August
substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer but all his efforts were of no avail.
construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less circulation in Negros Oriental.
than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed
opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its
as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos report to the court).
vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
the Court on the law invoked. On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
the trial court.4 "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
lack of merit. consented to the marriage.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to xxx xxx xxx
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her way of providing for divorce.
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically xxx xxx xxx
incapacitated. Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
of the provision. capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
xxx xxx xxx psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
Art. 36. . . . do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the xxx xxx xxx
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno,
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent
added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
(7) be modified to read: cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of consequence of marriage.
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations. and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or cured.
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
the very essence of marital obligations. consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally." of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines- marriage.5
) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency. xxx xxx xxx
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction. "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
cured. pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not. psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
incapacity becomes manifest." occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision
apparent. is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest. on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after taken from Canon Law.
the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this Law,9 which reads:
case is to allow him to remarry.6 Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx 1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows: 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization. Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. or construction of the codal provision.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the
the basis of abuse. third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while was proposed first:
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent. Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
February 9, 1984 meeting: unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or then a broader one followed:
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but . . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
incapacity to discharge . . ." (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to finally, a new version was promulgated:
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
marriage. term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
classified it as a special case. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
Canon Law. explanation appears:
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
other members replied negatively. real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops
prospective in application. which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of
to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
concerned about the avalanche of cases. abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
approved. canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a
The members voted as follows: person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity. 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
Eufemio were for retroactivity. psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained. moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7 former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8 although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision the means of the party involved.
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, Separate Opinions
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, private respondent.
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency,
void marriage to be "legitimate." among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, evidence.
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under marital obligations, to writ:
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being her husband.
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989,
psychological incapacity. but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and to do the same.
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
desirable. without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
— A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains.
the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
Code. (Emphasis supplied.) absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the
Our Constitution is no less emphatic: latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or
total development. maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). intention of living and cohabiting with him.
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
hold on to. essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close after the celebration of the marriage.
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
specific answers to every individual problem. duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
SO ORDERED. Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
Feliciano, J., is on leave. problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non- on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital marriage shall not prescribe."
obligation. xxx xxx xxx
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
ROMERO, J., concurring: rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
private respondent. Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion"
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
Article 36 in the Family Code. refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis
a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of supplied)
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
matter. the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
marriage as — provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
within the limits provided by law." disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble taken from Canon Law."3
social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice from the other.
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to
the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in Separate Opinions
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present PADILLA, J., dissenting:
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit: cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to private respondent.
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
as well as the following implementing provisions: petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case. Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the Article 36 in the Family Code.
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of
evidence. a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
marital obligations, to writ: between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
her husband. absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this
husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A. matter.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the
efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
to do the same. marriage as —
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, "a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts. entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence. marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a within the limits provided by law."
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble
a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry
Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
latter of his/her condition and whereabouts. opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
intention of living and cohabiting with him. again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to
after the celebration of the marriage. the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has as well as the following implementing provisions:
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled? "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non- prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by marriage shall not prescribe."
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital xxx xxx xxx
obligation. It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
ROMERO, J., concurring: with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
private respondent. declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion"
for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as well as the
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting 65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated January 11, 1999 of
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis 2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner
supplied) Jose Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the marriage between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the follows:
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to- It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable
principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
at the time of marriage although it be manifested later. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the Alano Ochosa.
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was stayed with him for four (4) days.
taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some aides.
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall
short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the
an end to their union through some legally-accepted means. failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had
manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in
from the other. her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one
occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having
Republic of the Philippines sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity
Supreme Court circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
Manila rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.

FIRST DIVISION During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, G.R. No. 167459
Petitioner, In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is
Present: currently supporting the needs of Ramona.

CORONA, C.J., Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil
Chairperson, Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify
- versus - VELASCO, JR., his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ. Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon
Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF Promulgated: period.
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
January 26, 2011 investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the parties.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both
parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined
whether or not there was collusion between them.
DECISION
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military
aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified
about respondents marital infidelity during the marriage. Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11,
1999 read:
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who
testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October
described as follows: 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity
of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all
Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking the effects and consequences provided for by all applicable provisions of
behavior. So therefore they dont develop sympathy in feelings and they have existing pertinent laws.
difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has
been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil
Philippines. And while he is being transferred from one place to another Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its
because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information
follow him in all his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she and guidance.[5]
followed him. And during those times that they were not living together,
because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair
with other man of which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part of The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court
their relationship she admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship of Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that the trial court erred in
with respondents driver. I believe with this extra marital affair that is her way granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to discharge the burden of
of seeking attention and seeking emotions from other person and not from proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with
the husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a the essential marital obligations.
marriage.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in
According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
her family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a states:
mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since
respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11
to acknowledge the reality. January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of
his evidence and rested his case. marriage.[6]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the
petition on the ground that the factual settings in the case at bench, in no Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of
measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).
Hence, this Petition.
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties marriage on the following findings, viz: The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
xxxx obligations.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows: The petition is without merit.

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY. only after its solemnization.

From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological
incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we observed that
INCURABILITY. psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.The incapacity must be grave or serious
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
in respondents infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses. marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondents history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
respondents bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of
achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with Appeals and Molina[8] the following guidelines in the interpretation and
several men before and during the marriage. application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
no insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
the case at bar, respondents psychological incapacity clinically identified as continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.) rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
by the state. independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given 1095.[9] (Citations omitted.)
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was evidence that can adequately establish the
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the partys psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
attached at such moment, or prior thereto. actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related place because the affliction already then existing was so grave and
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically assumed.[11]
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage. A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we
made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit:
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
outburst cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little
the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial individuals.[13]
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus,
provides: clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
psychological nature. priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should tribunals.[14]
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of
evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony[15] and
void. her psychiatric evaluation report[16] as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose[17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal[18] and
Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19] Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?

We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam.
presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several
other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal
that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same who testified in this court?
conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family A: Yes, maam.
Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already
present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her xxxx
alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
juridical antecedence. Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate
members of the parties?
With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we
have only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the
support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript: testimonies of other witnesses, maam.

Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several xxxx
years -
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the
torture because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and A: Yes, your honor.
finally, when I have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an
affair with other men. Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your
evaluation report?
Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course
before the marriage you have already known A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview
with the other witnesses, your Honor.[22]
A: Yes, your honor.

Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from
would go to end after your marriage? the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual
circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
A: Yes, I was thinking about that. psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear
it anymore? Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the
trial court judge had found them to be credible enough after personally
A: Yes, maam.[20] witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the
evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bonas pre-marital
history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we
Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family
evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Joses one-sided portrait which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted
assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrists conclusion that Bona by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose,
harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her marriage the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed
with Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her helplessly prone psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bonas family
to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both
proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their
reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of employment in petitioners household during the marriage. It is undisputed
evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. that Jose and Bona were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal
Bajet started to live with petitioners family only in 1980 and 1986,
The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from respectively.
a personal interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in
court, as follows: We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of
evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
test, how about the respondent, did she come for interview and test? mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize
A: No, maam. that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys
Q: Did you try to take her for such? complete personality profile, information coming from persons with personal
knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in
A: Yes, maam. the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it
avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview? expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.[23]

A: There was no response, maam.[21] However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouses psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different from admitting hearsay
Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[24]
testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did
not wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with
incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his your husband?
witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived
together?
Q: How long did you stay with your wife?
A: Yes. Maam.
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years
there were only few occasions that we were staying together because most Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the
of the time Im in the field. respondent stay?

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
wife come with you in any of your assignments?
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and
then A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.

Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you? Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?

A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan. A: Yes, maam, G-3.

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time? Q: May we know where this G-3 is?

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan. A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
it is not very far
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]
A: No, maam, once in a while only.

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home? DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:

A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least

three (3) days every other month. Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were A: Yes, maam.
supposed to have been living together?
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was
A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.[25] assigned in different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?

A: Yes, maam.
GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the
husband in different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was
Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife? the reason why she did not like to go those places?

A: 1979. A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by
transferring from one place to another, she just dont want to go, she just
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in wanted to stay in Basilan where her hometown is, maam.
this case because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters.
Does the quarters have different rooms? Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go
with him?
A: Yes, maam.
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to
Q: But very near each other? go with him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away
places.
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some
Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters? far away different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were
in this war regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan
A: Yes, maam. they were in fighting atmosphere?

Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay
together that you have a chance to be with the spouses? in Manila, maam.

xxxx Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house. A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She
stayed with him only for four (4) months, maam.
xxxx
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living
together as husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship? Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate
few months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
they were together the husband was giving an attention to her. The husband Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring
was always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
was not there anymore, maam.[27] initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]

The facts follow.

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his
later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple
that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as decided to move to Carmens family home in CebuCity.[7] In September 1975,
to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and thereafter
lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
decade. anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the
preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not
to the inception of the said marriage. The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981;
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19,
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.[12]
causes therefore manifest themselves.It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
221 and 225 of the Family Code.[28] Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even
at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly became manifest thereafter. [13]
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial
precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already
incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case. aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
friends.[14] But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There
were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.[15] Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist
SO ORDERED. was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his
THIRD DIVISION fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some
surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No.
petitioner
166562 to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about
Petitioner, the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the
same.[16]
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Carmen also complained
J., that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
Chairperson,
support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked
- versus - CARPIOfor
MORALES, *
money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would
CHICO-NAZARIO,
spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive
NACHURA, and for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18]and even neglected his
equipment
PERALTA,
obligation
JJ. to his children.[19]

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would

Promulgated:
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends,
Respondent. March brothers,
31, 2009 or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes,
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a
portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off
DECISION his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986
after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he
NACHURA, J.: said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.[23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted
of the following manifestations:
 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial
relationship and his profession; courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
regular drinking; Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]
from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
to pay the same; and Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since
and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.[24] the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more
than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. [42] She claimed
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the
said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance
violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari[43] with this
herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition
was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45] On
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November
means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and
lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28] A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same
was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and Hence, this petition.
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas,
who served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas
stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.[30] For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates
evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between
are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32] petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. We find merit in the petition.
Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by I. On the issue of stare decisis.
Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.[35] should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]
credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the
course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice
court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical
who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:
existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the
decision reads: The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing
and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x again in litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2)
xxxx where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the
binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary
SO ORDERED.[37] for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that
of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before
are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts. Madison agreed overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
but stressed that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
or repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior
Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing policy decision and its merits.
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added
that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It
is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the
over two centuries. rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so
States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or
apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must application or justification.[53]
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being
Constitution. contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or
decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled,
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway of lex prospicit, non respicit.
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the marriage under Article 36.
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question
once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on We have not.
judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources. guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours
economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to with another.[57]
be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them. are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a the person concerned need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any
state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly
In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition decisions of church tribunals.
process.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement SO ORDERED.
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or
parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial EN BANC
conference.[60] G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, DECISION
gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the "All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Case

III. On petitioners psychological incapacity. Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March
25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which
that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the
and respondent null and void ab initio. Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order)
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the Resolution5dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to
marriage.[61] The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62] preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further
enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior The Facts
to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink
and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal
prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable. Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of Building).13
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st
aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al,
Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological charging them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct,
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
with Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Dr. Obras findings. Cases).19

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction
excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous
love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to (a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase
declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36. III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and
the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any
in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I
2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as
2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
July 7, 2011;30 administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the
the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did
the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and
of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the
on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39 suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V office.63
of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the
required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG
release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director
P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46 failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the
Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City
for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as
for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of Acting Mayor.64
P27,443,629.97;47 and
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16,
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case
Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its
Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49 part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and
seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine,
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52 petition for certiorari .70

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state
upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension
2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during act to restrain.72
the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites
for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that: On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey
attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice
disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional
funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among
of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them preventive suspension order.77
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of
to the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily
directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
same.56 The Proceedings Before the Court

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25,
the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing
Binay, Jr.'s staff.57 the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO
The Proceedings Before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to
file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770, 82 or "The
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be
WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie
evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's other's memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its
jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum,
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her
to contempt proceedings.84 Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman
pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power resolution.chanrobleslaw
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the The Issues Before the Court
Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral
when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in
Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been seriatim are as follows:
apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of
determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No.
the preventive suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate
the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension remedy;cralawlawlibrary
order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition
clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;cralawlawlibrary
against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued
his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to by the Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting condonation doctrine; and
in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on
officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt. 89 Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and
illegal.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral
arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which The Ruling of the Court
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In
so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw
prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in I.
view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it
found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for
Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that
any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete reliefs as law and justice may require.
evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July
3, 4, and 24, 2013.98 x x x x

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and
a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100 respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral justice may require.
arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their
respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his
Memorandum the following day.104 Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a
parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court
the notice. or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.110
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a
resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x." 111 party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction
purely of law or where public interest is involved.113 to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions
attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides
of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly
powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP
Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy"
propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural
invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant
before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.chanrobleslaw "The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
II. legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that
when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, 114 it seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to
is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at
jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which
view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great
the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose,
had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."124
as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative
thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful
submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
objection against ruling on this issue. adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA
delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:127
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after
the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but
of law. on certiorari.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts. The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it
be more difficult to reverse the decision under review? change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts,
into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of
the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of,
supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that
clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
appeal procedure.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
x x x x
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if very well stated, Mr. President.
there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent
himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to x x x x
him?
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct. render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme
Court?
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short
by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ? Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr.
President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes. determination.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him? The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President? Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have
made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if Individual Amendments.
he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his xxxx
administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the
appropriate action? The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting
the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the is approved.128
administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust
all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however,
judicial review. unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the
Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of
x x x x Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase
"petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in "review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be
changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to a taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange
petition for certiorari? between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of
changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately,
here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed
Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA
difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its
court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one
that not correct, Mr. President? should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only
reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this
case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available
whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and has excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the
that not the consequence, Mr. President. Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27,
Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator
limited only to cases that I have enumerated. Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or
finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President. paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual
findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a paragraph):
distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ; Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders
because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the
Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the
directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy
taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary RULE 45
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one x x x x
(1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and
a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any,
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified
statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly
set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand
stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act
was passed way back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 RULE 45
Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken
thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version: by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
RULE 45 Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without
proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
supplied) could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or
the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of
B. Construing the second paragraph of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors
Section 14, RA 6770. of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a)
questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law,
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new
Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is
construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision. also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be
said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
question of law." ;cralawlawlibrary 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the
appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited,
whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the law.
Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception
below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," C. Validity of the second paragraph of
being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term Section 14, RA 6770.
"appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken
mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is
general sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can
separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not
refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon,
except a decision. Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter
the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued
by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule
45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions
errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit
vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own
also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter.
however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it
which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138 may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770
as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in
jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take
Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the
Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of D. Consequence of invalidity.
Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations
and ruling in Fabian were recounted: In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension
application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence,
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the unappealable.149
Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail
a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65
invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman
and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a
effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was -
its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by
Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding
Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other Rule 65."152
courts authorized by law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a
6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it
CA under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied) stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of
"decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v.
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against
effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-
stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the
review over issuances of the Ombudsman. CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO
determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order,
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent incidental to that main case.
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the III.
Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own
motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been
bearings in settled case law: adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis,
must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with
that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain. her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the
idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770]
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from
other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that
its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute pressure would."159
transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the
courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
before them for judgment.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
the Office of the Ombudsman: tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and making it an "independent" office, x x x.
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed. (Emphasis supplied) x x x x

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is
historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman: a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers,
Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting
grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and
government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their underscoring supplied)
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective
performance of their function as government critic. Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence
and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 (1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe
No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be
administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core
the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to functions"163;cralawlawlibrary
the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file (2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases. must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially
are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
Constitution. These provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary based";164 and
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and (3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional
corruption. Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973
Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by
at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations
justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied) of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's Commission on Audit from political pressure."165
mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision
complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine of the Executive Department:
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to [T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these
Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358),
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
of Congress, and the Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has
upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court
granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary
the Constitution. power of the President.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all x x x x

acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is
cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural
similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the
since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy country.
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from
office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the
Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it Supreme Court.
subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the
President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not approved.171
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory
of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things: orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a
corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this
decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
said functions; and constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of
these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that the complete disposition of this case.174
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority. In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral
Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and
the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it the judicial departments of the government."176 The constitutional
from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169 demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more
commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In particular,
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's
power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive functions."179
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating
the office from political harassment or pressure. Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is
allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the such lower courts as may be established by law.
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general instrumentality of the Government.
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other
Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations: lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary
is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether below the Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional Trial
Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183were established. Later, through the passage
paragraph for that? of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court of Tax
Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will
prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued. In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the
the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 186 of
Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in the same Article:
order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and
parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In
x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed
over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not
on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in
hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
organizes the court and defines its powers.'" procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter."194
matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned
constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
the passage of BP 129, as amended. various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
of BP 129, as amended: reads:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether x x x x
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
doctrine was explained as follows: remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to underscoring supplied)
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the
a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
Appeals.189 independent judiciary."199

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power. powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to
insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right
established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
the Government." National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution: supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies,
the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."201
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As
excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. pronounced in Echegaray:
The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
of the judiciary.192 enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the
first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and [A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any
this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and attempted thwarting of such process.
underscoring supplied)
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various
rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
injunction were thus provided. essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the
constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole
objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case
merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an the other is also conferred."215
act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle,
other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to
substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial
merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the
parties. specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable
the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional
remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a
Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a
grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the
be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
under certain procedural parameters. [T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which
is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power
with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial
means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it,
6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads: as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional
or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end,
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears was constitutionally impermissible:
comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language
framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to
ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.
the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As
the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion
the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental not be granted or denied.
matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For
this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the
any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied) constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court x x x x

endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in
jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section
administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of
power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied) powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the
to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction,
appellate judicial proceeding: through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed,
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot
does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a
powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject
right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control a matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise
subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power
play and have preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied) contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly
promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this,
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs
passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly
from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F.
nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay
the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, JUSTICE LEONEN:
define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of
implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs Court?
to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated
during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
stated that: Rule 58, Your Honor.
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; JUSTICE LEONEN:
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule 58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will
deals merely with procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our
resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases
of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of x x x x
Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal JUSTICE LEONEN:
Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please
enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5,
cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of would you kindly read that provision?
the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."
its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as
exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional JUSTICE LEONEN:
independence."226 Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article
VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5),
Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are JUSTICE LEONEN:
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which
its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not
jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by correct?
the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the Correct, Your Honor.
subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases;
the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the JUSTICE LEONEN:
relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is
Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional that not correct?
remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of
procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, Correct, Your Honor.
as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, JUSTICE LEONEN:
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle. On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that
not correct?
 TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: correct?
Correct, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
JUSTICE LEONEN: Yes, Your Honor.
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it
part of litigation in an ordinary case? JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an]
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
JUSTICE LEONEN: Correct, Your Honor.
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?
xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed
that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
JUSTICE LEONEN: government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic
will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct? and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken
Correct, Your Honor. down for being unconstitutional.230

JUSTICE LEONEN: However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional? principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
No, Your Honor. same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of
procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against
x x x x courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs
to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it
JUSTICE LEONEN. is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under circular duly issued therefor.
Rule 16?
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned
remedies, x x x. injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances
JUSTICE LEONEN. were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
cannot, because that's part of procedure... IV.

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely
That is true. abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the
JUSTICE LEONEN validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.
correct?
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: order.
Correct.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
JUSTICE LEONEN: preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court
So what's different with the writ of injunction? explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to
be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
(interrupted) preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by
considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as
JUSTICE LEONEN: they have different ends sought to be achieved.
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they
create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step
attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct? in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is
to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY: prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court... records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If
after such investigation, the charge is established and the person
JUSTICE LEONEN: investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal,
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
 suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which
Civil Service Laws. were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services
misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Court although the payments were made after the official's election,
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is executed before said re-election.242
placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the
actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have
guilty.232 (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with
in Section 24, RA 6770: the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay,
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the
condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with
period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative
defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an the subject injunctive writs.
investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs
herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense."246
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine. statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in
Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose,
injunctive writs. Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the
same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial
assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation
CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No.
established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that
were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were
following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds
charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the for disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo
would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that
least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective
of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his
pendency of the proceedings. immediately preceding term of office.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners."
conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that: Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned,
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make
to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and
neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered
that there is really no established weight of authority in the United States Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion
(US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation
theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had
office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation,
the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been
abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several proper.
rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the
matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this
across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced: Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as
guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in
public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note
allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting
the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable
committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing
removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after
to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that
Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the
commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can
previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in undecide."271
some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's
resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the
On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which
declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under
"office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior
to the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an
officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which
offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held
offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not
words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding
tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S.
statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law- p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40
making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of
during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257 Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P.
388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
was a successor in the same office for which he has been administratively
charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, [T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So.
incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)
Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand
Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263 Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63
nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked. So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to
illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance
supplied) of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation
under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows: accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that
the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US
the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws.
Pascual in verbatim. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of
condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term -
clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the
was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in
that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the
a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes
of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal
is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense. basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the
under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute
in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re- should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a
election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings. framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take
into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the operation of the political branches of government.286
Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore,
prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent
filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in
the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he
the contract and the incidents related therewith.279 defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public
the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the
Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no
anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is
presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character, With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII.
Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that
doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and
that as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."
term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of
the elective official. After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have
framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall
2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit: effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed the people at all times:
during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
official's culpability was committed prior to the date of with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with
reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the In Belgica, it was explained that:
condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to [t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise. which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust
therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
in view of the condonation doctrine.
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291
 different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of
Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted
of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
January 1, 1992: The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch
dereliction of duty;cralawlawlibrary as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations
the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;cralawlawlibrary more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an
enumerated above by order of the proper court. elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected
to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
be disqualified from running for any elective local position: disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
running for any elective local position: public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

x x x x To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State

jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in
effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not
extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred. 295 In
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer
dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind
disqualification from holding public office: condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. - election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this
The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on
of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of
and bar from taking the civil service examinations. condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a
ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be
nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none
qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the
pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor
is extinguished by the fact of re-election: At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x. of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's
prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This
x x x x treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b)
nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions
now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation
actually bereft of legal bases. that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their
officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's
of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has
it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot E. Consequence of ruling.
be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has
votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council jurisprudence."312
of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating
theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution
condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor
absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
something of which one has no knowledge. subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI
thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA. merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had
already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and
Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306 perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until investigation in the instant administrative case.
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.307 This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of
the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly,
be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled: dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated: the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or obtain in this case:
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is people at all times.
unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative
from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been
to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this
endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude
condonation doctrine. of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that
paramount public interest is involved. is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires (c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint
law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the
the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-
the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine 15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and
came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
relevance on the parameters of public office.
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for
the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of Republic of the Philippines
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, SUPREME COURT
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach Baguio City
of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, EN BANC
this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
therefore, not evade review. LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may DECISION
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, PERALTA, J.:
revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
discussion moot.chanrobleslaw Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz
V. (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the
now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution316 dated Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal. Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and
clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
contempt petition: another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a
Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa,
which reads as follows:
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k,
absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of
submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied. said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return
the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far
Decision, the Court resolves as follows: from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand
an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said
paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative CONTRARY TO LAW.
circular duly issued therefor;cralawlawlibrary On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows: The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio charged.
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant. even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court,
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse
was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both
even see. procedural and substantive issues.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and
states: its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
of the Revised Penal Code; identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable; his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally
AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit. returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the
SO ORDERED. one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus: reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the
30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused- subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of
plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in
the decision stands. the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
SO ORDERED. x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
Court the present petition stating the following grounds: Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th)
UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT - day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of
BE REMITTED, IF SOLD; the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein
1991; charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by
THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED; Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH - It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
INCIDENT; ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE; 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS xxxx
CASE; (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE. goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
stated the following counter-arguments: the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
to their admissibility. received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted
demand made by the offended party on the offender.8 with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is
the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on
to pay them. Thus: this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons
PROS. MARTINEZ convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when
could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
when the deadline came? reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
a I went looking for him, sir. impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
q For whom? consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the
a Lito Corpuz, sir. behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among
q Were you able to look (sic) for him? those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey
a I looked for him for a week, sir. M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the
q Did you know his residence? Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on
a Yes, sir. oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista
q Did you go there? appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
a Yes, sir. After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter,
q Did you find him? this Court finds the following:
a No, sir. There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
a I talked to him, sir. committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
q How many times? money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said
a Two times, sir. range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What
q What did you talk (sic) to him? the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that
q Referring to Exhibit A-2? would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir. can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
partially or full? ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
a No, sir.9 but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to made the subject of penal legislation.
a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13 In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
under Art. 315 1(b), thus: penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written by the offense.18
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne
"demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report
written demand as evidence is not fatal. to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is
money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation,
a demand, thus: thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14 the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate
to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper
shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return penalty.
the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B.
petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to
no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
prejudice of the latter.
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
previously and specifically provided for by penal statute. subdivisions shall be made applicable.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not 8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act. have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-
this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and
in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is
which it believes to be harsh.20 imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño- seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as
Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
commentary, thus: Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium
that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the
nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum
"Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto
questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21
duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing
clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22 Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of
be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is
₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the
be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers modified but the penalties are not changed:
of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, 1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00,
it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1
presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the day to 10 years).
subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we 2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional
the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it 3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable
is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In 4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by
the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day
Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00. to 2 years and 4 months).
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present 5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto
penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that: 6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: arresto mayor medium.
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the x x x x.
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this 1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00,
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be 2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if 3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4
12,000 pesos. months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if 4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
6,000 pesos. An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
exceed 200 pesos. The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
exceed 50 pesos. jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not requisites:
exceed 5 pesos. (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 JUSTICE PERALTA:
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest ... and determine the value or the amount.
on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the DEAN DIOKNO:
past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was Yes, Your Honor.
devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would JUSTICE PERALTA:
receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of
person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the DEAN DIOKNO:
IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing Yes, Your Honor.
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer JUSTICE PERALTA:
exist today. The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and Thank you, Dean.
declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating DEAN DIOKNO:
the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied Thank you.
in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds x x x x29
₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean
is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded
power to legislate laws. the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form.
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus: The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a
xxxx sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and
JUSTICE PERALTA: gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether
struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd. more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
DEAN DIOKNO: penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual same crime in other jurisdictions.
punishment. However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case,
JUSTICE PERALTA: because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the
more than Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no
DEAN DIOKNO: account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
be filled by Congress. parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony
JUSTICE PERALTA: convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred present controversy.
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ... With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the
DEAN DIOKNO: imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the
Well, my presen ... (interrupted) imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in
JUSTICE PERALTA: the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty- trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
of one (1) year, did I get you right? such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones
DEAN DIOKNO: and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission
interpretation. of such wrongful acts.
JUSTICE PERALTA: There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
Ah ... dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the
DEAN DIOKNO: proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
JUSTICE PERALTA: malversed by the public official, thus:
But if we de ... (interrupted) Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
DEAN DIOKNO: malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
....then.... is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or
JUSTICE PERALTA: shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or
court cannot fix the amount ... property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
DEAN DIOKNO: misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
No, Your Honor. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
JUSTICE PERALTA: the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty- exceed two hundred pesos.
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
DEAN DIOKNO: amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
No, Your Honor. thousand pesos.
JUSTICE PERALTA: 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
The Court cannot do that. in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand
DEAN DIOKNO: pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
Could not be. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if
JUSTICE PERALTA: the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
The only remedy is to go to Congress... twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
DEAN DIOKNO: shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
Yes, Your Honor.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
property to personal use. be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense
money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the
proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law), the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this
amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is
its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular
₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by law is not in question.
a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and
years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of
public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
property of the government entrusted to him. applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is
things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to
and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
dependent on the cost of the damage caused. legislation which will adopt to the times.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the
the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate
basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the
no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing
likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated
Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 far different from today’s conditions.
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a
(₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in
with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise,
penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction
unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner
illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking. that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away
penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the
exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article
exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible. Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article the death of the deceased.
316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind
(Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or
331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only
crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a
(Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
(Prohibited Transactions), offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
(Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is
responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country). unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in
certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity
awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our
the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks
that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar
awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article xxxx
222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be JUSTICE PERALTA:
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed PROFESSOR TADIAR:
the award of civil indemnity. Yes.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense JUSTICE PERALTA:
committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are Per capita income.
generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive PROFESSOR TADIAR:
or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. Per capita income.
It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are JUSTICE PERALTA:
clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly Consumer price index.
written. PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s Yeah.
opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared JUSTICE PERALTA:
unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty Inflation ...
corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount PROFESSOR TADIAR:
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law Yes.
is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be JUSTICE PERALTA:
punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of ... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of PROFESSOR TADIAR:
estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should There are many ways by w hich the value of the Philippine Peso can be
be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis determined utilizing all of those economic terms.
and directly runs counter to what the law provides. JUSTICE PERALTA:
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the Yeah, but ...
dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel and peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed JUSTICE PERALTA:
until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not Yeah.
impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel PROFESSOR TADIAR:
punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the ... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the JUSTICE PERALTA:
imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the That is legislative in nature.
intervention of the Court. PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty JUSTICE PERALTA:
emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of Yeah, okay.
due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not PROFESSOR TADIAR:
given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to
the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more JUSTICE PERALTA:
so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the Thank you, Professor.
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual Thank you.46
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice,
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the circumstances" in its decisions.
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the
ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
the community."45 Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
law and adapt it to our modern time. With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut
before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said
on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions. Department of Justice.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and
modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium SO ORDERED.
period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme,
Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of
the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in
the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions.
Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods
of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form
one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case,
the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the
maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also
states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the
₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional
₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by
law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and
usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous
proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007
of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO