Zach Schillace

04.27.2017

POLS 420C

The Republic of Macedonia and Hellenic Republics Name Game

Since its appearance on the global stage as an independent nation in 1991, the Republic of

Macedonia (FYR) has faced internal struggles as it tried to establish a national identity, as well as

outside pressure from the Hellenic Republic (GRC) to change that very identity even as it became

entrenched in the former Yugoslavian state. Essentially, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, several

smaller states emerged. What came to be known as the Republic of Macedonia made symbolic use of

the ancient Macedonian civilization of Phillip the Second and Alexander the Great, to forge a national

identity which unified the country. This symbolism extended to the nations name, flag, and even the

architecture of its rebuilt capital Skopje. All of this was met with cries of outrage from GRC which

contains a province named Macedonia, and which has historically laid claim to the cultural identity of

ancient Macedonia (indeed much of GRC historical claim to fame emerges from the exploits of such

famous Macedonians as Alexander the Great or his father Phillip).

However, this issue of modern ownership of a long dead historical culture is not clear cut at all

with major disputes raging even now between two camps of historians, archaeologists, and

anthropologists who disagree on whether or not ancient Macedonians were Hellenic (Greeks) or a

completely separate ethnic group.1 For GRC at least, the establishment of a new nation on its border,

bearing the name “Republic of Macedonia” was tantamount to a claim on GRC territory, and heritage.

This led to a diplomatic cold war of sorts, with GRC currently demanding that, “A compound name

with a geographical qualifier for use in relations to everyone (erga omnes) is the best possible basis for

finding an honest, mutually beneficial compromise that will not create winners and losers, but will lay

the foundations for the development of a healthy and stable bilateral relationship based on the principle
1"Macedonia: A Contested Name." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed April 27, 2017.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Macedonia-a-contested-name-1515349.
of respect for good neighborly relations, and will strengthen peace and stability in the wider region.” 2

while the FYR staunchly refuse to make any major changes to its name or new national identity. This

dispute has led to many real world problems and consequences, such as GRCs attempts to block the

FYR ascension to the European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well

causing the ruination of some politicians. These tactics are essentially GRC’s final option, “Greece

realizes that its only leverage to get the Republic of Macedonia to change its constitutional name is to

use its position as a member of the EU to block Macedonia's path to EU membership.” 3 Since the

resolution of a 1994 embargo, GRC can only resort to these delaying actions as a way to put pressure

on FYR to comply to its wishes. However, this policy has over the years lost traction due to

condemnation from the international community. Even so, the dispute endures to this day causing

political, cultural, and economic tension between the two nations and their allies. This issue boils

down to one fundamental question: should the FYR concede to GRC demands and change its

constitutional name. To answer this question we must analyze the two nations involved, determine

each of their motivations concerning the dispute, as well as any precedents that may have a positive or

negative effect on the results, and then apply this information to the relevant paradigms at the systemic

and sub-systemic level of analysis.

The FYR is a relatively new nation, having only emerged after the collapse of the USSR and the

resultant breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. For the international community FYR was at first hailed as a

great success story especially because of the usually violent series of rebellions, and independence

movements that were ongoing in the Balkans, “...at the peak of Croatian and Bosnian horrors,

Macedonia was often singled out as a “success story” in conflict prevention and peace-building, or,

more precisely, international state-building efforts.”4 Many saw a bright future for the tiny Balkan
2"FYROM Name Issue." Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 25, 2017.
http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/.
3"Macedonia's Dispute with Greece." Macedonia's Dispute with Greece - Macedonia - ESI. November 2012. Accessed
April 24, 2017. http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=562.
4Vankovska, Biljana. "The Macedonian Position(s) in the So-Called Name Dispute." Academia.edu. Accessed April 25,
2017. http://www.academia.edu/4025496/The_Macedonian_Position_s_in_the_So-Called_Name_Dispute. 3
nation, which had managed to successfully become an independent nation without firing a shot in

anger. Despite this brief love affair with the international community, the FYR soon faced a diplomatic

dispute with GRC which sought to hinder FYR acceptance to the UN as long as they word Macedonia

was included in its official name.5 While it was eventually accepted to the UN with the name “The

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, a nod to its name as a province in the former Soviet state,

the name, flag, and cultural identity dispute continued. Since its founding the FYR has existed as a

unicameral parliamentary democracy. Much of its nationalistic sentiment centered around its Slavic

peoples identity as “Macedonians” and thus differentiated from the other Slavic countries that rose after

Yugoslavia fractured. To this end more than 64 percent of its population of 2,100,025 identify as ethnic

Macedonians, with a large minority of over 25 percent Albanian. 6 This stratification carries over to

language and religious demographics of the FYR, with Macedonian (66 percent) and Albanian (25%)

being the official languages of the Republic, as well as Macedonian Orthodoxy Christianity (64

percent) to Muslim (33 percent).7 All of this data points to a nation that, while nominally united under

the idea of independence from the former Yugoslavia, is domestically fractured and in need of a strong

nationalist sentiment in order to provide a solid bedrock for the new nation to settle upon.

Indeed even a decade after independence, tensions between Macedonians and Albanians came

to a head, “During 2001 the Albanian population living in the Republic of Macedonia formed a

National Liberation Army, which sporadically clashed with the Macedonian police and army units,

leading to civil unrest and inter-ethnic animosities...”8 For such a small nation in both population and

territory (only 25,713 square kilometers) splintering into even smaller parcels could be potentially

disastrous from a political, economic, and cultural point of view. To this end maintaining a strong

5"The World Factbook: MACEDONIA." Central Intelligence Agency. January 12, 2017. Accessed April 24, 2017.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html.
6"The World Factbook: MACEDONIA."
7"The World Factbook: MACEDONIA."
8Nuhija, Bekim. "The Impact of Postponed Accession of Republic of Macedonia in the Euro-Atlantic Structures to the
Inter-Ethnic Relations." New Balkan Politics. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/The-
impact-of-postponed-accession-of-Republic-of-Macedonia-in-the-Euro-Atlantic-structures-to-the-inter-ethnic-
relations#.WP7mmPnyuc0.
unified front, and nationalistic sentiment is an important factor in maintaining the nation-state of FYR.

As far as international relations go, the FYR is a member of the United Nations, a candidate country of

the EU, and is seeking acceptance to NATO. Through all of the diplomatic processes related to

acceptance to these organizations, GRC has opposed or vetoed at almost every step the progress of

FYR demanding concessions concerning the FYR official name, flag, and cultural identity. Despite all

of this, FYR has maintained economic ties with GRC (save for a twenty month embargo that GRC

imposed in 1994), and in 2015 alone exported to GRC $224 million, while importing $514 million in

trade goods.9 All things considered, the FYR appears as a small, struggling Balkan state which has a

great deal of internal stratification which led to the need for a powerful national identity to rally the

country behind and form a more powerful domestic union. Its interest in working with and joining

international organizations as well as its democratic government, points to a nation that is firmly

embedded in the post-Cold War paradigm, and so can be expected to cooperate with other nation-states,

acting in a rational manner as part of the New World Order.

GRC borders FYR directly to the South, dominating 131,957 square kilometers of the southern

part of the Balkan peninsula. The nation gained its freedom from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, and is

very homogenous compared to their northern neighbor with 93 percent of their population of

10,773,253 identifying as ethnic Greeks. Greek is also the official language of the nation with 99

percent fluent, and 98 percent subscribing to the official state religion of Greek Orthodox. 10 GRC is

also a member state of the EU, UN, and NATO along with other international organizations. This

points to a domestically coherent and unified state, with a propensity to act rationally and cooperate

with international organizations is accordance with the New World Order and post-Cold War paradigm.

However, at least in relation to the thirty year long name dispute with FYR, GRC has tended to act

against this paradigm.

9"Macedonia." OEC - Macedonia (MKD) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. Accessed April 26, 2017.
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mkd/.
10"The World Factbook: GREECE." Central Intelligence Agency. January 12, 2017. Accessed April 24, 2017.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html.
 GRC sees the FYR official use of the name Macedonia, as well as the use of Macedonian

cultural references in its nation-building as an almost existential threat to GRC sovereignty, “The issue

of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is not just a dispute over historical facts or

symbols. It concerns the conduct of a UN member state, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

which contravenes the fundamental principles of international law and order; specifically, respect for

good neighborly relations, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The name issue is thus a problem with regional and international dimensions, consisting in the

promotion of irredentist and territorial ambitions on the part of the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, mainly through the counterfeiting of history and usurpation of Greece’s national, historical

and cultural heritage.”11 From a realist perspective, where security is the paramount concern, the

suggestion that the FYR would hold any serious territorial ambitions against GRC is simply not

credible when the facts are taken into account. Not only does the FYR not have any legitimate claims

to any of GRC territory that would stand up against international scrutiny in the ICJ, but if the FYR

was to attempt to make a move against GRC territory it would be under near suicidal conditions. As

mentioned before, the FYR entire population is equivalent to less than twenty percent of that of GRC.

The FYR also only maintains a standing armed force of around 13,000 personnel compared to GRC

127,000.12 That is an enormous numerical advantage to GRC. In addition GRC spends about 2.5% of

its GDP a year on defense (a little more than $7 billion in 2015) 13 compared to little more than 1% of

GDP spent by FYR (around $325 million in 2015).14 This simply extrapolates the near certainty that

any attempt by the FYR to use force of arms against GRC in any theoretical land grab would be an

almost hopeless enterprise.

11"FYROM Name Issue."

12Pike, John. "Europe Military Guide." Global Security. Accessed April 26, 2017.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/.
13"The World Factbook: GREECE."
14"The World Factbook: MACEDONIA."
 Of course this scenario completely ignores the fact that both GRC and FYR are members of the

UN, whilst the GRC is a member of the EU and NATO with the FYR attempting to join. It would be

completely against the FYR interests to start a territorial dispute with GRC while simultaneously

attempting to ingratiate itself with the EU and NATO. Not to mention that the FYR has incorporated

language into its Constitution in the form of its first and second amendments that directly contravenes

any territorial ambitions the republic might have in the future, “1. The Republic of Macedonia has no

territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state. 2. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia can

only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as in

accordance with generally accepted international norms… 1. In the exercise of this concern the

Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs.” 15 These

amendments were created in direct response to GRC concerns over the FYR use of the name

Macedonia and GRC perceived inference that the use of that name implied the FYR held ambitions

towards GRC territory especially its northernmost province of Macedonia. This implies FYR

sympathy towards GRC concerns in accordance with New World Order thinking and expectation of

cooperation between nations. Therefore it seems unreasonable for GRC to continue persecuting FYR

because of a fear of the latter’s supposed territorial ambitions.

Throughout this dispute, the goals of GRC and FYR have changed several times over the almost thirty-

year exchange. At first GRC demanded that all reference to Macedonia be removed from official FYR

usage despite the fact that this usage had been in place for nearly fifty years, “The roots of the name

issue go back to the mid-1940s, when, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Commander in Chief

Tito separated from Serbia the region that had been known until that time as Vardar Banovina (today’s

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), giving it the status of a federal unit of the new Socialist

Federal Republic of Macedonia, renaming it, initially, the ‘People’s Republic of Macedonia’, and, later,

15"Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia." WIPO: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 2011. Accessed April
26, 2017. http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=10558.
the ‘Socialist Republic of Macedonia’.”16 This is a key issue that usually lies below the surface of this

dispute. The Republic of Macedonia did not emerge from nowhere in 1991. Indeed, a republic by that

name had already existed within nearly the same geographic area and population demographics as FYR

for almost fifty years. After such a long period of time, with generations having lived as

“Macedonians” the thought of washing away all that history and starting anew was an almost

unthinkable proposition. To all intents and purposes it was an absurd and fanciful proposition. As the

first FYR President Gligorov put it, “To change our name we would have to change everything, from

schoolbooks to our poetry to our entire history - everything would have to change… and what benefit

would any of this be to Greece?”17 What benefit indeed, besides perhaps scoring some sort of political

victory, the equivalent of gaining intellectual property rights over the identity of a culture that died out

long ago? A Macedonian culture that has never and probably will never be confirmed as being

“Hellenic” or Greek in its ethnic or cultural origins. However, GRC was not prepared to stand idly by

as this dispute was played out through diplomatic channels.

In 1994 GRC began an embargo against FYR which created a diplomatic and economic crisis

not only between the two nations, but also within the larger community of nations, “Greek Prime

Minister Andreas Papandreou has ignored pleas from the 11 other members of the European Union to

drop the embargo. Gligorov maintains that Macedonia is willing to compromise, but he says Greece

keeps making new demands. President Clinton has appointed a special envoy, Matthew Nimetz, to

mediate the dispute, thus far without much effect, while the EU has said it will challenge the Greek

action in the European Court of Justice.”18 This creates the general feeling in the rest of the

international community, that what GRC was doing was against the norms of Western nations and

especially the post-Cold War, and New World Order paradigms. Here was a UN, EU, NATO member

16“Name Issue.”
17Williams, Carol J. "Greeks Keep Macedonia a Phantom Nation." Los Angeles Times. May 27, 1992. Accessed April 26,
2017. http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-27/news/mn-228_1_phantom-country.
18Vogel, Steve. "Greek Blockade, U.N. Embargo Threaten Macedonia's Future." The Washington Post. May 25, 1994.
Accessed April 26, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/25/greek-blockade-un-embargo-
threaten-macedonias-future/ba3ebab3-8035-44cd-8853-4f0f7b768b23/?utm_term=.10aa4fd45d97.
nation, unilaterally initiating an embargo against a tiny nation that had existed for barely three years. A

nation which had in no way acted aggressively towards any of its neighbors let alone GRC (even its

independence from Yugoslavia was a peaceful process, a rare event for the Balkans during this period

of time), and had which had made overtures to join the UN, EU, and NATO. During this crisis, the

FYR even attempted to capitulate on their official name as a show of good faith and to perhaps relieve

the tensions, “Macedonian leaders have offered to call their state New Macedonia or North Macedonia

but have rejected Greece's demand that the word Macedonia be dropped completely.”19 However for

GRC at the time addendum’s to the word Macedonia was not enough of a change to effect a

conciliation, and the embargo rolled on for twenty long months until international pressure forced GRC

to meet FYR at the bargaining table. It took an official UN treaty, and arbitration by a former US

Secretary of State to bring the crisis to an end, with GRC agreeing to cease its embargo and FYR to

cease using the ancient Macedonian symbol of the Vergina Sun on its national flag. 20 While this treaty,

called the “Interim Accord” did not solve the name dispute, it did lay a common ground between the

two nations, allowing for the start of political normalization between them.

The language of the actual Interim Accord treaty reveals the mindset of the parties involved, and

that of the international community, by whose will via the UN the treaty was enforced, “Article 1 1.

Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part [GRC] recognizes the Party of

the Second Part [FYR] as an independent and sovereign state, under the provisional designation set

forth in a letter of the Party of the First Part of the date of this Interim Accord. and the Parties shall at

an early date establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at

ambassadorial level.”21 The fact that the very first article enforces the recognition of FYR as a

sovereign nation, as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations is telling. GRC could possibly

19 “Phantom Nation.”
20Wren, Christopher S. "Greece to Lift Embargo Against Macedonia if It Scraps Its Flag." The New York Times. September
13, 1995. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/14/world/greece-to-lift-embargo-against-macedonia-
if-it-scraps-its-flag.html.
21 "Interim Accord between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | UN Peacemaker." United Nations.
Accessed April 26, 2017. http://peacemaker.un.org/greecefyrom-interimaccord95. 5
have been perfectly happy allowing their northern neighbor to wither and die on the vine so to speak

behind an embargo. Perhaps a new nation would have risen that would have been more amendable to

GRC demands and interests or perhaps GRC could have expanded to engulf some of that territory

itself. Either way, the treaty itself showed that the UN, and the US especially thought that FYR was

legitimate, and that GRC must acknowledge their right to exist. One particular part of the Interim

Accords that in the future would be tested several times by GRC was Article 11, “1. Upon entry into

force of this Interim Accord the Party of the First Part [GRC] agrees not to object to the application by

or the membership of the Party of the Second Part [FYR] in international, multilateral and regional

organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member...” 22 The clear objective

of this article was to smooth the future path of the FYR into the major international organizations such

as the UN, EU, and NATO. However, contrary to the intention of the Accords, GRC has at almost

every turn attempted to stymie the progress of FYR into those organizations. The FYR even filed

against the GRC in 2008 for breaching the Interim Accords by blocking FYR application to NATO,

bringing a case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

After three years of deliberation, the ICJ finally made a verdict in favor of FYR, “In its

Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding on the Parties, the Court... finds, by fifteen votes

to one, that the Hellenic Republic, by objecting to the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia to NATO, has breached its obligation under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord

of 13 September 1995...”23 This was a major turning point, and not only for the process of FYR’s

NATO application. The case showed that the FYR could bring international pressure to bear on GRC

to force its hand, in many ways simply side-stepping the name dispute altogether while still being able

to pursue its international relations interests. GRC was set on notice as well, that the international

community would only tolerate its dispute with FYR to a certain extent. Indeed in the original Interim

22“Interim Accord.” 7
23"ICJ Press Release Application of the Interim Accord." International Court of Justice. December 05, 2011. Accessed April
26, 2017. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=89&case=142&code=aci&p3=6. 1
Accords deal, there was even talk of the US having put significant pressure on GRC to reach an

amicable settlement with FYR at that time, “[Former US Secretary of State] Mr. Vance declined to

specify the final sticking points, saying only that "there were a lot of technical things" to resolve in so

wide-ranging an agreement. There were reports that the United States engaged in arm-twisting to get

Greece to settle its dispute with Macedonia.”24 At the time of those negotiations, the Balkans in general

was in a very precarious position and rife with conflict. The US and the international community in

was much more interested in stabilizing one of the few peaceful states in the region than recognizing

any claim by GRC against FYR name. While times have changed, the weight of those early decisions

is against the GRC as the ICJ case shows. As time moves on, it is not having a favorable effect on the

GRC demands, and as a result FYR can most likely simply wait out the GRC and pursue its diplomatic

goals one by one.

In addition to these effects on relations between GRC and FYR as well as international

institutions, the name dispute has had a negative effect on the careers of several politicians simply

because they said the wrong thing in public. Of course, “the wrong thing” refers most often to simply

using the word Macedonia to refer to FYR, a mistake that GRC reacts vehemently. Such was the fate

of one of GRC’s own ministers in 2016, “Greece’s migration minister came under pressure to resign

Wednesday for calling neighboring Macedonia by its name — in violation of Greece’s official position

that the Balkan nation has usurped the name used by a region in northern Greece… Migration Minister

Yiannis Mouzalas put his foot in it earlier this week during an interview on the refugee crisis on

Greece’s northern border with SKAI-TV, when he referred to groups of people aiding asylum-seekers’

‘passage into Macedonia.’”25 It is almost incredible that during a discussion of what may be the worst

refugee crisis in modern times, the use of FYR constitutional name alone dominated the story even

leading to calls for Mr. Yiannis to resign. This overshadowed both GRC and FYR humanitarian efforts

24“Lift Embargo.”
25Stiens, Teresa. "Greek minister ‘blunders’ in Macedonia name dispute." POLITICO. March 16, 2016. Accessed April 25,
2017. http://www.politico.eu/article/greek-minister-blunders-in-macedonia-name-dispute/.
simply to score political points and maintain an artificial international dispute. In many ways it is a

sorry state of affairs, but far from uncommon, and as may be expected not restricted to the politicians

of GRC or FYR alone. Even a President of the EU Parliament is not safe, and when a video showing

Antonio Tajani (recently having been elected to the aforementioned post) emerged in which the then

Commissioner Tajani spoke of FYR only as Macedonia instead of the internationally acceptable

Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, GRC expressed its consternation in extremely strong tones

leading to a bumpy arrival for Tajani. 26 This is because in most international organizations FYR is

mentioned only by its politically correct name “Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia”. In

addition to breaking that taboo, Tajani said that, “‘Macedonia is a beautiful country. Everyone in Italy

knows Macedonia. Why? Because Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon are very popular

ancestors of yours.’”27 Considering the aforementioned GRC concerns on the matter, it is not a surprise

that the government as well as public of GRC reacted poorly to this praise of the FYR. Tajani’s

intelligence as well as his political career was raked over the coals for his slip up. This political

firestorm only served to further isolate GRC and FYR relations. How can civilized discourse continue

between these nations if the merest slip up in nomenclature sparks such vitriol?

As far as applicable systemic paradigms, the name dispute certainly seems a relatively

straightforward issue. This conflict falls into the post-Cold War and New World Order spheres. Since

the beginning of this dispute, both GRC and FYR have been western-style parliamentary democracies

with capitalist economies. Due to this there is a great deal of expectation that both of these nations

should act in an open multilateral manner, working to cooperate on this issue both with each other and

international organizations, hopefully arriving at a decision amicable to both parties. As this paper has

explained, GRC has acted in a manner that hasn’t lived up to the expectations of these paradigms.

GRC has attempted to block or slow FYR acceptance into the UN, EU, and NATO since it gained

26"Tajani infuriates Greece with 'Macedonia' comment." EURACTIV.com. January 26, 2017. Accessed April 25, 2017.
http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/tajani-infuriates-greece-with-macedonia-comments/.
27“Tajani”
statehood in 1991. This is essentially a form of blackmail, keeping FYR from the diplomatic, and

economic benefits of being a member of these important international organizations until such a time as

it concedes to GRC demands. In addition GRC has resorted to more direct methods such as the

embargo from 1994-95, which was only lifted after GRC was strong-armed into a UN-sponsored treaty

and still cost the FYR millions in revenue as well as its original national flag bearing the Vergina Sun.

Even after the Interim Accords were established GRC still did not cooperate with the UN or FYR,

continuing to block FYR NATO membership, and was brought to the ICJ where it lost a case against

the FYR and told that it must comply. According to the FYR Foreign Ministry, “In general, the

political relations and cooperation mostly on Greek side are conditioned with finding resolution for the

differences regarding the name of the Republic of Macedonia – something that is not in accordance

with the Interim Accords.”28 It seems that as far as the FYR is concerned the issue has always

originated from GRC, and in any case the UN-sponsored Interim Accords (backed by the ICJ ruling)

essentially solved the issue by ensuring GRC was not legally able to hinder FYR diplomatic ambitions.

In addition, since the Interim Accords, GRC has even become one of FYR largest trade partners

as outlined above. So even without resolving the name dispute, FYR is reaping relatively strong

economic benefits from its current diplomatic relationship with GRC. Essentially, bilateral relations

with GRC are doing well even with the dispute hovering over their heads so to speak. FYR also acts in

a cooperative manner with NATO exercises, despite not even being a member yet. For instance, “The

Republic of Macedonia’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in

Afghanistan, for instance, ranks fourth in terms of the ratio of troops to the total population.” 29 In this

manner, as well as participation in the International Monetary Fund and other NGO’s, FYR shows its

sincerity in acting as a productive member of the international community. The weight of the

international community, as well as the ideals of the post-Cold War and New World Order paradigms

28"Neighbourhood - Greece." Republic of Macedonia - Ministry of Foriegn Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2017.
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/index.php/en/foreign-policy/bilateral-relations/neighbourhood.
29"The Macedonian Position(s)." 3
certainly seem to lie on the side of FYR, especially since GRC has historically acted against these

systemic codes. To this end the FYR should continue to advocate for the acceptance of its

constitutional name Republic of Macedonia.

Sub-systemically the issue becomes a little more complicated. FYR is currently in the most

divisive political crisis since the 2001 Albanian insurgency, the result of a paralyzed government after

an election in late 2016, “In a snap election in December, the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE won 51 seats

to the Social Democrats' 49, leaving neither able to form a government without parties representing

ethnic Albanians, who make up a third of the population.” 30 This have given the large Albanian

minority an excellent chance to make their voices heard at the national level, but neither major party

has made a deal yet in order to form a majority. Also it has brought up again the importance of

Macedonian nationalism, and acceptance to the EU which always brings up the issue of the name

dispute. Forty-Three percent (and the majority) of Macedonian’s polled in 2015 said that the greatest

foreign policy issue facing the FYR is the recognition of the nations constitutional name “Republic of

Macedonia”.31 That is a very large voting block to be concerned about appeasing, especially with very

close margins between the major political parties. At such a potentially divisive time, national unity is

always important, so any notion of suddenly acceding to GRC demands and uprooting what is by now a

more than seventy year tradition of Macedonian cultural identity would be in all likelihood an

extremely destructive action as far as national cohesion is concerned. By now numerous generations

have grown up only every identifying with Macedonian culture.

What President Gligorov said when the whole dispute began in the 1990’s holds even more true

now, every last inch of Macedonian culture would have to be excised or modified to meet Greek

demands. This would mean everything from school books to state documents and records would have

to be changed. Even if the notion of a compromise was considered, it would likely still follow the
30Casule, Kole. "Rise Above Political Bickering, EU Urges Macedonia Leaders." Reuters. March 21, 2017. Accessed April
27, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-politics-eu-idUSKBN16S22D.
31"Survey of Macedonian Public Opinion June 6-15, 2015 ." International Republican Institute.
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015-07-13_survey_of_macedonian_public_opinion_june_6-15_2015.pdf.
guidelines mentioned during previous attempts at solving the issue that is a plebiscite or referendum on

the issue, “‘We would like as soon as possible to go to dialogue with Greece to find a solution, and if

we find a solution we have to go to the citizens and organize a referendum,” said Gruevski. “Through

dialogue we have to find some solution, and after that to ask the citizens: is this right or not right?’” 32

Since a majority of the population wants the constitutional name of the FYR to be recognized, it is

doubtful that any compromise negotiated between either nations diplomats would pass muster in FYR.

Either way, compromise would be a truly monumental undertaking, certainly not anything a nation with

a domestic crisis could handle without risking internal upheaval. With any luck, once the current

political crisis within FYR is settled, the paths to EU, and NATO membership will be able to proceed

meaning that any compromise option will likely filter to the back of FYR political consciousness.

Therefore the sub-systemic situation encourages the FYR to not deal with GRC and keep its

constitutional name Republic of Macedonia in place.

Overall the situation as described leaves us with fundamental facts that should allow FYR to

maintain its constitutional name in the face of GRC objections. Systemically, that the international

community, in the form of UN-backed Interim Protocols, and the ICJ ruling against GRC, have taken

the teeth out of any diplomatic or political reprisals GRC could feasibly use to attempt to persuade

FYR to conform to GRC demands. GRC can no longer raise an embargo against FYR as it did in 1994,

or block FYR accession to EU, or NATO membership as it attempted up until 2011. In addition, sub-

systemic domestic conditions within FYR do not conform with any intrinsic need to redefine the

nations cultural heritage. Indeed such an operation would likely do more internal harm than good to

FYR, perhaps even opening domestic schisms leading to the attempted secession of FYR’s large

Albanian ethnic group. The current political crisis does not stem from problems with FYR cultural

identity as Macedonians, but purely political differences between two large parties with polarizing
32 Smith, Helena, and Patrick Kingsley. "Macedonian PM open to dialogue on name dispute to end 24-year row with
Greece." The Guardian. December 16, 2015. Accessed April 25, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/16/macedonia-open-to-changing-its-name-to-end-24-year-dispute-with-
greece.
platforms. Combined, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of the paper is easily

answered. The FYR should not concede to GRC demands, and retain the use of its constitutional name

“Republic of Macedonia”.
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